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ABSTRACT  
Significant criminological attention has been given to the relationship between 
immigration and crime. However, this relationship has not been researched in 
the UK to any great extent, and consequently the information on the UK 
context is limited. This research investigates how the criminality of foreign 
nationals have been constructed by examining the nature of immigration 
policy, foreign criminality discourses, and the media in the UK to understand 
how crime in particular has been used to define, refine, and inform control of 
immigrants.  
This study refers to the legislative, policy, and political factors that underpin 
this process, and particularly explains how immigration policy and political 
debates have emphasised the criminality of foreign nationals in the UK. In 
order to achieve these goals, this research reviews a brief history of British 
immigration policy and legislation and outlines the connections made 
between foreign nationals and non-immigration criminal offences. In addition, 
secondary data from different British institutions and data collected via the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 have been used to illustrate the level of 
foreigners’ criminality as well as the type of crimes compared to the British 
representation. Finally, Parliamentary debates and related political discourses 
have been used to examine the role of politics has in reinforcing the 
relationship between foreign nationals and crime and elevating negative 
public sentiment and the relationship with media reports.  
This research highlights the limitations of existing data relating to the 
criminality of foreign nationals in offending records in England and Wales, 
partly due to the disorganised recording of offender nationality. This study 
reveals that nationality is the new racism; whilst immigration has become a 
central focus in political and public discourses on crime they as a group in 
statistical terms exhibit low levels of offending but are more likely to be 
imprisoned for less serious crimes.  
The relationship between foreign nationals and crimes is thus a political issue 
rather than a legal one. As such, foreign nationals supposed criminality has 
been used to control immigration, avoid the blame of failing policies, gain 
electoral votes, and facilitate changes in immigration and crime policies. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
 Background of the study  
‘The perception of a high rate of criminality among foreigners has often 
emerged in western world, especially in the nations in which the immigration 
rate has been particularly high’ (Solivetti, 2011, p 18) 
Human have always been nomadic creatures, but boundaries and borders 
have not always been a part of human life.  However, the progress of 
civilisation and the eventual establishment of nation states gradually brought 
with it, restrictions on free movement and the arrival of newcomers (Anderson 
et al., 2011).  
Historically, foreign nationals have been represented as external pressures 
on demographic, health, the economy, and crimes (Warner, 2005, Swift, 
2002, Jones, 2013). The increase numbers of foreign nationals within a 
country, and the economic success they achieve, can be seen as some of the 
early motivations for complains against them and moves to link their 
presence to various kinds of illegal activities (Panayi, 2010, Layton-Henry, 
1992). Consequently, foreign nationals from different ethnicities and religions 
(with different levels) have been stereotyped as criminals (Swift, 1997, Smith, 
2009) and overrepresented in Criminal Justice System (CJS) statistics, which 
has exacerbated negative public sentiments that connects the rise in Foreign 
National Prisoners (FNPs) with the increasing population of newcomers 
(Banks, 2011).    
The USA saw the first empirical studies on the relationship between 
immigrants and crimes. The earliest American studies concluded a positive 
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connection between immigration and crimes when they compared criminals’ 
population of foreign and native born in the prisons with general population of 
foreign and native born (Hart, 1896). Hart (1896) proved methodological 
errors in the old studies, and found a negative relationship when he 
demonstrated the large number of native born prisoners in the Northern 
States prisons comparing to foreign-born prisoners. Subsequent empirical 
studies have mostly found a negative relationship between immigration and 
crime through using different measures such as the proportion of foreign 
nationals in prisons (Hourwich, 1912, Abbott., 1916, Claghorn, 1918), or the 
crime level and type of crime committed (Lee et al., 2000, Martinez  and lee, 
2000, Lee et al., 2001, Camarota and Vaughan, 2009).  
In the UK, the political, public and media representation of the relationship 
between foreign nationals and non-immigration criminal offences has been of 
recent concern to academics (Al-Faris, 2010). However, these studies are 
limited in scope, either by their data or by their review of the literature review. 
Some UK research has examined the relationship between foreign nationals’ 
criminality and the nature of criminal offences from an economic perspective 
(Bell et al., 2010, Papadopoulos, 2010, Bell and Machin, 2011). Others 
(Banks, 2011, Bhui, 2007, Bhui, 2009a) have looked at the 
overrepresentation of FNPs in British prisons from a criminological 
perspective.  
Banks (2011) and Bhui (2009a) have summarised the reasons behind the 
overrepresentation of FNPs in England and Wales (E&W); the high 
population of foreign nationals in the UK, their economic situation leading 
them to engage in particular crimes like drugs and fraud, the long sentences 
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they receive, and finally, the discrimination in how they are treated by the 
legal system.  
Increases in the population of FNPs have caused many scholars from across 
the world to analyse the reasons behind their overrepresentation in offending 
data. Scholars vary in the emphasis they place on economic, social, and 
discriminatory factors to explain this overrepresentation (Butcher and Piehl, 
1998, Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999, Papadopoulos, 2010, Simon, 2005, 
Williams, 2000).  
However, there are many difficulties preventing the findings of such studies 
being applied on a larger scale. For instance, there are differences in the 
foreign nationals’ characteristics, the different methods that have been used 
to clarify the foreign nationals-crime nexus, and just who is foreign national. 
Hagan and Palloni (1999), Miller and Gibson (2011), Wu, Sun, and Smith 
(2010), and Veen, Stevens, Doreleijers, and Vollebergh (2011) have looked 
at different ethnicities of foreign origin in different countries and compared 
them to the criminal behaviour of the indigenous population. In short, the 
findings varied due to the different methodologies used and the variety of 
different ethnicities in different countries.   
Although the existing literature would seem to suggestion some general 
reasons for the relationship between FNPs and immigration, this research 
intends to look more deeply at the basis of foreign nationals’ criminality it will 
do this by acknowledging the different characteristics among foreigners, and 
comparing them to the majority indigenous population. However, one 
important factor has been ignored by previous studies, the application of 
immigration policy that determines the legal status, obligations, and rights of 
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foreigners and how different systems and measures are used to achieve its 
aims. Treating all foreign nationals as one homogenous group without 
acknowledging these differences would affect the validity of the outcomes of 
research.  In addition, there is confusion in defining just who immigrants are, 
and whether immigration policy, political discourse, and different 
governmental institutions are using the same definitive frameworks. As such, 
the next section will clarify the different meanings and definitions of 
immigrants, in order to understand different studies and their varied 
outcomes, and to give greater clarity to the subject of this research.    
 Who is an immigrant? 
The first challenge when looking at the relationship between immigration and 
crime is how to define immigrant, and whether there even is a single clear 
definition at all. In 1998, the United Nations defined international migration 
(long-term) (United Nations, 1998 , p 18, para 36) as:  
‘a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence 
for a period of at least a year (12 months) so that the country of destination 
effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence’ 
The United Nations (1998 p18, para 37) defined short-term migrants as: 
‘persons who move to a country other than that of their usual residence for a 
period of at least 3 months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases 
where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits 
to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage’ 
The above definitions seem to be very general and as such do not provide 
precise criteria to identify who should be considered immigrants and who 
should not. For example, Does the term immigrant mean foreign born, foreign 
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nationals, those who does not hold British passport, those who are titled to 
immigration regulation, and does the term immigrant still apply for first 
generation who have been naturalised?  
Therefore, immigration policy in different parts of the world has interpreted its 
own definition to clarify the meaning of immigrant. In addition, the wide and 
diverse perception of the meaning of immigrant made different governmental 
institutions and national surveys putting their own definitions as well. This 
clearly impacts on the ability to produce comparative studies of the 
phenomenon of immigration across different countries. Furthermore, the 
study of immigration impact and issues related to immigration in a single 
country that does not acknowledge different meanings and definitions will 
also be problematic in terms of the collection and analysis of data, as the next 
section of this chapter will demonstrate. 
1.2.1 Immigration policy and the definition of immigrants 
As has been mentioned above, the absence of a universal definition for 
immigrant, alongside the sovereign power for every country to define who 
should be considered as foreign or indigenous has produced different 
interpretations of the word ‘immigrant’. For example, although USA 
immigration policy considers every child born on its land as an American 
(Sergot et al., 1986, Bauer et al., 2001), since 1983 when the Nationality Act 
1981 came into force, British immigration policy removed a similar 
mechanism and requires children to have British parents or grandparents. 
These two different policies affect the meaning of immigrant in research; 
American studies mostly define immigrant based on place of birth, rather than 
lineage. Using the same methodology in a UK context would lead to different 
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outcomes, as not all native born are British and vice versa. Furthermore, US 
immigration policy distinguishes between immigrant and non-immigrant inflow 
according to the intention of spending time in America or the purpose of visit 
(Marron, 2006). British immigration policy considers every non-British entrant 
to the UK as an immigrant1. 
1.2.1 Political discourses and the definition of immigrants  
There are numerous historical examples of the criminality of immigrants 
entering the national discourse; however, every time foreigners have been 
represented differently and mostly connected to different ethnicity.   
Between the 1950s and 1980s, the foreign nationals were linked to ethnic 
minority categories; therefore anti-immigration discourse were combined with 
Black and Asian Minority Ethnic (BAME) discourses (Pettigrew, 1998).  At the 
time when the public sentiments and the media were opposed to non-white, 
foreign nationals and immigration policy was linked with every clash or issue 
between white and non-white communities. There were therefore many 
appeals from politicians to follow a ‘closed door’ policy to foreigners because 
of their ‘violence’ and their connection to crime (Travers, 1999, Small and 
Solomos, 2006, Smith, 2008b).  
During the 1980s and 1990s, when the population of the asylum seekers and 
refugees had increased significantly, the relationship between immigration 
and crimes was expressed through a linkage between asylum seekers/ 
refugees and immigration crimes. At that time, the political focus was on 
linking immigration crime to bogus asylum seekers and connecting the 
                                                 
1
 However, Some British passport holder who are living abroad are controlled by the 
immigration regulations GOV.UK (2014). Types of British nationality London 
https://www.gov.uk/,  
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increase of asylum seeker population to negative impact on social policy and 
welfare benefit (Calavita, 2005, Bosworth and Guild, 2008b).   
However, post 2006 FNPs scandal, when over 1000 FNPs released from 
prison without considering their cases for deportation and resulted in the 
resignation of the Home Secretary, ‘foreign nationals’ was the most used 
term within the discourses of deportation predominating in parliamentary 
debates and other political arenas (6th Report of the Public Accounts 
Committee of the House of Commons, 2006). The subsequent discourses of 
the population of European citizens in the UK post 2004 have also been 
influential but the focus has remained on foreign nationals.  
1.2.2 National surveys and the definition of immigrants  
The different surveys that have collected the data on immigration have used 
different methods according to the aim of gathering these data and the 
definitions they are using to identify their sample. Immigrants have been 
presented differently under different categories like foreign nationals, foreign 
born, British passport holder, or country of origin.  
For example, the International Passenger Survey (IPS) has defined 
immigrants as ‘those who entering (or leaving) for an intended period of at 
least a year, after at least a year aboard (or in Britain)’ (Hatton, 2005, p 721). 
IPS counted as immigrant every newcomer who does not have a British 
passport and sometimes those who have not been born in the UK,  thus, 
there is a possibility that some individuals of dual nationalities are counted 
twice, which has confused the result and led to a total percentage of over 100 
(Office for National Statistics, 2012b).  
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Another example of two national surveys Labour Force Survey (LFS)2 and 
Annual Population Survey (APS)3; those two surveys have different aims and 
methods of collecting their data, which eventually will result in variation in the 
data and confusion of determining the population of immigrants in the UK 
(Office for National Statistics, 2011, 2012a). Moreover, the different methods 
by the different national surveys will result in variation in the data, referring 
mostly to foreign-born data to represent immigrants and mixing the latter term 
with statistical data by nationality.  
There is a serious implication of not distinguishing between cases, or 
depending on foreign-born data to represent immigrants, when most of 
foreign nationals are foreign born; some native born individuals are foreign 
nationals according to the Nationality Act 1981. At the same time, many of 
foreign-born have British citizenship and are therefore no longer considered 
as foreign. Hence, mixing the two terms confuses the outcome of different 
research, with some referring to immigrants as foreign-born and vice versa 
(Rienzo and Vargas-Silva, 2013).  
Finally, the definition of immigrant used in this research is consistent with the 
National Archives definition of ‘alien’: ‘An alien is a person present in a country 
who is not a citizen of that country’ (The National Archives). Hence, the subject 
of this research (an immigrant) is a person who does not hold British 
citizenship, and instead is either a foreign citizen or stateless.  
                                                 
2
 LFS is a household survey of the employment circumstances of the UK population, the sample 
of this survey is conducted with up to three hundred thousand homes.  
3
 APS is a combined survey of households in Great Britain. Its purpose is to provide information 
on key social and socioeconomic variables between the 10-yearly censuses, with particular 
emphasis on providing information relating to sub-regional (local authority) areas. 
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1.2.3 The implication of adapting different definitions and the subject of this 
study  
Looking at different definitions of immigrants and the subsequent methods of 
collecting immigration data brings many advantages, such as giving a clear 
idea about what sort of immigrant the research is focused on, as well as also 
displaying the vague meaning of most political and media debates evaluating 
the impact of immigrants in the UK.  
There are two implications on adopting different definitions in different 
immigration policies. Firstly, immigration policy plays a significant role not 
only in determining the meaning of immigrant, but also in influencing studies 
focused on the impact of immigrants, and their relationship with different 
economic, social, and legal issues in their host countries. Secondly, 
comparative studies concerning immigration should acknowledge the 
differences in applied immigration policies. The outcomes of different 
empirical studies in different countries will be influenced by the difference in 
immigration policy therein, and this should be kept in mind when considering 
their findings. 
In addition, the nature of the relationship between foreign nationals and the 
CJS will therefore be affected, due to the differential foreign national 
populations depending on the different methods and categories that national 
surveys have used. Table 1.1 (in Appendix 2) illustrates the practical 
difference between the population of foreign-born and foreign nationals, the 
considerable differences in the population between the two categories is 
resulted an exaggeration in the impact of immigrants (foreign nationals) have 
on British society and elevate negative public sentiments.   
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The issue is further confused by debates in immigration policy in relation to 
EU and non-EU citizens, despite neither of these being British. The concept 
of ‘foreignness’ in relation to these two groups is quite different, and EU 
citizens are afforded more freedom to enter, live and work in the UK, whereas 
non-EU citizens face significant social and economic barriers. Thus, it is 
important to recognise that ‘non-British’ is not a single group, but one that can 
be differentiated at a range of levels.  
 Motivations for this study  
The relationship between immigration and crime is a controversial topic, 
especially with the lack of data in research (Bhui, 2009a). There is a Western 
concern in regard to the level of criminality that foreign nationals demonstrate 
in Western countries, and the different types of illegal activities that foreigners 
are more likely to get prison sentences.  Despite the wealth of research and 
the various theories that have been applied to explain the overrepresentation 
of foreign nationals in crimes, which have focused on structural and cultural 
factors, as well as discrimination against foreign nationals in different stages 
of the legal process. However, the fluctuation and change in the prison 
population still needs more explanation. The main motivation for this research 
comes from a desire to examine important factors that have a significant 
impact on the overrepresentation of foreigners in statistical data on offending, 
and to interrogate the oft-repeated political discourses that focus on ‘foreigner 
criminals’. The broad literature review conducted shows a clear lack of a 
comprehensive framework regarding the link between foreign nationals and 
non-immigration criminal offences in the UK, which motivated this research to 
contribute to the migration and criminological studies.  
- 11 - 
 
 Aims and objectives  
The purpose of this study is not to simply critique others for their oversights, 
but to develop a new, empirically based, theoretical framework of analysis 
that will persuade criminologists to think in a new direction. The main aim of 
this study is to provide a criminological understanding of the links between 
foreign nationals and non-immigration criminal offences. The research argues 
that consistent criminalisation of foreign nationals, including linking foreigners 
to different crimes and blaming them for many issues in this country, which 
the immigration policy and the oft-repeated political discourses show, affects 
the representation of those foreigners in the CJS. In addition, there are tough 
numerous crime policies, some of which result in a significant negative impact 
on the relationship between foreign nationals and the CJS. To achieve the 
aims of this research the objectives are as follows:  
1. Review the extant empirical and theoretical studies related to change in immigration 
policy and how foreign nationals have been connected historically to different issues 
including crimes  
 
2. Identify the ‘methods of blame’ which the political, public discourses and media have 
used to represent the relationship between foreign nationals and non-immigration 
criminal offences  
 
3. Determine how the role of immigration policy, political discourse and the media in 
constructing foreign criminality.  
 
4. Identify the challenges and barriers to collecting and publishing data in regards to 
the nationality of offenders.   
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5.  Recommend possible ways of addressing the identified findings within immigration 
policy and the construction of foreign criminality  
 
 Research questions  
This research will consider the extensive literature, reviewing both 
immigration policy and criminological aspects of the relationship between 
foreign nationals and crimes in E&W, and identifying the gap in the previous 
studies, particularly in the UK context. The research intends to answer the 
following questions in order to achieve the mentioned objectives: 
1. Why there is a wide perception of a relationship between foreign nationals and 
crime in the UK?  
• Are foreign nationals more criminalised than British Nationals?  
• Are foreign nationals subject to stereotyping and/or a target of discrimination?  
2. What is the historical basis of the relationship between foreign nationals and 
crime in the UK? 
• When did the criminalisation of foreigners started?  
• What are the factors that helped to raise the criminality of foreigners?  
• What was the public attitude to foreign nationals? 
 
3. What was the role of immigration policy, which has been adopted by different 
ruling political parties?  
• What was the influence of the Labour party on the criminalisation policy of 
foreign nationals?  
• Was there any difference when the Coalition Government came to power in 
2010?  
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• How has immigration policy helped to enhance the construction of foreign 
criminality, or obligated some foreign nationals to commit different sorts of crimes?   
   
4. How can the overrepresentation of foreign nationals in British prisons be 
explained?  
• Are foreign nationals more likely to commit crimes than British nationals?  
• What sorts of crimes foreign nationals are more likely to commit?  
• Are foreign nationals targeted in the CJS institutions, and why? 
 
5. How has the relationship between foreign nationals and crime discussed in 
the political and parliamentary debates, and what are the implications?  
 Data and Methodology  
This research looks at how measures of immigration and crime policies, and 
related legislation, directly and indirectly impacts on the criminal behaviour 
that foreign nationals display in E&W and if those foreigners present a real 
threat to British society. 
The idea of looking at the relationship between foreign nationals and crime in 
the context of social constructivism and immigration policy was one that 
arose out of an initial duality of research interests: (1) New immigrants and 
their impact on present-day immigration policy (2), Historical immigration 
policy. What seemed at the start to be two quite separate fields of interest 
came to gradually appear more closely connected. In particular, the study of 
present day immigrants and immigration policy implications demand a 
historical perspective. 
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This research considers the impact of immigration policy on enhancing 
debates relating to foreign national criminalisation. It does so by both 
reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature and by providing an 
extensive evidence base for the UK. Offending data that includes the 
nationality of those people caught up in the CJS has been collected from 
different sources, including different government institutions, and national 
surveys, as well as Freedom of Information (FOI) requests to the Home 
Office, Metropolitan Police Services (MPS), Ministry of Justice (MoJ), and 
UKVI. These secondary data have been analysed in order to illustrate the 
level of criminality that foreign nationals demonstrate in E&W, the type of 
criminal offences those foreigners are imprisoned, resulting in a comparison 
of these results with British nationals’ criminal behaviour and representation 
in the CJS statistics. 
Although this research is not explicitly focused on the expansion of 
immigration crimes, presenting insight into this helps illustrate the general 
tendency of the government to criminalise foreign nationals, and connect 
them to different illegal activities. This will ultimately feed negative public 
sentiment and perpetuate the stereotyping of foreigners as criminal. 
In addition, the general themes of the parliamentary debates and the related 
political discourses have been gathered from a time period of 2001-2014. 
This has facilitated an analysis of the political language and the impact of the 
political focus on the criminality of foreign nationals in the UK. Finally, the 
outcomes of these two methods have brought into dialogue with another in 
order to produce a logical conceptual framework for interpreting the 
relationship between the criminal offences of foreign nationals and the 
remainder of the offending population.    
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 Overview of the research plan  
This research has used the restrictive immigration policy and foreign 
criminality discourses as main variables to examine foreigners’ criminality. In 
doing so, it begins by looking at the historical context of immigration policy 
and its influence on encouraging or discouraging different nationalities to 
settle in the UK. The literature has also shown how foreign nationals have 
been linked with different issues. It provides a background for analysing 
foreign national offenders and their relationship with criminal offences. The 
literature review also considers other aspects, such as how different political 
parties have changed crime policy when in government between 1997 and 
2014.  A methodology chapter that outlines the methodological approach 
taken in this research follows the literature review. Two chapters describing 
and analysing the collected data follow this. A discussion chapter then 
presents an evaluation of the findings and analysis of data; before a final 
chapter concludes, this research findings and limitations (see Table 1.2). 
Table 1.2: Research plan Navigation  
Chapter  Description  
Introduction  Chapter (1) outlines the background of this research, explains the 
definitional challenge of immigrant, explains the aim, objectives, and 
research questions, and presents an overview of the data and methodology 
and the research’s plan.  
Literature 
review   
Chapter (2) looks at the historical background of foreign’ criminality from 
12
th
 century -1997, and includes three case studies explaining the 
construction of foreign criminality in different times; 19
th
 century (Irish), the 
first half of 20
th
 century (Jews), and the second half of 20
th
 century (BAME) 
- 16 - 
 
Chapter (3) looks at the immigration and crime policies at two different 
governments: the Labour 1997-2010 and the Coalition (2010-2015). This 
chapter includes the final case study that explains how political discourses, 
immigration policy and the media constructed the criminality of asylum 
seekers.  
Theory  Chapter (4) incorporates social constructivism theory to foreign criminality 
in order to explain how the criminality of foreign nationals constructed by 
immigration-crime policies, political and parliamentary debates, the media 
and CJS data.    
Methodology  Chapter (5) shows the research aim and strategy, which includes the 
secondary (numerical) data and the parliamentary debates. This chapter 
also shows the challenges that changed the focus of this research 
completely and obligated the researcher to follow an alternative plan.  
Data and 
analysis  
Chapter (6) presents the statistical representation of foreign nationals in the 
different stages of the CJS and analyses this data to explain the different 
trends in FNP population, and the sorts of crimes they are imprisoned for. 
Chapter (7) presents foreign criminality discourses in the Westminster Hall, 
discusses the implication of the anti-immigration debates in the English 
parliament and shows how foreign criminality discourses change 
immigration and crime policies, CJS practise and relatively the public 
attitude.  
Discussion  Chapter (8) evaluates the findings of this research (the history review, 
secondary data, and the parliamentary debates) and presents a developed 
understanding of the reasons behind the over criminalisation and the 
overrepresentation of foreign nationals in the political debates, offending 
data and punishment institutions 
Conclusion  Chapter (9) presents an over view of the whole research; it shows the 
- 17 - 
 
contribution of this research and the limitation, and finally puts some 
recommendations and future studies.  
Appendix 1  The refusal letters of National Offender Management Service (NOMS) to 
make interviews with FNPs inside prisons. 
Appendix 2  Tables of this research  
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Chapter 2 The historical background of linking foreign 
nationals to non-immigration criminal offences  
 
‘The claims that the current developments are new or without precedent…are 
mostly not supported by extensive knowledge of migrations in the past’ 
(Lucassen and Lucassen, 2009 quoted in Anderson, 2013, p 12) 
The exaggeration of exploring immigrants’ criminality and their dangerous 
impact is not a new phenomenon it influenced by the vulnerable position of 
these foreigners in Western countries. Foreign nationals have been 
considered as an easy target during economic crises and can be blamed for 
creating problems.  
This chapter will explore the temporal aspects of constructing the criminality 
of foreign nationals and connecting them to different non-immigration criminal 
offences in order to understand the background to this issue and track the 
historical role of immigration policy and political debates in the construction of 
immigrant criminality. The historical journey this chapter takes will shed some 
light on the economic and social restrictions placed on foreign nationals’ 
activities, and the role of public sentiment and media coverage in connecting 
foreign nationals to non-immigration criminal offences. In other words, the 
historical background will attempt to establish some answers for questions 
such as: 
1. From what period did foreign nationals begin to be linked to non-immigration criminal 
offences? What was its purpose?  
2. Did foreign nationals show more criminality than the indigenous population? 
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3. What evidence has been used to support the relationship between foreign nationals 
and crime?  
4. How have government and immigration policy contributed to constructing foreign 
criminality?  
5. What was the role of public attitude, and how has it been formed? 
6. How has British immigration policy developed to encourage/discourage the 
criminality of foreign nationals to serve different motivations?  
7. What role has the media played in constructing foreign nationals’ criminality?  
 Immigration discipline and the early criminalisation of ‘aliens’ 
Those engaged in research on immigration policy and the historical 
background of immigration issues have the difficult task of knowing precisely 
where to start. Therefore, this chapter does not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive historical account; rather, it takes specific events and periods 
to illustrate the abiding relationship made between foreign nationals and 
alleged criminality. 
2.1.1 The beginnings of the criminalisation of foreign nationals  
Foreign nationals have been encouraged for centuries to come and settle in 
England in order to meet demographic and economic demands. For example, 
during the 12th century Jews were encouraged by the Crown to enter the 
country and to assist in running the fiscal matters of the Kingdom (Harper and 
Constantine, 2010, Wilson, 1970, Bevan, 1986 , Skinner, 2003). Other foreign 
nationals were formally encouraged to revolutionize the English economy by 
importing and teaching technical skills to indigenous population. Edward III 
opened the door for skilled workers to enhance the cloth industry in the 14th 
century (Bevan, 1986 ). Although foreign workers made a positive 
contribution to English industries and general economic wellbeing, an 
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unrestricted open door immigration policy led to a negative public attitude 
regarding foreign nationals’ overrepresentation in the economic sector. It was 
during this period that the first records are made of the concern over foreign 
nationals taking English Jobs.  
The negative sentiment against foreign nationals and especially against Jews 
increased during the 12th century. There were violent attacks on Jewish 
communities, which resulted in butcheries. Consequently, in 1290, Pope 
Edward I dislodged all Jews from England, although they were later 
readmitted from the 1650s (Harper and Constantine, 2014, Wilson, 1970, 
Bevan, 1986 ). 
Wilson (1970), argued that fear of the other and religious factors were the 
real motivations behind anti-Semitism, rather than economic competition, 
particularly in relation to employment. However, religious differences between 
foreign nationals and the indigenous population may not have been the 
reason for hatred and fear; Bevan (1986 ) shows that the economic success 
of foreign nationals was the most important factor in fuelling negative 
sentiments towards them. For example, the fear of foreign nationals 
continued in subsequent centuries with a different race and motivation. 
During the 13th and 14th centuries, Italians had achieved far broader business 
success in England than the Jews had. In 1463, the Importation Act 
prohibited the import of a ‘long list of manufactured articles’ mostly 
manufactured by Italian industries. This competed with the Papal economic 
oppression, which came alongside negative racial stereotypes of the Latin 
character: futility, lying and wiliness (Wyatt, 2005, Wilson, 1970).  
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The Importation Act, which was an Act of the Parliament of England passed 
during the reign of Edward IV (Cunningham, 1890), stands as the first official 
policy to use the construction of foreign nationals criminality to control the 
economic activities of foreigners.  
Negative sentiments against foreign nationals continued to be motivated by 
economic factors in the 15th century, rather than being founded in race or 
religion. This was due to the success of foreigners at the expense of native 
workers, who mostly did not have the same skills or had not learnt from 
foreign national tradesmen and merchants (Bevan, 1986 ). As the preamble 
to a statute of Richard III in 1483 noted, strangers would:  
 ‘not take upon them any laborious Occupation, as going to Plough and Cart, 
and other like business…and will in no wise suffer nor take any of the king’s 
subjects to work with them’ with the result that subjects ‘for lack of Occupation, 
fall into idleness, and be Thieves, Beggars, Vagabonds, and people of vicious 
living…’ (Pickering, 1763, p 14, Cunningham, 1890, p 388, Bevan, 1986 , p 52).  
Richard III’s immigration control statute referred to the negative role 
‘strangers’ took in society; foreign nationals were taking scarce jobs and did 
not employ locals, but were clannish. In consequence, natives were ‘forced’ 
to engage in violence and criminal activities because of unemployment and 
their poor economic situation. Richard III’s statute made it clear that there 
was an indirect relationship between foreign nationals and crime; foreign 
nationals monopolising non-dirty jobs and their economic success elevated 
the negative public and royal (political) sentiments, and for the first time the 
relationship between foreign nationals and crime was used to inform Law.  
The relationship between foreign nationals and crime thus helped to create a 
restrictive immigration policy; Richard III reacted to the negative public 
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attitude and restricted the economic activities of foreign workers. For 
example, foreign nationals were obliged to live with native merchants, 
administrate their commerce under native management and could only work 
as servants for citizens (Bevan, 1986 , Anderson, 2013).  
Moreover, the hate filled sentiments, which were accompanied by physical 
attacks and riots against foreign nationals in London in 1456, 1457 and 1517, 
saw the eviction of some foreigners from certain cities (Bevan, 1986 , Ross, 
1983, Fryde, 1983). These were followed by a band of Navigation Laws, 
starting in 1651, which restricted the use of foreign shipping to trade only 
between England and its colonies, and restricted foreign business to British 
merchants (Reeves, 1792, Ransom, 1968).  
2.1.2 Welcoming refugees and connecting them to crime 
Following the reformation in England and other parts of Europe, England was 
forced to adopt a more ‘open door’ immigration policy. This was to allow other 
followers of the Protestant doctrine to escape from the persecution being 
waved over by the Catholic church (Bevan, 1986 , Weir, 2011). This section 
will show how the change in religious primacy has affected immigration 
policy, and how the new foreign nationals (refugees) been criminalised and 
linked to different illegal activities.  
2.1.2.1 From Catholic to Protestant doctrine: England has changed  
The 16th century saw big changes in religious trends and consequently a new 
element – the plight of religious refugees – in the admission of foreign 
nationals into the country. The holder of Crown now had the power to admit 
foreigners more than any time before. The religious leaning of King Henry VIII 
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attracted Catholics in his earlier reign, but he later offered protection to 
European Protestants (Bevan, 1986 ).  
The big religious shift in the Henry VIII era contributed to accepting Protestant 
asylum later. Henry VIII is known for his role in the separation of the Church 
of England from the Roman Catholic Church after his decision to divorce 
Catherine of Aragon. Thus, Henry's struggles with Rome led to the separation 
of the Church of England from papal authority, the Dissolution of the 
Monasteries, and his own establishment as the Supreme Head of the Church 
of England. Yet he remained a believer in core Catholic theological teachings, 
even after his excommunication from the Roman Catholic Church (Weir, 
2011). 
However, during the rule of Mary Stuart (who took the country back to the 
Catholic religion), Protestant aliens were unwelcomed people, and French 
non-residents were removed (although they were later allowed to return 
under the sovereignty of Elizabeth I, who followed the Anglican Church). Her 
reign had seen a continued arrival of different refugees from Holland, France 
and Huguenots (French Protestant). Thus began the receiving of refugees 
into the UK from other states (Frow, 1997, Kreis, 2010 , Anderson, 2013).  
2.1.2.2 Criminalising the newcomers (refugees)  
The majority of refugees who came to the UK during the 16th century were 
poor, unemployed, had language barriers, and lived in their own separate 
religious communities. This created problems, especially as these foreign 
nationals competed with locals for the available jobs. Subsequently, negative 
attitudes developed with foreigners being seen as untruthful and unprincipled 
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people. Again, it was claimed that indigenous people were being forced to 
commit crimes because of the lack of economic opportunities (Bevan, 1986 ). 
The open door policies of Henry VIII and his daughter Elizabeth I to religious 
refugees, along with the provision of a place of safety and protection, gave 
foreign nationals the ability to work. This situation did not please British 
merchants who sent many petitions to the Crown Lessor explaining the 
negative economic impact of foreign nationals on their income. These 
petitions included accusations against foreign national  workers of committing 
property and violent crimes, and resorting to idleness. 
In consequence, the open door immigration policy and the right to work freely 
in England by foreign nationals were changed to be more restrictive. For 
example, foreign nationals who were openly hostile to the English local 
population because of religious or public order implications, were entitled to 
be deported whatever their economic impact in their area (Reeves, 1792, 
Bevan, 1986 ). Moreover, foreign workers banned from working in certain 
industries and suffered a withdrawal of the full rights of denization.4 This 
policy might be the basis of abolishing the right to work for asylum seekers 
suspected to be motivated by economic factors, rather than seeking safety 
(see Chapter 3).  
The Immigration Act by Richard III in 1483 was revitalized and adjusted by 
Henry VIII whereby foreign nationals were forbidden to take non-British 
trainees, or keep approximately two foreign servants. Moreover, the local 
wardens and bailiffs were given the power to monitor and supervise foreign 
nationals’ activities (Roche, 1969). This policy has been repeated, as Chapter 
                                                 
4
 Denization is an old process in English Common Law, starting from the 13th century, by which 
a foreigner became a denizen, gaining some privileges of a British subject, including the right to 
hold English land, through letters patent. 
- 25 - 
 
3 will show, in the Immigration Act 2014. This recruited the service institutions 
and local people to monitor and check for legal status to determine if foreign 
nationals are committing any sort of immigration crime.  
Historically, foreign nationals were accused of committing criminal offences 
and blamed for causing different economic and social issues at the time when 
those foreigners were using their own skills and working to create wealth and 
promote the English economy. Professor William Arthur Lewis has explained 
why immigrants were successful and how this has elevated the negative 
sentiments and the violence against them sometimes; the culture of 
immigrants are different, in the time when immigrants are able to work for 
most of the day for six days a week, as they knew their efforts and 
hardworking is the only way to succeed. It follow also that such groups are 
clannish. They preferred to hire they own people for their job because they 
knew from better experience that the locals surrounded them do not have 
what the success business requires. Competing with aliens was too hard as 
natives were not able to understand what business takes. In addition, aliens’ 
methods of learning that would be training their youngsters in other people’s 
business raised the negative attitudes towards them until they erupted in 
violent outbursts in the second half of the 19th century (Plant, 1970, p xiii). 
Thus, it would appear that jealousy regarding economic success is an 
important factor in explaining the historical root of criminalising foreign 
nationals.  
2.1.3 The national security threat and the right of seeking asylum 
By the end of the 18th century, manufacturing development and the high 
demand on labour capital contributed to modify the public and political 
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attitude to foreign nationals, largely due to the positive impact foreigners were 
seen to be having on world trade. However, during the conflict between 
Britain and France, the fear of political and military subversion directed the 
sights again towards foreign nationals, especially those asylum seekers from 
France, who were suspected to be a threat on British national security (see 
for example, Aliverti, 2013a).  
After the French Revolution and during the Napoleonic wars, the introduction 
of the Aliens Act 1793 was arguably the birth of current immigration law. The 
1793 Act aimed to protect the public from those who were seen as dangerous 
threat to the British public, especially radical troublemakers and refugees or 
foreign nationals who came from France. The Act gave the authorisation to 
remove the suspected persons (Ferch, 1978, Aliverti, 2013a). At the same 
time, the AA 1793 and the parliamentary debates in 1798 restricted entry and 
did not provide protection for refugees and asylum seekers; exactly those 
groups who suffered from persecution and harassment in France (Ferch, 
1978).  
The large population of foreign nationals consisting of refugees led to a wide 
range of debates in 1848. In response to fears of internal rebellion, 
particularly from undesirable foreign nationals, a new Bill was introduced. 
Essentially, the Bill was based on the fear of abuse of British hospitality by 
some foreign nationals, and therefore new legislation was needed to deport 
undesirable newcomers. The Bill was passed comfortably. It gave the power 
of removal of foreign nationals to Secretary of State in such instances when 
he believed it would benefit the peace of society (Bevan, 1986 ).  
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However, the mid-19th century period marks the beginning of the modern 
state, and certainly as a period when the labour market finally changed from 
a relatively fixed, local agrarian-based one to a flexible industrial urban-based 
market. At the time, the general parliamentary and public attitude was against 
the open door policy due to conflicts in Eastern and Central Europe, and the 
high number of incoming refugees (Bevan, 1986 ).  
 The industrial revolution and criminalising foreigners  
The industrial revolution, which started in the second half of 18th century, 
influenced immigration policy (which has been shown to be affected by 
economic policy in terms of how immigration might contribute to the national 
economy) and the reception of refugees for humanitarian motives. British 
immigration policy at that time showed an appreciation for foreigners who 
have an economic and technological value and it encouraged them to enter 
Britain (Plant, 1970). This section will look at the economic impact of the 
industrial revolution and the role of foreign nationals. At the same time, it will 
consider how debates around criminalising foreign nationals emerged due to 
the political and public concerns of their economic and social impact on 
British society. Special attention will be directed to Irish migrants as a case 
study of this era.  
2.2.1 Economic impacts and foreign nationals’ criminality  
The first half of the 19th century saw significant changes to British society 
mainly because of the industrial revolution and its impact on British life. The 
need for labour capital affected immigration policy and the open door was 
opened more widely (except in the times of war) especially for British subjects 
or those who has been born in the British territory. Hence, the Alien Act 1793 
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requested only registration from non-enemy aliens upon arrival, although the 
failure to do so might lead to deportation (Halliday, 2010).  
However, later in the 19th century there were large appeals to restrict the 
immigration movement especially those from Eastern Europe (Bevan, 1986 , 
Harper and Constantine, 2014, The National Archives (NA)).  
The open door policy placed restrictions on citizens from enemy countries or 
countries in conflict with England like France; foreign nationals from these 
countries were stereotyped as being ‘dangerous’ and the wide-ranging power 
of the Secretary of State meant many refusals of entry. In addition, suspected 
foreign nationals were detained and examined by magistrates who were able 
to influence the Secretary of State, who in turn had the final say on deporting 
or releasing them (Dinwiddy, 1992). 
By the end of the 19th century, the population of foreign nationals further 
increased due to large numbers of newcomers, mostly persecuted Jews from 
Eastern Europe. The bad economic situation of the newcomers, coupled with 
failing wages caused by the Great Depression in 1889, raised the negative 
public sentiments and political concern to the point where the tightening of 
immigration policy became an urgent necessity (Wilson, 1970).  
During this period, the fear of foreign nationals and their intention to commit 
crimes in the UK fed into public and political concern, especially after bomb 
explosions in Paris linked to refugees in Britain. As a result, the Palmerston 
Government of 1858 introduced the Conspiracy to Murder Bill to criminalise 
those involved in conspiracies (Porter, 2008, p 170). The Bill tried for the first 
time to enforce criminal law as part of immigration law; the existing British law 
on conspiracy made it a misdemeanour, and there was no extradition (Porter, 
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2008, p 176). The implications of the new Bill, which increased penalties and 
the of conviction of conspiracies in England, had been criticised in the UK 
Parliament members who saw the new restrictions on receiving refugees and 
suspecting them to be fleeing to the UK of their crimes, or they have a 
tendency to commit crimes in the UK (See the long argument in the House of 
Commons Hansard, 1858, col 1741-1758).  
Milner Gibson in the House of Commons, had argued the Bill by showing the 
concern of the British reputation in the world if they closed the door in front of 
vulnerable refugees, especially when the investigations and the court has not 
proved the involvement of those foreign nationals who were living in the UK in 
the assassination attempt in Paris (Hansard, 1858, col 1746-1758).  
Ultimately, Palmerston government fell within a month; and some related 
trials of radicals ended without convictions, in the middle of British public 
discontent towards French pressure (Porter, 2008).  
2.2.2 Irish experience: A case study   
At this time, the Irish were the largest foreign group coming to the UK and 
they continued to arrive into Britain from the Irish Sea. By the beginning of the 
19th century, Irish foreign nationals were already a familiar sight in Britain, 
and they were to become the largest, most dispersed and most controversial 
foreign group (Harper and Constantine, 2014).  
2.2.2.1 The characteristics of Irish foreign nationals  
Before the 1841 census, the official statistics of the ethnic minority population 
and foreign nationals in particular were very poor, if valid at all (Jones, 2013). 
Moreover, there was no precise number of Irish foreign nationals, and even 
the estimation of those entering the ports did not distinguish between 
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permanent and temporary arrivals, or between those destined to stay in 
Britain and those intending to move elsewhere via British ports. Moreover, it 
is difficult to use the town-based statistics, as these did not separate ‘Irish’ 
individuals from the wider ‘Catholic’ population, not altogether the same thing 
(Jones, 2013, p 44 , Harper and Constantine, 2014). 
Up to one million Irish settled in Britain during the 19th century, with 
approximately 300,000 arriving during in the ‘famine decade’ of 1845-55. The 
Irish-born population numbered 601,634 in England and Wales in 1861, 3 
percent of the population, and made up as much as 7 percent of Scotland’s 
population in 1851. Between 1876 and 1921, 12 percent of Irish emigrants 
settled in Britain, so that even as late as 1931 the Irish-born population in 
England and Wales totalled 381,089. Although their absolute and relative 
significance declined in 20th century, the Irish-born remained the largest 
minority foreign group in Great Britain until 1971. Eighty percent of post-war 
Irish emigrants went to Britain, mainly to England, with a significant surge in 
the 1950s (Layton-Henry, 1992, p 3, Harper and Constantine, 2014).  
Easy access, ready employment, and higher wages in the world’s first 
industrial economy were the incentives that encouraged many Irish, 
particularly unskilled labourers, to make the short journey to Britain. The Irish 
immigrants in the first half of the 19th century briefly were mostly poor, 
unskilled, insular by choice or necessity, and predominately inhabited the 
industrial and manufacturing cities (Jones, 2013).  
2.2.2.2 Irish population pressure and public negative sentiments  
Having provided a summary of the nature of Irish immigration during this 
period, this part will explore some of the issues and pressures (such as 
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overcrowding, health, drunkenness and economic impact) that were 
associated with foreign nationals from Ireland, which helped establish a 
stereotyped image of Irish immigrants as criminal.  
2.2.2.2.1 Overcrowding 
Britain’s economic and demographic changes during the industrial revolution 
were extraordinary. The population of the UK increased from 10 million in 
1750 to 42 million in 1900. The need for labour and the growing industries, all 
of which were located in the cities, led to large migration from rural areas to 
the big industrialised cities. By 1900, most British people were living in urban 
rather than rural areas (Swift, 1997). The growth of the Irish population in the 
UK raised many debates and in some cases hatred. For example, many 
British people thought that the Irish should never have entered a country of 
Britain’s stature because they were ‘less civilised’ strangers (Jones, 2013).  
2.2.2.2.2  Public health pressures 
Irish people were accused of bringing disease and causing health problems 
among the British population due to their lifestyle and living conditions. 
Subsequently, public and political concerns regarding general health were 
raised and led to legislation such as the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 and 
the 1848 Public Health Act. In addition, many investigations took place in 
order to evaluate the Irish lifestyle and their overall behaviour in the UK 
(Lynch, 1997, Jones, 2013). Irish health problems also brought a lot of 
attention from academic studies that examined the lifestyle and housing 
conditions of the Irish. The low wages that Irish foreign nationals were 
earning played a significant role in determining housing conditions at time 
when many of them were fleeing hunger and death in Ireland (Lynch, 1997). 
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2.2.2.2.3  Labour market pressures  
The low wages that Irish workers achieved contributed to a decline in the 
wages of English workers’, who seeking better pay than the Irish. As a result, 
English workers’ wages decreased in different cities according to some 
reports and statements by politicians (Jones, 1977, Jones, 2013). The public 
blamed the ‘gentlemen of Ireland’ who were transporting Irish employees, 
and the ‘English capitalists’ who were taking advantages of these workers 
and employing them at lower wages. Moreover, the lifestyle of the Irish, who 
were living in very low standard houses and suffering from different diseases 
due to their low income, increased negative public sentiments (MacRalied, 
1999).  
The begging phenomenon, which was seemingly created by the influx of Irish 
foreign nationals, built the impression that the Irish were a burden on the 
British economy. In addition, the large volume of Irish applications for 
financial support (welfare benefit) from different charities and the government 
only added to this perception (Jones, 2013).  
The Poor Law Amendment Act (similar in nature to the current welfare 
system) offered workhouses as a way to limit the application for financial 
support by unemployed people especially the Irish (The National Archives, 
2008). In England and Wales, a workhouse was a place where those unable 
to support themselves were offered accommodation and employment. 
Conditions of poverty, for both foreign nationals and the indigenous 
population were bad, which led to attributing of blame towards the arriving 
Irish. For example, a common feeling during the mid-Victorian time was that 
the Irish were committing more crimes than indigenous population. The 
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substantial growth in Irish foreign nationals, especially those who were poor, 
facilitated the stereotyping of the Irish and their connection with crime, mainly 
due to their levels of hygiene and drinking issues (Swift, 1997).  
2.2.2.2.4  Drunkenness concern  
As above noted, there was visible concern about the Irish in terms of both 
recklessness and fecklessness (although the same concerns were being 
levelled at the indigenous ‘undeserving poor’). Measures to curb these 
alleged characteristics were an integral part of the 1834 Poor Law 
Amendment Act (MacRalied, 1999, Jones, 2013). 
Although commanding low wages, Irish immigrants had a reputation for 
drinking on Saturdays, and the image of them spending their weekly earnings 
in pubs on Saturdays persisted (Jones, 2013). However, Lynch (1997) has 
showed that Irish drunkenness was not different from that of other ethnicities 
or nationalities, and in addition the Irish tended not to drink on work days. In 
relation to their perceived public health issues, because Irish people tended 
inhabit industrial cities it could be argued that the inherent conditions of these 
cities made low levels of hygiene and general health inevitable (Jones, 2013). 
Even so, the Irish lifestyle and their drinking habits mean they were 
associated with other issues such as crime.  
2.2.2.2.5  Crime pressures  
In addressing the construction of Irish migrants as criminals, this section will 
consider the Irish relationship with the police, their representation in prison 
statistics and the reasons that led them to engage in illegal activities.  
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2.2.2.2.5.1 The  Irish migrants and the police  
Generally, the Irish showed less respect for the police, and much was made 
of how their violence was fuelled by alcohol consumption. It could be argued 
that the image of the Irish as out of control criminals was in part due to the 
more passive nature of policing in England, especially in Manchester and 
Lancashire; in Scotland where the police administration was firmer, the Irish 
did not have the same reputation (Swift, 2002).  
In addition, the relationship between Irish immigrants and the police 
(represented by the street brawl that occurred in Wolverhampton) meant their 
behaviour was categorised as anti-police, which increased cultural conflict 
and violence between the Irish and local English, particularly between the 
1870s and 1880s. This might also explain why the Irish were targeted by the 
CJS more than the British were (McManus, 1994).  
2.2.2.2.5.2 The representation of Irish migrants in prison statistics  
Equally, evidence shows that during this period, the Irish were 
overrepresented in prison statistics; the Irish were five times more likely to be 
imprisoned than their English counterparts. In Carlisle gaol in 1861, 23.4 
percent of male prisoners were Irish and 12.6 percent of female prisoners 
were Irish. Ten years later, the figure went down for male prisoners to 18.9 
percent, but increased for Irish female prisoners to 16.6 percent. 
The Irish born male prisoner population was 23.1 percent, with 20.1 percent 
for Irish women in Lancaster gaol late in 1891. In Preston gaol, the Irish-born 
male prison population fell into single figures at 9.2 percent in 1870, while in 
Durham gaol Irish-born prisoners fluctuated between a high of 21.4 percent 
and a low of 12.4 in the second half of the 19th century. 
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The figures show that the Irish were five times more likely to be imprisoned 
than the English, making up 15 percent of all prisoners in 1861 (an index of 
overrepresentation of 4.9), 14 percent in 1871 (5.7), 12 percent in 1881 (5.7), 
8 percent in 1891 (5.3), and 7 percent in 1901 (5.6). Although the general 
Irish population in the UK declined in the second half of the 19th century, 
judicial statistics showed that the Irish were more likely to be convicted and 
imprisoned for breaking the law and committing crimes than British citizens 
(Swift, 1997). The overrepresentation of Irish born individuals in the criminal 
statistics fuelled negative sentiments and used to prove the relationship 
between foreign nationals and crime (Swift, 1997, Swift, 2002).  
In summary, the presence of the Irish in crime statistics is hard to interpret 
fully because the statistics referred only to the Irish-born and did not include 
the second generation born in Britain. This means that the contribution of all 
Irish immigrants to local criminality was probably higher than these figures 
suggest. Moreover, many second and third-generation Irish were designated 
as Roman Catholic, hence the proportions of Catholics in crime statistics 
were higher (Swift, 2002).  
2.2.2.2.5.3 Irish criminality by crime type  
A large proportion of the British public blamed the Irish for the spread of 
prostitution in the UK, and this created a stereotype of the Irish criminal, 
despite several local studies showing that Irish criminals engaged in less 
serious crimes and violent crimes (Swift, 1997).  
The types of crimes that Irish committed were not serious, and most assaults 
were committed while Irish offenders were drunk. Serious crimes that the 
Irish used to commit in Ireland, which required premeditation or was 
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committed by gangs like murder, night attacks on houses and rapes, barely 
ever saw Irish conviction in Britain (Bowman, 2006, Swift, 1997).  
Therefore, despite their reputation and stereotyping, the sort of crimes that 
the Irish commonly committed in the Great Britain were alcohol-related 
violence, and this was mostly among the Irish themselves rather than against 
the indigenous population. There was a tendency for the Irish to use any 
available weapon they found rather than using their fists in their fighting. This 
can explain the high representation of the Irish in criminal statistics relating to 
the consequences of using such weapons in fighting (Swift, 1997, Lynch, 
1997, Bowman, 2006).   
2.2.2.2.6  The reasons for Irish criminality 
In addition to the negative economic situation and the bad relationship with 
the police, there are other explanations for the Irish engaging in crime in the 
UK. These can be found by examining their overrepresentation in prison 
statistics, social and familial relationships, and the racism that the Irish were 
subject to.  
2.2.2.2.6.1 Explaining the overrepresentation of Irish in prison statistics  
The over-representation of Irish offenders in magistrate courts (proportionally 
twice as much as English offenders) and prison statistics enhanced the 
construction of the relationship between Irish foreign nationals and crime. 
However, looking in depth at these statistics reveals another side to the story. 
McManus (1994), found that the majority of Irish offenders in 1861 were 
charged for drunkenness and being drunk and disorderly, the rest were 
charged for minor crimes with very few charged for theft.  
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Evidence thus indicates that the representation of the Irish in the criminal 
statistics was high due to drunkenness, disorderly behaviour, assault 
(including assaults on the police), and to a lesser extent petty theft and 
vagrancy. Generally, at least one-third of all prosecutions in these categories 
in Leeds, York, Manchester, Liverpool and Wolverhampton during the 1850s 
involved Irish people (Lynch, 1997). 
Swift (1997) analysed the overrepresentation of Irish foreign nationals in the 
CJS, and found it disproportionate to their numbers in the community at large. 
He showed that Irish-born individuals were almost three times as likely to 
face prosecution as their English counterparts. Swift thought that the 
overrepresentation in the crime statistics built a stereotype of Irish criminality 
even before the new waves of poor Irish came to the UK during the 1840s 
and 50s.  
Moreover, Swift (2002) has assessed The Report on the State of the Irish 
Poor in Great Britain, parliamentary Papers, XXXIV (1836), xx-xxiii. He used 
quotes from different police and prison officers, and their statements have 
reached a similar conclusion to the above studies: drunkenness, cultural 
background and bad parenting were the main three factors that made Irish-
born individuals more prone to criminal activities than English. Although this 
may be true, the interviewees stated again that the Irish engage mostly in 
minor crimes and offences against public peace rather than crimes of felony 
like murder.  
2.2.2.2.6.2 Irish parenting and the relationship to crime 
Many young Irish boys and girls were forced by their parents to beg in the 
street and their parents would punish them if they came back home without 
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any money. Therefore, many of these children were seen on the streets at 
night, afraid to go back home because they had not gained any money that 
day (Swift, 2002). Hence, parental pressure could be regarded as having 
forced children to engage in stealing and other criminal activities to gain 
money. Additionally, the houses many Irish foreign nationals lived in were 
extremely overcrowded and unhealthy, and this contributed to compel Irish 
children to beg and steal, as well as some engaging in more serious criminal 
activities with older people (Swift, 1997, Swift, 2002, Jones, 2013). 
2.2.2.2.6.3 The impact of racism on perceived Irish criminality 
Notably, many historians have referred to the racism that Irish foreign 
nationals faced in the UK and noted the exaggeration of the negative impact 
of Irish on the UK. For example, MacRalied (1999), thought that Irish foreign 
nationals were ‘a ready-made scapegoat’ for the disease, overcrowding, 
immorality, drunkenness and crimes of the urban world; even without Irish 
foreign nationals, the industrial environment would still have been a miserable 
and unhealthy place to live and work.  
In return, Irish scholars consider the relationship between Irish and crime in 
the UK to be as a result of these negative sentiments, and the English bias in 
Victorian England. The overrepresentation of Irish in crime statistics, public 
disorders, small disturbances, violence in the work place, and individual 
attacks on Irish people have been used as evidence to show the prejudice 
against the Irish and the spread of anti-Irish sentiment (Swift, 1997). 
To summarise, there are numbers of inter-related reasons why there was a 
perception that Irish foreign nationals were more criminal than the British. 
Firstly, cultural differences especially around the use of alcohol: 
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contemporary evidence found that when the Irish were drunk, their level of 
assaults was higher than those committed by Britons. Secondly, religious 
differences between the Protestant and the Catholic communities. Thirdly, 
low wages, large families and poor housing conditions leading in some cases 
to begging and other low-level crimes; the Irish were more likely to be 
involved in other crimes like stealing and unlawful distillation of spirits. 
Fourthly, stereotyping and the targeting of Irish communities by the police 
and the courts, especially when the police forces were seen as not able to 
confront the criminality of Irish foreign nationals (Swift, 2002, Jones, 2013, 
McManus, 1994). 
Finally, the media also played a part in the stereotyping of the Irish, especially 
those workers who were pictured lazy and too unreliable for any sort of work 
in the UK. In consequence, the only available jobs for the Irish were for 
casual occupations paying low wages and requiring little skill (Jones, 2013).  
 The first half of the 20th century  
Restrictions to control immigration were again recognised as important at the 
beginning of 20th century when the foreign national population increased due 
to a large number of poor Jews fleeing persecution by the Russian Empire. 
What was termed as an ‘open door’ immigration policy started to decline in 
the initial part of the 20th century, due to immigration causing further financial 
and cultural problems. Therefore, naturalization rules and procedures to enter 
legally and settle down in the UK were increasingly controlled and limited 
(Mynott, 2002, Humphries, 2004). In this section, the connection between 
foreign nationals and criminal offences will be explored, as well as how this 
relationship was used to restrict immigration policy and lead to anti-
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immigration legislation. These factors led to physical attacks on foreign 
nationals, especially those who did not fit with the ‘British’ appearance.  
2.3.1 Restricted ‘undesirable aliens’ (poor and criminals) 
Media campaigns on the negative impact of foreign nationals in the UK, 
coupled with consistent public complaints supported by some politicians and 
political parties, combined to produce accusations of foreign nationals as the 
dirtiest, unhealthiest, overcrowded population, and thus associated them with 
criminal offences (Panayi, 2010). 
Jewish migration came at a time when anti-Irish sentiments were still running 
high. Combined anti-Jewish and anti-Irish feelings led to accusations of them 
creating extra competitive pressure in the labour market, as well as rising 
crime levels and a dilution of ‘British culture’ (Bevan, 1986 , Panayi, 2010).  
Public dissatisfaction grew, and appeals to control immigration were raised. A 
campaign from Evans-Gordon (Con MP) finally succeeded, when he got 
strong support from his party to control immigration; in 1894, Lord Salisbury 
(Con MP) introduced a new Bill to control immigration and especially control 
‘undesirable aliens’. In 1898, Lord Hardwicke (Con MP) introduced the same 
Bill. Both Bills had aims to control foreign nationals in relation to health, 
economic and legal (crimes) issues in the UK. At the same time however, the 
Select of Committee in the House of Commons in 1889 and the Royal 
Commission of Alien Immigration in 1902 demonstrated that the 
overcrowding in certain communities was the primary problem and the 
population, health issues and criminality of foreign nationals were not 
significant enough to cause alarm (Layton-Henry, 1992).  
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As a result of the tireless efforts by Evans-Gordon and his party, the 1905 
Alien Act was passed in order to control ‘undesirable aliens’: those who 
cannot support financially themselves or their families, ill foreigners, and 
those who had a criminal records in another country or were well known 
criminals. ‘Undesirable’ foreign nationals were liable to deportation unless 
they proved they fled their original country due to political or religious 
persecution (Pellew, 1989, Panayi, 1999, Harper and Constantine, 2010). 
This Act has been criticised by academics, and described as ‘unnecessary 
legislation’ and an ‘anti-alien supporter’ (Layton-Henry, 1992) 
The criminality of foreign nationals, and the numbers of charged and 
convicted foreign national criminals, had a significant enough presence in 
parliamentary debates for the Alien Act 1905 to be passed, which restricted 
immigration in general. Associating foreign nationals with different criminal 
offences, and blaming foreigners for increasing crime in the UK, both resulted 
in the widespread notion among political and parliamentary debates of the 
time that immigration had to be more strictly controlled (see the debates 
about the Alien Bill in Hansard, 1905a, col 332, Hansard, 1905b, col 280). 
Some politicians (like Evans-Gordon) and political parties (the Conservatives 
in particular) leveraged attitudes of the judiciary and the contemporaneous 
CJS statistics to support their campaign of the necessity to control foreign 
nationals (see table 2.1 in Appendix 2).  
Table 2.1 is very valuable to this research, as it shows how foreign nationals 
have been connected to criminal offences, what sorts of offences foreign 
nationals blamed for, how the immigration policy influences the relationship 
between foreign nationals and crime, and the foundation of the type of 
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arguments for criminalising foreign nationals, and how this association served 
different motivations.  
Furthermore, the table raises some key issues. Firstly, most of the evidence 
used by Evans-Gordon came from interviews with people who had contact 
with ‘foreigner criminals’, and all complained of the change to the crime levels 
with the increase in the UK foreign national population. Secondly, although 
there were relatively high numbers of ‘foreigner criminals’, it would appear 
that a small number of recidivists committed the majority of crimes. For 
example, 13,114 foreign nationals were sent to prison between 1898-1903, 
nearly 24 percent of those FNPs were convicted before; 17.5 percent have 
been convicted between 1-5 times and over 6 percent have been convicted 
between 6-over 20 times. It is also important to bear in mind the racism and 
hatred in political and parliamentary discourse relating to foreign nationals, 
especially those from Russia and Eastern Europe (Hansard, 1927, col 1604-
1605, Hansard, 1906, col 1408-1410). Thirdly, in the interviews which Evans-
Gordon (1903) presented, there are a some serious crimes committed by 
foreign nationals, but in most cases those ‘foreigner criminals’ have a criminal 
record or have been imprisoned in a foreign country before they came to the 
UK. Therefore, the evidence linking foreign nationals to crime was weak, and 
the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration report in 1902 placed less 
emphasis on the relationship between foreign nationals and criminal 
offences. It instead concentrated more on population density and economic 
factors that foreign nationals are experienced in the UK. This was despite the 
attempt of Evans-Gordon to focus on the criminality of foreign nationals in 
order to push the legislation of Alien Act 1905 forward.  
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However, the Alien Act 1905 was not robust enough to face the new 
challenges that occurred with the onset of WWI (1909- 1914), when some 
nationalities were named as ‘alien enemies’. This again raised appeals 
around the need to control immigration and the status of ‘dangerous’ foreign 
nationals who settled in the UK before the war (Pellew, 1989, Panayi, 1999, 
Mynott, 2002).  
The Alien Restriction Act 1914, passed in a rush on the first day of the 
conflict, gave the home secretary wide powers over the landing, movement 
and deportation of all aliens. The British Nationality and Status of Alien 
Restriction Act 1914 followed. This required those aliens applying for 
naturalisation to demonstrate good character and an adequate knowledge of 
English; it also defined British nationality (Harper and Constantine, 2010). 
Feelings around dangerous foreign nationals were running high. For 
example, Colonel Charles Burn (Con. MP) noted the necessity to update the 
Alien Restriction Act 1914 (Hansard, 1919, col 2804):  
‘No German has ever come to this country for the good of the British, and I am 
wholly in favour of those who are here being sent back to their own country… 
We know the sort of enemy alien we have here, and when we know 2804 that 
men and women of enemy origin are the instigators of crime, and have proved 
themselves again and again to be some of our greatest criminals, now is the 
time to get rid of them. Men have been brought up in the Courts in connection 
with the white slave traffic, and they were nearly always Germans’  
As a consequence of the anti-immigration environment, hostile political and 
parliamentary discourses, negative media coverage and the attitude of CJS 
workers, the negative public attitude towards foreign nationals increased. 
Violence against ethnic minorities or “anti-ethnicity” in the UK returned by 
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1919; there were a number of assault cases against blacks in particular in 
Wales (Cardiff), Scotland (Glasgow) and England (London, Hull, Liverpool, 
Manchester) (Skillington and Morris, 1996). 
2.3.2 Jewish experience: A case study  
Many Jews in the UK were alien by origin, race, religion, and culture. The 
nature and makeup of the population and the economic situation of the Jews 
who fled to the UK at the end of the 19th and the beginning of 20th centuries 
was different from those who moved to the UK in the 11th century. As a result, 
the 19th century Jews were blamed for many issues relating to crime. As a 
result, there were many calls to move them to a new country (Palestine).  
2.3.2.1 The characteristics of Jewish foreign nationals   
During the last decades of the 19th century, a number of different events 
taking place in Eastern Europe forced Jews to migrate. These included the 
Russo-Turkish war in 1875, widespread pogroms in Southern Russia in 1881, 
Jewish expulsion from Russian cities in 1890, mass migration from Romania 
in 1900 and the Russian revolution in 1905. However, the exact number of 
permanent Jews resident in the UK was not available at that time, because 
many recorded Jews moved to the US. Furthermore, British records had not 
distinguished newcomers from Eastern European by their religion (Jones, 
2013). 
It must be noted that the new wave of Jewish foreign nationals was unsuited 
to the newly industrialised and skilled nature of the British economy. Many 
Jewish foreign nationals came from rural agrarian backgrounds and 
possessed skills unsuited to industrialise urban living. In addition, these 
newcomers did not speak English and had different cultural background, in 
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addition to the differences in religion that separated them even from those so-
called ‘co-religionists’ established in this country. This led to the development 
of what has been called an ‘immigrant trade’, and the return of some old 
trades like peddling, hawking and shop keeping that required working for 
longer hours with little return (Endelman, 2002, Jones, 2013).  
2.3.2.2  The Jewish issues and negative public sentiments  
Some of the Jewish refugees arriving in Britain faced negative political and 
public attitudes. However, such criticism was often veiled, as anti-immigration 
campaigns did not want to be accused of anti-Semitism or seen as 
unwelcoming toward genuine refugees (Jones, 2013). We thus see that these 
waves of Jewish foreign nationals were accused of the same issues that the 
Irish had been before them, but with two new themes emerging: housing, and 
education.  
2.3.2.2.1 Public health pressures  
The differences between UK natives and Jewish foreign nationals were 
obvious in relation to language, dress and customs. Like the Irish, Jews were 
seen as strangers, ‘less-civilised’, ‘unclean’, and ‘immoral’. It was alleged 
Jews in particular brought ruin to the neighbourhood because of their 
carelessness and ignorance (Endelman, 2002, Jones, 2013). Paradoxically, 
at that time the Irish were considered as a part of society, and thus were able 
to blame social issues on ‘foreigners’ (Henriques, 2005, Jones, 2013). 
2.3.2.2.2  Labour market pressures  
The ‘prescribed’ negative role of foreign nationals on the British labour market 
was connected directly to foreign nationals being poor, unprincipled and 
willing to take advantage of any available charity and financial support. 
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However, Jewish foreign nationals who were in employment created a 
different form of economic problem. Unlike the Irish who were seen as low-
value, low-wage workers, the new wave of Jews were willing to take any job. 
As a result, indigenous workers were now competing with a hungry and 
ambitious influx of Jewish foreign nationals (Endelman, 2002, Drewry, 2010, 
Jones, 2013). 
Thus, Jewish foreign nationals were very different from other foreigners; they 
were able to work in minimal working conditions, take a low paid job rather 
than be unemployed, and were ‘the fittest’ for the hard economic competition, 
especially in London where bad work conditions were associated with the 
‘notorious sweated trade’. Jews provided competition for jobs by producing 
high quality products at low cost, and this threatened British workers (Lipman, 
1959). This led to negative sentiments from the unskilled working class, due 
to high competition for the available jobs, as foreign nationals were a willing 
supply of unending cheap labour. As a result, the working class supported 
control legislation against poor Jews in particular (Lipman, 1959, Jones, 
2013).  
2.3.2.2.3  Housing pressures  
Additionally, it was claimed at the time that Jewish foreign nationals were 
creating a shortage of housing, particularly in the East End of London. This 
was driving rents upward, to the extent that some property owners preferred 
to rent their houses to foreign nationals rather than English. There are two 
reasons for this: First, many houses were let as multiple occupancy with 
whole families living in one room. Secondly, many foreign nationals managed 
to buy cheap houses and used multiple occupancy letting to pay the 
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mortgage, as an HM Government report in 1902-3:309 recorded (quoted in 
Jones, 2013, p 76):  
 ‘…these men came over here and they save a little money and they live in the 
worst style imaginable, and they get these houses and let them in tenements, 
and then they buy the property and get £100 or £50, and they mortgage it. They 
do not pay the mortgage; it is the incoming tenant who has to pay the mortgage’  
2.3.2.2.4  Crime pressures  
Jews from across Europe and the Soviet Union were infamous because of 
their perceived relationship to serious crime and gang activity (Bell, 2008, 
Vyleta, 2012). With the absence of statistical data at that time regarding the 
quantity and the quality of the type of crimes committed by Jews, anti-Semitic 
sentiment was used to justify Jewish criminalisation (Bell, 2008). 
Vyleta (2012), analysed some Austrian press (newspapers) that touched 
important social problems and covered sensational trials in public discussions 
of the Jewish criminality. The author explained how political narratives and 
the media (Viennese press) that covered those trials constructed the Jewish 
criminality, and shaped the public perception and the nature of temporary 
discussion concerning the Jewish question. The criminality of part of the Jews 
were applied to the majority and were seen as  a part of their lifestyle (Vyleta, 
2012, Knepper, 2007). Consequently, different criminal activities were alleged 
to be associated with Jews; some of these were so-called to be created and 
enhanced by Jews, such as the trade in girls or ‘white slavery’. Viennese 
press and the surrounded political discourses then promoted public 
awareness of Jewish involvement in illegal trade and used the girls in 
prostitution, exporting them to different parts of the world. The trade started in 
Britain in 1885, and many parliamentary debates, CJS workers raised the 
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public awareness that poor Jews made prostitution their livelihood (Knepper, 
2007).  Few of CJ workers like Judges and police officers support the 
allegations that prostitution had risen significantly after refugee Jews arrived 
in large numbers at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century: 
‘as regards of prostitution, the evidence shows that in certain parts of London 
there are a large numbers of foreign prostitutes…the number of charges against 
prostitutes in 1892 were 256 against British subjects and 150 against 
foreigners; in 1902 these figures were 350 and 347 respectively’ (Evans-
Gordon, 1903, p 262). 
However, Knepper (2007) highlighted the role of Jewish Association for the 
Protection of Girls and Women in 1885 that countered the racialisation of 
crime, and denied the relationship between Jews and sex trade and 
considered such narratives as a reflection of anti-Semitic sentiment.   
Jewish foreign nationals were also known as being ‘fraudulent aliens’, with 
the forging of stamps and banknotes connected largely to Jews in London. In 
addition, convictions for fraud grew in the East End of London after the arrival 
of Jewish foreign nationals. In 1897, there were six fraud conventions but this 
rose to 51 convictions between January 1898 and December 1902 (Evans-
Gordon, 1903, p 266 ). In one account of Jews and fraud (Evans-Gordon, 
1903, p 267-268) wrote: 
 ‘in October 1901, two officials of the Russian Government came to London in 
consequence of information they received that Russian state notes, postage 
stamps, and excise labels for tobacco, which are found to be imported into 
Russia were manufactured in London by a gang of Jews emigrates of 
Russia…they found a man… called himself Samuel Miller, a Russian 
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emigrant… on the third [interview] he produced to him 96 sheets of forged 
Russian postage stamps … forged Russian notes…and he said he could 
procure forged Russian excise labels for Tobacco if required’  
Although some Jewish foreign nationals undertook criminal activity, this did 
not mean that all foreign national Jews were prone to commit crimes. Most of 
them were hard workers, and worked for longer hours and less return, which 
caused a direct threat to English workers. The English complained of wage 
undercutting and competition in the labour market, especially those working 
in the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives. Hence, anti-immigration 
voices united and rose to again call for greater control in immigration policy, 
and to cut the new flood of foreign nationals because of their criminality or 
negative economic impact on British workers (Bell, 2008, Jones, 2013). Jews 
were overall law-abiding, particularly in East End area; they were less prone 
to engage in criminal activities their rejuvenation of the worst East London 
streets has been praised. However, Jews were maligned for the offences of 
perjury and adulteration of nutrients, in addition to swindling and duplicity as a 
part of their overall supposed degeneracy and degradation (Jones, 2013). 
As a result, there was a rise in anti-Jewish sentiment, especially in London’s 
East End where criminality, a negative impact on the local economy and a 
refusal to embrace ‘British values’ were all seen as negative consequences of 
Jewish foreign nationals (Jones, 2013). At this time, opponents of immigration 
were, not for the last time, aided by the lack of statistical evidence regarding 
the economic and criminal impact of foreign nationals. This allowed for 
eagerly voiced ‘fear mongering’, with no danger of structured evidence being 
used as a counterpoint:  
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‘The important changes in the content and style of the campaign were, firstly, 
the more skilfully orchestrated opposition to aliens, partly as a result of better 
means of communication and partly because of a Parliament more receptive to 
shades of public opinion and pressure… second, to the usual armoury of anti-
alien propaganda was added the charge of racial inferiority based on Darwin’s 
theory of evolution… third, opponents were able to point to recent immigration 
legislation in other countries, notably the United States’ (Bevan, 1986 ).  
 The second half of the 20th century  
From the end of WWI to the 1950s, immigration ceased being a social issue. 
However, following the end of WWII and the British economy’s need for 
labour, a new wave of foreign nationals again raised what are by now familiar 
concerns relating to health, housing, criminality, wages and jobs (Panayi, 
1999). This section will focus on how immigration policy was which affected 
by the political factors, public sentiment, and the media, and will therefore 
attempt to explain the relationship this had with criminalising foreign 
nationals.  
2.4.1 ‘Legal discrimination’ in immigration policy  
After the WWII (1939-1945), Europe was destroyed physically and collapsed 
economically. The continent needed to be rebuilt, and an open immigration 
policy was seen as the best approach. This period saw a huge number of 
newcomers; 145,000 Poles (the majority from the Polish army after Poland’s 
collapse into Soviet power), as well as Italians and Irish were followed by 
newcomers from the Commonwealth regions of South West Asia, Africa, 
Hong Kong and Cyprus (Panayi, 1999). 
Theoretically, the British door was open for all races, but especially for 
Commonwealth citizens according to the British Nationality Act in 1948, which 
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facilitated their entry to work without obstacles (Bell, 1997, Small and 
Solomos, 2006). However, in practice, Asians and Black British faced tough 
procedures for settlement as ‘the British Government throughout this period 
adhered to a racially discriminatory immigration policy’ (Spencer, 2003). 
From the 1940s to the late 1960s the UK used the ‘guest-worker’ method to 
support its economy; labourers from Eastern Europe were brought to stay in 
Britain to work for as long as the labour market needed them, whereas West 
Indians or Caribbean natives who were already in the UK were suffering from 
unemployment (Hansen, 2003, Panayi, 1999). The British immigration policy 
was unfair to colonial Commonwealth workers when it required 180,000 
European labourers, and reduced Asians and ‘Black’ people to enter or to 
settle down in Britain for work purposes (Spencer, 2003).  
Getting rid of some foreign nationals, who had been connected to financial, 
social and crime issues, was a big concern for the British government. 
Initially, the British government used diplomatic/informal channels to cut the 
immigration flow. For example, it granted the Indian subcontinent and 
Caribbean nations’ self-government. Consequently, in 1947 these new 
independent states were encouraging their own wave of immigration in order 
to strengthen their own economic bases. Furthermore, the British government 
made many visits to the Caribbean in order to convince people not to 
immigrate to the UK. This was attempted via restricting borders and 
passports, or by using documentary films. These films depicted the winter of 
1947-48, showing a miserable life for Caribbean without jobs who were living 
in very bad conditions in the cold British winter. In addition, some British 
officials visited Jamaica to persuade people not to come to the UK by 
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showing them the difficulties and dark side of immigrating to the UK 
(Spencer, 2003). 
At the same time, concerns were being raised in the UK about the difficulties 
of integrating existing immigration into the ‘British’ way of life. Despite many 
attempts and policies, discrimination against foreign nationals continued in 
the arenas of education, health, employment and crime (Small and Solomos, 
2006).  
By the mid of 1950s, demographic changes, limited jobs and increased 
unemployment resulted in an increase in negative perceptions towards 
immigrants. These negative attitudes were mainly targeted towards West 
Indian immigrants, and produced violence in 1958 toward some ethnic 
minorities (Skillington and Morris, 1996, Spencer, 2003). In the meantime, 
hostile rhetoric coming from the Conservative party encouraged and 
supported tough immigration policy legislation (Humphries, 2004).  
Responding to all these pressures, in July 1962 the Commonwealth 
Immigration Act (CIA) (amended and restricted in 1968 and 1971) came into 
force to limit immigration and remove the prerogative of commonwealth 
citizens (Small and Solomos, 2006, Hansen, 2003). The CIA 1962 created 
huge arguments about racism and immigration, and was arguably the starting 
date for racist legislation debates (Smith, 2008b). It seems that Britain had 
learnt its lesson since the large wave of Jews at the end of 19th century, and 
the British government wanted to send a message to all newcomers that 
Britain is not a ‘soft touch’ (Spencer, 2003). 
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2.4.2 The political role in creating an anti-immigration society  
Whilst there were some serious attempts to foster racial harmony and 
community integration during the 1950s and 1960s, the beginning of a 
downturn in the British economy of the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a re-
emergence of hostility toward BAEM and foreign nationals. A notable role 
was played by Enoch Powell (Con MP) in attract media attention, through his 
discourses of repatriating and minimizing the foreign national population 
(Studlar, 1978, Small and Solomos, 2006). 
In 1964, the Labour party won the general election, and in the next year, the 
Race Relation Act (RRA) was legislated. This act aimed to achieve 
integration by ensuring equality, avoiding any kind of discrimination or racism 
(Small and Solomos, 2006). Ironically, in the same year the Labour party 
introduced an amendment of CIA in a white paper. The new Bill intended to 
decrease the population of foreign nationals in the UK. Roy Hattersley (Lab 
MP) clarified the relationship between integration and immigration reduction 
in his speech:  
‘Without integration, limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is 
impossible’ (Miles and Phizacklea, 1984, p 57).  
The RRA 1965 was an official appeal for a ‘closed door’ immigration policy, 
especially for coloured foreign nationals like blacks and South Asians, 
creating a new discriminate society (Modood, 1997). Racism in immigration 
policy has developed from the social and political attitudes toward difference 
races, especially towards Asians and ‘Black’ people. Their integration in 
British society is correlated with a restrictive immigration policy approach 
towards them (Kostakopoulou, 2006 ). 
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Due to the 30 November 1967 Law in Kenya, which requires being a Kenyan 
national to register for an ‘entry certificate’, and to stay there to live and work, 
a significant number of Asians (non-Kenyan citizenship holders) migrated 
from Kenya to the UK seeking jobs (Lattimer, 1999).  
Responding to these changes, the Labour party amended the RRA in 1968 
and forbade discrimination in public institutions. In the same year, the CIA 
1962 was revised and became restricted (Geddes, 2003). Arguably, the CIA 
1968 carried within it a racist implication such as disclaiming the free ingress 
and habitation right from British passport holders who were black (East 
Africa) or South Asian (especially of Indian origin) (Smith, 2008a). This series 
of strictures persisted; in 1969, the Immigration Appeals Act came into force, 
requiring foreign nationals’ dependents to get a certificate of entry from the 
British embassy in their hometown before they entered the UK (Small and 
Solomos, 2006).  
In 1970, the Conservative party won the election. The first legislative step of 
their policy was amended the CIA in 1971, which ended the citizenship of 
thousands of Commonwealth citizens, remove their prerogative, and put them 
on the same footing as other foreign nationals by requiring then to get a 
British visa before coming to the UK (Bell, 1997, Small and Solomos, 2006).  
With a fast-growing foreign national population, the debate about second-
generation immigrants in the 1970s took things further. It carried racist 
overtones by focusing on black native-born Caribbean individuals facing 
problems in education or the labour market. The economic situation for some 
West Indian youth was tinged with racial discrimination, especially in terms of 
employment. However, this period saw the development of a more organised 
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opposition to discrimination; this stance refused racism and emphasises the 
connection between racism and capitalism (Small and Solomos, 2006). 
At the end of 1970s, Margret Thatcher (Con) became Prime Minister, and she 
brought with her a very strict approach towards economic foreign nationals 
(Small and Solomos, 2006; Smith, 2008b). At the time, British immigration 
policy was still relatively open for political refugees (Kaye, 1994). The 
Nationality Act legislated in 1981 (which came into force on January 1st 1983) 
was one of the most important pieces of legislation, both in the history of UK 
immigration and in Thatcher’s own immigration policy. The Act ended the 
right to receive British nationality through physical location; every baby has 
born from January 1st 1983 in the UK would no longer be a British citizen 
unless its parents or grandparents were British, or had settled in the UK for 
longer than five years. (Sergot et al., 1986, Humphries, 2004).  
This came at the time when global political tensions and changes were 
unfolding. For example, the dissolution of Soviet Union; political change in 
Eastern European countries; the war between Iraq and Iran; the war in 
Yugoslavia and the Balkan’s war; the unsteady political situation between 
Turks and Kurds in Turkey; and finally increasing global poverty (Bauer et al., 
2001, Smith, 2008b). Therefore, the number of asylum seekers and refugees 
into Europe increased from 190,000 in 1987 to 700,000 by 1992. 
Nevertheless, British policy during the Yugoslavian war meant it received the 
fewest refugees of any country in Europe; it received 2000 refugees while 
Germany received 220,000 (Panayi, 1999).  
By the end of the 1980s ended, Britain was a multi-faith and multi-ethnic 
society, despite the variety of immigration policies that preceded that point. 
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However, as this chapter has demonstrated race relations between the state 
and majority population were sometimes tense: the riots of 1981 and the 
ensuing Scarman Report confirmed racism in British society (Pettigrew, 1998, 
Small and Solomos, 2006). By the time the 1990s had reached its mid-point 
there were further strict changes in immigration policy and the re-emergence 
of foreign nationals being seen as economic rather than politicised incomers; 
1993 saw the decrease in the welfare benefit to asylum seekers as well as 
changes to housing legislation (Mau, 2007 ). 
On the other hand, institutional racism became a popular topic, especially 
following the murder of Stephen Lawrence and subsequent Macpherson 
Report of 1999. Stephen Lawrence, a black man of 18, was stabbed to death 
by a white gang, and this was compounded by the poor attempt by the police, 
which led to them being described as ‘institutionally racist’ (Macpherson, 
1999). The report attracted much public and media attention, and became the 
focus of Tony Blair’s New Labour Government. The RRA was amended in 
2000 (came into force 01/12/2001) and emphasised on retaining, restoring 
and improving ethnic parity. The government reviewed institutional 
performance, especially the police and civil service, and this led to a 
recruitment drive targeting BAME communities within the police service 
(Small and Solomos, 2006). 
2.4.3 The experience of BAME groups: A case study  
In spite of the significance of the previous waves of immigrants (Irish and 
Jews), Commonwealth immigrants are a more significant subject given they 
produced the largest immigrant group since WWII, and their presence has 
contributed to the development of wide lines in current immigration policy. 
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This section will follow the structure of the case studies above. It will start 
generally by describing the characteristics of this group of newcomers, before 
then exploring the issues associated with them including their relationship 
with criminality.  
2.4.3.1  The characteristic of BAME groups 
Questioning minority ethnic groups has been introduced for the first time by 
the 1991 census to make sure of providing equal opportunities, aid anti-
discrimination policies and to plan for the future through resource allocation 
and provision of services. However, Lupton and Power (2004), found that 
BAME population has grown rapidly since the early 1950s. The high point of 
Black people of Caribbean immigration was the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, 
Pakistanis and Indians began to arrive in large numbers in the mid-1960s and 
Bangladeshi arrivals peaked in the early 1980s. The black African population 
was relatively small until the 1990s, but doubled between 1991 and 2001.  
At 2001, the major minority ethnic groups were Indians (1,052,000), 
Pakistanis (747,000), black Caribbean (566,000), and black Africans 
(485,000) with smaller Bangladeshi (283,000) and Chinese populations 
(243,000), in addition to those identifying as mixed race (674,000) (Office for 
National Statistics, 2004).  
Black and West Indians newcomers were seen to be poor, low living, low-
skilled, prone to deception, and foreign in terms of their culture, religion, 
customs and appearance. They were also seen to be insular, just like the 
Eastern European Jews and Irish in the 19th and 20th centuries (Solomos, 
1991). Like Irish migrants, new Commonwealth immigrant settled in industrial 
cities. Their presence was therefore much more generally apparent than had 
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been the case with Jews who had lived predominately in the East End of 
London. However, the large numbers of new Commonwealth immigrants who 
came for economic reasons as result of the open door immigration policy 
faced prejudice similar to anti-Semitism against the Jews, only this time 
based on colour rather than religion (Solomos, 1991, Solomos, 2003). 
Refusing to accept the existence of these foreigners and the overall anti-
stranger sentiment resulted in negative public attitudes, supported by political 
mouthpieces (Jones, 2013). These foreign nationals were blamed for taking 
cheap casual labour, carefree living, and immoral and disorderly actions; 
there is indeed a striking similarity to the experience of the Irish (who were, 
after all, still in evidence).  
At the time, the first survey of the Policy Studies Institute, conducted in 1966, 
found that Asians and Caribbean immigrants faced racial segregation due to 
overt exclusion from access to rent or buy housing, resulting in their bad 
housing conditions and isolation from white neighbourhoods. In addition, the 
survey found Asians and Caribbean immigrants were predominantly working 
in jobs far below their qualifications or skills. These newcomers faced clear 
discrimination, especially when some of employers refused to hire ‘coloured’ 
employees. Many opportunities were only available where there was not 
competition with white workers to fill the post (Modood, 1997).  
2.4.3.2 BAME communities issues  
To keep consistency with the case studies presented already, and to make 
analysis easier, the same issues that have been covered in the case studies 
of Irish and Jewish immigrants will be explained here. In addition to these, 
there are new further issues connected specifically to this group of 
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immigrants – such as education, transportation and other general public 
service pressures – and these will be covered below.  
 
 
2.4.3.2.1  Overpopulated pressures  
The open door policy ended in 1905 with the introduction of the Alien Act 
1905; however, post WWII, the door re-opened ‘temporarily’ again (as it has 
been explored above). Official statistics (Office for National Statistics, 2013) 
and academic scholars (Spencer, 2003, Knoll, 2009) conclude that the 
population of foreigners increased significantly since because of the increase 
of foreign born individuals. Those who are foreign born do not represent the 
population of foreign nationals. Therefore, it could not be used for the 
purpose of this research, as many of them are British citizens or British 
passport holders. Therefore, the research assumes that those foreign 
nationals who came to the UK post WWII were lower than the presented 
number.  
Arguably, when the door was open there were plenty of jobs available, which 
would lead to attracting more foreign nationals. The consistent increase in the 
population of newcomers elevated negative public sentiment, due to the 
economic crisis and the limitation of the available jobs. Hence, appeals were 
raised to restrict immigration policy, especially with the large number of 
jobless, which included many of immigrants of West Indian origin. At that 
time, the Ministry of Labour made a survey investigating public opinion in 
relation to the economic situation and the available jobs. The argument was: 
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‘It is clear that the key issue for the Cabinet throughout was that of numbers; not 
numbers of immigrants, but numbers of ‘coloured’ immigrants’ (Spencer, 2003, 
p 43). 
However, not all foreign nationals came to the UK post the WWII voluntarily; 
some of them have been obliged to migrate to another country because of 
natural disasters. For example, 100,000 Pakistani Muslims migrated to Britain 
as around 250 villages in Mirpur were inundated by the dam projects of 
the1960s (BBC, 2009 ). 
2.4.3.2.2  Health pressures  
There was an assumption that BAME groups have more health problems 
than the indigenous or white British population (Gill et al., 2007). BAME 
groups are more likely to be diagnosed with mental health problems, 
experience poor outcomes from treatment, and disengage from mainstream 
mental health services (Johns, 2004). Nevertheless, many scholars 
demonstrated that the health problems of BAME groups are not different from 
the white British, but that health services provided to them are ‘different’ from 
the one that white British receive (Johns, 2004, Iganski and Johns, 1999). 
Poverty and racism are two main factors that help explain the high 
representation of BAME groups with mental health problems (Gill et al., 2007, 
Johns, 2004) 
2.4.3.2.3  Labour market pressures  
Due in part to these demographic changes, British public sentiment towards 
BAME groups fluctuated; in the mid of 1940s, with the need of the labour 
force and cheap wages there was no recognised negative sentiment. 
However, by the mid of 1950s, there was an increase in the negative 
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perception of foreign nationals, largely for economic reasons based on limited 
jobs and increased unemployment (Jackson et al., 2001, Skillington and 
Morris, 1996, Spencer, 2003).  
The influence of foreign nationals on the British jobs and wages has attracted 
many scholars due to the widespread anti-immigration sentiment and media 
calls to cut the inflow of the foreign nationals. Dustmann, Fabbri and Ian 
(2005) used empirical analyses based on British Labour Force Survey data to 
examine the effect of foreign nationals on the British labour market, and the 
resulting consequences on indigenous labourers in terms of jobs and wages. 
They did not find strong evidence of foreign nationals having a negative 
influence on native-born employment, and saw little actual effects on those 
who have intermediate skills. Similarly, no impact was found of foreign 
nationals on native wages (Wadsworth, 2010, Dustmann et al., 2003 ). 
Reed and Latorre (2009 ), found similar results and arrived at a very 
interesting conclusion through reviewing two literatures (theoretical and 
empirical) preceding their empirical study. First, by reviewing theoretical 
literature, the authors found no correlation between the foreign nationals and 
native jobs or wages overall. Second, the empirical literature revealed a 
somewhat positive outcome from foreign nationals on the UK labour market; 
foreign nationals will create more jobs for natives rather than reduce job 
opportunities. Third, there is a slight consequence of the foreign national 
labour force on indigenous wages: for every 1 percent increase in foreign 
national participation in the British jobs market, natives’ wages decrease by 
around 0.3 percent. Finally, O’Rourke and Sinnott (2004) found that the 
economic impact of foreign labour, especially when competing with low skill 
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jobs, impacted negatively on the attitudes of the British public, especially 
those who have a low-income or are in low-skilled professions.  
 
2.4.3.2.4  Housing pressures  
The 1958 Nottingham and Notting Hill riots against BAME communities 
brought debates about the relationship between race, nationality and crime, 
housing and employment to the forefront. The Conservative Government 
response to such riots, as well as the frequent attacks by white gangs on 
black and West Indians, was the 1962 CIA. This brought with it the intention 
to restrict and reduce the number of such ‘migrants’ as they were seen to be 
causing problems, and the act was therefore aimed at eliminating the social 
disharmony (Schuster and Solomos, 2004).  
The anti-immigration political parties and the media were sending messages 
to the public that BAME newcomers were putting too much pressure on social 
housing, something that produced negative public perception and a reduction 
in community cohesion (Rutter and Latorre, 2009). In an analysis of focus 
groups, regarding the public perception of the pressure created by non-white 
foreign nationals on social housing supply and allocation: 
‘Dominant views about migrants and social housing were threefold. Firstly, that 
migrants and ethnic minority communities were being granted housing outside 
the allocation system by queue jumping, perhaps by bribing local authority 
housing staff. Secondly, some interviewees thought that migrants were 
committing tenancy fraud, by presenting false information or borrowing children 
from compatriots. Thirdly some interviewees believed that the allocation system 
itself disadvantaged white British’(Rutter and Latorre, 2009, p 40) 
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2.4.3.2.5 Crime pressures  
The recognition of ethnic concern started after the Second World War; crime 
rates elevated, with a concurrent increase in the prison population (Hicks and 
Allen, 1999), at the same time as many foreign nationals from different 
ethnicities were coming to the UK to work or live permanently (Small and 
Solomos, 2006; Panayi, 1999). This part will consider the relationship 
between BAME groups and the police, including the suspicion methods of 
policing, prison statistics, and the racial discrimination and institutional racism 
as a result of negative public sentiment and legitimise racism in immigration 
policy.  
2.4.3.2.5.1 ‘The method of suspicion’  
According to Layton-Henry (1992), first generation post-WWII foreign 
nationals tended to be less involved in criminal activities than the indigenous 
population, and all BAME groups were treated fairly by the CJS at that time. 
In addition, black foreign nationals had lower offending behaviour than the 
white population, despite slight indications that the rise in the black and Asian 
population was correlated with the increase in crime rates. 
However, Matza (2010) situation of suspicion represents the historic choice of 
a main method over conceivable and extant others. Though the tendency to 
rely on the method of suspicion is perhaps always implicit, that of making in 
the pronounced routine of ordinary police operation develops with specific 
context. The method of suspicion that the police used to follow; to suspect, 
question, stop and search, and stereotype certain people as committing 
certain crimes, according to Matza, comes into use when police faced with 
considerable volume of crime are asked to provide an account of their 
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activeness. At the time the law required that the police suspicions should 
meet certain criteria like sufficient grounds, which should not be motivated by 
race, nationality, religion, or hatred sentiments towards any group (Smith, 
2009) 
In fact, the difference between legislation as written and its application 
demonstrated how the BAME groups were disadvantaged by the CJS. 
Theoretically, legislation was not created to target any specific group or 
people but to criminalise or penalise law-breakers regardless to their 
ethnicity, nationality or religion. However, the practical implications of some 
legislation, and its grounded interpretation by the police, resulted in suspicion 
and related over-policing being placed on certain communities, as a result of 
associating them with certain types of crimes (Spalek and Davies, 2012).  
In the last quarter of the 20th century, public anxieties about the imagined 
danger posed by BAME individuals, and their connections to different illegal 
activities started to grow. While Asians were seen as more law-abiding and 
qualified, the black population were over policed, resulting in anti-policing 
campaigning by black activists groups, and different clashes and 
confrontations between young black people and the police during Notting Hill 
Carnivals of 1976-1978 (Smith, 1984, Smith, 1997).  
During the 1980s, the relationship between the police and BAME 
communities (particularly with black communities) deteriorated, and reports of 
racist attacks were commonplace. Consequently, there began a general 
assumption that BAME communities were pre-disposed to greater 
involvement in criminal activity than the white population (Waters, 1990). 
Black communities have since been suspected, and the culture of black 
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people has been seen as deviant and incapable of impressing correct values 
upon its youth. The relationship between black, especially young black, 
people and the CJS has therefore been influenced by various media and 
political discourses, which hold black people as a scapegoat to blame for 
increasing crime trends in the UK (Smith, 2009). Tauber (1997), Wenk et al. 
(1972), Charles Teddlie and Reynolds (2000), analysed hypotheses being 
made about certain classes or ethnic backgrounds from the potential 
consequences of labelling them. For example, the underachievement of a 
young black male in school could lead to a teacher stereotyping and 
supposing that any such individual in his or her class would be more prone to 
deviance. Such a belief may affect their treatment of such children, which in 
turn would create a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. If a child is labelled as deviant, 
they have the potential to behave to fit their label (Madon et al., 2004). 
Similarly, young south Asians have the attention of the media and the political 
discourses. Asian gangs was presented as an serious social problem that 
needs an immediate reaction from the government, the images of violence 
and drug dealers has been connected to Asians and pictured them as the 
new devil (Alexander, 2000). The Asian gangs’ social problem was only the 
beginning of a series of accusation, labelling, and identification of the new 
deviants, especially Asian Muslims who have been connected to religious 
fundamentalism (Alexander, 2004).  
2.4.3.2.5.2 Making minorities devils: Representation in prison  
Since the 1950s, the prison population of different ethnicities has increased 
significantly, although the ethnicity of prisoners was not recorded until 1991. 
Under Section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 the Government is 
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required to publish statistical data to evaluate whether people from different 
ethnic minorities are being treated fairly with the CJS (Office for National 
Statistics, 2004). The Home Office issued a series of documents in 1992, 
1994, 1995, and 1997 providing statistical data on the representation of 
ethnic minorities (both offenders and victims) in the CJS. From 1998 the 
Home Office started to individually publish these statistics on an annual basis 
(Barclay and Tavares, 1998).  
Britain has the topmost proportion of imprisonment in the European Union 
(see Table 2.2 in Appendix 2), and outside of the white prisoners population, 
black prisoners (African/Caribbean) contribute the highest rate (Spalek, 
2008b). The majority of these prisoners are incarcerated for drug offences, in 
spite of several American empirical studies and some British surveys finding 
that white people are more prone to taking drugs, whereas the majority of 
ethnic minority offenders (especially black) are charged for drug offences 
(Banks, 2011, Heaven and Hudson, 2005).  
In Table 2.3 (Appendix 2), the percentage of the population of different ethnic 
groups in the 2001 and 2011 census is compared to their representation in 
the prison population. This shows there was an increase in the percentage of 
BAME prisoners compared to white prisoners, which decreased from 90 
percent in 2001 to 74 percent in 2011. Due to the decrease in the total 
population of white people, which it does account for the significant decrease 
in the white prisoner population.  
Furthermore, the unequal representation of black prisoners compared to the 
total population is visible in each census. In 2001, the black population was 2 
percent, compared to their 12 percent representation in the prison population. 
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This is even more striking when considering the general population of Asians 
at 4 percent in 2001 and an Asian prison population of 3 percent (four times 
less black prisoners’ percentage).  
Hence, there is an unequal representation in the prison population between 
BAME and white prisoners. In return, there is a difference among the minority 
ethnic prisoners themselves; black prisoners have the highest proportion of 
prisoners compared to their total population in E&W.  
The overrepresentation of BAME prisoners might be explained because 
those individuals are committing more crimes than the white indigenous 
population. However, this can be interpreted differently by looking in depth at 
the available statistical data, and accounting for the implications of public 
attitudes, political discourse, and media representations. For example, Hing 
(2006), described in his article ‘Misusing Immigration Policies in the Name of 
Homeland Security’ the tough time experienced by Arabs and Muslims post 
9/11 terrorist attack, and the ‘random’ increase of Arabs and Muslims prisons 
inmates in American prisons because of ‘indirect’ suspicions. 
The criminal activities of BAME groups cannot be assessed separately from 
the racial segregation, discrimination, and ‘an anti-colonial struggle’ 
experienced by these groups. There is a common sense that there is an 
association between the increase of the population, especially the BAME 
groups, post-WWII, and the increase of the criminal population (Spalek, 
2008b). In addition, the high representation of BAME prisoners has fed the 
stereotype that more BAME individuals are engaging in criminal activities 
than white British (Spencer, 2003; Skillington and Morris, 1996). However, 
the relationship between the BAME groups and crime cannot be understood 
- 68 - 
 
without considering the racial discrimination and institutional racism that they 
face from the CJS.  
Some scholars (FitzGerald, 1991, Kasturirangan et al., 2004, Quraishi, 2002 ) 
have proposed that the difference of cultural background for different BAME 
groups might explain the overrepresentation of these groups in certain CJS 
statistics. However, the Home Office has published a study based on young 
offenders, which concluded that, when some structural and cultural factors 
are controlled for, such as parenting, school performance, socioeconomic 
class, drug issues, siblings in trouble with the police, family size and type and 
gender, ethnicity is not a significant factor in explaining differences in 
committing crimes (FitzGerald, 1991).  
2.4.3.2.5.3 The racism and institutional racism  
Officially the enslavement and discrimination of black people has ended; 
however, the common considering black people as the lowest class has 
continued, which has created negative public sentiments and attacks against 
BAME groups (Skillington and Morris, 1996). The victimisation of those 
BAME groups has also not been treated sufficiently; victims were blamed of 
creating disharmony in British society (Small and Solomos, 2006, Hansen, 
2003) and such allegations open the door to stereotype and criminalise these 
people.  
Some researchers (Tuck and Southgate, 1981, Williams, 2000) have 
considered the over-representation of BAME groups in crime statistics from a 
perspective of racism and anti-colonial struggle. Racial discrimination varies 
within the different stages of the CJS, and a large volume of research 
(FitzGerald, 1991, Tonry, 1999, National Research Councel, 2004) has 
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looked at the racial discrimination in the CJS, particularly at the level of 
policing. The increase in stop and search during the 1990s, as well as the 
consequences of the murder of Stephen Lawrence, has meant that 
institutional discrimination and racism has been of primary concern. In his 
1999 report into Stephen Lawrence’s murder, Sir William Macpherson of 
Cluny described the reaction of the police as:  
‘the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and 
professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin’, 
which "can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes, and behaviour, which 
amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, 
thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping, which disadvantages minority ethnic 
people’(Macpherson, 1999) 
Racial discrimination in the CJS thus started to attract many scholars 
(FitzGerald, 1991, Tonry, 1999, National Research Councel, 2004), who were 
looking at CJS statistics, especially prison statistics, revealed an 
overrepresentation of black people in British prisons. Self-report studies 
(FitzGerald, 1991, FitzGerald, 1997, Wu et al., 2010, Williams, 2000) found 
that police bias and unfair treatment to minority ethnic group delinquents was 
the reason behind the disproportionate amount of crime. Police officers are 
five times more likely to stop, search, and then arrest a person from an ethnic 
minority group for drug crime compared with a white person. Since 1995, per 
head of population in England and Wales, recorded stops and searches of 
Asian people have remained between 1.5 and 2.5 times the rate for white 
people, and for black people have been between 4 and 8 times the rate for 
white people (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011).  
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In May 2010, London’s Metropolitan Police Service faced a racism case as a 
senior black officer claimed he was side lined. A top black officer sued the 
Metropolitan Police for race discrimination amid claims that senior police 
covered up a damaging report alleging racism in the ranks. The Macpherson 
Inquiry analysed and assessed claims of racism against the Metropolitan 
Police. It suggested major changes in the ways the Metropolitan Police 
handles members of an ethnic minority (Macpherson, 1999). 
The previous literature outlined racial discrimination in the police but it is 
unclear whether discrimination is limited to aspects of policing such as stop, 
search, and arrest, or whether the over-representation of BAME groups in 
CJS statistics is also a result of discrimination at other stages of the justice 
system. Institutional racism and discrimination regarding nationality is not 
monopolised by police; court procedures are also accused of racism and 
differential treatment between white and non-white British, as well as harsher 
sentences handed down to disadvantaged people (foreign and ethnic 
minorities) (Fekete and Webber, 2010, Williams, 2000).  
There is limited literature on whether discriminatory treatment of foreign 
nationals leads to harsher sentences compared to British nationals. The 
literature (see for example, Crow, 1987, Killias, 1989, Travers, 1999, 
Thronson and Sullivan, 2012) concentrates on racism based on colour, 
focusing on longer and more severe sentences with small chances of 
discharges and fine. Most are subject to immediate custody outcomes, which 
send the majority to prison, usually for offences relating to drugs, robbery and 
fraud (Abbas, 2005). Finally, Bhui (2007), Bhui (2009b), Bhui (2009a), found 
that there are some factors that explain the disproportionate representation of 
BAME groups and foreign nationals in the crime statistics: racism, their 
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economic situation, and culture, as many BAME victims are from the same 
ethnicity (Home Office, 2006).  
 The media role  
There is a historical role played by parts of the media in highlighting, 
exaggerating, and presenting different foreign nationals from different 
ethnicities as criminals which can be argued to have increased negative 
public attitudes (Calavita, 2005). For example, the media has contributed the 
Irish to be seen by the British locals as part of social residuum whose alien 
character and unruly disposition habitually exercised police officers and 
magistrates alike, but that does not mean that the majority of Irish foreign 
nationals were unruly drunks, engaging in many different types of crime 
(MacRalied, 1999).  
The harshest anti-Irish titles often sounded in local and provincial 
newspapers rather than illustrated national journals, and few historians have 
undertaken detailed study into the role of provincial journalism in moulding 
the Irish stereotype (MacRaild, 1999, Potter, 2004). The reportage has 
elevated fear and worry regarding Irish immigrants, and the media has 
perpetuated the perception of Irish as quick to violence. In consequence, Irish 
society has been perceived as being much more violent in the 19th century 
than the rest of the UK. This despite the fact that Irish criminals in the UK 
tended to be petty larcenists and small-scale brawlers, though sometimes 
repeat offenders. However, they did not often commit murder, or the more 
serious types of physical assault (Potter, 2004).  
Less visible, however, is a similar position of the media of the time towards 
Jews, because as has been mentioned earlier, no one wanted to be accused 
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of being anti-Semitic or unwelcoming of refugees. Even when the negative 
public sentiments rose in the beginning of 20th century, there was not the 
expression of the opposition to the presence of Jews at a national level 
(Jones, 2013).  
However, BAME groups have been targeted by the media; crimes committed 
by black or West Indian youths have been highlighted and aggrandized by 
newspapers reportage. These actions have likely influenced negative 
attitudes toward immigration in some sections of the British population 
(Solomos, 2003). Indeed, the former Metropolitan Police commissioner, Sir 
Ian Blair, said that the British news media is institutionally racist, a comment 
that offended journalists, provoking angry responses from the media, despite 
the police association welcoming Sir Ian’s assessment (BBC NEWS, 2006b, 
BBC NEWS, 2006a).  
The media focuses on discourses that highlight the relationship between 
foreign nationals and crime, blaming foreign nationals for a wide range of 
issue affecting the country, and interpreting and using statistical data in ways 
that serve its aims (Unity, 2008). For example, Rumbaut and Ewing (2007) 
argued that the relationship between illegal foreign nationals and crime have 
been created by political factors and the media, which represented many 
poor people looking for better life as criminal.  
 Conclusion 
This chapter tracing the history of immigration, and the relationship between 
foreign nationals and crime, has raised many key issues: Firstly, the early 
history shows that the foreign nationals have been attracted to contribute to 
the British economy and demography, and there were racial attack on those 
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foreigners when demand has stabilised. Secondly, Britain has a significant 
role of welcoming persecuted refugees because of their religion and those 
who have been in a natural disaster. Thirdly, there is a similarity among the 
three case studies (the Irish, Jews and BAME) in that there was a tendency 
to blame and accuse those foreign nationals for issues in the country. 
Fourthly, There is a clear relationship between the demographic and the 
economic change and the increase of negative public sentiments and 
debates in regard to the relationship between foreign nationals and crime. 
Finally, there is an important role of the immigration policy, political 
discourses, and the media in exaggerating foreign nationals’ criminality.  
Previous studies have demonstrated that foreign nationals have been 
stereotyped, suspected, and targeted by police, and there is a mainstream 
racism and discriminatory treatment within CJS institutions regarding ethnicity 
and the nationality. The next chapter will continue with the more recent 
history of foreign nationals in the UK, and answer the research questions of 
how immigration policy has been changed and how the relationship between 
foreign nationals and the non-immigration criminal offences was constructed.  
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Chapter 3 Immigration and crime policies from 1997-2014 
 
This chapter examines how immigration and crime policies since late 
1990s have raised the profile of the foreign national/crime debate by 
associating foreign nationals with different crimes. The implication of 
tighter immigration and crime policies, and the establishment of 
‘crimmigration’5 crisis in the UK, will be categorised and analysed across 
two different governments: the Labour Government (1997-2010) followed 
by the Coalition Government over the years 2010-2014.  
This chapter will consider the significant features that the analysis of 
these two different governments presents. During the Labour party’s time 
in office, the main feature was the emergence of what theorists have 
described as ‘crimmigration’ (Stumpf, 2006), including the expansion of 
immigration control and a political rhetoric that encourages deportation as 
(a) a tool for fighting a perceived growth of crime amongst foreign 
nationals communities and (b) managing foreign nationals. In terms of 
crime policy, Labour implemented different policies related to their 
guiding slogan ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’. The 
chapter will therefore explore the most prominent of these: the ’war on 
terror’ and ‘war on drugs’. 
Following on from the most recent Labour Government, the immigration 
policy of the Coalition Government can be characterised as using 
                                                 
5
 For the purpose of this research, ‘crimmigration’ or ‘criminalization of immigration law’ 
means the connection between immigration and criminal law. It refers to the merger of the 
two areas in both substance and procedure has created parallel systems in which 
immigration law and the criminal justice system are merely nominally separate. STUMPF, 
J. (2006). The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, &Sovereign Power. bepress Legal 
Series, (issue), 1-44. 
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‘blaming’ rhetoric to impose tough measures and policies, which control 
the quantity of non-EU foreign nationals, including deporting foreign 
nationals and FNPs. In terms of their crime policy, the focus of the 
Coalition Government has been on tackling offenders of immigration 
crimes, foreign national ex-offenders and minimising the pressure on the 
punishment institutions, especially prisons. In exploring the policies of the 
both governments, a case study of the criminalisation of the asylum 
seekers will be presented to illustrate the implications of the applied 
immigration policy. Finally, the role of the media in shaping public 
attitudes and raising debates that associate foreign nationals with 
criminality through scapegoating will be explored.  
 Labour Party policies (1997-2010) 
In 1997, the Labour party came to office and stayed in power for 13 
years. During their three consecutive general election victories, the 
Labour Government made significant changes to immigration and crime 
policy in the UK. As this section will show, different measures were 
adopted to encourage and discourage immigration, starting with an open 
door policy at the beginning of their first term, and moving toward more 
restrictive policy for the remainder of their time in power (Somerville, 
2007).  
3.1.1  Labour’s immigration policy  
When Labour came to power in 1997 their immigration policy could be 
characterised in terms of being ‘less restrictive’. However, at this time 
Labour policy distinguished between ‘wanted immigrants’ – those who 
came to the UK for economic reasons and contributed to the British 
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economy – and ‘unwanted immigrants’ – including refugees and asylum 
seekers (Mulvey, 2011, Kostakopoulou, 2006 ). This subsection will 
discuss three significant features that categorise the Labour period: 
expanding the criminalisation of foreign nationals, strengthening the 
British border to tackle criminals and controlling foreign nationals 
because of their association with crime.  
3.1.1.1 Expanding the criminalisation of foreign nationals 
The Labour Government introduced fifteen main pieces of legislation, 
focusing on immigration, asylum, terrorism and border control, along with 
numerous discussion papers and working parties (Somerville, 2007). This 
large amount of legislation means that immigration, as a programme, was 
one of the most important issues that the Labour Government focused 
on. The tranche of legislation introduced new immigration crimes, more 
border control, as well as organisational changes to the immigration and 
border agencies to create the UK Border Agency (UKBA)6 (superseded in 
2014 by the Border Force). A new points system and biometric visas 
were introduced in 2008 and a number of initiatives for border security 
and the control of immigration were also brought into place (Hampshaire, 
2009).  
Since 1999, British immigration laws added 84 new types of immigration 
crimes, compared with only 70 having been introduced between 1905 
and 1998 (Aliverti, 2013c). The list of immigration crimes is very long and 
includes those who registered as asylum seekers or came to the UK 
without documents or with false documents (Bosworth and Guild, 2008a). 
                                                 
6
 The term of UKBA has been changed in 2014 to be UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) 
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In the early 2000s, there was an expansion of using criminal law to 
‘manage’ immigration (Aliverti, 2013a, p 60), which resulted in a steady 
increase in the rate of prosecutions and convictions for these offences 
(Aliverti, 2013b); this aligns with the general increase of FNPs since 1997 
(Berman and Dar, 2013). 
The blaming and scapegoating that has historically been used against 
different groups of foreign nationals (see Chapter two) contributed 
significantly to raise the awareness and negative perception of foreign 
national criminality, ultimately by connecting them to different illegal 
activities. For example, the White Paper in 1998 ‘Fairer, Faster and 
Future, A modern approach to immigration and Asylum’, introduced by 
the Home Secretary Jack Straw, was a plan to maintain the old 
bureaucratic system that led to backlogs and prohibited those who were 
using the system falsely, including taking advantage of taxpayers’ money 
while awaiting their decision (Cwerner, 2004. p 77-78). 
This White Paper simplified the procedures to judge asylum applications, 
but it also stereotyped asylum seekers and made concrete links between 
asylum seekers and those who were ‘bogus’, or ‘abused the system’.  
In addition, this White Paper prepared the ground for the Immigration and 
Asylum Act (IAA) 1999. The Act targeted asylum seekers in particular, 
who seen a significant increase in numbers, and enacted 35 different 
immigration related crimes (Aliverti, 2013a). IAA 1999 expanded the use 
of civil and criminal sanctions; for example, it extended the criminalisation 
of entering Britain by fraud (Part 1), the punishment on carriers 
(particularly lorry drivers) who knowledgeably held illegal immigrants, and 
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increased the power of immigration officers, enabling them to arrest, 
search, and fingerprint (Somerville, 2007, p 21). IAA 1999 provided a 
significant change to Labour immigration policy, and it demonstrated an 
essential restriction similar to the Conservative’s approach in 1905 
(Cohen, 2002). Therefore, the consequent political and parliamentary 
debates (see Chapter 7) concentrated on making a link between foreign 
nationals and their intention to commit crimes. 
Furthermore, the expansion of ‘crimmigration’ laws expanded the range 
of alternative strategies that immigration officers might take against 
suspected foreign nationals. Examples of these strategies included 
refusal of entry, executive removal, deportation on ‘conducive to public 
good’ grounds by the Secretary of State, and criminal prosecution, which 
may include a recommendation of deportation.  
These strategies could work together as, ‘the principle of double 
jeopardy, which proscribes multiple prosecutions for the same act, does 
not apply in immigration proceedings’ (Aliverti, 2013a, p 60). Moreover, 
the expanding of ‘crimmigration’ legislation gave greater power to 
immigration officers to detain suspects for hours, refuse entry, stop and 
search passengers. In addition, police officers had the power to 
investigate the legal status of any person they suspected. In other words, 
the two officers jobs have ‘combined’: immigration officers acting as the 
police and vice versa (Aliverti, 2012a, Aliverti, 2012b). For example, the 
Borders Act 2007 (Section 2) allowed detention of an individual at a port 
in E&W, and Northern Ireland (NI) by an immigration officer, if that officer 
thought the individual may be liable to arrest under sections 24(1)-(3) of 
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the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PCEA) 19847 or Articles 26(1)-(3) 
of PCEA Order (NI) 19898 or is subject to a warrant of arrest (Home 
Office, 2007b). Similarly, the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 
2009, allowed indictment, unlimited fines or prison for maximum of 2 
years (UKBA, 2009).  
The expansion of criminalising foreign nationals was not only in relation 
to immigration crimes; the ‘war on terror’ campaign policies, which began 
post 9/11, resulted in the coupling of immigration and security legislation 
to address the danger of international terrorism. For example, the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 made further provision 
in terms of terrorism and security. The ATCSA 2001 provided for the 
freezing of assets, made provision for immigration and asylum, amended 
and extended criminal law and powers for preventing crime and enforcing 
law, made provision for the control of pathogens and toxins, provided the 
retention of communications data, provided implementation of Title VI of 
the Treaty on European Union, and connected purposes (Home 
Secretary, 2001 ).  
ATCSA 2001 made a connection between foreign nationals (particularly 
asylum seekers) and terrorism by including measures meant to deny 
prospective or suspected terrorists access to asylum and allowing 
applicants’ fingerprints to be kept for ten years in order to prevent multiple 
                                                 
7
 ‘Arrest without warrant: constables: (1) A constable may arrest without a warrant—
(c)anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be about to commit an 
offence;(d)anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be committing an 
offence. 3) If an offence has been committed, a constable may arrest without a warrant—
(a)anyone who is guilty of the offence; (b)anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting to be guilty of it’.(1984). Police and Criminal Evidence Act. 60. UK: 
Legislation.gov. 
8
 Same text above. (1989). The Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 
1989. 1341. Northern Ireland/ UK Legislation.gov. 
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claims by such individuals. In addition, political and media discourse 
became louder to vindicate immigration control for national security, as 
well as the attendant legislation (Bosworth and Guild, 2008a). In 
consequence, foreign nationals (particularly Muslims), and even those 
with the appearance of being ‘foreigners’ or ‘Muslims’, were seen as 
potential terrorists or violent people (Gilmore, 2011).  
The subsequent immigration legislation, comprising the Nationality 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimant) Act 2004, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, and the Terrorism 
Act 2006 introduced new immigration crimes. The Acts placed greater 
restriction on the ability of foreign nationals to enter the UK, and placed 
an emphasis of suspicion on all asylum seeker cases (Schuster and 
Solomos, 2004, Kostakopoulou, 2006 , Somerville, 2007, p 22-24, 
Zedner, 2007, Mulvey, 2011). Even so, criminalising foreign nationals, or 
labelling them as potentially criminal, is not limited to these legislative 
changes. The next subsection will highlight changes in the operation of 
British borders as a means of addressing crime and confronting criminals.  
3.1.1.2 Controlling and reinforcing British borders  
Borders can be described as being like a filter, which distinguish between 
desirable and undesirable people, genuine from bogus, legitimate from 
illegitimate, and allow for only the ‘wanted’, those who contribute to 
economic growth, to enter a country (Anderson, 2013, p 2, Hampshaire, 
2009, p 230). In the academic literature and descriptions of practitioners, 
borders can also have a wider meaning. This moves beyond a simple 
territorial demarcation, and also contributes to defining a political space. 
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Political influence and the practice of law produce precise sorts of social, 
political and economic relationships that define foreign nationals 
(Anderson, 2013). Hampshaire (2009) suggests the term ‘differentiated 
borders’, which relates to the obstacles and barriers (including difficulties 
to obtain a British visa) in place for those from countries classified as 
high-risk (including asylum seekers, incidence of illegal entry, overstaying 
and terrorism), while at the same time the entry of other categories of 
travellers is facilitated. 
In 2002, the Home Secretary David Blunkett presented the White Paper 
‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’, which set out the key challenges facing 
British nationality. It called for new immigration policy to prevent the 
admission of ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and those who abuse the system 
(The Secretary of State, 2002). The White Paper focused on asylum 
seekers, and every time asylum seekers were mentioned, the terms 
‘abusing the system’, ‘applying new fair and effective policy’, or ‘the need 
for close integration’ appeared in the same line or paragraph. This gave 
presented a perception of all asylum seekers as abusing the system that 
immigration policy was not tough enough to control these abuses and 
that asylum seekers were not integrating into wider society.  
In February 2005, a five year plan for asylum and immigration was 
introduced by Charles Clarke, the Secretary of State for the Home Office, 
titled ‘Controlling our borders: Making migration work for Britain’. The 
paper introduced fingerprinting for non-EU visa applicants, pre-boarding 
electronic checks of all persons entering and leaving the UK by air, 
screening of visa applicants, expansions of the network of Airline Liaison 
Ofﬁcers (who work with carriers overseas to prevent undocumented 
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foreign nationals reaching the UK), and introduced ﬁxed penalty ﬁnes for 
employers for each illegal worker they employ (The Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, 2005). 
The 2005 White Paper focused on border control, which was enhanced 
after the London bombings in July 2005. Since then, the issue of border 
control has been associated with controlling the entry of criminals from 
outside the UK, as a part of the wider association with the control of 
crimes committed by foreign nationals. Thus, foreign nationals are mostly 
presented in a negative way; the positive aspects of foreign nationals and 
their historically significant role in building the British economy are often 
overlooked (Hampshaire, 2009, p 232).  
British borders were expanded during the last Labour term in office in two 
ways: externally and internally. External enlargement included 
agreements with some neighbouring countries, such as those made at 
the Seville summit in June 2002. The UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
Spanish PM Jose Marie Aznar met and proposed a campaign to harden 
trade policy and suspend foreign aid to developing countries that refuse 
to take back refugees whose applications for asylum have been rejected. 
The external expansion of borders also included the requirement from the 
airline companies to check travel documents and visas before allowing 
the passengers to come to the UK. If illegitimate passengers were later 
identified, the airline would be responsible for flying them back to their 
homeland (Guiraudon, 2006).  
Internal expansion occurred through a new set of policies designed to 
focus control interventions on the inflow of specific foreign nationals, 
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something that has been termed ‘remote border control’ (Hampshaire, 
2009, p 237). For example, under the pre-departure screening and carrier 
sanction, under Section 40 of IAA1999, the carrier (especially the owners, 
agents and operators of ships and aircraft) who operate international 
travel to the UK are liable to a charge (£2000) if they carry undocumented 
passengers (UK Border Agency (UKBA)). Therefore, UK authorities 
established the Risk and Liaison Overseas Network (previously known as 
Airline Liaison Officers and Risk Assessment Managers) to provide help 
for carriers in detecting inadequately documented passengers, thus 
reducing potential charges against them. The UK has a network of 
Immigration Liaison Managers overseas, a number of whom are in 
locations that have been identified as major sources or transit points for 
inadequately documented passengers arriving in the UK (sometimes 
known as IDAs) (UKBA).  
The association of foreign nationals with crime was used to restrict and 
expand British borders. The fear of crime, particularly that based in the 
direct relationship between foreign nationals (Muslims in particular) and 
terrorism, led to swift action by the British Government, especially after 
9/11 (Hampshaire, 2009, Aliverti, 2013b). In consequence, the UK border 
became less permeable even for legal foreign nationals, goods, and 
services. The policy of risk management and control in relation to 
potential illegal foreigners and products resulted in a slowdown in the 
passage of foreign passengers and trade, which eventually impacted on 
British economic growth (Hampshaire, 2009, p. 230). Managing foreign 
national offenders and tackling illegal immigrants have gone too far in 
British immigration policy; tackling ‘illegal immigrants’ has been applied 
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as a means to scrutinise the legal. For example, if the non-EEA students 
do not renew their student card every month with the international office 
of their university, enrolment with the university will be suspended or 
withdrawn, the student’s visa will be cancelled and they will be required to 
leave the UK.  
Having summarised the major developments in legislation and border 
control during this period, the next section will look more closely at the 
implications of criminalising foreign nationals by exploring how the 
quantity of foreign nationals has changed as a result. 
3.1.1.3 Managing ‘risky’ foreign nationals 
In the early 2000s, the number of failed asylum seekers removed from 
Britain increased. In 2003, Tony Blair announced that he would be taking 
‘personal control’ of asylum policy, and one of his main priorities would be 
swifter and more efﬁcient removals (Gibney, 2008).  
Due to the focus of the Labour Government’s immigration policy on the 
deportation of asylum seekers, it was soon overwhelmed by a deportation 
crisis of a different nature. In 2006, controversy emerged over the failure 
of Home Ofﬁce ofﬁcials to consider many non-citizens convicted of 
serious crimes for deportation. This eventually led to the resignation of 
the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke (Bosworth, 2011). In the wake 
of this event, new legislation was passed by Labour allowing for the 
mandatory deportation of individuals convicted of certain listed crimes or 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of a year or more (Anderson et al., 
2011, Bosworth, 2011). 
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For some time now, non-EU citizens sentenced to more than 12 months 
custody in E&W, and EU nationals sentenced to more than 24 months, 
have been deportable at the end of their sentences. Yet, until recently, 
the immigration and prison systems operated largely independently from 
one another. Since 2006, however, the Home Ofﬁce has prioritised the 
deportation of time-served FNPs and removal of failed asylum seekers 
(Bosworth, 2011). 
The terms risk and risk management have been used to describe an 
approach taken by government that does not ‘gamble’ with national 
security and the safety of citizens. A risk approach was used during 
Labour’s second term in office, and increased during the Coalition 
Government.  Foreign nationals have therefore been classified according 
to different categories of either high risk (those who are targeted for 
particular attention) or low risk (those who are subjected to lighter-touch 
controls) (Hampshaire, 2009, p. 231).  
The real question here is whether such risk management and related 
immigration control has been based upon accurate data, or whether this 
data has been of an estimated nature, or even exaggerated in order to 
serve certain policy objectives. Whichever is correct, the fact is that risk 
management plays an essential role in determining which groups to 
target for more inflexible checks and which to target for facilitated entry 
and exit (Hampshaire, 2009).  
To conclude, Labour immigration policy indicates how the criminality of 
foreign nationals was used to distinguish between ‘desirable’ and ‘non 
desirable’ persons to enter, live and work in the UK. This general 
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background becomes clearer when considered in reference to crime 
policy of the Labour Government. This will be explored in the next part to 
which will explore and explain the representation of foreign nationals in 
CJS statistics.  
3.1.2 The Labour’s crime policy  
Labour crime policy can be generally described as being focused on 
apparently tough and more restrictive measures to tackle the crime and 
criminals. Implementation of their policies produced an increase in the 
numbers of people coming into contact with the CJS, a particularly 
relevant example being the increase in the stop and search, and the 
prison population, especially FNPs (Criminal Justice Alliance, 2011).  
3.1.2.1  ‘Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’  
This slogan is one of the most memorable of New Labour’s time in 
government, but its sincerity has since been criticised. The Criminal 
Justice Alliance (2011) argue that in reality the true focus of the Labour 
Government was on crime rather than its causes. As a result, between 
1997 and 2010 there was a significant increase in recorded crime and the 
number of people stopped, searched, trailed, and imprisoned (see 
Chapter 6). A study by the Ministry of Justice (2013b) found that between 
1999 and 2011 there was an increase in the population of prisons due to 
the two main reasons: an increase of those with Immediate Custodial 
Sentences between 2000 and 2005; a decline in the parole release rate 
from 2006/07, which meant that offenders served longer before being 
released.  
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The second largest increase was within the recall population. This 
reflected a higher recall rate caused by changes to the law making it 
easier to recall prisoners, and changes introduced in the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, which lengthened the licence period for most offenders. Recall 
prisoners also stayed in custody for longer because, prior to the 
introduction of Fixed Term Recalls (FTRs), under which some offenders 
are recalled for a fixed 28 days period, the Parole Board were required to 
review all recall cases. Since 2008, use of FTRs has increased and the 
recall population stabilised (Ministry of Justice, 2013b).  
It is not just that the population of prisoners has increased, but that 
sentences for certain crimes became longer. For example, the Forgery 
and Counterfeiting Act 1981 allows imprisonment for 6 months, a fine, or 
both for forgery, copying a false instrument, using a false instrument and 
using a copy of a false instrument. The Identity Cards Act in 2006 
introduced indictment for possession of false identity documents to a 
maximum of 10 years imprisonment, a fine, or both.  
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 allowed one or both of imprisonment and 
fines for trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation (UKBA, 2009). 
Furthermore, by introducing indeterminate sentences for the purpose of 
public protection in certain cases, this means that certain sentences were 
no longer than they had been before. In addition, the likelihood of 
offenders being imprisoned for breach of non-custodial sentences or 
recalled to custody for failure to comply with licence conditions was also 
increased (Ministry of Justice, 2013b).  
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Foreign nationals were most affected by these more punitive crime 
policies, despite the theoretical perception that the legislation did not 
target foreign nationals, however; its implications made foreign nationals 
the most disadvantaged group, as compared to their general population 
or to their British counter parts (see Chapter 6). The next part will provide 
some more detail on two instances where this has been the case: the war 
on terror and the war on drugs. 
3.1.2.2  The ‘war on drugs’  
In the decade between 1992 and 2001, the number of prisoners in E&W 
grew by 45 percent, as a consequence of the tough sentencing policies 
introduced through the declaring of ‘war on drugs’. Buchanan and Young 
(2000), argue that the war on drugs really meant a war on drug users, 
and instead of developing rehabilitative models it concentrated on 
prevention, prohibition and punishment. Due to the ‘war on users of 
drugs’, the numbers of FNPs for drug crimes gradually started to decline 
from the late 1990s, at a time when the number of British prisoners for 
drug crimes (using drugs rather than trafficking them) was increasing..  
Under the rubric of a generally tougher crime policy, intending to make 
punishment harsher and longer, drugs crimes were of concern in parallel 
to crimes of Violence Against The Person (VATP) and sexual offences, 
and the offenders convicted of these crimes produced a fundamental 
elevation in the prison population (Ministry of Justice, 2013b). Over a 
quarter of women prisoners in 2002 were foreign BAME prisoners, and 
had been given long ‘deterrent’ sentences for smuggling drugs (Councell 
and Olagundoye, 2003). In addition to the long sentences, in August 
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2008 the Home Office introduced a new category of foreign offender 
liable to deportation. Non-EU nationals who are convicted in the UK and 
receive a custodial sentence of any length for an offence relating to the 
supply of class A, B or C drugs would now be considered for deportation 
(Home Office, 2009).  
3.1.2.3 The ‘war on terror’ 
A couple of months after the 2001 riots in Bradford, Harehills, and 
Oldham, the 9/11 terrorist attacks negatively affected British race 
relations (Gilmore, 2011), with a particular impact on those in the Muslim 
community. Muslim individuals were increasingly suspected, stopped, 
searched and detained without charge (see figures 3.1A, B, C).  
Figure 3.1A: Arrested persons for terrorism-related offences
9
, 
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 Figure: 3.1B Charged persons for terrorism-related offences 
                                                 
9
 Domestic: refers to terrorist activity where there are no links to either Northern Ireland 
related or international terrorism. 
10
 International: refers to activity by an individual or a group of individuals (regardless of 
nationality) linked to or motivated by any terrorist group that is based outside the UK which 
operates in and from third countries. 
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Figure 3.1C Convicted persons for terrorism-related offences  
 
Source: Table A.13 Categorisation of persons arrested, charged and convicted after a charge for 
terrorism-related offences. Home Office 
The above figures show high numbers of arrests, charges and 
convictions, especially for those (BAME groups) who have link to or are 
motivated by any terrorist group that is based outside the UK, which 
operates in and from third countries. In addition, the peak increase was 
after the two main terrorist attacks (in the UK-USA context) since the turn 
of the century: 9/11 in the USA and the 7/7 in London. The results of 
these figures concur with previous studies that found arrests of Muslims 
and foreign nationals increased after 9/11 (Hing, 2006, Mythen et al., 
2009, Spalek and Davies, 2012). 
The large amount of immigration and security legislation, which expanded 
the immigration crimes and the crimes relating to terrorism, has further 
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implications. These legislative changes increased the chances of 
stereotyping toward foreign nationals and brought them into direct contact 
with the police, who now shared powers with immigration officers to be 
able to check the legal status of people in the street (Aliverti, 2013b, 
Aliverti, 2012b). The war on drugs during the last decade of 20th century, 
and the war on terror during the first decade of 21st century can therefore 
be considered to have elevated levels of suspicion, conviction and 
imprisonment significantly (Buchanan and Young, 2000, Amoore and de 
Goede, 2008). By considering the policies of the Coalition Government, 
the next section will explore the most recent developments in the UK 
context to have impacted on the association being made between foreign 
nationals and criminality. 
 The Coalition Government policy since 2010  
3.2.1 The Coalition’s immigration policy  
From the very beginning, the immigration policies of the Coalition 
Government were focused on minimising immigration into the UK, and 
doing so in such a way that shares many features with the historical 
antecedents that have been outlined in the previous chapter:  
The Government believes that immigration has enriched our culture and 
strengthened our economy, but that it must be controlled so that people 
have confidence in the system. We also recognise that to ensure cohesion 
and protect our public services, we need to introduce a cap on immigration 
and reduce the number of non ­ EU immigrants’ (Cameron and Clegg, 
2010, p 21). 
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3.2.1.1 The toughest measures and policies to control immigration  
When the Coalition Government came to power in 2010, their priority was 
to reduce the foreign national population and increase restrictions on 
immigration. The results came fast: the number of people who migrated 
to the UK in the year ending June 2013 decreased by 14,000, and the 
number of foreign nationals arriving from non-EU countries saw a 
significant decrease from 282,000 in June 2012 to 242,000 in June 2013. 
The formation of the Coalition Government in 2010 changed the political 
context of the immigration debate. The immigration policy set out in the 
Coalition Agreement states that it will ‘introduce an annual limit on the 
number of non-EU economic migrants admitted into the UK to live and 
work’. The target was to reduce net migration from its then current level 
of about 250,000 a year to ‘tens of thousands’ by 2015 (Parliament UK, 
2012).  
One of essential duties that the Coalition Government undertook was in 
controlling the number of non-EEA legal immigrants. Kershaw (2012), 
has denounced the immigration policy forthcoming in 2016 that intends to 
force non-European nurses who entered the UK after the 1st April 2011 to 
leave if they earn less than £35,000. This policy is similar to the Labour 
policy of 2008, whereby the Home Office announced that non-European 
residents’ doctors would not be able to apply for postgraduate training 
posts in the UK. The new policy followed continued criticism from doctors' 
bodies that UK graduates were unable to find work due to the 
competition, making it very difficult for the junior British doctor to find a 
job as a GP or consultant (BBC NEWS, 2008).  
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Furthermore, the political focus on controlling immigration has more 
recently even turned towards some EU citizens, in response to concern 
over the high levels of immigration by Polish, Romanian and Bulgarians. 
Ministers wish to demonstrate to critics, such as the anti-EU party UKIP, 
that Britain is not a ‘soft touch’ or beholden to Brussels. At the same time, 
they do not want to deter skilled foreign nationals who can help the 
economy. David Cameron wants to make sure people come to the UK 
‘for the right reasons’, not just to claim benefits. The government says it is 
particularly concerned about the pressure created by foreign nationals on 
local services, housing, and the health service. To tackle this, Cameron 
wants foreign nationals to have to prove they are ‘genuinely seeking 
employment’ to be able claim jobless benefits. This would be a tougher 
test than the current one and would include a requirement for jobseekers 
to speak English. Foreign nationals may also be kept off council house 
waiting lists in England for at least two years, under plans for councils to 
introduce a residency test. The Coalition Government wants the UK to 
get better at charging foreign governments for NHS treatment provided to 
non-working foreign nationals. Ministers are also examining the possibility 
of linking some benefits to contributions, which could exclude new 
arrivals from eligibility (BBC News, 2013a, BBC NEWS, 2013c, Riley-
Smith, 2013). 
EU foreign nationals found begging or sleeping on the streets can already 
be deported, and from 1st January 2014 have been barred from re-
entering the UK for a year - unless they get a job (De Peyer, 2013). In 
addition, EU foreign nationals are to have their benefits cut after six 
months unless they can confirm they are genuinely seeking work. The 
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government says the UK will not pay ‘out-of-work benefits’ to EU 
foreigners in the first three months of their stay, claiming that some 
foreign nationals clear the habitual residence test within a month of 
arriving. Employers paying less than the minimum wage will face a 
£20,000 fine per underpaid worker. There is also a proposal to impose a 
minimum earnings threshold below which EU migrants would not be 
entitled to benefits like income support. In the longer term, Cameron says 
he wants to impose restrictions on the freedom of movement in the EU, 
with new member states having to reach a certain income per head 
before they are allowed full access to other member states' labour 
markets (BBC News, 2013a, De Peyer, 2013). 
3.2.1.2  The ‘deportation turn’  
It is no exaggeration to talk of a ‘deportation turn’ in the practices of 
Western states in their dealings with unwanted foreign nationals (Gibney, 
2008). There has been a remarkable raise in the use of deportation by 
Western since the beginning of 1990s, along with a newfound public and 
ofﬁcial interest for removal, and thus we have seen an increase of the 
number of foreign nationals who leave these states by force (Anderson et 
al., 2011).  As a result, ‘David Cameron is to insist that illegal immigrants 
are deported to the European country where they first arrived, and 
rejected  EU proposals to stop countries deporting asylum seekers to the 
European country in which they first arrived, which places a 
disproportionate burden on countries like Greece (Philo et al., 2013, 
Briant, 2013). Deportation is a significant aspect of the Coalition 
Government’s ‘tough’ immigration policy. This measure has been used as 
a way to control unwanted foreign nationals, and can include those who 
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have become naturalised and have British citizenship if they have 
committed a serious crimes that threatens British society, such as 
terrorism or terrorism related offences (2014b). Deportation has also 
been used to reassure the public that there is a ‘tough’ policy towards 
illegal immigrants, with the ultimate goal of gaining their support in the 
forthcoming general election in 2015 (see Chapter 8).  
For example, in July 2013 the Home Office launched an infamous pilot 
project to encourage illegal immigrants to leave the country. The project 
used vans, which had colourful billboard posters on their sides, in six 
multicultural areas of London. The posters included a picture of handcuffs 
and carried the slogan: ‘In the UK illegally? Go home or face arrest’ 
(Barrett, 2013). The project was criticised, especially by members of the 
Liberal Democrats. Additionally, a large number of Britons saw the 
message as racist, and more than 200 complaints were received from 
immigrant rights groups and legal academics. In addition, a member of 
the House of Lords said that the signs were humiliating and a reminder of 
the racism campaigns of the past. Consequently, on October 9th 2013, 
the Advertising Standards Authority prevented the advertising from 
appearing again in its current form, but did confirmed it as a racist label 
(Saul, 2013).  
Shadow Home Secretary Yvette Cooper commented that one person 
returned to their home after the ‘ill-judged ad vans’, and called on 
Theresa May to take responsibility for the 'complete failure' of the 
campaign (Cooper, 2013). By the end of October 2013, the Home Office 
declared that only eleven people had contacted them were deported from 
the UK as a result of seeing the vans,, despite vans claiming in the style 
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of an official stamp of: ‘106 arrests last week in your area’ (Saul, 2013). 
Other political parties condemned the van project. The Liberal Democrat 
Business Secretary Vince Cable described the campaign as ‘stupid’ and 
mentioned that his party were not consulted about the idea, and would 
have opposed it had they known; Party president Tim Farron suggested 
they should take credit for not allowing it to go any further. UKIP 
commented that the scheme was ‘disturbing’, and reminiscent of a fascist 
dictatorship. The Home Secretary Theresa May told Parliament at the 
end of October it would cancel the scheme after the negative response 
from politicians and the public (BBC NEWS, 2013c). 
After the huge failure of this scheme, on October 10th 2013 Theresa May 
announced new government policies to create a ‘hostile environment’ for 
undocumented foreign nationals, with the launch of the Immigration Bill, 
which gained Royal Assent in April 2014. The new Immigration Act 2014 
introduced charges for non-EU foreign nationals to use the NHS and 
sweeping document checks across society for landlords, at banks, for 
those wishing to take their driving test, as well as at universities that had 
already begun this practice some years earlier (Crawford, 2013).  
Universities have been asked by the Home Office to do the job of 
immigration officers by monitoring the status of foreign national students 
and consistently checking their movements and attendance. In addition to 
taking a copy from student passports and visas, non-European students 
with Tier 4 General Student Visas are obliged to present their student 
card for scanning at least twice a year (HomeOffice.). This is a striking 
parallel to the responsibility of prisoners on conditional release, required 
to register or check in with a parole officer.  
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The most important thing the Act facilitated is the deportation of foreign 
national criminals, who are now forced to stage their appeals from 
overseas, partly to stop offenders avoiding deportation on human rights 
grounds (Article 8 of The Human Rights Act 1998). In addition, any 
planned marriage between a British citizen and a person from outside 
European countries will be scrutinised in order to reduce 'false' marriage 
for immigration purposes, which seems in line with the previous 
Conservative policy of Primary Purpose Rule (PPR)11 in 1983 (Home 
Office, 2013). 
3.2.2 The Coalition’s crime policy  
Under the Coalition programme of government, crime policy has been 
purported to focus on the causes of the crime, more freedom for the 
police and rehabilitation programmes: 
‘The Government believes that we need radical action to reform our 
criminal justice system. We need police forces that have greater freedom 
from Ministerial control and are better able to deal with the crime and anti-
social behaviour that blights people’s lives, but which are much more 
accountable to the public  they serve’ (Cameron and Clegg, 2010, p 13 ). 
3.2.2.1 Cut the crime rate  
It seems that the Coalition Government have learned from the criticism of 
Labour failing to enact the second half of their slogan. The focus of the 
Coalition Government in 2010 was on expanding the power of the police 
and reducing bureaucracy (Home Office). Much attention has been given 
                                                 
11
 PPR, required the applicant to prove ‘that the marriage was not entered into primarily to 
obtain admission to the United Kingdom’ WATCH UK. (2009). How did immigration get out 
of control? . Newspaper, [Online] Pages. Available at 
http://www.migrationwatchuk.co.uk/BriefingPaper/document/116 [Accessed 11/10/2013 
2013]. p,9. 
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to the role of alcohol and drugs as criminogenic agents, as well as the 
holding of knives and firearms (Cameron and Clegg, 2010, Home Office).  
Under the policies of the Coalition Government, much attention have 
been given to foreign nationals and their involvement with crime, 
especially drug, weapon, trafficking and other serious crimes, not least 
terrorism. Foreign nationals are often considered as a negative risk 
importer; therefore, many precautions have been taken under the guise 
of ‘defending’ the nation from the risks that foreign nationals are seen to 
bring, including terrorism, crime, social disorder, cultural issues, public 
health issues and strain on the economy (Hampshaire, 2009, p 229-230).  
The trend in the most recent police statistics is an overall decrease in the 
recorded crime in the UK (Home Office, 2011a), but the extent to which 
information generated by the police can be trusted has been questioned 
by many, including Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
(Inspection of Cheshire Constabulary, 2014). Their report found no 
policies or strategies to direct and inform crime recording, relying instead 
on officers complying with the National Crime Recording Standard 
(NCRS) and Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR). Similarly, the ONS 
found:  
‘in accordance with the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007, 
statistics based on police recorded crime data have been assessed against 
the Code of Practice for Official Statistics and found not to meet the 
required standard for designation as National Statistics’ (Flatley, 2014, p 3).  
Davies and Francis (2011 ) explain how the police have the authority to 
decide whether the reported/discovered crime is a notifiable (-recorded) 
offence, and therefore whether or not to record it as a crime. The ‘blurred’ 
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policy of recording crime, and the discretionary power of the police to do 
so, raise the question of whether the approaches in meeting the NCRS 
and HOCR are effective or even ethical (Inspection of City of London 
Police, 2014).  
3.2.2.2  Minimising the pressure on prisons  
After the big increase in the prison population, especially from FNPs, 
during Labour’s time in office, and the economic crisis affecting most of 
the Western world since 2008, Coalition Government crime policy tried 
limit the building of new prisons or increasing prison capacity. Instead, 
their policies focused on restructuring the penal system to allow for closer 
engagement with local authorities, voluntary organisations, and police 
and probation services. This was intended to deter society from engaging 
in crime, and to increase public confidence in the CJS (Lyon, 2010).  
The recorded rate of stop and search has reduced significantly since 
2012, which has ‘positively’ affected recorded crimes. As Theresa May 
stated:  
In London, thanks to the leadership of Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, changes 
to stop-and-search show that it is possible to reduce the number of stops, 
improve the stop-to-arrest ratio, and still cut crime. Since February 2012, 
the Metropolitan police have reduced their overall use of stop-and-search 
by 20%, and they have reduced no-suspicion stop-and-search by 90%. In 
the same period, stabbings have fallen by a third and shootings by 40%. 
Complaints against the police have gone down and the arrest ratio has 
improved’ (Hansard, 2014e, col 831).  
One implication of the decline in stop and search was a decrease in the 
number of new offenders sent to the court; instead the courts have been 
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urged to reduce the population of those on remand in prison, resulting in 
a fall in their number in 2012 (Ministry of Justice, 2013b).  
Furthermore, the focus on rehabilitating offenders was due to the 50 
percent increase of located budget for prisons since 2000, the high cost 
of housing prisoners, and the high rate of reoffending. The then Justice 
Secretary Ken Clarke introduced a Green Paper ‘Breaking the Cycle: 
Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of Offenders’ in 
2010 in order to focus on ‘punishing offenders, protecting the public and 
reducing reoffending’ (Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, 
2010).  
However, the Coalition crime policy was also focused on addressing the 
issue that the increase in prison population was in part due to the growth 
in the FNP population. Therefore, it has developed a different policy, as 
the Justice Statistics Analytical wrote in his response to the FOI request 
made for this research to the Ministry of Justice (Ministry of Justice, 
2014b): 
‘Reducing the FNO population is a top priority for this Government and we 
are working hard to reduce the flow of FNOs into our prison system and 
increase the number of FNOs removed from the UK through Prisoner 
Transfer Agreements (PTAs)’  
Deporting FNPs and ex-offenders has been touched on often in political 
and parliamentary debates, with the intention to remove pressure from 
the prisons and allow for the success of prison rehabilitation 
programmes. Some Tories have blamed FNPs for putting more pressure 
on the CJS; Peter Bone (Con MP) had this to say on the effects of foreign 
nationals on prisons: 
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‘Wellingborough prison is in my constituency, and it is overcrowded all the 
time. Its prison officers, who do a wonderful job, tell me that they never 
have enough time to work with prisoners and get them educated, so that 
when they go back on the streets, they reoffend instead of being model 
citizens. That is partly due to the overcrowding, which is caused by there 
being so many foreign national prisoners’ (Hansard, 2010a, col 55WH). 
As a result of the new Coalition crime policy, the population of FNPs 
declined post 2010; however, the British prisoners population has 
increased at the same time (see table 6.8A). This has led some to reprise 
Martinson’s famous 1974 claim that when it comes to prisons reducing 
reoffending, ‘nothing works’ (Goodman, 2011). 
In May 2014, the Justice Secretary Chris Grayling sought to impose an 
automatic six-month jail term for any adult convicted of a second offence 
involving a knife. However, the Deputy Prime Minister objected to the 
proposal, partly because it includes minimum sentencing, which carries ‘a 
serious risk it could undermine the role of the judges’ (Hansard, 2014b, 
col 966). It is no surprise to find the population of prisoners has declined, 
as the different crime policies have played a significant role in confirming 
the slogan: ‘the CJS is fit for the purpose’.  
 The experience of asylum seekers: A case study 
In the past, the UK has demonstrated itself as a place that welcomes 
vulnerable and persecuted people seeking asylum (see Section 2.1.2). 
However, the expansion of arriving asylum seekers since the 1990s 
created a problem, more specifically a so-called European asylum 
problem (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). As with previous cases studies 
presented above, what follows will demonstrate the general 
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characteristics of this group and the issues that are associated with 
asylum seekers, especially those relating to crime and criminality.  
3.3.1 The characteristics of asylum seekers  
There was a considerable increase of the inflow of asylum seekers during 
the 1990s when immigration policy was less restricted. This increase 
peaked during the first years of the Labour Government, but started to 
decrease following implementation of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act (NIAA) 2002, when the asylum system became tougher.  
Figure 3.2: Asylum seekers inflow in England and Wales 1993-2012 
 
Source: Table 2.04 Long-Term International Migration time series 1991 to 2012; The Main 
Reason for Migration, E&W, ONS. The MoJ and MPS (FOI)
  
The majority of those asylum seekers came from South Asia (Pakistan, 
India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka) (Refugee Council 
information, 2013). Most asylum seekers in these cases are poor 
economically and some cannot speak English (Poppleton et al., 2013); 
however, some are highly educated and left much behind in order to seek 
safety (Doyle and O’Toole, 2013)  
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3.3.2 Asylum seekers issues and negative public sentiment  
Many societal issues have been linked to asylum seekers; however, this 
section will focus only on a limited number of key themes that are similar 
to the previous case studies issues in order to keep the research aims 
relating to the case studies aims manageable and deliverable.  
3.3.2.1 Population pressure  
The media and a number of political parties have criticised the 
considerable increase in the inflow of asylum seekers to the UK since the 
1990s (Kent, 2001, UKIP, 2010). Therefore, subsequent immigration 
policy, especially that of the Coalition Government administration, has 
promised on different occasions to significantly reduce the number of 
foreign national arrivals to the UK in response to the issues such as the 
economic crisis and perceived threats to national security. Thus, as a 
result of recent unrest in Syria, the UK accepted just 500 Syrian refugees 
compared to the 10,000 taken in by Germany (Wintour, 2014). 
3.3.2.2 Public health pressures  
In a similar fashion to BAME populations, asylum seekers have been 
connected to various health problems and blamed for delays faced by the 
general population in receiving NHS treatment (Cherfas, 2006, Poppleton 
et al., 2013). There has been a heated mainstream discourse regarding 
the accessibility of the health care system to foreign nationals in general 
and asylum seekers in particular (Cherfas, 2006). However, research 
studies (Migration Advisory Committee, 2012, Cherfas, 2006) have not 
found foreign nationals to be placing any significant pressure on the 
National Health Service (NHS) (see in contrast Poppleton et al., 2013) 
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and for the benefit of the society these foreigner need to have a free 
access to the health services.  
Therefore, the Immigration Act 2014 continued to give free health access 
to asylum seekers and placed charges on other types of foreign nationals 
(except those who have indefinite leave to remain, and EU citizens).  
3.3.2.3  Economic  pressure  
In order to make the immigration and asylum system tough for those 
claiming false asylum (without a well-founded fear of persecution), 
immigration and social policies aimed to ensure that foreign workers can 
enter only when there is a shortage in their specialist field so they can 
offer value to the UK economy (Policy and Strategy Group, 2010). Those 
who are homeless or do not have funds to buy food (so-called 
‘destitutes’) may receive benefit (UK Visas and Imiigration (UKVI), 2014). 
Initially, asylum seekers are expected to rely on their own resources, but 
if they are destitute they can apply for support from the National Asylum 
Support Service (NASS) (this facility was introduced following the 
passage of the IAA1999) (Bell and Machin, 2013a). In any case, asylum 
seekers are not allowed to claim mainstream welfare benefits and NASS 
provisions are very basic regarding the level of financial support they 
provide (see Table 3.1 in Appendix 2).  
In addition, while asylum seekers wait for a decision on their application 
for asylum, they have no automatic right to work (paid or unpaid) or to 
seek permission to work. Asylum seekers do not have the same 
entitlements as refugees and those with other forms of protection to 
government funded training and for work programs (Carter, 2008 ).  
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The Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 discouraged employers from using 
asylum seekers by making it an offence to employ those who have false 
documents and those who have no right to work in the UK. NIAA 2002 
made further controls on asylum seekers and abolished their right to 
apply for permission to work, on the ground that all application processes 
would then be sped up, and the majority of application would be finalised 
in three months (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). In 2004, new guidance 
was issued that dictated employers have to check the documents of their 
employees to see if they are entitled to work. In 2005, The Immigration, 
Asylum and Nationality Act enforced a civil penalty of £5000 (quadruple 
in 2014) on those employers who employed a person subject to 
immigration-control restriction (McKay, 2009, p 61- 62).  
Legislation such as these have effectively barred employers from 
employing particular communities, such as those from ethnic minorities, 
for fear of prosecution and fine (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). The 
2008 Prevention of Illegal Working guidelines are rooted in the 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. They promote migration 
compliance and penalize those who break the rules.  
Biometric overseas border controls are introduced within prescribed 
categories, as well as tougher enforcement for non-compliance, including 
fines of up to £10,000 in 2008 (doubled in 2014) for employers who 
employ illegal migrant workers (Carter, 2008 , Home Office, 2009). 
From September 9th 2010, qualified asylum seekers and failed asylum 
seekers have been given the right to apply for a permission to get a paid 
job under the following conditions (Policy and Strategy Group, 2010): 
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1.  The claim has been outstanding for at least twelve months 
2.  The delay cannot be attributed to the applicant 
3.  Not applying for permission to become self-employed 
4.  The applicant will only be allowed to take up a job, which is 
included on the list of shortage occupations published by UKVI 
Once legally entitled to work, refugees face a range of barriers to 
employment. A significant barrier is that they will have been unemployed 
for several months, or even years. These issues are exacerbated by the 
government offering only small grants to the main refugee agencies to 
help support settlement (Sales, 2002). The limited financial support 
available to asylum seekers received much attention in parliamentary 
debates, with some MPs criticising the amount and the method of 
delivery (vouchers) that are in place to help the asylum seekers cover 
living expenses in the UK while they await their case decision (Hansard, 
2001a). In a question by Anne Campbell (Lab MP) to the Secretary of 
State (David Blunkett):  
‘… Does he (the Secretary of State) understand that asylum seekers find 
the process of making purchases with vouchers humiliating? In addition, 
they are unable to get full value for money because of shops' inability to 
give change on the vouchers. Will my right hon. Friend therefore make sure 
that any future system addresses both those problems and will he try to 
ensure a speedy conclusion to the review?’ (Hansard, 2001a, col 1-2) 
The language around asylum and refugees has changed and since 
become linked to issues around benefit and welfare, as a study in the 
Glasgow University conducted how the media covered asylum in the 
press and television news in 2006 and 2011 (Briant, 2013): 
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‘…the language itself, the difference between refugee and asylum seeker, 
you do not hear the word refugee anymore, its asylum seeker all the time’  
Asylum seeker has been reconfigured as somebody seeking benefits. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the spending cuts that were being pushed 
through during the period, a sample of 2011 press reports revealed an 
increase in the representation of asylum seekers as a ‘burden’ on the 
taxpayer (Briant, 2013). 
3.3.2.4 Housing pressures  
The 1993 Asylum and immigration Appeal Act had reduced the right to 
accommodation for homeless asylum seekers, and the Asylum and 
Immigration Act 1996 eliminated the right of being offered housing for all 
asylum seekers (Humphries, 2004, UKBA, 1997). The most important 
change was in 2000, when the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 came 
into force, removing existing rights to housing and all types of benefits. A 
new setup housing and subsistence scheme for asylum-seekers, 
administered by the UK Border Agency has been introduced. Since 2000, 
homeless asylum-seekers have been housed in specially commissioned 
emergency accommodation on first arriving in the UK. After this they 
have the option to apply for a ‘subsistence only’ package or for 
subsistence and accommodation (Rutter and Latorre, 2009).  
3.3.2.5 Crime pressures  
There are three types of crimes that have been connected to asylum 
seekers: bogus claims (abuse the immigration system), engaging in 
illegal working and potential engagement in property crimes.   
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Sales (2002), Bloch and Schuster (2002) argued that the tightened 
immigration policy on non-EU economic migrants made them look for 
other legitimate ways, such as seeking asylum, to gain access to Europe. 
The motivation of seeking asylum to the UK has been suspected by many 
to be motivated by economic factors (Kent, 2001). Since the 1990s, 
politicians and the media have repeatedly circulated the word ‘bogus’ and 
connected asylum seekers, which has placed a burden of suspicion on all 
applications until proven genuine.  
The British Government’s tough response to new applications can be 
seen as in line with the general trend across Europe of more restrictive 
policies towards asylum seekers (Zetter and Pearl, 2000). 
The Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 aimed to deter those 
arriving in the UK for economic and not political reasons as they claimed 
(Schuster, 2003, p 62). The Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, formalized 
the discussion of ‘deserving’ and undeserving’ asylum seekers, and 
made reference to those whose claimed fear was deemed unfounded 
(Sales, 2002, Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). 
The term ‘bogus asylum seekers’ has been used without clarity and 
precision, and in practice those who failed to prove their cases or had 
their cases considered as unsuccessful are usually suspected to be 
bogus or at least the considered by the public as such (Neumayer, 2005, 
UNHCR, 2013). This is in spite of the UN stating that the term ‘bogus’ or 
‘illegal’ asylum seeker does not exist, and if an asylum seeker has not 
received refugee status and been deported that does not mean s/he is 
bogus. As Kofi Annan (UNHCR, 2013) said: 
- 109 - 
 
‘Let us remember that a bogus asylum-seeker is not equivalent to a criminal; 
and that an unsuccessful asylum application is not equivalent to a bogus one’ 
Political rhetoric and government documents (Home Office, 2007a) reveal 
a lack of clarity and the random use of undefined terms like ‘bogus’ and 
‘failed asylum seekers’. At first it might seem that those who cannot 
present their case well, or whose cases are ended because of unfounded 
fear are considered as ‘bogus’ (Wainwright and Ward, 2006). Even so, 
the few ‘bogus’ asylum seekers have dominated the general discourse 
around those vulnerable people who seek refuge in the UK, fleeing from 
torture and persecution.  
Furthermore, controlling immigration policy has been stated as a 
necessity for preventing the nation from being subject to crime and 
terrorism (Hansard, 2001g, col 629, 652) There are numerous occasions 
when asylum seekers have been suspected of being potential terrorists 
or less law-abiding than the indigenous population (Hansard, 2001d, col 
154). The statement of Lord John Cope (Con) named immigrants and 
asylum seekers as a problem that needs to be confronted strictly, through 
forcing them to appreciate British values and thus avoiding the horror and 
destruction that America has experienced; this presents a clear means of 
criminalising foreign nationals and connecting them to violence and 
terrorism. 
Different MPs have placed pressure on the government to control 
immigration policy, especially through the asylum system and by 
introducing tougher measures in general, because of the perceived 
relationship between foreign nationals and different sorts of crimes 
(Hansard, 2001g, col 657, Hansard, 2001e, col 675, 681). However, 
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restrictive immigration policy and tough measures to control some 
nationalities mean British immigration policy can be considered 
essentially racist. Rejecting asylum for people with convictions for crime, 
or suspecting and deporting them to a country in which the deportee 
would be likely to suffer torture, cruel or inhuman treatment has been 
criticised by Lord William Goodhart (Lib. Dem). He found it as a 
breaching Article 3 of The European Convention on Human Rights 
(Hansard, 2001d, col 268). 
Moreover, it is argued by some that individuals rationally choose between 
criminal and legal activity by comparing the expected net benefit from 
each activity (Becker, 1968), Ehrlich (1973) found that there is a positive 
relationship between income inequality and crimes against property. In 
their qualitative report Burnett and Whyte (2010) indicated the 
occupational risks faced by undocumented workers in the UK, describing 
the immigration and social policies asylum seekers are subject to 
(including those who are in the process, failed asylum seekers, and those 
who could not go back to their home country for various reasons). The 
report found there are hundreds of thousands of ‘refused’ asylum seekers 
in the UK who will not voluntarily return home through fear of torture, 
regardless of whether their claim has been accepted or not. Forced into 
destitution, working is the only way through which they can obtain the 
means through which to exist on the margins of society. Yet, unable to 
work ‘legally’, they are forced into the ‘black market’ as undocumented 
workers. Banned from working for the first twelve months after arrival, 
and subject to very restricted conditions under which they have the right 
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to apply for a permission to work, this forces many asylum seekers to 
engage in illegal activities, including working illegally (Sales, 2002).  
The consequences of abolishing the right to work for asylum seekers has 
been questioned in Parliament, and the immigration policy abolishing the 
right to work for asylum seekers does no favours to either them or the 
British public, as it will drag some asylum seekers to engage in illegal 
working. As Tony Banks (Lab MP) (Hansard, 2001d, col 743) stated: 
 ‘…I am also looking forward to proposals to allow refugees and economic 
migrants to work. It is scandalous how we treat these people. They want to 
work but are told that they cannot. We are forcing them into areas of 
uncertain employment and we are inflicting poverty on them. It is 
unacceptable. I look forward to a proper immigration policy…’ 
However, the Secretary of State has not replied properly on the raised 
issues (Hansard, 2001a, col 3), as he said:  
‘I am aware of the strong feelings—how could I not be?—about the 
operation of the system generally and the perception of vouchers in 
particular. That is precisely why my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary 
initiated the voucher review, why we have taken our time to take the 
suggested changes on board and why I want to make any change part of a 
much broader package of measures’ 
There was concern that continuing the immigration policy would lead 
asylum seekers to commit crimes and engage in illegal economic 
activities, shown when Tony Banks asked of the junior minister for the 
Home Office (Angela Eagle) in the House of Commons:  
‘There are many thousands of asylum seekers in my constituency. I do not 
sneer at economic migrants, who have come to this country to try to make 
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a contribution. Thousands of them have nothing to do. If that position is 
allowed to persist, they will enter the unofficial economy, as they 
undoubtedly already do. It is demeaning to individuals who want to work not 
to be able to do so. I therefore ask my hon. Friend to think about the policy 
again’(Hansard, 2001a, col 7). 
Nevertheless, the minister’s reply seemed to misunderstand the point of 
helping asylum seekers, with many of them having fled dangerous 
situations in order to found a better life in a new country. The reply of the 
minister was (Hansard, 2001a, col 7-8):  
‘If those people have applied for asylum, they have come to this country 
because they are fleeing torture. For those who are economic migrants, my 
right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will have something to say about 
organising the way in which we will deal with them in a more coherent way 
in the future. My hon. Friend should not mix up the two’ 
it is hard to determine the exact population of asylum seekers who are 
working illegally in the UK, due to the secretive nature of this 
phenomenon and the lack or recorded data. However, researchers have 
used data in accordance with Public Service Agreement 3 Indicator 4 
(Increase the proportion of ‘higher harm’ enforced removals and voluntary 
departures) by the UKVI. The harm of those working illegally in the UK, or 
making dishonest claims for asylum support and identity fraud is 
assessed as ‘medium’ (see table 3.2 in Appendix 2).  
It needs to be taken into consideration that the numbers in the table do 
not show the precise number of illegal workers, and even where the 
illegal worker population is included it does not refer to how many asylum 
seekers are working illegally because of the limited (or complete lack of) 
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financial support for failed asylum seekers. However, the numbers are 
used to provide an illustration of the large number of ‘known’ illegal 
workers, and it is predicted that the number of those not found exceeds 
that published in table 3.2. 
In addition to the accusation of being bogus, asylum seekers have been 
connected to property crimes. The relationship between asylum seekers 
and property crime has been widely covered in the studies by Bell, 
Machin and Fasani. They developed an economic model to explain 
motivations to commit crimes, and they recognized that the economic 
situation of British and EU workers is better than foreign nationals. The 
authors found a one percent increase in the asylum seekers share of the 
local population is associated with a 1.1 percent rise in property crime, 
but no change in violent crime (Bell et al., 2010, Bell and Machin, 2013a).  
Bell and Machin (2013a), found that property crime rates are significantly 
higher in areas in which asylum seekers are located, but there is no 
significant relationship between foreign nationals (asylum seekers in 
particular) and violent crime. They reached this conclusion after 
controlling for the location choice and crime trends within the Police 
Force Area. The same picture emerges when the time-series evolution of 
incarceration rates are explored, which suggest a rise in the rate of 
incarceration of foreigners from asylum seeking countries as the asylum 
wave arrived in the UK. 
The strong economic opportunities that foreign national groups have, and 
their intention to work in the UK, explained their significant negative 
impact on property crime and their lack of effect on violent crimes. Those 
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who do not have labour market access after coming to the UK and face 
restriction on their engagement with the labour market are more prone to 
involvement in criminal activities than other foreign nationals and the 
indigenous population. In other words, the motivation of asylum seekers 
was different, they are not allowed to work in the UK upon arrival, and 
they also have reduced access to welfare benefits. Given the lengthy 
process involved in deciding asylum applications, this restriction is likely 
to have increased the relative returns to crime (Bell et al., 2010, Bell and 
Machin, 2011).  
Similarly, Ochsen (2010) has looked at European immigration policy and 
the limited labour market opportunities for asylum seekers. She 
confirmed the ‘indirect relationship’ between immigration and social 
policies via unemployment and asylum seekers engaging in crime. 
However, an increase in the share of foreigners decreases assault and 
drug offenses signiﬁcantly, which is incompatible with the social 
disorganization theory. 
Many asylum applicants have been waiting for more than a year for their 
decision, and the appeal process can often elongate this wait. The 
outcome of such legislation reflects an immigration policy that leans 
towards exempting asylum seekers from the labour market, and as a 
result exacerbates socioeconomic problems for asylum seekers. This 
therefore increases the likelihood of their involvement in crimes, property 
crimes in particular (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006, McKay, 2009, P 61).  
Although they provide some useful insight, the application of economic 
theories does not account for other factors. For example, the awareness 
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of the consequences of committing crime in a foreign country and the 
implications on their residency or legal status in that country may be a 
deterrent from engaging in criminal activity. The awareness of the cost of 
crime and being caught differ between British nationals and foreign 
nationals (Bell et al., 2010). For asylum seekers, being caught for 
committing a crime means a high likelihood of being deported (in many 
cases) from the country, this is exactly the situation most asylum seekers 
would not want to be in. Moreover the methodology of (Bell et al., 2010, 
Bell and Machin, 2013a) identifies the asylum wave effect using 
nationality, even though the majority of such nationals were unlikely to be 
asylum seekers. Their study is thus prone to criticism in terms of its ability 
to control the data and allow firm conclusions to be drawn from such 
researches.  
A report published by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
confirmed that there is no evidence for a higher rate of criminality among 
refugees and asylum seekers. In fact, according to ACPO, asylum 
seekers are more likely to become victims of crime. There have been 
countless attacks on asylum seekers around Britain, including the 
murders of an asylum seeker in Glasgow in 2001 and in Sunderland in 
2002. The murder in Glasgow prompted the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees to condemn the British media for provoking racial hatred 
(Salford City Council, 2012). 
Despite the unfortunate absence of data describing the level and the type 
of crimes that asylum seekers are engaging in (HM Prison Service, 
2008), research still shows sympathy for the argument that proposed 
links to the black market and engagement in property crimes. This 
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perspective leaves vulnerable foreigners with little choice and a 
probability to engage in illegal activities to meet their daily needs.  
Due to the poor economic situation of most asylum seekers caused by 
their lack of working rights, and the limited resources they can access in 
the UK (which cease after their cases are rejected), it is easy to see why 
they can be ‘Invariably and inevitably… sucked into the black economy’, 
as Tony Baldry said (Hansard, 2006b, col 14). The Conservative MP 
criticised the Labour Government and their management of the asylum 
system, which essentially encourages asylum seekers to commit 
immigration crimes – either through being in the UK illegally or working 
illegally (Hansard, 2011a, col 1014).  
 The media role in criminalising foreign nationals  
Some sections of the media produce misleading reports and use 
inaccurate data; sensationalised reporting with the intention of selling 
newspapers and the common by-product of increasing public fear and 
distrust (Wainwright and Ward, 2006). Wainwright and Ward found that 
many reports present misleading allegations against foreign nationals 
and asylum seekers, and link foreign nationals inappropriately and 
repeatedly to Islamic fundamentalists’ terrorists and organised crime. 
This has negatively affected public attitude, particularly against those who 
are seeking asylum from Islamic countries as can sometimes be 
represented as potential terrorists. There is no doubt that the media has a 
significant role in elevating negative sentiments against foreign nationals, 
often using inaccurate or unreliable data to link them to crime and imply 
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that foreign nationals are more prone to commit crime than natives (Unity, 
2008).  
Hansen (2003) and Boswell, Chou and Smith (2005) debated the political 
and media role in directing public opinion, concluding that European 
opinions towards immigration could be influenced into becoming broadly 
negative if they support particular ‘racist’ parties and access the ‘bad 
media’ of the ‘gutter press’. For instance, crimes committed by black or 
West Indian youths have been highlighted and aggrandized by some 
media and newspapers, such as The Sun. These actions increase 
negative attitudes toward immigration in some sections of the British 
population (Solomos, 2003). 
Significantly, misleading media reports do not only affect public attitudes, 
but also impact immigration policy as well. Somerville (2007), argued that 
in this respect the media have a direct and indirect influence. In direct 
terms, they influence the attitude of politicians and pressure them to 
change policy. An example of this is how a big campaign run by The Sun 
in 2004, in response to Labour’s announcement of an open door policy 
for EU A-8, ‘inspired’ Conservative leader Michael Howard to oppose the 
Labour plan. The indirect impact arises when discussion in the media 
takes account of the ‘presentation of policy development (Somerville, 
2007, p 136, Spencer, 2003). 
The Glasgow University Media Unit conducted a comparative study of 
how the media covered asylum in the press and television news in 2006 
and 2011. They found common usage of the term ‘illegal immigrant’ 
across all national UK TV news reports in the 2006 sample in which 
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asylum seekers were discussed. Only the Scottish regional broadcasts 
avoided the term altogether. The term ‘illegal immigrant’ (or variations 
such as ‘illegals’) was also common in the press, appearing 90 times in 
34 articles in which asylum seekers were discussed, with the highest 
usage in The Daily Mail (25) and The Times (18). In 2011, the term was 
used less on TV, but still appeared a concerning amount in the press. 
Across all 69 articles in the 2011 sample, the term ‘illegal immigrant’ (or 
variations such as ‘illegals’) appeared 48 times. 16 of these were found in 
The Daily Express and 11 in The Sun (Briant, 2013) 
Hostile coverage on the part of the media has a great impact on the 
representation and subsequent experience of asylum seekers in the UK, 
leading to verbal and physical abuse by some racist groups. It also 
legitimises negative public responses in a climate of panic, and demands 
immediate action from policy makers (Davies and Francis, 2011 ). Now, 
more than ever, care needs to be taken to ensure that refugees are not 
caught up in a debate over immigration, or presented in ways that can be 
exploited by populist groups in the wake of the Woolwich attack12.  
On the other hand, stereotyping BAME groups and the 
overrepresentation of black people in particular in CJS, statistics 
increases fear of these people and strengthen the perception of their 
involvement in crime. This relationship has been spearheaded and 
highlighted by the media, exaggerating the criminality of BAME groups 
                                                 
12
 The soldier Lee Rigby had been hacked to death by Michael Adebolajo and Michael 
Adebowale, the murderers used holy war as a justification for the murder in Woolwich 
London May 22/ 2013 
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and significantly contributing to increasing negative sentiments against 
them (Solomos, 2003). 
Igartua and Cheng (2009), studied the effects of how newspapers frame 
immigration. The newspaper highlighted the positive (economic 
contribution frame) versus negative (crime growth frame) consequences 
and associated certain nationalities with each frame. The crime growth 
frame stimulated responses that are more negative, increased the 
salience of immigration as a problem, generated a negative attitude 
toward immigration, and induced greater disagreement with positive 
beliefs about the consequences of immigration for the country. 
The media can also present and sometimes ‘exaggerate’ stories 
anticipating large numbers of future newcomers and their detrimental 
impact on British jobs, culture, and crimes, particularly after the 2004 EU 
free movement directive. Foreign nationals in general, and more recently 
those coming from Poland, Romania, and Lithuania, have topped the 
immigration and crime headlines. For example, ‘Foreigners 'commit fifth 
of crime in London' (Harper and Leapman, 2007), ‘Immigrant crime soars 
with foreign prisoners rising’ (Giannangeli, 2013), ‘Coalition must come 
clean on immigration nightmare’ (Express, 2013), and 'Immigrant crime 
wave' warning: Foreign nationals were accused of a QUARTER of all 
crimes in London’ (Doyle and Wright, 2012). 
In addition, some media reports intended to increase anti-immigration 
sentiments and the fear of foreigners by relying on the high arrest rate of 
foreign nationals to imply the criminality of those foreigners. However, the 
arrest data does not demonstrate criminality among foreign nationals; in 
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contrast, it supports the studies that confirm discrimination of CJS 
institutions towards some minorities in the UK (Smith, 1997, Modood, 
1997). The high arrest rate of foreign nationals could be looked at from a 
much broader perspective and link the criminalization and victimization of 
foreign nationals to the political economy and global social structures 
(Palidda, 2009, p 313). 
In summary, negative media coverage has done much to present hatred 
headlines and stories about the linkage between asylum seekers and 
different sorts of crimes, mostly without recourse to a reliable source. As 
Lord David Davies commented (Hansard, 2001e, col 239): 
 ‘With regard to asylum seekers, I have seen it reported that there could be 
as many as 200,000 to 300,000 asylum seekers who have been denied 
entry to this country, but nevertheless have melted into our society and are 
surviving by way of the black economy. We do not know how many of those 
have become members of terrorist cells. Another newspaper report 
suggests that there are as many as 1,200 terrorists living in Britain today. 
This state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue. In my view, the law 
should be tightened accordingly’ 
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Chapter 4 Theorising the relationship between foreign 
nationals and crime 
 
Many of the related theoretical and empirical studies outlined in Chapters 
2 and 3 advocated the necessity to look at immigration policy, legislative 
expansion, political narratives, and the media as a process of social 
constructivism, rather than focusing only on external factors (like the 
economic and social position) to explain the overrepresentation of foreign 
nationals in the CJS statistical data (Solivetti, 2011, Banks, 2011, Aliverti, 
2013a).  
Social constructivist traditions understand that knowledge is developed 
and constructed through human interaction, the influence of social 
context, and via policies and law (Whiteside et al., 2012, Berger and 
Luckmann, 1991).  This provides the epistemological foundations for this 
thesis for many reasons. Firstly, it is most closely related to the research 
questions that examine how foreign nationals have been criminalised 
within historical, political, and legal contexts. Social constructivism theory 
allows this research to engage with some important questions, such as 
how has the criminalisation of foreign nationals been politicised and what 
is the implication of the foreign criminality discourses, and why there is 
opacity in the recording and publishing of CJS data by nationality. 
Secondly, this theory is deployed to provide a more nuanced approach to 
analysing the statistical data of the CJS and thus aims to fill the gap in 
theoretical knowledge on the level of crime that foreigner nationals are 
seen to be involved in the UK. To this end this research intended to 
- 122 - 
 
critically examine the over criminalisation and overrepresentation of 
foreign nationals in the British legal system (Whiteside et al., 2012, 
Andrews, 2012). Thirdly, while social constructivism examines the 
subjective meanings, it highlights the intellectual basis of discourse 
analysis (Chamberlain, 2013) for the political and Parliamentary debates 
that this research has used to examine how the relationship between 
foreign nationals and crime were discussed in Westminster which it is 
argued is central to the imagination of foreigners’ criminality.  Finally, 
social constructivism provides the foundations to investigate the further 
impact of immigration, crime legislation (the crimmigration crisis) and the 
media in the further propagation of the image of criminality and its 
application to foreign nationals in order to facilitate changes to law and 
increase public confidence in immigration policy.  
This chapter will thus explain what social constructivism theory is, how it 
explains criminality and deviance, how the theory interprets the criminality 
of foreign nationals in the context of politics,  and how the CJS has been 
affected by the cooperation between immigration and crime laws in the 
UK enhancing the linkage between foreigners and crime.  
 Social constructivism theory  
Social constructivism is an interdisciplinary theory that cuts across 
different disciplines such as sociology, psychology, science, education 
and philosophy (Henry, 2009). Social constructivism argues that 
knowledge is developed by jointly constructed understandings of the 
world, and the coordination among human beings develops the 
understanding, significance, and meaning of the social world (Miller and 
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Fox, 1999). Thus, people explain their experience by creating a model of 
the social world and meanings, and they construct reality through 
language (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2009) and the media (Potter and Kappeler, 
2006).  
Social constructivism is fundamentally related to both the epistemological 
and the ontological assumptions of constructivism in ‘describing the 
bodies of knowledge developed over human history as social constructs 
that do not reflect an objective external world’ (Constantino, 2008, p 118). 
The philosophical view of this theory is that knowledge and truth is 
created and subjective as a result of our perspective (Schwandt, 1998, 
Howell, 2013), which offers a radical and critical alternative inquiry, 
especially in the social science disciplines and the humanities (Burr, 
2003). This thus infers that everything an individual comes to know is 
determined by a variety of factors, such as ideology, language, politics, 
culture and religion (Bayram, 2010). In other words, knowledge is built 
from human interactions as is contributed to by many influences such as 
policies and governance ideologies prevailing in society in addition to 
religious and moral values held by individuals. Humans, in turn, are 
subjects to law to maintain their own interests and social status (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1989). 
According to constructivists, humans create social reality through their 
interactions by identifying some ‘important’ aspects of social life, 
separating them from other aspects, acting as though they have a real 
existence (Henry, 2009, p 1). The extreme group of constructivists  
though believe that social reality is created inside human minds, who 
interpret the world and make images in their mind that they believe is 
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representative of reality. At the time, the moderate accept that there 
some form of reality fundamental exists, and even social constructions, 
once created, have a degree of reality in that they recognize that if 
humans define situations as real, then they are real in their 
consequences as Henry (2009, p 1), described:  
‘If we categorize behaviour, events, and experiences as similar, and name 
or label them in specific ways, they appear before us as representations of 
object-like realities with real effects that can be experienced positively or 
negatively’ 
Consequently, crime is seen as one of social realities that are collectively 
created to shape the social world and impacted by the actions of those 
who have the power into sustaining them as realities.  However, humans 
have the power to change these realities by recognising their role in its 
construction and collectively deconstruct and replace it with a less 
harmful reality (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2009).  
Constructivists believe that we create the social world through our words, 
our actions, and media products. For this reason, social constructivism 
theory lends itself particularly well to discussions of the connection 
between the macro and micro. Most often, this implies using analysis at 
the micro level (specific words, images, actions) to examine a macro 
process (or structure, or institution). For example, how the politicians and 
the media use words, images, and legislation describing criminality of 
foreign nationals and what role statistical data on offending has in 
enhancing the relationship between foreign nationals and crime thus 
constructing a particular identity as suspects, offenders, or victims.    
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 Social constructivism and crime  
Quinney (2008, p xiv), criticised the definition of crime; crime is not 
created according to the nature of behaviour rather it is generated and 
legislated by the political resident as the most powerful members of the 
society: 
 ‘Crime is a judgment made by some persons about the behaviour and the 
characteristics of others. Crime is an artificial construct created by a 
powerful segment of society to benefit their particular interests. In this 
sense the formulation of all criminal law is a political matter’  
The enforcement and the administration of criminal law are shaped as a 
public policy by those who have the power in society.  Criminal definitions 
are enacted by those powerful agents and are expanded and 
exacerbated by the increase in the conflict of interests between segments 
of a society. The substantive and procedural laws that emerge from this 
conflict reflect the interest of the powerful in protecting themselves from 
the competing interests of the powerless. Conduct that is perceived to 
threaten or conflict with the interests of the dominant groups is 
designated as criminal (Quinney, 2008, p xiv).  The dominant groups see 
to it that their particular definitions of criminality become enacted as law, 
ensconced in public policy and protected by the operation of the CJS 
(Quinney, 2008).    
Those who have titled authority and power construct the system of 
government we have created for ourselves. In creating the structure, they 
protect their own privilege. Those who are rewarded with titled places in 
the structure also protect those privileges for they aspire to their share in 
them. Those who are hired into the agencies and institutions of the 
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system gain higher authority and title, as well as some form of sharing in 
the profits, by following the agenda of the system. The owner class may 
have more than the others, but each is a stakeholder to a small extent.  
Since the definitions of crime are enacted by those in power, this ever-
widening gap in power as well as income puts even more power in the 
hands of the defining group. Not only that, but the criminal laws and 
regulations have been in effect now for a long enough time that they 
seem to just be there as a normative consensus. The original source of 
the definitions of deviance and crime are long forgotten. We no longer 
think to look for the unstated assumptions, for the injustices. The laws 
have come to feel ‘right’, and the definition of criminal accompanies more 
accurately our reaction to the behaviour than does the behaviour itself. 
The discussion on social and political powers and the way crime is 
socially constructed are important in order to explore how crime 
narratives emerge in society, who makes laws and for what purposes. 
The differences of social norms and values according to the differences 
in culture, religion, political, and ultimately societies led to differences 
when social rules are broken and become acts of crime. For example, 
when chewing khat was criminalised as a class C drug by the UK 
government in June 2014, foreigners particularly Yemeni and Somali 
would find this strange especially as it is still considered legal in their own 
countries.  
Crime is constructed by the use of social laws and the decisions of those 
with power, to make some of these social laws into criminal laws. Crime 
(as deviant) can be seen as a social construction as what is legal or 
illegal in one society or culture. 
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Those with power determine which acts are criminal whether the acts are 
socially deviant or not, to suit their own purposes and to control certain 
parts of the society. This argument may explain how and why the 
criminalisation of foreign nationals has been expanded in the UK. From a 
foreign nationals’ criminality point of view, it is argued that the 
immigration policy (legislation and parliamentary debates) is mainly 
focusing on labelling foreign nationals as criminals. For example, 
focusing on immigration, asylum, terrorism, immigration crime, and 
border control, along with numerous discussion papers (Somerville, 
2007), the focus on linking foreign nationals to different types of crimes 
either by legislate  creates more immigration crimes.  This thus connects 
the border control to controlling foreign criminals.  The limited offending 
data illustrates the relationship between foreigners and crime 
constructing a tight nexus between foreigners and crime and 
consequently labelling every newcomer and some ethnic minorities as 
criminal.   
Finally, it is also important to distinguish between the social construction 
of crime and deviance. Deviance is defined as any non-conformist 
behaviour, which is disapproved of by society or a social group, whether 
it is illegal or not, while crime has been defined as the violation of norms 
that a society formally enacts into criminal law (Browne, 2011). There are 
different kinds of norms including sexual, religious, and health norms. Not 
all deviant are criminals, as criminals break legal norms while deviants 
break social norms in spite of sometimes these two norms are the same.  
In other words, crimes are generated by sections of the media and 
government as a physical fact. However, it is evident that crimes are 
- 128 - 
 
socially constructed, as society formally chooses which norms to legally 
obey by passing them into law. If these laws are broken, the act is seen 
then as a crime.  
 Social constructivism and foreign nationals’ criminality  
Constructivists believe that the type of the behaviour is not an important 
element to establish in the crime definition.  Rather an authorised and 
influential member agents introduce the issue as a social problem that 
affects society in order to gain social credibility (Bourdieu, 1989, 
Yamamoto, 2010).  For example, those who have the authority and the 
power (like the Home secretary) are more likely to get the social 
credibility of claiming that a particular sector of the society (like foreign 
nationals) cause a social problem. However, in liberal democratic 
societies, authority alone is not enough to achieve social credibility. 
Presenting the issue in moral terms and creating a moral panic that 
foreign criminality needs to be acted on by policy and more laws to 
defend the immediate danger in addition to using an ‘objective’ data like 
the CJS statistical data by nationality as a part of the processes of 
constructing the criminality of foreign nationals (Agozino, 1997, Chapin, 
1997, Warner, 2005).  
In order to understand how the criminality of foreign nationals is 
constructed, we need to understand first how the political discourses, 
CJS agencies, and the media construct identity. This section raises 
important questions in regards social identity and especially non-
traditional identities (nationality), which get its importance from the 
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successive development within the immigration policy, foreign criminality 
rhetoric, the CJS agencies, and the media.  
4.1.1 Constructing identities by political rhetoric  
Constructing social identity is a growing subject in modern Western 
societies. It became progressively challenging due to the economic and 
security changes in Western countries, which turn the focus upon social 
identities as a source of meaning (Spalek, 2008a). The political rhetoric is 
an important aspect of processing, persuading and making certain social 
realities more legitimate or credible than others (Gorman et al., 2006, p 
22).  
Sociological and criminological work in immigration (Flores, 2003) 
suggest interconnections between race, ethnicity, nation, faith and 
immigration in political rhetoric. In crisis, questions of identity seem to rise 
more than in times of stability. Throughout UK history, political rhetoric 
has focused on particular ethnicities, races and religions and created 
cultures of fear and surveillance. Such debates are especially heightened 
during times of economic and political turmoil. For instance, the war on 
drugs heightened fears of some ethnicities (like black groups and in 
particular Caribbean nationals), while national security and terrorism may 
result in heightened anxieties of some faith groups (like Muslims), and 
ultimately they all often impact issues of immigration (see Chapter 3).  
As Chapter 2 illustrated, political power has the greatest capacity to 
impose labels upon people by raising a moral panic surfaced about Irish, 
Jewish, and BAME groups as a source of social problems and picture 
them as the alien criminals. Angel-Ajani (2003), argued that in Italy and 
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the rest of Europe (much like the USA), discourses on race, ethnicity, 
faith and nationality are joined together with the rhetoric of crime and 
crime prevention in such a way that migrant populations are popularly 
viewed as being illegal and therefore more prone to criminal behaviour. 
Not surprisingly then, discourses on crime and on who commits it are 
saturated with the language of national citizenship, social class, gender 
and race. In other words, the volume of political  rhetoric in using ethnic 
minority and foreign minority in crime, violence, terrorism contexts has 
implied a common culture in Europe that ‘all Third World people as 
immigrant and refugees, and all immigrants and refugees as terrorists 
and drug-runners’ (Angel-Ajani, 2003, p 433).  
Ethnic and foreign minorities are considered as an easy target to blame 
especially when political policy is contributing actively to the fear of their 
criminal behaviour and keep trying to convince the public that the safety, 
security and integration is not possible with the continuity of accepting 
new comers (Sayad, 1996, Palidda, 2009).  
Agozino (1997, p 103), explained how the political discourses in the UK, 
which circulated the criminality of black people and especially black 
women have constructed the criminality of foreign nationals. Agozino, 
described a predictable pattern in regards the relationship between 
foreign nationals and crime in the UK, which suggests that foreigners are 
criminals, unless otherwise proven.  
The racist discourses by some British politicians that manifest itself in 
text, talk and communication contribute to the reproduction of ethnic and 
foreign criminality (Panayi, 1999, Panayi, 2010). Presenting the identity of 
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some races, ethnicities and faith as a social problem, blaming them for 
social and legal problems, and applying the criminality of some of them to 
their majority have alienated ethnic minorities from the rest of society and 
placed them firmly as suspicious (Bolognani, 2006, Beddoes et al., 2010).  
However, the construction of identities by politicians changed over time 
when the focus was directed to faith groups, especially Muslims, rather 
than other key categories like race and ethnicity, at the beginning of 
2000s (Den Boer and Monar, 2002, Fenwick, 2002, Amoore, 2006, 
Fischer et al., 2007). The rhetoric of terrorism, for example, has 
presented widely across contexts of contention. Where the focus was 
supposed to be on how to keep the nation safe and protect the country 
from danger, the forms of rhetoric have concentrated more on presenting 
some faith groups and foreign nationals as the source of terrorism 
(Fischer et al., 2007, Hammond, 2011, Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008).  
The threat of international terrorism had been of increasing concern for 
UK governments from the 1980s onwards, however it has accelerated 
further during the 1990s, before the terrorist events in 9/11/2001 in the 
USA and the start of the ‘ war on terror ’ policy that has been followed by 
western liberal states. However, the terror of terrorists has produced a 
conflict in understanding who is the enemy therefore, some particular 
ethnicities and faith groups have been targeted by the ‘new’ policy 
(Jackson, 2007, Spalek and Lambert, 2008).  
The political rhetoric pictured the ‘new’ terrorism has ‘new’ characteristics 
in terms of different actors, motivations, aims, tactics and actions. For 
instance, instead of political and ideological reasons the ‘new’ terrorists 
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are motivated by religious extremism and ethnic-separatism and are not 
prone to political negotiation or military deterrence.  In addition, the new 
technology and weapons increased the threat of the nation and the fear 
of terror (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). The 'War on Terror', which 
started in 2001 in the USA, might not be directly focused on immigrants 
but has a significant impact on them. Foreign nationals from specific 
countries have been stereotyped and many of the human rights of these 
foreigners have been breached under the guise of security, counter-
terrorism or national security (Hansard, 2001f, col 747, 773, 807-808, 
924-925). 
The political rhetoric that have social and practical implications ultimately 
affect the criminalisation of foreign nationals; by focusing on the 
criminality of the few and applying it to the majority and to legislate more 
acts that connect them to different sorts of crimes under the label of 
national threat, controlling borders, or reducing the pressure on prisons 
(Gorman et al., 2006, Every and Augoustinos, 2007, Kundnani, 2002). 
4.1.2 Constructing identity by the CJS 
Historically, as explained in Chapter 2, foreign nationals from different 
ethnicities and faith groups in different eras were attached to particular 
labels (offenders) because of economic, political, social, health and 
security problems. Foreign nationals have been put in the spotlight by the 
CJS agencies and especially the police due to particular events or 
conceptualisations at particular times, place and in relation to the 
individuals with whom there is interaction.  
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Webster (2007a), discussed how public order and race relation became 
synonymous with negative stereotypes British police have of ethnic 
minorities. The police denial of the race-relation regression between white 
and BAME communities in one hand, and then over policing of BAME 
communities as being suspected of prostitution and gambling and then 
reinforcing the negative stereotype towards non-whites has explained the 
real relationship between BAME groups and the police. 
Neighbourhoods where non-white and foreign nationals are dominant 
populations tend to be over-policed, something that makes ethnic and 
foreign minorities more ‘visible’ (Papadopoulos, 2010) and under 
protected (Bowling and Philips, 2002). For example, West Indians, black 
and Muslims neighbourhoods were over-policed due to their attachment 
to prostitution, drugs and terrorism respectively (Webster, 2007b).  
The over-policing and overrepresentation of some ethnic and faith groups 
in CJS statistical data, make many researchers’ think of the beginning of 
stereotype offending creation by the police to some BAME groups (Keith, 
1993).  
Norris, Fielding, Kemp, and Fielding (1992) used quantified observational 
data to explore the complex link between racial prejudice and 
discriminatory police action. The data confirm that black people 
(especially the young) are more likely to be stopped by the police than 
white groups, although they are, on average, stopped for the same types 
of offences.  It would also appear that black groups are stopped on more 
speculative grounds than white groups. However, once stopped, the 
demeanour of black groups towards the police is no different to that 
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displayed by white groups, except that blacks are less likely to show signs 
of insobriety.  
Ethnic and foreign minorities are disproportionally represented in prison 
statistical data to an alarming level. England and Wales has the topmost 
proportion imprisonment in the European Union and Blacks 
(African/Caribbean) contribute the highest rate for having drugs (Heaven 
and Hudson, 2005). There is greater disproportionality in the number of 
black people in prisons in the UK than in the United States; 13.1 percent of 
prisoners self-identify as black, compared with approximately 2.9 percent 
of the over 18 population recorded in the 2011 Census. Similarly, Muslim 
prisoners account for 13.4 percent of the prison population compared with 
4.2 percent in the 2011 Census, this figure has risen sharply since 2002 
when Muslim prisoners were 7.7 percent of the prison population (Jess 
Mullen, 2014).  
Many studies (Waters, 1990, Smith, 1997, Wu et al., 2010, Hood, 2003) 
have investigated the representation of BAME groups into the CJS and 
found that some minorities (particularly black) are over representing at the 
receiving end of the system. That is as defendants, suspects and 
prisoners and under represented on the giving end, that is as personal 
occupying posts as police officers, lawyers, judges, probation and prison 
officers.  
Data on out of court disposals and court proceedings show some 
differences in the sanctions issued to people of differing ethnicity also in 
sentence lengths. These differences are likely to relate to a range of 
factors including variations in the types of offences committed and the 
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plea entered, and should therefore be treated with caution (Moore et al., 
2011). Conviction ratios for indictable offences were higher for White 
persons in 2012 than for those in the BAME groups, and a higher 
percentage of those in BAME groups were sentenced to immediate 
custody for indictable offences than in the White group in 2012 (Ministry of 
Justice, 2013a, Marques dos Santos et al., 2013). This may in part be due 
to differences in plea between ethnic groups.  
The over-representation of BAME groups in judicial statistics and crime 
rates is the product of their social weakness and of the process of labelling 
(Burdett et al., 2003, Burdett et al., 2004). It is within this context that the 
courts and public broadly deﬁne what is ‘deviant behaviour’ when 
performed by a foreigner or other disagreeable characters and disregard 
the same behaviour as an eccentricity when performed by a ‘citizen’ 
(Angel-Ajani, 2003).  
As an application of the social construction of deviance, stereotyping and 
labelling some ethnic and foreign minorities as criminals is common in the 
judicial system (Palidda, 1997). For example, the highest Average 
Custodial Sentence Length (ACSL) for those given determinate sentences 
for indictable offences was recorded for BAME groups, at 23.4 months, 
followed by the Asian, Mixed and Other groups with averages of 22.4, 20.4 
and 17.2 months respectively. The lowest ACSL was recorded for the 
White group at 15.9 months (Marques dos Santos et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, recent shifts in migration patterns have demanded a re-
conceptualisation of the perception of those who might belong to BAME 
groups and the question of the difference that has become salient in 
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contemporary societies. Such conceptual shifts have implications for the 
relationship between the police and citizens from BAME communities 
(Bowling and Phillips, 2003).  
The over policing of BAME groups and religious communities to tackle 
illegal immigrants and terrorists led to over representing of BAME and 
foreigners in CJS statistical data and blaming them for causing legal 
problems (Chapin, 1997, Papadopoulos, 2010), which eventually has 
enhanced the construction of foreign criminality and labelled foreigners as 
offenders.  
The political rhetoric, which accompanied with a multitude of legislation, 
bills, white and green papers in addition to the government publications in 
the Labour, Conservative and Coalition governments has impacted the 
criminal justice agencies and those employed with them. The implication 
of these and other government initiatives have been serious. 
Organisationally there have been attendant increases in visibility and 
accountability; a greater preoccupation with public protection, inter-agency 
partnership and evidence based practice; and in agencies such as, 
Probation service an important shift of emphasis from the treatment of 
individual offenders to the classification and management of offending 
(Gorman et al., 2006). These continuing organisational and ideological 
changes have impacted on the everyday activities of individual 
practitioners’ especial police and prison and court staff. However, others 
also working with prison staff implicit in the changes is a ‘decline in trust’ in 
the expertise and the decision making of front line practitioners like 
immigration officers and the UKVI and the institution related to them 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1991, Jordan, 2006). 
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4.1.3 Constructing offenders’ identity by the media   
Constructivism problematizes what is called facts or reality. It challenges 
the view that conventional knowledge is based upon unbiased 
observation and that we can therefore separate subject and object, the 
perceived and the real, and it warns us to be ever suspicious of our 
assumptions about how the world appears and the categories that we 
use to divide and interpret it (Gorman et al., 2006).  
Moral panics over foreigners are not new in British society. There is a 
historical role played by parts of the media in the stereotyping of the Irish, 
especially those workers who were pictured as lazy and too unreliable for 
any sort of work in the UK. The media played also an essential role in 
highlighting, exaggerating, and presenting different foreign nationals from 
different ethnicities and religions as criminals (Al-Faris, 2015).  
Potter and Kappeler (2006), examined how crimes are constructed by 
analysing what crime means to the public and how do they know about 
it? Potter and Kappeler highlighted the role of the media in constructing 
crimes in addition to their personal interaction. Our understanding makes 
the world that we understand through available information, and it is here 
where the importance of the stories, images, film, documentaries and 
programmes that the media produce appear in order to influence and 
affect the opinions of society about the relationship between foreigners 
and crime.  
Some newspapers and TV programmes produce concerns about the 
possible criminal behaviour of foreign and ethnic minorities in British 
society and believe there are consequences of their perceived hostile 
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behaviour. Newspapers reproduce the idea that these social groups are a 
real problem and that they pose a threat to society, and that something 
should be done about it, generating citizens demand for more social 
control (Gomes and Machado, 2011).  
Gomes and Machado (2011), explained how the media constructed moral 
panics over foreign minority criminality via four factors. First, the media 
are dependent on official sources of news, so act as secondary definers 
of such primary definers. Second, the media translate the statements of 
the powerful into a ‘public idiom’, familiar to their readers. Third, the 
media feedback to primary definers their own reactions as if they were 
public opinion. Fourth, the media overemphasise violence in order to 
justify the extent of reaction.  
The national press present foreigners from different categories especially 
asylum seekers as groups that threaten the values and interests of British 
society.  There is disproportionality and exaggeration in the reported 
crime. In fact, journalists tend to emphasise a sort of crime that is often 
not pervasive in society, promoting fears and anxieties of becoming a 
potential or real victim. The bulk of the media in host Western countries 
support and even strengthen this negative perception against foreigners 
at the time empirical researches often concluded the opposite (Hagan 
and Palloni, 1998, Tonry, 1999, Mears, 2002, Papadopoulos, 2010).  
These reactions are denoted either upstream or downstream of news 
production. The news tends to emphasize feelings of insecurity, 
victimization and fear of crime through reporting the reactions and 
opinions of authorities and common citizens. This trend might denote an 
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overreaction which has the potential to reproduce stigmatization of 
foreign nationals and other BAME groups and which might be more 
visible in periods of political, economic and social tension(Boomgaarden 
and Vliegenthart, 2007, Gomes and Machado, 2011). 
4.1.4 Constructing foreign nationals criminality  
Spalek (2008a) explained how the construction of identity is connected to 
the notion of power; the identity of offenders as constructed by 
governmental activities, which aim to shape, guide and affect the conduct 
of some people. This is true of immigration policy that determines the 
rights of foreign nationals and restricts some of others like the right to work 
for asylum seekers, leaving them with no choice but to engage with illegal 
activities, especially in the case of unreturnable failed asylum seekers 
(Bell and Machin, 2011, Bell et al., 2010). It is also possible to include 
political rhetoric as a part of the notion of power.  Bourdieu (1989), 
explained how governmental authority in modern society uses the 
strongest symbolic power regarding social problems and labelling certain 
offenders due to its structural position. For example, when rhetoric about 
foreign criminality comes from the Home Secretory or Prime Minister, it 
would be more likely to believed that foreigners caused crimes, than if it 
comes from a person who has no authority or experience (Yamamoto, 
2010).  
This section will explain how the immigration policy and the political 
rhetoric reinforced and constructed the relationship between foreign 
nationals and crime by labelling them as criminals. 
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4.1.4.1 Culture of panic and emergency: the role of the immigration 
policy 
The increasing culture of panic and emergency with regard to immigration 
has created social panic among the public, fed by the mass media and 
driven by anti-immigrant policies.  
Over the past several years, Europe has moved toward more repressive 
immigration laws and stricter enforcement measures. The intensifying 
policing of national borders has created state-sanctioned practices of 
targeting particular immigrant groups, as potential criminals (Angel-Ajani, 
2003). Racially coded immigration laws in Western countries have 
facilitated the constructions of the relationship between foreign nationals 
and crime in those countries.  
Bowling and Sheptychi (2015, p 65), argued how globalisation especially 
in relation to increase mobility have developed the ‘moral panic’ to 
immigration in western countries. The increase in mobility has led to a 
transformation in the traditional site of policing and established the 
‘crimmigration control system’; immigration officials, police and customs 
officers are all now active in the field of crime and immigration 
enforcement and the borders.  
Expanding the borders of the state outside its official territories is a move 
to criminalise immigration violations like illegal entry and overstaying, 
which has expanded the enforcement of migration control inward. 
Combining the immigration with criminal laws and giving the nature of 
penalty to the immigration legislation in addition to the increase in official 
and non-official actors that have been into the enforcement process has 
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made it clear to the public and the CJS institutions and workers that 
foreigners are potential criminals (Bowling and Sheptychi, 2015). 
There are approximately 50 offences in immigration legislation that could 
result in a custodial sentence. In particular, the Immigration and Asylum 
Act 1999 signiﬁcantly increased the chances of those seeking asylum to 
be prosecuted for immigration offences. For example, under section 2 of 
the Act, deception exercised in obtaining leave to enter or remain in the 
UK can be punished by up to two years imprisonment. Deception broadly 
encompasses entering the UK under false pretences, possessing false 
documentation, or the destruction of travel documents. The burden of 
proof is placed upon the asylum seeker who must demonstrate a 
‘reasonable excuse’ in such circumstances (Aliverti, 2013a, Aliverti, 
2013c).  
Stumpf (2006), Aliverti (2013a), and Bowling and Sheptychi (2015), 
argued how the government has used criminal laws to control 
immigration; criminalising the violation of borders like illegal entry, failure 
to register, attempting to enter with false documents and unlawful 
employment and changing the label of them from illegal immigrants to 
foreign offenders mirrors the government attempt to link these people to 
criminals.   
The obsessive of the state in controlling unwanted foreign nationals and 
protecting nation’s security from terrorism and violent attacks have led to 
a revolution in the managing of borders or as some scholars called  
‘border militarisation’ (Wilson, 2015 p, 144). The establishment of 
surveillance technologies from reinforced barriers and border patrols to 
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the technology of border surveillance such as satellites, X-Ray scanners, 
and heat and motion detention systems have successfully accomplished 
its mission of immobilising the unwanted foreigners and increasing the 
stereotyping and linking of foreigners to different sorts of criminal 
activities.    
The UK government has at times opportunistically manipulated fears on 
crime and security to gain support from citizens made insecure and 
fearful in part by its economic programmes. It has also tried to gain 
political capital by fostering hostility to welfare cheats and bogus asylum 
seekers. Its restrictive policies in the field of income maintenance and 
immigration have reinforced suspicious and resentments against poor 
people, BAME groups, and immigrants (Jordan, 2006). For example, 
section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 has made it illegal for 
anyone to enter the UK without a valid passport, increasing the difﬁculty 
for those seeking asylum to enter the country and further criminalising 
those individuals who do arrive without the appropriate documentation 
(Stevens 2004). Within a year of its implementation, 230 asylum seekers 
had been arrested and 134 convicted for failing to produce a passport 
upon arrival (Aliverti, 2013b). These measures have come under severe 
criticism for criminalising foreign nationals who under Article 31 of the 
1951 Geneva Convention should not be punished for their illegal entry or 
presence if they arrive from a country in which their life or freedom is 
threatened (Banks, 2011). 
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4.1.4.2 Constructing foreign criminality by the CJS 
The construction of offenders identity is widely implemented by their 
overrepresentation of different ethnic minorities and religions in the CJS 
data has widely the construction of offenders’ identity. Banks (2011) and 
Chapin (1997) finds that although foreign nationals are overrepresented in 
prison statistics and statistics of criminal suspects, a large fraction of their 
crimes concern violations of immigration law regulation. He shows that if 
these violations were taken into account, the difference between 
foreigners and natives’ involvement in crime would be considerably lower.  
The over involvement of criminal law in immigration law, the cooperation 
between the CJS and the UKVI agencies, and foreign criminality 
discourses have required the CJ agencies to consider the appearance, 
language and skin colour as identities of offenders when applying 
immigration and crime policies. On the other hand, the connection 
between immigration and crime has taken a new shape recently regarding 
the transnational violent attacks and transformed the arguments from 
identifying the responsible of these crimes to the connection between 
Islam and terrorism and violence. All the different types of immigrants are 
a core of the suspicion from the official institution, media and the public 
attitude (Calavita, 2005). Banks (2011), explained that the growth of FNPs 
in patterns of offending through the increase in non-criminal prisoner 
receptions, an increasingly restrictive immigration policy, ineffective 
deportation provision, and a (perceived) lack of viable alternatives to 
custody. Bank’s research also mentioned the role of the increasingly 
restrictive immigration policy as a reason for a rising foreign national 
population in British prisons. This is because tightened immigration policy 
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has resulted in an increase in both the number of those held without 
arrest and the number of those charged with immigration offences (Banks, 
2011, Bhui, 2009a).  
Restrictive immigration policy has played a significant role in the increase 
of the FNP population. Immigration legislation during the 1990s and 
2000s focused either on restricting the right to live and work in the UK 
(like the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 & 2004 and UK Border Act 
2007), or criminalising foreign nationals by expanding the criminal law. 
The preoccupation with risk and managing foreign nationals’ risk has 
shaped current responses to crime, FNPs, and foreign national offenders. 
Garland (2009), pointed out the culture of the fear of crime, which started 
to become the key concern regardless to the level of crime, and 
implemented an increase in stereotyping and accordingly a change in the 
CJ policy its practise.  
The practical side of immigration and CJ legislation, and especially anti-
radicalisation and anti-terrorism laws, reflects how the CJS and 
immigration officers target BAME groups in general, and made them a 
core for suspicious (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009, Mythen et al., 2009). 
4.1.4.3 Foreign criminality discourses 
The volume of foreign criminality discourses and public concerns about 
the relationship between immigration and crime as immigrants are more 
dangerous than indigenous and committing more crimes than their 
counterparts. There is a common sense that the increase in prisons’ 
population means increases in committing crimes, and then the rise of 
foreign nationals’ prisoners’ population is correlated with the increase of 
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immigrants and newcomers.  Ultimately all previous allegations used as 
evidence to confirm the relation, as foreign nationals are more dangerous 
than indigenous (Banks, 2011, Young, 2003). Issues of immigration, like 
those of crime and criminals, are viewed as public policy dilemmas in 
which themes of immigrant criminality are so prevalent, societal 
imagination already regards immigrants as criminals because, ‘spatial 
mobility is expected to imply anomie’ (Agozino, 1997, p 103).  
Warner (2005), highlighted the importance of the political debates to 
construct the relationship between foreign nationals and crimes. Warner 
argued that the political attack on criminalising illegal immigrants, 
deportation measures, and the focus on militarising borders in order to 
protect the nation’s security have led to the increase in stereotyping of 
foreign nationals and their linkage to different immigration and non-
immigration criminal offences (Wilson, 2006, Wilson, 2015).  The climate 
of anti-immigrant rhetoric relies on the dual discourses of criminalization 
and notions of racial and cultural difference, which can negatively affect 
public knowledge about immigrants, and policing practices additionally 
fuel the public’s imagination and misperceptions. (Angel-Ajani, 2003). 
The official discourse of foreign criminality presents crimes by foreigners 
as a clear and immediate danger to British communities (Yamamoto, 
2010). Yamamoto (2010, p 38), Yamamoto (2013) explained how the 
dichotomised picture of ‘foreign predator and Japanese prey’ in foreign 
criminality discourses consists the link between foreign nationals and 
crime in Japan. The author explained how crimes associated with 
foreignness in Japan and the foreign criminality discourse ties local 
citizens with innocence and safety, emphasizing the safeness of ‘pre-
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foreigner’ communities. The dramatic increase of FNPs is emphasized 
and the brutality of some crimes especially those that are dominated by 
foreign nationals like terrorism and immigration crimes are explained as 
the result of cultural and religion differences (Kundnani, 2002, Noronha, 
2015).  
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Chapter 5 Methodology 
 
 Research aim  
The main aim of this research is to provide a critically examination of the 
reasons for the widely held perception that foreign nationals are more 
involved in crime than UK nationals. In order to do this, the research 
examines elements such as nativism in immigration policy, foreign 
criminality discourses, and the statistical offending data to understand 
how the criminality of foreign nationals has been constructed. It examines 
how foreign nationals have been stereotyped and criminalised in 
immigration policy and political rhetoric, and the negative impact of this 
on public sentiment and CJS practise. At the time when there are limited 
criminological studies into the perceived association between foreign 
nationals and non-immigration criminal offences, the objectives of this 
research are set within a wider theoretical framework that examines the 
criminalising of foreign nationals and changes to immigration policy 
intended to address foreign national criminality.  
This research examines discrimination in legal treatment that 
disadvantages foreign nationals, and how the immigration and crime 
policies will direct the perception of the relationship between foreign 
nationals and crime, increasing negative public sentiments and the 
overrepresentation of foreign nationals in the CJS statistical data. This 
research has important implications in that it intends to help fill gaps in 
UK criminological and migration studies concerning issues relating to the 
legal impact of foreign nationals.  
- 148 - 
 
This research raises important questions about why there is a limitation in 
statistical data relating to foreign nationals, and whether this issue alone 
might provide a reason for the shortage in studies and investigating the 
nature of foreign national criminal offences (Banks, 2011; Bhui, 2009a; 
Bhui, 2007).  
This chapter starts with a discussion of the methodological design by 
looking at the methodology approaches to measuring foreign criminality 
and a description of how this research was designed and implemented. 
This part contains an analysis of the methods of why a comparative 
analysis is being carried out in this study. Finally, the chapter will provide 
details about challenges that affected the research and obliged the 
researcher to make significant changes to methodology, with corollaries 
for research methods and data analysis.  
 Methodological approach  
In the literature review in Chapters two and three and in the theory 
chapter (Chapter four), in has been noted that the criminality of foreign 
nationals is constructed; it is more enduring depending on various factors 
and ultimately may or may not have a relationship with behaviour. It is 
both important and difficult to explore the relationship between foreign 
nationals and crime; therefore, several methodologies have been 
developed to measure the relationship between foreign nationals and 
crime in this research.  
First of all, the broad approach of the current research is considered as 
social constructionist, since it is concerned with identifying the various 
ways of constructing social reality (Willig, 2001), specifically the various 
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ways of constructing the relationship between immigration and crime. 
Social constructivism holds that facts, like for example attitudes towards 
foreign criminality, are products of human acts of interpretation, 
judgements and negotiation. As Burr (2003) suggests, by observing 
certain things and interacting with each other, people socially construct 
knowledge and what exists is what people perceive to exist. Different 
groups will have different ideas concerning what counts as their reality, 
here their perceptions towards crime and criminals related issues.  
In general, measures of foreign criminality are either direct (explicit) or 
indirect (implicit). Direct measures of foreign criminality are frequently 
statistical data (especially in the USA where the place of born is usually 
recorded) that mostly published by the CJS and other related agencies 
(Solivetti, 2011, Stowell, 2007). However, researchers faced several 
limitations of direct measures, including the restriction and the 
disorganisation of recording the nationality or the place of born in the CJS 
data (Solivetti, 2011). In the UK, there is a limitation of recording 
nationality of the place of born and a largely focus on ethnicity due to 
different reasons: Firstly, practical barriers of recording nationality at the 
stop and search stage especially after repealing the Identity Card Act 
2006 when the National Identity Register was cancelled (2006). 
Secondly, in order respond to the Secretary of State’s duty of publishing  
statistical data to evaluate whether people from different ethnic minorities 
are being treated fairly, CJS and some statistical agencies think of 
recording race and ethnicity rather as an easier and more practical way 
than recording nationality, as well as ethnicity would not change unlike 
nationality (Office for National Statistics, 2004, Office for National 
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Statistics, 2012b).  As a result, such limitations have led to the creation of 
indirect measures of foreign criminality, by interviewing those who work in 
the CJS or the UKVI fields and analysing the political discourse, 
government document and/or analysing some of the media products 
(Noronha, 2015, Yamamoto, 2013, Yamamoto, 2010).  
This research will be using mixed methods and analysed comparatively, 
for the first time, the CJS statistical data by nationality and the political 
and parliamentary debates in order to present a wider picture of the level 
and the type of foreign criminality in the UK and how the political 
narratives and the immigration and crime legislation constructed their 
criminality.  
 Research design  
Research strategy must be paid a close attention when developing 
research especially in complex and difficult issues like constructing 
foreign criminality. The debate of qualitative versus quantitative is based 
upon whether researchers should use one approach over the other 
although the two strategies are discrete in quite a few aspects (Creswell, 
2003).  Quantitative research has generally been directed more at theory 
verification and it is based on the researcher’s choice to use post-
positivist claims to generate knowledge such as variables, hypothesis, 
and tests of theories, while qualitative research has usually been more 
concerned with theory generation and the researcher is looking for 
knowledge based on constructivist perspectives (Creswell, 2003, Punch, 
2000). Many scholars engage in words versus numbers debates; 
qualitative data is collected in the form of words, pictures or objects, 
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emphasising the meaning of words rather than numbers and statistics, as 
in quantitative data collection (Bryman, 2006). That separates the two 
strategies in terms of deductive (the researcher uses theories and puts 
these forward at the beginning of the study) and inductive (the researcher 
begins to collect information in turn identifying themes that are associated 
with theory generation) approaches (Creswell, 2003). David and Sutton 
(2004) note that the quantitative approach is related to the deductive 
approach which aims to test a hypothesis, whereas qualitative strategies 
link with the inductive approach, which is more exploratory. However, 
both qualitative and quantitative research strategies are constructive and 
significant, depending on what a researcher is investigating. 
Creswell (2003), considers mixed methods as a further approach in itself, 
one that is able to leverage the advantages of using each method alone. 
Creswell acknowledged that while many researchers in the past have 
used both quantitative and qualitative methods, the conscious merging of 
both forms of data together as a distinct research design or methodology 
is new. In the field of criminology, the strategy of using mixed methods 
has increased in popularity in the last couples of decades. Different 
methodologies have been used towards several aspects of foreign 
criminality like analysing CJS statistical data, immigration legislation and 
the immigration policy (Stowell, 2007, Aliverti, 2013a, Anderson, 2013). 
Despite the use of different approaches to measure the criminality of 
foreigners, the negative relationship between foreign nationals and crime 
was the main finding for various studies that used dissimilar 
methodologies.  
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There are a number of approaches for acquiring information about foreign 
criminality that are of importance to this research and a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods has been used in order to the 
relationship between foreign nationals and crime. Analysing the CJS data 
by nationality (quantitative) together with discourse analysis of 
parliamentary debates (qualitative) can help to ensure that there is no 
ambiguity or misunderstanding, as well as providing data to establish an 
estimate of the reliability and stability of the method (Punch, 2000).  
There has been growing acknowledgement amongst criminological 
scholars of the need to design research strategies according to the 
specificity of the research question(s), rather than personal preferences 
for either quantitative or qualitative methods (Chamberlain, 2013). This 
research questions are not only focused on the number of foreign 
national criminals and prisoners, and the types of crimes they commit, but 
also relate to finding explanations for the reasons behind criminal 
foreigners’ perception, as well as examining immigration policy, political 
debates and the media coverage of the relationship between immigration 
and crime. Therefore, in this research, the quantitative method is useful 
to find the level of foreign national criminality and the sort of crimes 
foreigners commit in the UK, however; statistical offending data alone is 
not sufficient to explain and understand the criminality of foreign 
nationals, especially with the limited relevant criminological literature in 
the UK context. At that point, a qualitative method is appropriate to 
answer the research questions, analyse how the criminality of foreign 
nationals constructed in the UK, and examine specific aspects in more 
depth such as the nationality as the new racism. In summary, the 
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qualitative analyses allow the key findings on foreign criminality 
perceptions obtained through the quantitative deconstruct to be explored 
in more details. 
 Secondary data  
Secondary data is data collected by an individual or institution other than 
the researcher (Crow and Semmens, 2008). As such, there are two 
different analyses of the secondary data. The first of these is secondary 
data analysis, of data such as crimes, offending, and victimisation, 
Census, national surveys, and interviews collected and processed in one 
study. The second area of secondary analysis is through discourses 
analysis, concerned more with government documents and reports, 
political discourses, media, and parliamentary debates (Semmens, 2011, 
Whiteside et al., 2012, Saunders et al., 2007). In criminological studies, 
secondary data is widely used, especially when the research concerns a 
large geographical sample; national-level data collected by the 
government and official national surveys will help researchers 
constrained by time and expense (Crow and Semmens, 2008).  
5.3.1 Analysing CJS data by nationality (quantitative data)  
The data of incarceration may not be the best inductor of criminality, but 
they are undoubtedly a sound measure of incrimination (Solivetti, 2011, p 
125). 
In order to find the level of foreign national criminality and the sort of 
crimes foreigners commit in the UK, the statistical offending data 
published by different CJS institutions and available from official national 
UK websites will be used. Phillips and Bowling (2003), show different 
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methods that have been used to measure delinquency, such as self-
report studies, surveys/questionnaires, or polls in which respondents read 
questions and select a response by themselves without researcher 
interference. However, other studies have used the official statistics or 
national surveys to provide data on the same area. 
In this research, statistical offending data was chosen over the other 
methods outlined above for the following reasons. First, these secondary 
data also demonstrate the level of knowledge that different CJS 
institutions and national information offices in the UK have in regard to 
the foreign nationals and their relationship with criminal behaviour (see 
Chapter 6). Second, this route of analysis also allowed the research to 
demonstrate how some politicians and media take advantage of the 
different methodologies used to collect these data to perpetuate the 
relationship between foreign nationals and crime in the UK. This will also 
highlight the limitations of such data, and show why the political and 
media inferences that are drawn from it are inaccurate or unfounded. 
Third, using secondary data helped to eliminate the time and expenses 
limitations in collecting such information directly (Saunders et al., 2007). 
5.3.1.1  Quantitative data resources 
There are different resources available for offending data in relation to 
foreign nationals and their population in the UK that have been used in 
this research. Secondary data has been drawn from the following:  
1. Government publications: Different governmental institution 
websites have been consulted, such as the MoJ, Home Office, ONS, the 
NISRA website, and NI Prison Services (NIPS). The latter website has 
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been used to find some data regarding foreign nationals in NI and their 
relationship with the CJS there, only as a comparative example for the 
situation in E&W. 
2. FOI requests: Due to the limitation of the data published by 
government institutions, successful replies to requests under the FOI Act 
2000 made by the researcher or other people in the UK to the MoJ, MPS 
and Home Office have been used. The researcher has made 12 
requests: nine via the ‘What do they know’ (WDTK) website, and three 
through University email (see Table 5.1). Much of this data took a long 
time to be provided; some have taken months and in some requests only 
partial information has been supplied regarding foreign nationals and 
their relationship with the CJS in E&W.  
Most of the requests have been sent to the MoJ, as the literature 
indicated that the prison services hold the most complete data, being the 
only institution in the CJS interested in recording the nationality of 
prisoners. Additionally, most of FOI requests to the Home Office have 
taken longer time than FOI requests to the MoJ and one request 
(Processing non- recorded nationality prisoner cases (30721)) has been 
‘ignored’, in spite of the efforts that the researcher has made of sending 
reminders to them of the need to respond within 20 working days. 
However, when this outstanding request was sent to the Home Office via 
‘What Do They Know’ website, the response was the fastest of all 
requests.  
3. Official national surveys: different national surveys like APS, LFS, 
and IPS and the 2001 and 2011 Census in the UK, mainly to determine 
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the population of foreign nationals in the UK and the different 
methodologies of collecting such data.   
5.3.1.2  The limitations of data related to foreign nationals 
Different countries have varied approaches to recording data; some (such 
as the USA and most western European countries) include more 
information than others, particularly in terms of the nationality of those 
who have been involved in problems with the CJS. Other countries, such 
as the UK, concentrate on recording some variables more than others, 
like focusing on ethnicity rather than nationality (Solivetti, 2011).  
Hence, CJS data organised by nationality is not so detailed and widely 
available as those recorded by ethnicity. Despite prison data being the 
most ‘complete’ in terms of recording nationality, it still far from perfect. 
Limitations in recording and publishing such statistical data hence 
impacts on the related literature and the ability to investigate foreigners’ 
criminality.  
In general, the limitations of secondary data are divided into three types. 
Firstly, recorded unpublished data, meaning data the researcher has 
acquired through the FOI Act 2000 or using the results of other FOI 
requests. An example of this data is the characteristics of prisoners by 
nationality. Secondly, recorded unorganised data; those data that have 
been recorded but are unpublished for a variety of reasons. Thirdly, 
unrecorded data, referring to data that has not been recorded and 
therefore is unavailable from CJS records, such as stop and search data 
by nationality.  
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Table 5.2 shows the limitation of the obtainable data; there are numerous 
occasions when data are limited or unable to be published because of 
how they have been collected, input, or organised. For example, 
recording stop and search data by the nationality is not required 
according to PCEA 1984 (see page 158), and any related information is 
unavailable according to a FOI request to the Home Office (Robb, 2010). 
Similarly, the number of annually convicted and sentenced foreign 
nationals (not necessarily under immediate custodial sentence) in British 
courts is not identifiable in national data due to the lack of organisation.  
In an FOI request by the researcher to the Ministry of Justice regarding 
how many foreign nationals were convicted and sentenced annually from 
1997-2014, the Analytical Services Directorate in the Justice Statistics 
Analytical Services explained:  
 ‘The Ministry of Justice Court Proceedings Database holds information on 
defendants proceeded against found guilty and sentenced for criminal 
offences in England and Wales. This database holds information on 
offences provided by the statutes under which proceedings are brought but 
not all the specific circumstances of each case. This centrally held 
information does not allow us to separately identify a foreign national. This 
detailed information may be held on individual court files but is not reported 
to Justice Statistics Analytical Services due to its size and complexity.’ 
(Analytical Services Directorate, 2014). 
The restriction of collecting, organising, and publishing foreign national 
data with the CJS reinforced the intention of this research to examine 
nationality more closely and how its lack of recording relates to (indeed 
facilitates) political agendas (Chamberlain, 2013, Crow and Semmens, 
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2008). The restricted publication of available data breaks rules relating to 
clarity in the level of foreign national engagement in criminal activities in 
the UK. For example, when political and parliamentary debates connect 
foreign nationals to terrorism, with border control raised as a suggested 
solution, data describing those who are stopped, searched and arrested 
by nationality is not available and it is not collected by any means.  
 
5.3.1.3  Disorganisation in the published data and poor justifications 
It took some time to collect the data, re-categorise, and represent it for 
this research. The data in this research accounts for the majority of 
relevant recorded data that includes nationality. There is however an 
unjustifiable limitation of the data published by the Ministry of Justice and 
Home Office, in addition to the weak methodologies used by the Ministry 
of Justice Court Proceedings Database and prison administration. 
In addition, there is a conflict in the publishing numbers of different tables 
that present the same type of data in the same government institution. 
For example, tables 6.8A and 6.8B showing the population of those who 
are in prison under the 1971 Immigration Act or immigrant detainees.  
The Home Affairs Committee (HAC) 21st report (Home Affairs Committee, 
2011b) confirmed the limitation and the chaos of finding information in 
relation to immigration data: 
‘On this occasion, even their Chief Executive had difficulty in following the 
data provided to the Committee. The work of the "Agency" and any 
discussion on immigration will necessarily involve the use of statistics… It is 
difficult to see how senior management and ministers can be confident that 
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they know what is going on if the "Agency" cannot be precise in the 
information it provides to this committee. As The Committee has pointed 
out on a number of occasions, the "Agency" is an integral part of the Home 
Office and is not a separate "Agency" with separate systems of 
accountability’  
There are also examples of these discrepancies with the data obtained 
under FOI 2000. For example, in a request to the MPS asking for 
clarification over published data in regards of arresting foreign nationals 
in London, the researcher asked for explanations of putting countries that 
do not exist like 'United Arab Republic', or putting different names to the 
same country with different numbers of arrest like Free Irish State and 
The Republic of Ireland (Al-Faris, 2014). The reply was as follows:  
‘When an individual is arrested they are asked to define their own 
nationality, this is recorded even if this is not an officially recognised 
nationality, as this is how the individual has described themselves. Hence 
the reason for the 'Free Irish State … The reason that a country called the 
'United Arab Republic' is there is because this is the country that an 
individual has given for their nationality. If they choose not to give their real 
nationality that is their right’  
Another example, relating to a request sent to NOMS in the MoJ, asked 
about the prison policy of recording the nationality of prisoners, 
specifically the ‘not recorded nationality’ prisoners category. The research 
asked how HMPS would cooperate with the UK Border Force to deport 
unrecorded nationality prisoners if their nationality remains undeclared. 
The reply was:  
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‘A prisoner's nationality is recorded on the Prison Service IT system (P-
NOMIS) on initial reception into prison custody. It is also recorded on the 
prisoner's core record which is a paper file. Nationality can be indicated by 
a passport or other accompanying paperwork, or be self-declared. If a 
prisoner's nationality cannot be established on reception, this will be 
recorded as 'unknown'. All efforts will be made to establish a prisoner's 
nationality when it is unknown. The prisoner will be referred to the Home 
Office who will determine their nationality. Should the Home Office confirm 
a prisoner's nationality, or establish that it is in fact different to the one 
recorded by the prison on initial reception into custody, prison records will 
be updated accordingly. In the majority of cases where the nationality was 
unknown, the prisoner is proven to be British’ (National Offender 
Management Service, 2014) 
Furthermore, the researcher received no answer to an FOI request to the 
UKVI in February 2014, investigating further the fate of unrecorded 
nationality prisoners, their potential for deportation, and what happened if 
the nationality of the prisoner still unclear. However, when the same 
request was made via the ‘what do they know’ website, the following 
reply was received (Immigration enforcement/ Criminal casework, 2014): 
‘The Home Office process is to investigate all cases where the nationality is 
unrecorded. The Home Office check various databases and sources of 
information, as well as interviewing the prisoner, to establish their 
nationality…The Home Office considers for deportation or other 
immigration enforcement action all non-British/foreign national offenders 
who are sentenced to a period of imprisonment following a criminal 
conviction. Once a person’s nationality has been established the Home 
Office will deport the prisoner to their country of origin’  
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The implication of such ‘mess’ in recording the nationality of arrested 
foreign nationals and prisoners affects the validity of the national-level 
data, and ultimately the analysis of these data. Weak justifications and 
excuses for the poor recording of data in addition to the difficulty in 
getting reliable answers, or answers at all, from institutions involved in the 
control of people using their services are also problematic. At a time 
when some foreign national offenders are deported depending on a 
recommendation from the court (Aliverti, 2012), recording nationality is 
restricted. In other words, when the deportation of foreign national 
offenders is such a priority for the Coalition Government, and when 
foreign national offenders are one of the most heated topics in media and 
political discourse, it is regrettable that the system for recording foreign 
national data seems so flawed. 
The lack of clarity of information related to FNPs raises concerns 
regarding around access to rights, representation, access to information 
and advice and language barriers. As the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission express in their Response to Northern Ireland Prison 
Service Draft Foreign national Prisoner Strategy 2008-2010: 
‘Drawing comparisons between the representation of nationals within the 
prison population could exacerbate racial tension, heighten levels of 
xenophobia and feed racial stereotypes’ (Potter, 2011, p 2) 
Moreover, it is not only the prison and arrest data by nationality are 
chaotic and confusing; the term ‘offence not recorded’ seems vague too. 
When a prisoner reaches the final stages of the CJS, at the very least the 
important related information such as the type of the crime should be 
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recorded. The Prison and Probation Statistics section (2009, p 165) 
mentioned in their statistics bulletin:  
‘Efforts are made to ensure the completeness and accuracy of the data, as 
far as is practicable. Establishments are not, however, always in receipt of 
the necessary details, notably regarding offences. Where the offence data 
are incomplete we use the category 'offence not recorded'  
The obtainable published data that has been used in this research 
presented many challenges in addition to the above limitations and 
reliability issues. For instance, there are varied definitions of immigrants, 
and as Chapter 1 showed, different meanings such as foreign national, 
foreign born, or non-British passport holder imply such differences should 
be publishable in order to clarify the different numbers representing the 
population of immigrants. However, the different methodologies used to 
identify and collect data on the number of the foreign nationals in the UK 
population mean there is a lack of clarity between different cases. 
5.3.1.4 The variables and the sample identification  
Every chosen variable within the secondary data distinguishes by 
nationality. The research questions and the main aim of this research 
informed the variables that have been chosen as a focus, including 
ethnicity, the type of offence, the length of the sentence, and the type of 
the prisoner. 
Table 5.3 presents the complete titles of the available data regarding 
foreign nationals in E&W from different government institutions. The table 
also includes the areas where the data is Not Applicable (NA), either 
according to a statement of a worker in the MoJ from one of the FOI 
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requests, or to the knowledge of the researcher, when finding information 
about that area is not possible.  
In terms of the type of crime, in spite of the focus of this research being 
on non-immigration criminal offences there are some places where the 
research will explore other crimes, like immigration crimes and terrorism, 
to give the reader an idea of political tendency to describe foreign 
nationals as criminal and the implications of such discrimination on public 
sentiment.  
5.3.2 Discourse analysis   
In the traditional sense, discourse analysis is usually described as a 
theoretical perspective or a methodology that falls into the postmodern 
tradition rather than as a method (Phillips and Hardy 2002:3, Billing, 
1985). Discourse analysis has become a major research area within 
criminology and an increasing number of scholars use discourse analysis 
as a method and/or theory in order to analyse language (Van Dijk, 1985, 
Van Dijk, 1996, Gee, 1999, Fairclough, 1992) 
The definition of discourse analysis is overly debated due to the different 
analytical approaches, schools of thought and the understandings of 
‘discourse’ found both within and across disciplines (Paltridge, 2006). 
Thus, in order to define discourse analysis we need to understand first 
what does discourse mean. There is a broader understanding of 
discourse due to the socio-political changes in western societies since the 
second half of last century, which put the theoretical discussions of 
discourse together with concepts like ideology and postmodernism 
(Foucault, 1981, Derrida, 2001, Foucault, 1972, Gramsci, 1971 ). 
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Discourses are defined as the core level for the expression of beliefs, 
such as personal and social knowledge, opinions, attitudes, ideologies, 
norms and values (Van Dijk, 2000, p 90). Hence, discourse analysis as a 
method, as well as methodological traditions, is usually used to examine 
the spoken or written practices or visual representations, which 
characterize a topic, an era, or a cultural practice (Billig, 1996, Silverman, 
1997). Chamberlain (2013, p 137), defined discourse analysis as the 
examination of the language and how it grounded assumptions and 
meanings in order to reveal the socio-political functions discourse serves. 
However, there are other sorts of sign systems in discourse analysis, 
including visual and behavioural ones (Griffin, 2007).                                 
Discourse analysis does not expose the true nature of actions but rather 
to understand the processes that led to the point where objects are talked 
into being and therefore it varies to positivism (Willig, 2001). Alternatively, 
where the structure of discourse analysis is rooted in language and 
discourse, discourse analysis looks at reality as socially constructed 
rather than as objective and therefore it reaffirms relativist ontology, 
where the epistemological foundations are socially constructed 
(Johnstone, 2002, Burr, 1995, Burr, 2003). Discourse analysts believe 
that objects brought into existence by language, which is a requirement to 
develop our thoughts and build a framework as language and discourse 
construct reality and not represent it (Wetherell et al., 2001, Parker and 
Burman, 1993, Parker, 1999). In other words, as discourses are set of 
spoken and written statements, they are analytically constructs the object 
of which it speaks (Foucault, 1972, Fairclough, 1995), and therefore 
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reality is dependent upon context and is not an independent fact 
(Fairclough, 1995, Fairclough, 1999).                                                           
There are two approaches to identifying and analysing discourses are; 
Foucauldian discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis. The 
strategy of Foucauldian discourse analysis focuses on tracking historically 
the modifications, changes and challenges of the identified discourses in 
order to represent a map of the creation and maintenance of power-laden 
discourses (Diaz-Bone et al., 2007). The historical and political tracking of 
discourse over time and interpreting the theoretical concept of power are 
Foucauldian approach.  
Alternatively, critical discourse analysis pursues societal structures; how 
conversational practices secure and maintain power over people. 
According to critical discourse analysis discourses are shaped by social 
groupings, culture and constructs, they have the power to limit our 
knowledge and beliefs. In this thesis, the phenomenon of political 
discourse of foreign criminality is approached  by establishing  the  
various  political  views  co-occurring  with  foreign criminality related  
phrases.  With the intention of identifying these views, the analytical tool 
of discourse was chosen, as it is more suitable because it looks at 
language and context meaning and it is important to make phenomena as 
well as people meaningful and recognisable, which is greatly relevant to 
this research interests.  
There are different ways of analysing discourses and the range of 
potential approaches becomes progressively more extensive.  For that 
reason it is necessary to choose potential approaches carefully according 
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to the (amount and kind of) data and according to the purpose of 
research. Due to the sheer number of texts that comprise my data, I have 
to include approaches that are solely qualitative analysis, as the purpose 
of this research investigation requires identifying discourse and 
interpreting them in the light of political perspective and socio-historic 
context. 
Furthermore, the emergence of postmodernism, which occurred in the 
latter part of the last century, and the subsequent social constructivist 
perspectives regarding the nature of knowledge of social reality and how 
his is gained, makes the intellectual roots of discourse analysis 
(Chamberlain, 2013, Billig, 1996, Cheek, 2000). Chamberlain argues that 
postmodernism rejects theories of the physical and social worlds and the 
idea that rationality, reason, science and technology lead to progress and 
knowledge. Unlike Modernists, postmodernists believe that the social 
world is disordered, unscrutinised and unpredictable, and language is 
constitutive, which created, manipulated and destroy meanings; language 
constructs the world instead of representing it. Therefore, postmodernists 
believe that analysing language and conversations used to construct a 
meaningful social world and do not create a real and true understanding 
of it (Cheek, 2000, Chamberlain, 2013). According to postmodern 
criminologists, discourses need to deconstruct in order to understand the 
social process, meanings of crime and criminal justice and the 
relationships of power and control, which can be entrenched within crime 
and criminal discourses (Arrigo, 2003, Tierney, 2006). Postmodern 
criminological deconstruction enables this research to expose the 
inconsistent beliefs about social phenomena in some discourses and how 
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particular discourses (like foreign criminality discourses) are privileged 
more than others in the way in which deconstruction analyse the written 
and spoken language that people use to express their opinions and 
beliefs (Arrigo, 2003, Chamberlain, 2013). Additionally, postmodern 
criminological deconstruction approach reveals the role of politicians and 
the media to highlight nationality surrounding who breaks the law and 
why, and reject the possibility of alternative explanations for criminal 
behaviour and crime. Deconstructive process within criminology will allow 
this research to unmask hidden interferences to connect foreign nationals 
to crime on ways of talking about foreign criminality as a social problem 
and imaged foreigners as bad people who are involved in illegal activities. 
In this sense, postmodernist criminology fits well with the theoretical 
framework of this research (social construction of identities). It examines 
how social institution, policymakers, politicians and the media affected by 
the power and inequality and construct certain people as deviants and 
bad by connecting them in different ways to crime and deviance for 
different purposes (Henry and Milovanovic, 1999, Yamamoto, 2010, 
Yamamoto, 2013). Power is a key aspect of discourse, technologies of 
power include: sovereign power (monarchy), disciplinary power (legal 
system) maintained through ‘normalisation’ of discourses, surveillance 
and monitoring, and enforced by the law, police, warders and the courts. 
As Chapter 4 explained, there is an important role of power and authority 
to get social credibility and value particular discourses over others not 
because they are accurate or presenting facts but because they 
presented by someone who has the power in a dominant way of talking 
about crimes and the cause of crime (see section 4.3.4). Therefore, 
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analysing foreign criminality discourses will give the chance to explain 
what kind of social identities were constructed and explain the 
overrepresentation of foreign nationals in CJS statistical data. Using the 
concept of criminological post-modernism involve in issues related to the 
steadiness of meaning and social structures and the inconsistency of 
political viewpoints which are relevant and important to my data analysis 
that aim to investigate the identity work involved in constructing people in 
different ways especially how different form of foreign criminality 
discourses valued more than others and categorises these political 
debates and discourses in terms of which crimes are committed, how to 
stop it and what the implications are of targeting certain type of people. 
5.3.2.1 Discourse analysis strengths and weaknesses  
The importance of conducting discourse analysis as a method and /or 
methodology comes from the acknowledgment that language is a 
constitutive of reality; the language enable us to construct our attitude and 
the way that we think about the world around us (Chamberlain, 2013).  
Discourse analysis strength lies in emphasising of the origins and 
functioning of commonly accepted discourses with the capability to follow 
them historically and to illuminate marginalised ideas, discourse analysis 
(as a social constructivist methodology) considers the role of historical 
socio-political, and moral factors of the research agenda (Parker and 
Burman, 1993, Parker, 1999). In addition, it is able to set itself along the 
varied fields of epistemological positions, be it realist or relativist 
(Wetherell et al., 2001, Morgan, 2010), it inspires researchers to define 
and explain research in immaculate, objective, detached and ignoring 
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subjective aspects by analysing the language as it is constructive and 
functional (Willig, 2001, Parker and Burman, 1993). Discourse analysis 
also highlights the voice given to those being studied, analysing 
discourses presents a dialogue rather than the researcher imposing a 
greater impact upon the object in question, thus giving equal status to 
both researchers and the respondents (Burr, 2003). In addition, discourse 
analysis gives us the chance to understand critically things that are 
familiar in our world and to ask those questions that will enable a critical 
understanding of context (Jane Ritchie and O'Connor, 2003, Burr, 2003). 
Despite the above strength points of discourse analysis, Burr (1995) 
criticised the structure of discourse analysts, the later blamed for 
repeating similar structures, which they are trying to challenge in the first 
place when identifying a discourse. The identification of discourses was 
criticised as it has a propensity to become little more than the labelling of 
everyday rational categories. The lack of instruction and the potential to 
use discourse analysis method as a value-free technology was criticised 
(Burman and Parker, 1993, Parker and Burman, 1993), as there is a 
possibility of losing its critical and political position by becoming one of 
the numerous scientific research tools (Bucholtz, 2001). Howsoever, this 
criticism could be avoid as discourse analysis like another method/ 
methodology it needs a cognizance to be presented and more critical 
stance, which requires a significant role of the researcher should be 
taken in any discourse analysis study in order to avoid such criticism and 
ensure that the assumptions put forward are transparent (Willig, 2001). 
Discourse analysts were blamed also for providing different unclear 
interpretations and creating a whole new ideology (Fairclough, 1999), 
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their strategic/political choice on which texts to analyse were criticised as 
they have some form of underlying assumption that encourages a set of 
interpretations of the chosen texts to analyse (Cheek, 2000). However, 
not all scholars agree with such criticisms, Mather (2000) think that 
discourse analysis provides reliable and regular ways of battling social 
problems and presenting solutions for political change.  
Another common critique of discourse analysis is found with its incapacity 
to be more than an academic exercise as it is only interpret texts and 
language, unlike action research, it could only record the dominance of 
powerful discourses and unable to reinstitute other ideas (Morgan, 2010, 
Raskin, 2001). However, it could be argued that analysing language is 
still important method for some epistemological positions. Interpreting 
discourses does not make this method less valid than others especially 
for the aim in this research, which is to find a way of analysing discourses 
in which the research will be able to base the results upon quantitative 
data and not to present two separate analyses. Another criticism for 
discourse analysis assumption that the world can be different if we write 
about it differently, which leads it to reject an existence of a world without 
language. The relativist position of discourse analysis makes it difficult to 
maintain (Wetherell et al., 2001, Willig, 2001), and limited to be used as 
framework for practical purposes(Morgan, 2010, Van Dijk, 1996).  
According to Parker (1999), discourse analysis’s relativism is not a 
problem as it only rises when labels that posse an epistemological 
position, obtain an ontological status which then can be used to justify an 
unjust status-quo (Burman and Parker, 1993).   
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Discourse analysis method is accused of being subjective especially 
when considering its political dimensions; while discourse analysts 
investigate, categorise, identify and help unauthorised social groups, they 
are risking their accounts as becoming the subjective truth (Parker and 
Burman, 1993, Burr, 2003). Even though there are a number of 
limitations to as what discourse analysis is able to offer but discourse 
analysis is still considered as a very useful tool for reflective analysis, by 
its nature of providing a deep analysis of the current discourses present 
in our lives.  
5.3.2.2 Analysing foreign criminality discourses (parliamentary debates) 
First of all, discourse analysis has been used in this research as 
a secondary/supportive method to illustrate how foreign 
nationals have been connected to different illegal activities 
(Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008). It has also been used to show 
how the criminality of FNPs and ex-offenders has been 
exaggerated in order to facilitate changes in immigration policy, 
and resulted in an increase in negative public attitudes toward 
foreigners. Parliamentary debates have been examined in order 
to understand the attitude to immigration and how immigrants 
have been connected to different types of crimes in different 
instances. Initially, the research is aware of the limitation of 
using the parliamentary debates alone as a method to analyse 
and determine the foundation of the relation between 
immigration and crime in E&W from a political perspective 
(Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008).  
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Therefore, political discourses and the relevant immigration 
legislation, in addition to a proper literature review, have been 
used to provide a comprehensive account of debates throughout 
the UK political arena.  
This research aims to determine how politics influences the 
perception of a relationship between foreign nationals and crime 
in E&W, to show how these debates affected public opinion, and 
to demonstrate how foreign national criminality is politicised for 
other purposes. These purposes include providing a rationale for 
the control of foreign nationals, gain support from the electorate 
or rush through terrorism and crime control legislation. The oft-
repeated discourses regarding the criminality of foreign 
nationals are used to support a stricter and somewhat racist 
immigration policy.  
There are further advantages to using data drawn from 
parliamentary debates. It presents a clear indication of how the 
impact of immigration on the UK has been discussed, and how 
immigration legislation has been passed so quickly. 
Parliamentary debates provide a rich account of the political 
perspectives regarding the presence of foreign nationals on 
British territory, and how foreigners are distinguished between 
being ‘desirable’ (EU citizens) and ‘non-desirable’ (non-EU 
citizens, apart from other first world countries).  
Qualitative data produced by debates in both Houses provided 
this research with a valuable resource. There are further 
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advantages to using parliamentary debates, because some MPs 
or Lords do not only present their perspective on issues, but 
also represent the perspectives of those in their constituency. 
Although the public might respond to surveys, whose questions 
have been designed from the perspective of a part icular 
individual or organisation, these people already have dialogue 
with their relevant MP or Lord. In such instances, data drawn 
from parliamentary debates provides the research with valuable 
insight into public attitudes, although it is acknowledged that 
these will not always represent the views of all constituents.  
Parliamentary debate data was selected for analysis by 
searching for every clause containing one or more of the 
following words: immigration, immigrant, migrant, asylum 
seekers, refugees, borders, terrorism, EU enlargement, EU 
migrants, Muslim, foreign national, foreign national prisoner or 
offender, deportation, crime, immigration crimes. These words 
have been identified and analysed in paragraphs considered to 
be of relevance to the general aim of the research, and some of 
the more specific research questions. The selected words found 
via the search field of the UK Parliament website (Hansard) and 
through checking the contacts of many themes of ‘Debates and 
Oral Answers’ option daily from the 14th September 2001 to the 
14th May 2014.  
The start and end dates were chosen according to the specific 
events have connected the foreign nationals to crime. For 
example, debates post 9/11 have been chosen as the starting 
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date, and the gaining of Royal Assent for the most recent 
Immigration Act on May 14th 2014 was chosen for the end date. 
This is because of the importance of this Act in strengthening 
the perception of the relationship between foreign nationals and 
crime, and engaging the public in stereotyping foreigners as 
criminals.  
Some specific criteria were used to analyse and evaluate the 
general trends of the political and parliamentary debates (Van 
Dijk, 2000). These included the word order, sentence meaning, 
global topics, metaphors, global topics connected to the time of 
the speech and finally the interactional strategies among 
different MPs. Some quotes from MPs and Lords have been 
used with little emphasis on the political parties that those MPs 
or Lords belong to. Apart from far-right parties, the differences 
in immigration policy and the political attitude to immigration are 
very limited among the three biggest political parties 
(Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat) in the UK (van 
Spanje, 2010).  
However, direct comparison was made between the rhetoric of 
the House of Commons and House or Lords members, in order 
to assess whether there are any differences in the attitudes of 
linking foreign nationals to crime, and to give an impression of 
the general attitudes and actions in Parliament. Nevertheless, 
the general themes of parliamentary debates have been 
compared with that of politicians outside of Parliament 
(especially political party leaders and those who have occupied 
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jobs in the Home Office, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of 
immigration). This was done in order to identify conf lict, 
opposition, or support for notions of considering foreign 
nationals as scapegoats and linking them to illegal activities. In 
addition, reports from Home Affairs Committee discussing the 
issue of FNPs and their deportation, and the release of foreign 
national offenders into the society, have been closely 
scrutinised to cover the period following the 2006 scandal of the 
over 1000 FNPs being released from prison.  
Finally, the categories (sections) for analysis were derived from 
either the literature review or the topics in daily parliamentary 
debates that the research considers most relevant to questions 
covered in specific chapters and the overall research aim. The 
chosen topics focused on when immigration and crime have 
been connected in political and parliamentary debates, how MPs 
think (inferred through their opinions or transmission of their 
constituent attitudes) regarding foreign national criminality, what 
sorts of crimes have been connected and if they think that 
foreign nationals are more of a threat than indigenous nationals.  
 Methodological and practical barriers to the research  
This research was begun with the intention of analysing the structural and 
cultural factors affecting foreign nationals in E&W, as well as those that 
affect their criminal behaviour. The overrepresentation of foreign 
nationals in prison statistics and the limitation of the criminological 
specialist studies in the UK in that field inspired this research to 
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contribute to the academic field, and in doing so start to develop a 
grounded theory of the relationship between immigration and crime.  
The initial research focus aimed to look at the overrepresentation of FNP 
in CJS statistics, with the intention of explaining the reasons behind such 
increase. This would be done by examining the cases of FNPs, as well as 
investigating the surrounding circumstances and reasons behind their 
imprisonment.  In order to investigate the structural and cultural causes 
behind the overrepresentation of foreign nationals in prison, and evaluate 
the relationship between foreign nationals and the CJS, it was originally 
envisaged that qualitative methodology would be used which would allow 
for interviewing some prisoners and exploring their experience with the 
CJS. Furthermore, the research also intended to interview some prison 
staff with experience of dealing with FNPs, to provide a different 
perspective on the issue. The qualitative data was to be collected via 
semi-structured interviews (face to face) with prison staff and prisoners. 
Firstly, a pilot study was conducted with five prison officers in Devon 
prisons, to test the reliability of the instrument. Then, interviews were 
intended to take place in ten other prisons across England, selected 
according to the population of FNPs in these prisons.  
The prison interviewees were to be divided into two groups. First, four 
senior prison officers would be identified by the prison administration 
according to their experiences with FNPs. Secondly, Asian FNPs would 
be chosen randomly by the prison administration, which would also 
arrange the interview’s location and date (four from each prison). The 
analysis of data gained through these methods was to be completed 
through open coding, axial, selective, theoretical sampling, theoretical 
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emergence and the process of abstraction. This is an analytical process 
of reducing the raw data into concepts that are designated to stand for 
categories. These categories are continually compared through sampling 
until the theoretical emergence develops.  
Some nominated prisons (like Wandsworth, Wormwood Scrubs, 
Pentonville, Highpoint South & North, Holloway and Bronzefield Prisons) 
were sent a letter explaining the purpose of the research, which 
concentrated on understanding the relation between immigrants and 
crime in E&W. Moreover, the interview questions were attached with the 
letter to prisons. The essence of the draft questions was to alert 
participants to the nature and scope of the interview to follow.  
However, when the researcher applied to the National Research 
Committee for NOMS research applications, the request was rejected, 
even after appeal, for three reasons. 1) The potential benefit for NOMS 
was not clear, 2) the link between the methodology and the request to 
make interviews inside the prisons was not clear, 3) there were some 
leading questions (see Appendix 1). This rejection was made despite the 
fact that the application made clear that previous research was limited, 
the importance of the topic, as well as the intention to find the reasons 
(structural, cultural and legal factors meant to be) behind the criminal 
behaviour of foreign nationals in E&W.  
Interviewing FNPs inside prisons was important to this research for two 
important reasons: Firstly, all previous studies which has been done with 
FNPs in the UK focused on these prisoners’ life inside the prison, 
discrimination from prison staff or their inmates (see for example, 
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Richards et al., 1995; Bhui, 2009a; Bhui, 2009b; Bhui et al., 2010). 
Secondly, locating FNPs in their communities and interviewing them after 
finishing their sentence would not be easy or even possible. Most of the 
FNPs included in a research sample would be subject to deportation if 
they had committed a crime and been imprisoned for 12 months and 
above. Accordingly, on release, FNPs would disappear into the 
community, or they would be detained in detention centres or the prison 
itself.  
In addition to this research concentrating on criminal offences committed 
by foreigners in E&W, interviewing police officers to ask about their 
recording practices during stop and search would not be sufficient. 
Furthermore, interviewing Borders and immigration officers would mean 
necessarily lead the research to concentrate more on immigration crime, 
which was obviously not the main area of interest in this research.  
Having been presented with these significant challenges, the only way to 
recover and maintain the pathway of this research was to change the 
focus, and accordingly the methodology, in such a way that would allow 
completion in the specified time period. The decision was therefore to 
retain a focus on criminal offences committed by foreigners in E&W, as 
well as the requirement to examine the relationship between immigration 
and crime. However, a new position was adopted which focused on the 
role of policy, and how the perception of a relationship between 
immigrants and crime has been espoused and perpetuated through 
political discourse and immigration policy. In other words, the research 
would now be focused on the roots of the relationship between 
immigration and crime in E&W, by looking at the role of immigration 
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policy, political and parliamentary debates through recourse to secondary 
data, and discourse analysis, as outlined above.  
Having presented an overview of the development of the methodological 
approach taken in this research, including providing details on the 
methods of data collection and analysis, as well as some significant 
barriers to the research, the next chapter will provide detail on the 
analysis of secondary data into the overrepresentation of FNPs in the 
CJS. 
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Chapter 6 The overrepresentation of foreign nationals in 
the CJS statistics: Secondary analysis  
 
This chapter aims to look at the overrepresentation of foreign nationals in 
CJS statistics, in order to examine the type of criminality that FNPs 
demonstrate and evaluate policies that anticipate dangers of releasing 
foreign nationals into the British community.  This chapter is divided into 
two parts: firstly, it presents the police and prison data by nationality and 
analyses them in the second part.  
 Police and prison data 
This part outlines the arrest data to explore the sort of the relationship 
between the police and foreign nationals, the reception and sentencing 
data to figure out the court and foreign nationals’ relationship, and the 
prison data to present a picture of how the criminality of foreign nationals 
was constructed by the CJS practice.  
6.1.1 Arrest data  
Due to the absence of recording stop and search data by nationality This 
subsection will show the findings of the arrest data to describe the 
relationship between foreign nationals and police. 
Freedom of Information (FOI) requests were made to NIPS and MPS are 
the resource that will be used here to demonstrate the relationship 
between foreign nationals and the police. This subsection will explore this 
relationship across three categories: foreign nationals in NI; foreign 
nationals in London; and British in London. In addition, arrested foreign 
- 181 - 
 
nationals are presented in terms of their proportion of the overall general 
population.  
6.1.1.1 Arresting foreign national in Northern Ireland  
A FOI request was sent to the NIPS (table 6.1A & B) regarding the 
number of arrested foreign nationals per offence from 2006-2010. This 
part will describe first the representation of foreign nationals in the arrest 
data and second will explore why foreign nationals are highly arrested.  
6.1.1.1.1  The representation of foreigners in the arrested data  
Table 6.1A (in Appendix 2) shows a trend for the total arrest rate to 
fluctuate; for the first two years (2006-2008), there was a 49 percent 
growth in the total annual arrest rate of foreign nationals between 2006 
(4,883) and 2008 (7,281). While in the last two years, the number of 
arrested foreign nationals dropped slightly by 9 percent from a peak in 
2008.  
Despite the fact that the arrest rate for foreign nationals started to decline 
from 2009, the overall annual growth in the arrest rate for four years 
(2006-2010) recorded an 8 percent increase.  On the other hand, by 
comparing the estimated population of foreign nationals in NI it has been 
found that overall 12 percent of foreign nationals (7 percent of foreign 
born) are arrested every year. The percentage of arrest is considered to 
be particularly high, especially if compared to the total prison 
population(from all nationalities), which was not exceeding, 1000 
prisoners at that time (Statistics and Research Branch, 2013). It should 
be noted that there is a lack of knowledge about CJS statistics like prison 
routines and prison population in NI. As a result, there are very limited 
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resources to indicate the precise number of FNPs in NI. This research 
depends mainly on FOI requests in regards to FNPs in NI to the 
Department of Justice in Northern Ireland (DOJNI); in spite of they are 
not covering the same period detailed in the arrest table. 
In January 2011, there were 131 FNPs in custody in NI prisons, 
comprising 9 percent of the total prison population. In a FOI request to 
DOJNI regarding the population of FNPs in NIPS in 2012, the reply 
indicated that as of December 31st 2012 there were 113 FNPs in NIPS, 
comprising around 7 percent of the total prison population in NI (Northern 
Ireland Prison Service, 2013). Arguably if it has been predicted that the 
FNPs population in NI between 2006 and 2010 is (130), at the time, the 
arrested number of foreign nationals was between 5000 and 6000 per 
year, meaning there is an overrepresentation of foreign nationals in the 
NI arrest data. This overrepresentation will be examined further in the 
next section, when the type of crimes foreign nationals are more likely to 
be arrested for will be described. 
6.1.1.1.2   Arrests of foreign nationals by crime type  
Figure 6.1B shows that foreign nationals were highly suspected and 
arrested for ‘other crimes’13; 83 percent were arrested for non-serious 
minor crimes in 2006, and 76 percent in 2010. In parallel, in 2006, 12 
percent were arrested for violent crimes14, 4 and 2 percent for burglary 
                                                 
13 Other total crimes: those ‘other total crimes’ figures are arrests for any offence not 
included in any of the other arrest categories it includes arrests for offences that are not 
crime like motoring offences NORTHERN IRELAND POLICE SERVICE (2011). Foreign 
Nationals Arrested in the Last Five Years/ Northern Ireland. FOI. NI: NIPS. 
14 include all violent, murder and robbery 
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and sexual crimes15 respectively.  In 2010, the arrest for violent crimes 
only increased to 17 percent.  
Figure 6.1: Foreign nationals arrested in NI per crime from 2006-2010 
 
Source: Adapted for Table 6.1B In Appendix 2.  
In consequence, foreign nationals in NI are more likely to be suspected 
and arrested for minor crimes rather than serious crimes. There is also a 
considerable increase in arrests for all sorts of crimes apart from murder.  
6.1.1.2 Arrests of foreign nationals in London  
A FOI request to MPS (table 6.2A and figure 6.2) shows the number of 
foreign nationals who have been arrested on suspicion of committing 
different sorts of crimes in London. This part will be presented in two 
parts; the representation of foreign nationals in the arrest data compared 
to their total population in London, and the types of crimes they were 
arrested for from 2008-2012. 
6.1.1.2.1  The representation of foreign nationals  
Table 6.2A (Appendix 2) shows a considerable increase in the first two 
years (2009 and 2010) in the arrest data by 117 percent, while in the last 
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two years (2011 and 2012) there was a decline by 16 percent, this 
decline does not affect the overall annual growth of arrested foreign 
nationals, which recorded as a 16 percent increase from 2008 to 2012 in 
London.   
When the population of arrested foreign nationals is compared to their 
general population in London, the result shows a considerable increase in 
the percentage from 2008 (2 percent) to 2009 (4 percent), and increased 
to 5 percent in 2010 and then declined slightly in the last two years to be 
4 percent 
6.1.1.2.2  Arrests of foreign nationals by crime type  
There is a similarity between Figures 6.1 and 6.2 (below). Foreign 
nationals in both NI and London were arrested in high numbers and 
mostly for miscellaneous non-serious crimes, which include different 
categories of offences like possession of firearm, immigration offences, 
bigamy, absconding from lawful custody, Customs and Revenue 
offences, and disclosure, obstruction, false or misleading statements etc.) 
(Home Office, 2011, p 60-61). 
Figure 6.2: Foreign nationals arrested in London per crime, April 2008-31
st16
 Dec 2012
 Source: Adapted from Table 6.2B In Appendix 2.  
                                                 
16
 The arrest data before 31
st
 April 2008 is not available.  
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In 2008, 26,794 (71 percent; 68 percent in 2012) foreign nationals 
arrested in London are arrested for ‘other crimes’ like those in NI. 
Furthermore, 21 percent (8439) of foreign nationals were arrested in 
2008 for violent crimes (all violent, murder, and robbery), which increased 
to 23 percent (17,595) in 2012. Moreover, only 3 percent of foreign 
nationals were arrested for sexual offences (rape and all sexual 
offences), and 3 percent for burglary.  
There are many similarities indicated by the arrest data in London and NI; 
foreign nationals are overrepresented and arrested mostly for minor 
crimes/non-serious crimes. In the next section, the outcomes of arresting 
foreign nationals will be compared to the arrest rate of British nationals in 
London as the only other available arrest data that accounts for 
nationality to illustrate the relationship between foreign nationals and 
police.  
6.1.1.3 Arrests of British nationals in London  
This section is based upon the results of an FOI sent to the MPS, 
requiring information regarding the arrest data of British nationals in 
London (Metropolitan Police Services, 2014), and variance data gathered 
from ONS. This section will be divided into two parts. Firstly, it will look at 
the proportion of British nationals in the arrest data compared to the 
general population. Secondly, it will look at the type of crimes they were 
arrested for between 2008 and 2013.  
6.1.1.3.1  The representation of British national in arrest data 
In 2008, 196,951 British nationals were arrested in London and 
increasing by 16 percent the next year. However, in 2010, the arrest rate 
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decreased by 6 percent and continued to decrease, which resulted in an 
overall decrease of 3 percent for every year from 2008-2013 (see Table 
6.3A) 
Moreover, when the population of British arrests was compared to their 
presence in the general population of London, the table shows a 4 
percent representation in the first three years, decreasing to 3 percent in 
the last two years because the decrease in the general arrest rate of 
British in London.  
If the results of this table are compared to the results of Table 6.2A, it is 
obvious to note the overall representation of foreign nationals in the 
arrest data is higher than that of British nationals. While the number of 
arrested British nationals decreased considerably since 2010, the foreign 
national arrest population was increasing. Even when it started 
decreasing from 2011, overall it showed a 16 percent increase in the 
period studied, while the proportion of British nationals arrested 
decreased by 3 percent.  
6.1.1.3.2 Arrests of British nationals in London by crime type 
Figure 6.3 shows the different crimes that British nationals are arrested 
for. All violent crimes (includes common assault and common assault 
racial) were the crimes with the highest arrest rate for British between 
2008 and 2013. These crimes increased significantly in the years 2009 
and 2010, before declining from 2011. Robbery and burglary were 
competing to be the second highest crime, followed by other crimes. 
Rape is recorded as having the lowest arrest rate for British nationals, 
followed by all sexual offences and murder.  
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Figure 6.3: British arrested in London per crime 1
st
 April 2008-31
st
 December 2013 
 
Source: Adapted from Table 6.3B1 in Appendix 2 FOI (Metropolitan Police Services, 2014)  
If the data in Figure 6.3 are compared to the results of Figures 6.1 and 
6.2, it demonstrates different experiences of arresting British nationals 
compared to foreign nationals in NI and London respectively. For 
example, whilst foreign nationals in both NI and London had a high arrest 
rate for non-serious crimes (other crimes), British nationals demonstrated 
the highest arrest rate for violent crimes, and considerably higher figures 
in other serious crimes like robbery and burglary.  
6.1.1.4 Nationality type and arrest rates  
Previously, this chapter showed that the overrepresentation of foreign 
nationals in the arrest data in both NI and London mainly relates to non-
serious crimes. The majority of foreign nationals are arrested for minor 
crimes, meaning those other than violent or property crimes; British 
nationals are mostly arrested for violent, burglary and robbery crimes 
(serious crimes). However, there are still serious questions lurking behind 
the overrepresentation of foreign nationals in the arrest data: do all 
foreign nationals groups have a high arrest rate, or do they differ 
according to their nationality.  
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Tables 6.4 A1 & A2, illustrate the top ten nationalities most likely to be 
arrested from 2008 to 2012. The arrest rate of these nationalities has 
been compared firstly to their general population in London. This has 
been done to find their representation in the arrest data in London, 
whether there is a relationship with demographic changes, the change of 
the crime level, and the police attitude. The outcome of this was as 
follows: 
1. There is a cumulative increase of the arrest rate for EU nationalities like Poland, 
Romania, and Lithuania, which made the top three of foreign nationals arrested 
in London from 2008 to 2012 (see table 6.4B). The increase in the arrest 
number of these countries is in parallel with the increase of their general 
population in the UK due to the 2004 free movement. 
2. There is a decline in the number of arrests for those from traditional immigration 
countries like Nigeria, Jamaica, and Somalia, concurrently with the decrease or 
the slight increase in their general population in London particularly compared to 
the percentage increase of the population of new wave of EU migrants (see 
table 6.4A1& 2).    
3. However, the map of the top ten arrested nationalities has changed 
considerably when the general population in London of those top ten 
nationalities listed in the Table 6.4A1 compared to their arrest data (see table 
6.4A2). The top three nationalities were Romanian, Jamaican, Lithuanian, while 
Irish, Indian, and Portuguese stayed in the bottom of the table from 2008-2012.  
The data illustrates a positive relationship between the general population 
trends and the parallel increase or decrease in their representation in the 
CJS statistics. It is suggested that the increase in the population of 
foreign nationals in London led to increase in the crime level there, in 
which Figure 6.4 opposes such a conclusion, or they have been targeted 
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by the police through an immigration policy intended to decrease the 
population of certain nationalities who population has increased 
significantly.   
Figure 6.4: Trends in police recorded crime and Crime Survey E&W 1981- Dec 2013 
 
Source: Figure 1, trends in police recorded crime and CSEW 1981 to year ending December 2013 
(Flatley, 2014, p 6-7).   
Although the arrest data is important to show the type of the relationship 
between foreign nationals and police and illustrate why foreign nationals 
engage in problems at the first place with the CJS, and if they have been 
targeted by the police, but it is not able to measure the criminality, as 
people are innocent until proven guilty in court.  
6.1.2 The population of prison reception and by prisoner type   
There are four main categories of receptions: untried (those awaiting 
commencement or continuation of trial prior to verdict), convicted un 
sentenced, sentenced, and non-criminal (The Research Development 
and Statistics Directorate, 2006). Through assessing foreign nationals 
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of receptions17, in order to understand how the population of prison 
reception affect the change in prison population. 
6.1.2.1 Untried receptions and the untried prisoner population  
Changes in the size of the prison population are affected by changes in 
the number and type of receptions and of those who are discharged 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011).  
Table 6.5A shows an opposite growth between British national and 
foreign national untried receptions. When the reception of untried British 
nationals decreased, especially in the years 2000, 2003, and 2009, the 
reception of foreign nationals into prison was increasing, especially 
between 2001 and 2007.  The consistent increase in receiving FNPs 
resulted in a 243 percent increase in their population into prison 
receptions between 1993 and 2009 and making 8 percent an annual 
growth for 16 years, whereas the decrease in receiving untried British 
nationals into prisons resulted in a 15 percent decrease between 1993-
2009 and 1 percent decrease in their annual growth for the 16 years. 
Finally, the table highlights the high number of unrecorded nationality 
prisoners received into prison, the population of which has increased by 
140 percent since 2004. 
The next part will examine the population of untried prisoner in prison, 
and compares this to the result of the above table in order to draw full 
conclusions for the reasons behind the increase of prisoners received, 
especially foreign nationals.  
                                                 
17
 There is no reception data for the category of those convicted un-sentenced  
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Table 6.5B (Appendix 2) shows a considerable increase from 1999 - 
2012 in the population of untried foreign nationals by 105 percent and 
annual 6 percent increase for 13 years. At the same time, there was a 27 
percent decrease of the untried British national population in prisons and 
2 percent annual decrease for the 13 years. The consistent general 
increase in the population of untried foreign nationals, especially post 
2006, has contributed toward the higher percentage of foreign nationals 
being received into prison compared to their British counterparts.  
Finally, Table 6.5C (Appendix 2) compares the representation of the 
untried reception and untried prisoner population by nationality. The 
result shows the representation of untried FNPs compared to their untried 
receptions is higher than the British national group.  The 136 percent 
growth in untried foreign national receptions and 125 percent growth in 
their untried prisoners resulted in an 8 percent annual growth from 1999 
to 2009. In contrast, the 28 percent decrease in British nationals’ untried 
reception, and 9 percent decrease in their untried prisoners resulted in a 
1 percent decrease of their annual growth from 1999 to 2009.  
The overrepresentation of foreign nationals’ reception affect directly their 
general population in prison, and raising questions if those foreigners are 
more likely to commit crimes or they have been targeted by the CJS.  
6.1.2.2 Convicted un-sentenced prisoners 
Table 6.6 (Appendix 2) shows a higher rate of foreign national convicted 
un-sentenced prisoners, and shows a 90 percent growth of this category 
between 1999 and 2012 and 5 percent annual growth for the 13 years. 
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On the other hand, British nationals convicted un-sentenced decreased 
by 24 percent for the same period and made 3 percent annual decrease.  
In 2005, there was an opposite growth between the two nationalities; 
foreign nationals convicted un-sentenced population increased from 575 
(6 percent) in 2004 to 775 (8 percent) in 2005. The British national group 
decreased from 4163 to 3948 in 2005, and continued with a fluctuating 
decrease. The above table shows another difference between the two 
main groups of prisoners being discussed here.  Foreign nationals show 
higher percentage of being convicted, but not sentenced, which agrees 
with the results of the previous table showing untried foreign nationals are 
higher than British.  
6.1.2.3 Immediate custodial sentenced receptions  
Table 6.7A (Appendix 2) shows an initial 85 percent increase in the total 
of the Immediate Custodial Sentenced Receptions (ICSR); the 456 
percent increase in the total foreign nationals ICSR is a large component 
of this increase, especially compared to the 83 percent increase in the 
population of ICSR British nationals from 1993 to 2009.  Moreover, the 
table shows that the number of foreign national ICSR has increased since 
2001; the percentage of total population of foreign national receptions 
has been doubled since then.  
However, when the percentage of sentenced reception prisoners is 
compared to their total prison reception, the picture changed. The British 
ICSR group shows a higher percentage compared to foreign nationals 
despite the latter having a higher annual growth of 11 percent, compared 
to 4 percent for British nationals. Nevertheless, the most significant 
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increase was in the unrecorded nationality ICSR (1280 percent), which 
together with the increase of foreign national receptions contributed to 
increase the total ICSR.  
Table 6.7B (Appendix 2) shows the population of sentenced prisoners by 
nationality. Sentenced British prisoners are still higher that sentenced 
FNPs, despite there being fewer differences in the percentages between 
these two groups. Sentenced FNPs show a higher annual growth of 5 
percent from 1999 to 2012, comparing to 2 percent of British prisoners.  
There were specific times when the population of sentenced foreign 
nationals increased. In 2002, the sentenced foreign nationals grew to 
over 1000 prisoners (73 percent). In addition, between 2006 and 2008 
there was another increase, which has affected the overall population of 
FNPs. While, British sentenced prisoners increased post 2001, then 
2004-2009.  
Table 6.7C (Appendix 2) summarises the results of Tables 6.7A and B. 
There is an opposite trend between the British nationals and FNPs 
regarding the percentage increase, and the percentage of sentenced 
FNPs started higher than British. It started to decline from 2004; in 
contrast, British sentenced prisoners started to increase from 2004. 
Alternatively, the consistent increase (152 percent from 1999-2009) of 
receiving sentenced foreign nationals has affected the population of 
sentenced FNPs, who increased by 94 percent from 1999-2009, at the 
time when the 6 decrease of receiving British sentenced resulted in a 28 
percent increase only in their sentenced population. The result of 
sentenced tables showed an opposite outcomes to the remand and 
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convicted un-sentenced tables; foreign nationals contributed highly in 
remained and convicted un-sentenced however they showed lower 
percentage than British national sentenced and ICSR.   
6.1.3 Foreign national prisoners  
The prison administration is the only CJS institution that is concerned 
with and records prisoner nationality.  Therefore, prison data will be relied 
on to assess the level of criminality that foreign nationals demonstrate, 
and the types of crimes committed by these FNPs.  Eventually, the 
results of prison tables will be compared to the arrest and prison 
reception data to figure out if those foreign nationals are treated fairly by 
the different stages in the CJS or they have been targeted for different 
motivations. 
6.1.3.1 Calculating foreign national prisoners  
Table 6.8A (Appendix 2) shows the overall prison population broken 
down by nationality and the type of prisoner (criminal and non-criminal 
prisoners). There is overall an 89 percent increase in the total prison 
population from 1993-2013; the considerable increase of the FNP 
population by 171 percent since 1993 is a significant feature of the prison 
population that merits academic interest, and it is important to recognise 
in order to explain the general increase in the prison population 
compared to the British national prisoners increase of 79 percent. 
Simultaneously, immigrant detainees (which are calculated as a part of 
the FNP population) increased by 60 percent from 1996, and those with 
an unrecorded nationality increased 126 percent from 1995. The table 
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shows a considerable increase in the total prison population, especially 
for FNPs in comparison to the decline in crime in the UK (see figure 6.4).  
There was a consistent increase in the FNP population, between 2001 
and 2009, before this started to gradually decline. However, if the 
definition of FNP was taken into account, along with the number of 
foreign nationals who have been convicted and sentenced for a non-
immigration criminal offence, the result would be different. 
Table 6.8B (Appendix 2) shows the population of non-criminals and fine 
defaulters broken down by nationality. The population of those two 
categories, which do not represent prison offenders, is added to the total 
prison population, and when distinguished by nationality, it appears to 
affect the population of FNPs more than British prisoners. The Table 
shows a higher population of both foreign national non-criminals and fine 
defaulters than those who are British. For example, there is a 123 and 
650 percent increase of foreign national non-criminals and fine defaulters 
respectively, compared to a decrease of 53 and 86 percent of British 
nationals. If these two categories were removed from the calculation of 
FNPs, or even distinguished more clearly, the population of FNPs who 
have been imprisoned for committing non-immigration crime would be 
lower (see column 8 in the above table). Accordingly, the percentage of 
FNPs in the total prison population would be less than it appears from 
government and academic publications.  
Table 6.8C shows over 1000 FNPs throughout all years covered within it. 
Different quarters show prisons are still detained even after finishing their 
time, and the consequence of this is that ‘ex-prisoners’ are still counted 
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toward the total population of FNPs. This will ultimately affect the 
perception of the relationship between foreign nationals and crime.  
6.1.3.2 The demographics of foreign national prisoners  
There is an obviously differentiated representation of ethnicities in the 
prison population, which different publications and statistics have 
indicated and explained. However, this section will classify the ethnicities 
of the prisoner population by nationality in order to examine if there is any 
relationship between overrepresented ethnicities for example black and 
foreign nationals. In other words, this section will look at the differences 
between different ethnicities by nationality, to see if the 
overrepresentation of some ethnicities remains when nationality has been 
considered, along with differences between those of a shared ethnicity 
but differentiated nationality (see Table 6.9 Appendix 2).  
6.1.3.2.1 Foreign national prisoners by ethnicity  
Figure 6.5 shows some changes in the trends of FNPs from different 
ethnicities. Black FNPs had the highest population amongst other ethnic 
groups between 1994-2010, especially between 2001 and 2008; 
however, since 2010 white foreign nationals became most prominent. In 
contrast, white FNPs had a very slight increase in proportion before 2004, 
but after this started to show a sharp increase in the prison population, 
before taking the lead in 2010. Meanwhile, Asians FNPs have showed 
some changes in the figure’s timeline. This group started higher than 
Chinese FNPs, but dropped from 16 percent in 1996 to 8 percent in 2003, 
and has since jumped up again. Alternatively, the Chinese FNP 
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population peak was between 1997 and 2003, after which it started to 
drop and more than halved by 2012.  
Figure 6.5: FNPs by ethnic minorities 1993-2012  
 
Source: Adapted from Table 6.9 in Appendix 2 
6.1.3.2.2  British national prisoners by ethnicity  
The British picture is different from the foreign one; white British prisoners 
constitute the majority of British prisoners. Their proportion of the total 
prison population stood at 88 percent in 1993, and decreased slightly 
from 2009 to stand at 79 percent in 2012. Black British prisoners became 
a distant second place; British black prisoners made up 9 percent of the 
total population in 1993, and have slightly increased to 11 percent in 
2012. However, the most significant increase was among British Asian 
prisoners, whose proportion of the total has tripled from 1993 (2 percent) 
to 2012 (6 percent of the total of British prisoners); still a small 
percentage in comparison to white prisoners. Finally, British Chinese 
prisoners showed very low representation compared to the other minority 
ethnic groups (see Figure 6.6).  
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Figure 6.6: British prisoners by ethnicity 30
th
 June 1993-2012  
 
Source: Adapted from Table 6.9 (Appendix 2) 
Table 6.9 (Appendix 2) shows the population growth of different ethnic 
groups of prisoners from both nationality groups. Foreign nationals white 
prisoners had the highest growth of 225 percent, followed by Asians, 
black and Chinese with 216, 191, and 56 percent respectively. 
Nevertheless, British white prisoners are the predominant prisoner 
ethnicity, although their growth (62 percent) is incomparable to British 
Asians prisoners who increased by 479 percent, followed by black 
prisoners at 119 percent and finally the 190 percent decrease of British 
Chinese prisoners.  
6.1.3.3 Foreign national prisoners by the type of nationality  
Table 6.10 shows the nationality of FNPs. As has been explained in the 
arrest section (see Table 6.4 A1), there is a considerable representation 
of EU migrants in British prisons, which is a more recent trend. The rank 
of FNPs has changed significantly from 2006, when Poland entered the 
top ten in, and steadily started to climb. In 2013, Polish prisoners became 
the highest FNPs in British prisons. Similarly, Romanian and Lithuanian 
prisoners entered the top ten FNPs in 2009 and 2010, and then climbed 
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to 4th and 8th place respectively in 2013. At the same time, Irish and 
Nigerian prisoners shared the top three foreign nationalities in British 
prisons. Furthermore, South Asian prisoners made a large contribution to 
the FNP population, particularly Pakistani prisoners who stayed in the top 
five FNP rank until 2008, when the new wave of the EU migration pushed 
them, and the remainder of the South Asian prisoners, back in the 
rankings.   
Table 6.11 (Appendix 2) shows a comparison between the arrest data 
and prison population of top ten prison nationalities in E&W, in order to 
find if they have been highly represented in the arrest data as well, and 
then to see if there is a potential discrimination in the police attitude to 
these foreigners.  The table shows an interconnection between the 
cumulative increase in the prison because of the high arrest number of 
the new migration waves and the increase in their prison rank.  For 
example, the implication of arresting more Polish, Romanian, and 
Lithuanian foreign nationals has raised their prison population and their 
nationality representation in the British prisons.  
That representation increase meant a parallel decrease of other 
nationalities in prison such as Somalian and Nigerian. If the result of this 
table has linked to the arrest data results, it will appear that the increase 
in the general population of certain nationalities leads to an increase in 
their arrest data and prison population. 
In summary, there is an obvious overrepresentation of new waves of 
migration from the EU, especially Polish, Romanian, and Lithuanian. This 
is evident not only in the arrest data, but also in the prison population, it 
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also mirrors a decline in the ‘traditional’ migration cohorts from countries 
like Nigeria, Jamaica and Somalia. 
6.1.3.4 Foreign national prisoners by crime type  
The final part of this section will provide evidence to enable examination 
of the legitimacy of political discourses and media reports linking foreign 
nationals to ‘serious crimes’ and presenting them as being ‘dangerous 
criminals’. As such, it is important to examine which crimes foreign 
nationals are imprisoned for when compared to British prisoners, and this 
can be done by looking at data for each crime category (see Table 6.12).  
6.1.3.4.1  Violent crimes (VATP and robbery)  
Violent crime contains a wide range of offences, from minor assaults 
such as pushing and shoving that result in no physical harm through to 
serious incidents of wounding and murder (Home Office, 2011b).  British 
prisoners show an increase of 42 percent in VATP from 1999 to 2012, 
compared to a 186 percent increase for FNPs. This sort of crime seems 
to be an important route of imprisonment for both nationality groups, 
despite it being higher among British prisoners. In 1999, the VATP 
offences group accounted for the largest proportion of British prisoners at 
22 percent, and the second largest proportion of FNPs at 16 percent. 
British prisoners imprisoned for this crime increased to over 4000 (5 
percent more) from 2003-2005, but this figure has decreased in 2012. 
The highest increase in the FNP population for this crime category was 
nearly 200 between 2003 and 2004, and since then there was a 
consistent increase by 8 percent growth from 1999 to 2012. 
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In terms of robbery, in 1999 13 percent of British prisoners (decreased to 
12 percent in 2012) were in prison because of committing robbery, 
compared to 7 percent in 1999 (increased to 10 percent in 2012) of 
FNPs. However, there are certain times when the number of prisoners for 
robbery has increased considerably for both nationality groups like in 
2002 and 2007. The figure has decreased in 2012 for British prisoners, 
which has affected their total percentage growth from 1999 to 2012 (0.2 
percent), while at the same time FNPs recorded a significant increase of 
165 percent. 
If these two crimes groups are combined for the years 1999 to 2012 to 
find the percentage of prisoners by nationality who has committed violent 
crimes, the figure stands at 35 in 1999 to 41 percent in 2012 of the total 
British prisoners, and 23 percent in 1999 to 34 percent in 2012 of all 
FNPs.  Nevertheless, the data does not provide a precise level of how 
‘dangerous’ of each nationality is due to the wide-ranging definition and 
broad classification of violent crimes. 
6.1.3.4.2  Property crimes (burglary, and theft and handling)  
Burglary is one of the crimes that FNPs are least imprisoned for at 5 
percent of the total FNP population. On the other hand, burglary is one of 
the top three highest crimes committed by British national prisoners (18 
percent – second highest in 1999, and 12 percent - third highest in 2012).  
The population of British burglar prisoners started to decline sporadically 
from 2005, leading to an overall decrease (-31 percent) of their 
percentage from 1999 to 2012, whereas foreign national burglar 
prisoners grew by 96 percent. 
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Alternatively, the representation of both prisoners’ nationalities of theft 
and handling offences is not high like burglary. In 1999, 9 percent of 
British prisoners and 5 percent of FNPs were imprisoned for this crime. 
However, these percentages started to decrease following 2001 for both 
nationality groups, and then recorded a slight increase in 2012: 7 percent 
for both. Due to the overall decrease of British theft and handling 
prisoners, the population of those prisoners for this crime decreased by 
21 percent from 1999 to 2012, whereas foreign national theft and 
handling prisoners increased by 203 percent for these 13 years.  
If these two types of crime were combined to represent the level of 
economic/ property crimes committed by nationality groups in prison, the 
data shows that in 1999, 27 percent (19 percent in 2012) of British 
prisoners comparing to 10 percent (12 percent in 2012) of FNPs are 
imprisoned for property crimes. Similar to the result of violent crimes 
above, British national prisoners are more likely to be imprisoned for 
economic crimes.  
6.1.3.4.3 Sexual offences  
There are many similarities in the general trends of this offence between 
the two nationality groups. Both of them had a 10 percent share in 1999, 
increasing to 16 percent of the total British national prisoners and 14 
percent of total FNPs in 2012. The recognisable increase of both 
nationality groups started in 2007 (with different percentages).  
6.1.3.4.4  Drugs and fraud  
The drug offence group accounted for the largest proportion of the FNP 
population in 1999 (42 percent). This proportion started to fluctuate, 
- 203 - 
 
decreasing post 2005 to be 34 percent in 2007, and ending up at 22 
percent in 2012. Although the percentages are different, this category of 
crime also shows that for British nationals’ prisoners, 14 percent were 
imprisoned for over the 10 years of table data. However, a significant 
decline (almost 4000) in the British national prisoner population for drugs 
occurred in 2012. Despite the gradual decline year-on-year of the FNP 
population for drugs, overall there is a growth from 1999 to 2012 of 7 
percent (1 percent annual growth). The overall growth of the population of 
British prisoners for drugs shows a decrease of 11 percent in the same 
period. 
Similarly, foreign nationals have a higher representation than British 
nationals have in prison for fraud and forgery crimes, especially post 
2005 when the percentage increased from 9 percent to 12 percent the 
year after. However, this figure started to decline following 2010. On the 
other hand, British nationals show a very low representation percentage 
in prison for this crime. Hence, the overall growth from 1999 to 2012 was 
6 percent for foreign nationals, and a 2 percent decrease for British 
nationals.  
6.1.3.4.5  Other crimes motoring, and not recorded crimes  
Other offences (includes non-violent offences, such as possession of 
firearms, public order offences, immigration, and public health offences) 
(Home Office, 2011) are the fastest growing crime in prison for FNPs. In 
1999, 7 percent of foreign nationals were imprisoned for these minor 
crimes, and this figure started to rise consistently from 2003 to reach to 
11 percent in 2012. This is a crime category many British prisoners are 
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imprisoned under too, with 11 percent in 1999 - a figure that has 
fluctuated slightly in the meantime before settling at 10 percent in 2012. 
Motoring and not recorded crimes present smaller percentages for each 
nationality group.  
6.1.3.4.6 Crime Type of prisoner by nationality groups  
There are some crimes with a faster growth than others in the prison 
data. For example, for FNPs the ‘other crimes’ category has grown the 
most (206 percent), followed by theft and handling (203 percent) and 
sexual offences (189 percent). In return, drugs offences recorded the 
lowest growth of committed crimes by FNPs (7 percent), followed by 
motoring (23 percent), and burglary (96 percent). In parallel, sexual 
offences by British national prisoners increased the most (77 percent), 
followed by VATP (42 percent) and other offences (4 percent). 
Alternatively, the general picture for crimes committed by British national 
prisoners was of a decrease across different crime categories. For 
example, motoring offences decreased by 77 percent, followed by 
burglary (31 percent decrease) and theft and handling (21 percent 
decrease).  
Tables 6.12C1 & 2 (Appendix 2) summarise the results of the previous 
two tables and shows the type of crimes that both nationality groups tend 
to be imprisoned for. The picture for British national prisoners (see Table 
6.12C1 in Appendix 2) shows VATP as the most prominent reason for 
imprisonment among British citizens, followed by drugs (although this has 
declined recently), and for 2012 sexual crimes is the second largest 
group. Burglary was the second largest crime category for these 
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prisoners for the years represented in first half of the table, but this has 
usurped by the increase of drugs, sexual and to some extent robbery 
crimes.  
On the other hand, minor crimes (like those included in ‘other crimes’) 
have dropped off, with motoring and not recorded crimes remaining at the 
bottom of the ranking.  
Table 6.12C2 (Appendix 2) gives a similar summary of the reasons for 
FNP imprisonment. Drugs offences are the largest category for FNP 
imprisonment, followed by VATP, sexual and for a period fraud and 
forgery. ‘Other crimes’ are also a prominent reason for the incarceration 
of FNPs, but economic crimes remain the least prominent category.  
6.1.3.5 Foreign national prisoners by sentence length  
There is a large variation in the distribution of the sentenced population 
by sentence length for different offence groups. Figure 6.5 shows the 
different length of sentences for FNPs. Those who were sentenced for 4 
years and greater were the highest proportion of sentenced FNPs: 59 
percent in 2002, although this declined from 2005 to 40 percent in 2013. 
The second highest group is those who were sentenced for between 12 
months and 4 years, with an average of 27 percent of all prisoners, 
followed by those sentenced for indeterminate sentences, which had 
more than doubled in 2013. Finally, those who have sentenced for 12 
months or less have roughly doubled, but this group do not make up a 
considerable proportion of the total compared to other longer sentences.  
 
 
- 206 - 
 
Figure 6.7 FNPs by sentence length, 2002 to 2014 
 
Adapted from Table 6.13A (Appendix 2) 
Overall, FNPs are more likely to be sentenced to longer sentences than 
those for a year or less. In addition, the increase of short sentences is not 
significant enough to be considered, as with the percentages of other 
long sentences with the lowest 2 percent for recall from 2010 to 2013. 
Figure 6.8: British prisoners by the type of custody 30 June 2002-2014  
 Adapted from Table 6.13 B (Appendix 2) 
Although with different figures, British prisoner sentence length presented 
a similar picture to that of FNPs. Most prisoners were sentenced for 4 
years or more, with those sentenced between 12 months and 4 years 
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being the second largest group. As with FNPs, there has been a 
significant increase in the use of indeterminate sentences for British 
national prisoners since 2007. Alternatively, the lowest representation for 
the British national prisoners group was for those sentenced for between 
6 and 12 months, followed by those sentenced for 6 months or less. 
However, the main difference between FNPs and British national 
prisoners is the level of presentation for long sentences. Nearly two third 
of FNPs are sentenced for 4 years and more, and just above 25 per cent 
were sentenced to between 12 months and 4 years. This suggests that 
foreign nationals receive longer sentences than British offenders.  
 The statistical picture: Analysis  
The final section of this chapter will offer an analysis of the data outlined 
above. This will provide an explanation of foreign nationals’ 
overrepresentation (by nationality and types of crime) in different stages 
of the CJS.  
6.2.1 The ‘ideal suspect’: The relationship between foreign nationals and 
the police   
According to PCEA 1984, a police officer is required to record ethnicity to 
classify a person who has been stopped and searched. The Act also 
exhorts police officers to use their powers fairly. In parallel, RRA 
(Amendment) 2000 makes it unlawful for police officers to discriminate on 
the grounds of race, colour, ethnic origin, nationality or national origin 
when applying their powers. However, if the recording of nationality is not 
required in stop and search protocol, it is difficult to ensure this police 
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power is not abused on grounds of nationality. This also means that 
PCEA data on stop and search by nationality is not available.  
In a FOI request to the Home Office asking for statistics relating to the 
level of crimes committed or suspected to be committed by foreign 
nationals, the Home Office reply did not include any information, but 
instead it explained that police data focuses solely on the numbers of 
offences recorded and detected by the police. In other words, recorded 
crime offences are counted on an aggregate basis and the nationality of 
the offender cannot be specified (Home Office/Direct Communications 
Unit, 2010). Nevertheless, the high rate of stop and search foreign 
nationals can be inferred by looking at the high rate of BAME individuals’ 
stop and search for purposes of illegal immigration or suspicion of 
terrorism (Wheatle, 2013). Following the 7/7 bombings in London, the 
political and parliamentary debates focused on foreign nationals’ 
relationship with terrorism threat and how they provoke British citizens to 
engage in terrorist activities. The debates resulted in a general urgency 
for the government and CJS to introduce stricter precautions in order to 
manage the terrorist risk (Hansard, 2005c, col 1255). These policies 
might not only mean an increase in the population of BAME groups and 
foreign nationals in the CJS statistics, but at its extremes could have 
consequences that are far more serious. The case of Jean Charles de 
Menezes provides an example of where such policies can lead when 
feelings are tensions are running high. Menezes was a Brazilian man 
who shot dead by London MPS at Stockwell tube station on London 
Underground after he was misidentified as one of the escapees from the 
previous day's failed bombing attempts (Vaughan-Williams, 2007).  
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The absence/ limitation of recording nationality in police data, might lead 
to couple of results: Firstly, it made a gap in police studies and their 
relationship with foreign nationals. The relationship between police and 
foreign nationals in the UK is an under-researched area, due to a 
combination of an inability by authorities to record identity, nationality and 
deficiencies in how the data has been collected and organised.  
Secondly, the absence/limitation in police data has helped to enhance the 
construction of foreign criminality. The politicians and the media have 
misused the aggregate number of arresting foreign nationals or taken an 
advantage of the absence data to articulate the picture of foreign 
criminality. For example, a report published in the Daily Mail includes a 
speech by the Police Minister Damian Green (Doyle, 2014):  
‘The number of crimes committed by foreign criminals is ‘sizeable and 
increasing…‘In 2011/12 the Metropolitan Police arrested over 74,000 
foreign national offenders…the scale of the challenge is less well 
understood outside London… this is not about picking on people because 
they are not from the UK… foreign national offenders are first and foremost 
criminals. The fact that they are not UK nationals provides us with other 
options for dealing with them’.  
Although the arrest data is important to illustrate why foreign nationals 
engage in problems at the policing stage but it is not able to measure the 
criminality, as people are innocent until proven guilty in court. In addition, 
without looking further in those data (as this research did), it will not be 
possible to present a real picture of how foreign nationals were targeted 
and socially identifies as criminals.  
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The arrest data in NI and London by nationality is the only data that 
represents the nature of foreign nationals’ contact with the police, as stop 
and search data by nationality is unobtainable. The arrest data by 
nationality showed similarity of foreign nationals experience in both NI 
and London, perhaps due to the similar application of immigration policy. 
There is an overrepresentation of foreign nationals in the arrest data, 
which raises concern regarding their social and legal justice. The high 
arrest rate illustrates how foreign nationals come to have such high 
representation in prison. This high representation in arrest data also gives 
an indication that stop and search of foreign nationals is logically higher 
than the arrest rate, and should reveal higher percentages compared to 
their presence in the general population. 
This thesis argues that the discriminatory practices of the CJS towards 
foreign nationals that shows foreign nationals have been over policed, 
targeted in the streets, and have had longer sentences than British, mirror 
another application of applying social constructivism theory in this 
research. Immigration policy and counters terrorism legislation, which 
expanded and added new duties for CJS workers to monitor foreign 
national communities in order to keep the public safety, national security, 
and assure of no violation for immigration rules (Banks, 2011, Bell and 
Machin, 2011), is the driving force behind disproportionality. The police 
have been given wider powers due to applying stricter immigration policy 
and the pressure from foreign criminality discourses and the media. The 
police required to apply different policies arising from the war on terror, 
drugs, and trafficking, in addition to the violation of immigration legislation, 
which might explain the overrepresentation of foreign nationals in arrest 
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data, and the inferences drawn about stop and search. Considering the 
findings of previous studies into the overrepresentation of BAME groups in 
police crime statistics, the experience of foreign nationals could well be as 
the ‘suitable enemy’ (Wacquant, 1999, Fekete, 2009) and ‘ideal suspects’ 
(Wilson, 2006). Moreover, over-policing in target areas where ethnic 
minorities are concentrated, makes immigrants more ‘visible’ 
(Papadopoulos, 2010).  
The overrepresentation of arresting foreign nationals disagree with the 
findings of Stowell and Martinez Jr (2007), Stowell (2007) and Bell and 
Machin (2013b) found that in neighbourhoods where foreign nationals 
(and EU citizens) predominate there are lower crime levels than in 
neighbourhoods where the majority are indigenous. Along with this, the 
presence of foreign nationals tends to lead to a decline in the crime level. 
However, this is contrary to the high representation of EU citizens in the 
data presented above. 
Moreover, there was a fluctuating decrease in the arrest rate; in the first 
three years of the arrest tables, there were a high representation of 
foreign nationals then it started to decline at the end of the 2000s when 
immigration and penal policies changed, as did the ruling political party. 
The literature in Chapter 3 showed that during their three terms in office 
the Labour party introduced much immigration legislation that 
criminalised foreigners, an outcome of which was an increase in the 
arrest rate, mainly for less serious crimes of which immigration crimes are 
many (Aliverti, 2013b). The ‘crimmigration’ crisis in the UK has further 
serious implications, such as using different UK institutions to monitor 
and scrutinise foreign nationals. This is done to ensure they are not 
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breaking immigration legislation, threatening public safety or national 
security (Stumpf, 2006). At the time, the Coalition Government penal and 
immigration policy to reduce crime and imprisonment comes in parallel 
with an increase in foreign national offenders being deported and a 
decrease in their prison population. This has resulted in a greater decline 
in the arrest data of foreign nationals compared to that of British nationals 
(compare Tables 6.2A and 6.3A).  
After all, foreign national overrepresentation in CJS statistics (especially 
the police data) mirrors the proposals that constructing the criminality of 
foreign nationals and imaging them as the devils influence the practice of 
CJS workers and enhance the idea of targeting ‘unwanted foreigners’ as 
a new version of racism, criminalising them and restrict their mobility 
through and to the country (Lee, 2007b). 
6.2.2 The story of prison reception  
Again, the population of those received into prison are not necessarily 
convicted offenders, as some them are awaiting trial. Instead, this 
number can be considered to be all those persons who come into 
significant contact with the CJS (Solivetti, 2011). Reception into prison 
data provides a good picture of prison population trends though and 
influences on the prison reception population. This data highlights 
significant differences between the foreign national and British national 
prison population growth. 
6.2.2.1 Untried prison receptions and untried prisoners  
Untried foreign nationals received into prison showed a higher 
percentage compared to British nationals; foreign nationals are more 
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likely to be kept in prison without trial than indigenous. Moreover, the 
terrorist attacks since 2001, British riots in 2011, large number of 
immigration and criminal justice legislation (see Chapter 3), the general 
decrease of sentenced offenders post 2002 and the rapid increase of 
suspended sentences after 2005 (Ministry of Justice, 2013c) have all had 
an immediate impact of the increase in untried foreign national receptions 
since 2001. As a result of the above outcomes and policies, foreign 
nationals are more likely to wait longer for their trials than British 
prisoners, which mean that FNPs are more likely to be counted twice in 
the total prison population. Thus, an inaccurate number of total FNPs 
could potentially skew public opinion and the general perception of the 
relationship between foreign nationals and crime. In addition, the data on 
untried foreign nationals suggests that untried British nationals received 
into prison are more likely to be released, discharged, given parole or 
community service, something which agrees with Ministry of Justice 
(2013b) outcomes. FNPs are less likely to be released, given a parole or 
a community sentence due to restrictive immigration policy, stating that 
even when a foreign prisoner has served their sentence, they are to be 
detained in prison or transferred to the IRC to facilitate their deportation 
(Hansard, 2006d, col WA203, Bosworth, 2011).  
On the other hand, the story of un-sentenced foreign nationals convicted 
is similar to those high numbers in the remand. Foreign nationals 
convicted but un-sentenced show a significant growth during periods of 
both Labour and Coalition Government, compared to British nationals 
whose population in this category showed a decrease from 2005 on. The 
2005 was of course when the terrorist attacks occurred in London, 
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leading to anti-terrorism legislation that increased police powers, and 
along with it the criminalisation and stereotyping of foreign nationals 
(Muslims in particular) as a potential criminals and terrorists (Spalek, 
2013, Spalek and Davies, 2012, Spalek and Lambert, 2008).  
6.2.2.2 Immediate custodial sentenced reception and prisoners  
The second group of those received into prison are those who have been 
sentenced. The data showed that the representation of FNPs in this 
category is logically lower than the first one. British nationals are more 
likely to be sentenced immediately than foreign nationals. Hood (2003) 
argued that there is discrimination in the courts regarding race, especially 
against black groups. This thesis agrees with the perception that the 
experiences of foreign nationals in the CJS could be described as a form 
of direct discrimination since criminal justice practices, legislation and 
immigration policies set foreign nationals at disadvantage and labelled 
them as criminals.  
There are methodological problems of ascribing different nationalities due 
to limitations in the data produced by the Home Office and the Ministry of 
Justice. However, there are many similarities between the experiences of 
black people and foreign nationals in the CJS. The majority of black 
people (which is similar to foreign nationals) were put into prison under 
remand awaiting trial, while white defendants (corresponding with British 
nationals) show higher percentages in the ICS category (Hood, 2003, p 
11).  
Moreover, the data showed there are two periods when the proportion of 
sentenced foreign nationals was at its highest in the prison population: 
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post 2001 and post 2005. There are two different explanations for these 
spikes. First, they correspond with ‘war on terror’ policies resulting from 
the terrorist attacks on the USA (2001) and the UK (2005). The 
governmental response to the public and political ‘fear’ of terrorism, partly 
fuelled by the media and political discourses, along with immigration 
policy, has meant foreign national offenders have been impacted upon by 
crime policy (Ministry of Justice, 2013b) and been subject to more 
restrictive immigration policy (Somerville, 2007, Aliverti, 2013b). The 
second explanation for these figures relates to the 2006 scandal, when 
the political, public and media focus was placed on FNPs, and the Home 
Office performance in this regard. From 2006-2009 there was a crime 
policy to increase the ICS prisoners and hand down sentences of a 
greater length (Ministry of Justice, 2013b). 
To conclude, the results indicate that court decisions differ according to 
the nationality of the defendant. Foreign nationals are more likely to stay 
in prison for longer before being sentenced. Canton and Hammond 
(2012), pointed out how the probation staff and sentences view differ, as 
the courts are more prone to sentence foreign nationals with prison rather 
than give them a community sentence, and that they also differ in terms 
of whether or not they use pre-sentence reports18.  
                                                 
18
 Pre-sentence reports: are normally prepared where a court is considering a custodial or 
a community sentence CANTON, R. & HAMMOND, N. (2012). Foreigners to Justice? 
Irregular migrants and foreign national offenders in England and Wales European Journal 
of Probation, 4 (issue), 4-20. 
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6.2.3 The different representation of prisoners by nationality  
6.2.3.1 Recording and counting foreign prisoners  
Using records of foreign nationals in the CJS is actually one of the 
biggest challenges to understanding the levels of criminality that they 
show. Prison records, widely recognised as the only stage of the CJS 
when nationality is recorded, the chaotic and disorganised nature of 
recording nationality affects the validity of the presented data, and thus 
the population of FNPs.  
It should be noted that this limitation of recording is a historical one. For 
example, in a question to the Home Secretary (Winston Churchill) in 1911 
about how the ‘alien’ criminal population relative to the general population 
of aliens is calculated, the Home Secretary replied:  
‘So far as the Home Office is concerned, no attempt has been made to 
calculate the percentage which alien criminals bear to the alien population; 
and I do not think we have at present any trustworthy materials on which 
such a calculation could be made’ (Hansard, 1911, col 1520) 
Principally and by law, the recording of nationality is not obligatory at the 
stages of stop and search and arrest. Prisoners’ nationality is recorded on 
the Prison Service IT system (P-NOMIS) and on the prisoner's core 
record, which is a paper file on initial reception into prison custody. The 
nationality of the prisoner is indicated by a passport or other 
accompanying paperwork, or through self-declaration (National Offender 
Management Service, 2014).  However, what if the prisoner comes with no 
official papers or the accompanying official papers cannot indicate the 
nationality of the prisoner, and the prisoner refused to declare his 
- 217 - 
 
nationality? In a request sent to National Offender Management Service, 
the researcher asked about prison’s policy in relation to recording the 
nationality, specifically those ‘not recorded nationality’ prisoners’ category. 
The researcher asked how Her Majesty Prison Services would cooperate 
with the UK Border Force to deport unrecorded nationality prisoners if their 
nationality remains undeclared. The reply was (National Offender 
Management Service, 2014):   
‘If a prisoner's nationality cannot be established on reception, this will be 
recorded as 'unknown'. All efforts will be made to establish a prisoner's 
nationality when it is unknown. The prisoner will be referred to the Home 
Office who will determine their nationality. Should the Home Office confirm 
a prisoner's nationality, or establish that it is in fact different to the one 
recorded by the prison on initial reception into custody, prison records will 
be updated accordingly. In the majority of cases where the nationality was 
unknown, the prisoner is proven to be British’ 
The researcher received no answer for a FOI to the UKVI via her 
university email FOI act 2000 in February 2014, investigating further the 
fate of unrecorded nationality prisoners, their potential for deportation, and 
what happened if the nationality of the prisoner still unclear. However, 
when the same request was made via the ‘what do they know’ website, 
the following reply was received (Immigration enforcement/ Criminal 
casework, 2014): 
‘The Home Office process is to investigate all cases where the nationality is 
unrecorded. The Home Office check various databases and sources of 
information, as well as interviewing the prisoner, to establish their 
nationality…The Home Office considers for deportation or other 
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immigration enforcement action all non-British/foreign national offenders 
who are sentenced to a period of imprisonment following a criminal 
conviction. Once a person’s nationality has been established the Home 
Office will deport the prisoner to their country of origin’ 
Although the Home Office has provided an answer, this is not wholly 
satisfactory, as current policy does not seem to solve the overall issue. If 
the prisoner is in the country illegally, has no identity papers, and/or 
refuse to voluntary declare her/ his nationality (especially when the 
nationality cannot be self-classified as with ethnicity), then in these cases 
the prisoner will be held for an undetermined period. In a written answer 
by the former Minister of Justice Mark Harper to a question by Priti Patel 
(Con MP) about the number of foreign nationals living in the UK subject 
to deportation orders, Mr Harper wrote:  
‘…at end of Q3 there are 3,980 foreign nationals in the UK subject to 
deportation action living in the community. We continue to pursue removal 
in all these cases. The principal barriers to removal are non-compliance on 
the part of individuals which means we have insufficient evidence of 
nationality and identity to obtain a travel document, ongoing legal 
challenges and the situations in countries of return’ (Hansard, 2012b, col 
778W) 
The above quote refers to unrecorded nationality prisoners, and the 
difficulties of dealing with their cases and if they subject to deportation 
from the UK. The above quote, in some ways, answers the questions 
above that the Home Office did not. Given these difficulties, it is not out of 
the question to suggest that the nationality of some FNPs might not be 
accurate.  
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The voluntary declaration of nationality of those entering prison, the 
vague methods to record the nationality of prisoners, and the increase in 
‘unrecorded nationality’ category prisoners all demonstrate a weakness of 
prison records in this respect. Self-reported nationalities are not checked 
by the prisons before being entered onto the Inmate Information System 
(Justice Statistics Analytical Services, 2011, p 2). Depending on 
prisoners’ self-reporting further reduces clarity in the prison records, 
giving the chance for some prisoners (those who share similar 
demographic characteristics like the similar ethnicity, for example, 
African, South Asians, Europeans, and Arabs) to choose the nationality 
that fits with whichever motivations are guiding them (Unity, 2008).  
6.2.3.2 Who are foreign national prisoners? 
Politicians and the media use prison population numbers frequently to 
claim that foreign nationals present a real danger, and this can heighten 
public concern while creating a widespread acceptance of the association 
between foreign nationals and crime (Corporate Watch, 2013; Prison 
Reform Trust, 2013). However, data in this research shows not all FNPs 
are offenders or serious criminals, as some politicians (Canton and 
Hammond, 2012; (Hansard, 2010a) and media (BBC News, 2014, 
McFadyean, 2013, Shipman and Doyle, 2013) describe them. Indeed, it 
is useful at this juncture to clarify the categories into which FNPs can be 
placed:  
1. Foreign national ’detainees’ in Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs), controlled 
by the prison service 
2. Remand prisoners (untried and convicted unsentenced) 
3. Fine defaulters  
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4. Prisoners sentenced for committing non-immigration criminal offences  
5. FNPs detained after serving their time in prison  
The population of foreign nationals ’detainees’19 in IRCs controlled by the 
prison service are usually added to the total population of FNPs in HMPS; 
foreign nationals’ detainees in Dover, Haslar, Lindholme, and Morton Hall 
IRCs are usually added to the FNP population (see Table 6.8A & B). The 
IRCs hold different types of foreign nationals for different reasons, but all 
detainees regardless are labelled as FNPs. For example, Morton Hall 
holds males subject to deportation without any reference to the reason of 
deportation, whether for immigration crimes or non-immigration criminal 
offences (Her Majesty’s Prison Service, 2013c). Dover (IRC) holds 
‘appellant and failed asylum seekers’. Haslar (IRC) holds those detained 
by the Home Office while their eligibility to remain in the UK is 
considered, and whilst removal or deportation processes are carried out. 
Lindholme (IRC) holds males prisoners (Category C over the age of 21 
and a small number of Category D) (Her Majesty’s Prison Service, 2012; 
2013a; 2013b). In addition, fine defaulters who are considered along with 
detainees in the IRCs to be non-criminal prisoners are added to the 
population of FNPs, and in most cases without making a clear distinction 
between FNPs and non-criminal foreign nationals (Bhui, 2009a; Hales 
and Gelsthorpe, 2012; Ministry of Justice, 2014a). The data in this 
research has clarified the meaning of FNP by distinguishing between 
foreign national offenders, foreign national non-criminals, and foreign 
national ex-prisoners detained in the prison waiting for their deportation.  
                                                 
19
 Immigration detainees are connected directly to the policy towards asylum seekers, 
particularly those who enter the country illegally or with fraudulent documents, or those 
who be caught working illegally.  
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6.2.3.3 Why foreign prisoners population has increased  
As a result to presenting foreigners existence as a social problem, which 
impacted a moral panic and the consequent policies that connected 
foreign nationals directly to different sorts of crimes like wars on drugs 
and terrorism, the population of FNPs has risen, especially as foreigners 
have been stereotyped as being involved with drug offences and 
terrorism (see 3.1.2). The change in foreign prisoners’ rate could be 
explained by changes in the crime policy, as those detained or 
imprisoned under immigration legislation affects the total population. As 
well as the expansion in ‘crimmigration’, an immigration policy tightened 
by reducing free services for foreigners, along with removing the right to 
work for asylum seekers in 2002, has resulted in a high proportion of non-
criminal FNPs. For example, the peak of the increase of detaining 
immigrants started from 2005, along with The Asylum and Immigration 
Act 2004 (Treatment of Claimants, etc.). This removed benefits payable 
to refugees once they received a positive decision, in recognition of their 
retrospective entitlement to full levels of income support whilst claims 
were determined (Section 12). The increase in the population of FNPs 
thus came from different sources: foreign nationals in the IRC detained 
for illegal entry or overstaying; prisoners detained after completing their 
sentences and awaiting deportation; even asylum seekers and refugees 
detained on arrival in the UK (Clarke and Newman, 2007, Silverman and 
Hajela, 2013).  
In a report by HM chief inspector of prisons Nick Hardwick in August 
2012 examining conditions in the Category B jail, two FNPs were found to 
have been held for long periods beyond the end of their sentence; one of 
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these FNPS was held for an extra nine years (Hardwick, 2012). These 
two men had each been awarded and served long sentences as both of 
them had committed serious offences. As such, in normal circumstances 
they would be returned to their home country after serving their sentence. 
However, it seems that for reasons out of their control, such a return is 
extremely difficult if not impossible. It was recognised that they could not 
continue to be detained for so long without the authority of a court (HM 
Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2012). The report also criticised the UKVI and 
the lack of an independent immigration advisory service that mean the 
detention of FNPs for years without court authority is possible (Hardwick, 
2012). The Chief Executive Officer of the NOMS Michael Spurr (Ministry 
of Justice, 2012) responded: 
‘I acknowledge that the performance at Lincoln has declined. This is not 
acceptable and we have taken urgent action to address the Chief 
Inspector's concerns.’ 
The UKVI spokesperson also justified the long detention of the two FNPs 
without a court authorisation, as the ‘extended’ period of detention was 
necessary for the two individuals who had been described as ‘extremely 
dangerous’; one of them had absconded before and the other had 
previously failed to comply with his bail conditions (BBC NEWS, 2012).  
In the response of the Chief Executive (Rob Whiteman) to the HAC 
question regarding the deportation process delay, Whiteman (Home 
Affairs Committee, 2011b) said: 
 ‘UKBA's position is that we believe people should remain in detention until 
the removal takes place. As the Minister made clear yesterday in an urgent 
question, in 90% of cases where people are not detained pending removal, 
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it is because of the decision of the courts. Our position remains that we 
think people should remain in detention until the removal takes place’ 
Juliet Lyon, director of the Prison Reform Trust, has been very critical of 
this way of doing things:  
‘For a foreign national man to be found in the depths of this jail nine years 
after the expiry of his sentence tariff is a matter not only for prison staff but 
also for the Justice Minister’ (Lincolnshire Echo, 2012).  
The rapid increase in criminalisation and imprisonment is unparalleled in 
volume and scope. A consequence has enhanced the construction of 
foreign criminality and negatively affected BAEM communities’ 
relationship with the CJS. The literature that looked at the criminalisation 
of ‘race’ investigates the impact of labelling young black people as 
criminals (Dovidio et al., 1997). BAME groups are overrepresented in the 
CJS statistical data due to the influence of the media and political 
discourses, which pictured them as evils and influence new waves of 
modern racism (Rowe, 2012). The old scenario of targeting BAME groups 
and labelling them as criminals has back with slight difference, othering 
foreign nationals and presenting them as the biggest threat in this country 
would lead to one result; over representing them in the CJS data. The 
data showed how the pattern of prisoner rankings has changed since 
2004 when the door was open further for EU migrants. In terms of 
ethnicity, there are differences according to nationality, especially for 
black prisoners. Foreign national black prisoners had the highest 
representation among other ethnic minorities, and a higher representation 
compared to the total population than British black prisoners. The high 
representation of black ethnicity is understood by looking at the largest 
- 224 - 
 
nationality groups of prisoners in E&W. The data showed a high 
representation of the traditional UK immigration nationalities: Africans 
(Nigeria, Somalia, and South Africans), Caribbean (Jamaica), South 
Asian (India and Pakistan) and Irish. Jamaican prisoners were 
predominant among all FNPs from 1999 until 2013, when Polish 
prisoners replaced them. These Polish prisoners have been the 
predominant group, proportionally speaking, in arrest data since 2008.  
The decrease in the Jamaican prisoner population (due to the general 
decrease in FNPs population) did not affect their primary ranking until 
2013. Jamaicans have been stereotyped and connected to drugs crime, 
one in six Jamaican prisoners are imprisoned for drugs offences, and 
some of these are drugs couriers arrested on entry to the UK (Bowling 
and Phillips, 2003; 2002). In 2008, 71 percent of those who have been 
arrested ended up in prison; in 2012, half of this percentage (35 percent) 
ended up in prison. However, it should be noted that the prison 
population in the table includes those remanded in prison, that those who 
are sentenced for drug offences have longer sentences, finally that the 
British Government has struggled to deport Jamaican prisoners to their 
homeland (Public Accounts Committee, 2014b). This means that some 
Jamaicans are held in prison longer, and the research suggests that the 
percentage of the Jamaicans convicted FNPs is less than the above. This 
is particularly problematic when discussing FNPs because statistics show 
that foreigners are now twice as likely to be held on remand as British 
citizens, and this discrepancy has grown significantly over the last 
decade. Therefore, it is very likely that actual percentages of convicted 
FNPs may be lower.  
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On the other hand, the increase in foreign nationals of white ethnicity in 
the prison population is strongly associated with the increase in the EU 
population. However, by combining the arrest and prison tables, the 
result shows: 11 percent only of arrested Polish were imprisoned in 2008, 
decreasing to 10 percent in 2012. This means that around 90 percent of 
those arrested were either discharged or released. This raises some 
concern that the police are targeting Polish citizens. Similarly, Romanian 
prisoner data shows 7 percent of those arrested in 2009 were jailed, and 
this percentage has only increased slightly in 2012. Lithuanian prisoners 
show the same pattern, with 8 percent of those arrested in 2010, and 11 
percent of this arrested in 2012 imprisoned. It should be noted that 
prisoners who are on remand (untried or convicted unsentenced) are also 
included in these figures.  
As such, this data seems to echo the arguments of Lee (2007b), who 
found that political discourses and the media now focuses on nationality 
rather than race/ethnicity as used to be the case. In an environment 
where the numbers of foreign nationals have increased, tightened 
immigration policy is not only expressed by greater borders control, but it 
also means indirect control through criminalising foreign nationals, and 
presenting them in general as potential criminals.  
6.2.3.4 Dangerous criminals: the types of crimes’ committed 
The data in the tables shows that VATP and drug crimes were the most 
commonly committed crimes for both nationality groups. However, VATP 
was the highest category for imprisonment of British national prisoners, 
whereas drug crime stand was the largest category for which foreign 
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nationals were imprisoned. These results agree with those (Heaven and 
Hudson, 2005, Beddoes et al., 2010, Canton and Hammond, 2012, Bhui, 
2007, Banks, 2011). Each of these studies found that foreign nationals 
are more likely to be convicted and sentenced for drugs, and that they 
are more likely to receive longer sentences.  
There are different explanations of the high number of FNP for VATP, 
such as the intolerant crime policy towards foreign nationals and the wide 
range of crimes that VATP captures: 14 categories with over 100 types of 
violent crimes, which most of which do imply physical harm. For example, 
a threat to kill is considered a crime under the VATP with a sanction not 
exceeding 10 years;20 under the law of some other countries, this is not 
considered a crime unless accompanied with concrete action (see for 
example Moroccan criminal legislation (s425-427); Iraqi criminal law (421, 
B)). Moreover, constructing the criminality of foreign nationals and 
stereotyping foreign nationals, presenting them as potential criminals and 
associating them with violence and terrorism might affect how criminal 
justice workers treat those (non-whites in particular) who do not fit the 
typical ‘British’ appearance (Bowling and Philips, 2002, p 207). 
Furthermore, it can be stated that immigration policy as a means to 
control the expansion of ‘unwanted’ immigrants has used prison as a 
primary tool (Lee, 2007a).  
The other prominent offending categories for FNPs are those relating to 
sexual crimes and robbery, followed by fraud and ‘other crime’. The 
                                                 
20
 ‘A person who without lawful excuse makes to another a threat, intending that that other 
would fear it would be carried out, to kill that other or a third person shall be guilty of an 
offence and liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
ten years’ Offences Against the Person Act 1861/ section 16 
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position of British prisoners is a little different: proportionally speaking it 
features more serious crimes (in both quantity and quality) than FNPs. 
This result is contrary to the majority of the negative political and media 
discourses that focuses on the criminality of foreign nationals, blaming 
them for increases to the crime level in E&W.  
It should be note that the increase of the FNP for property crimes since 
2006 accompanied the Royal Assent for the Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Act 2006, which boosted government’s powers to tackle illegal 
working and strengthen the UK borders. At the same time, immigration 
detainee data recorded its highest figures from 2005-2008, when tackling 
illegal immigrants and illegal workers was the main concern of the Home 
Office. After the incident in 2006 when it emerged over 1000 FNPs were 
released without being considered for deportation between 1999 and 
2006, Labour’s immigration policy became much tougher in order to 
rebuild public confidence in the immigration system in the UK (The Home 
Affairs Committee, 2012). 
On the other hand, in spite of the data showing that FNPs are more likely 
to be imprisoned for drugs and non-serious crimes compared to British 
prisoners (who are more likely to be imprisoned for serious crimes), the 
sentence lengths for foreign national offenders are more likely to be 
longer than for British. This again raises the question of whether foreign 
nationals are targeted and discriminated against in the courts due to their 
nationality and legal status. Canton and Hammond (2012), Miller (2005), 
Solivetti (2011) and Councell and Olagundoye (2003) point out that when 
the defendant is a foreign national, the attitude of the court will be 
different compared to if the defendant was indigenous. However, none of 
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these studies was able to justify or explain the reasons for this difference. 
In this respect it is also useful to remember that other studies have shown 
that BAME individuals receive tougher sentences, suggestive of 
‘institutional’ discrimination in the CJS (Fekete and Webber, 2010, 
Williams, 2000).  
Prison data does not compare the differences in criminality behaviour 
between foreign and British citizens. In addition, it does not show whether 
foreigners are more prone to commit crimes than British. This is partly 
because prison data does not show the number of crimes committed by 
individual prisoners. The incarceration data gives an indication of the 
problems of penal justice incurred by foreign nationals in their host 
country, and this analysis suggests deeper thought is required in relation 
to crime policy and the problems of interaction, reception, integration, and 
adoption between foreigners and the host country (Solivetti, 2011, p. 
126).  
To sum up, by recognising the differences between FNPs and foreign 
national offenders (for non-immigration criminal offences), this chapter 
agrees with those studies that suggest foreign nationals do not have the 
large effect on crime levels in western countries, including the UK, that is 
often claimed. In addition, discrimination in the different legal stages, the 
varying representation of foreign nationals in contact with the police and 
the court, and the longer sentences they are more likely to receive (as 
well as those detained after their sentence has expired) all affect the 
construction of foreign national criminality. Immigration policy has 
intertwined with the CJS to facilitate the deportation of foreign prisoners, 
and ultimately act as a means of controlling the quantity of immigration in 
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the UK. Policy therefore plays a significant role in determining the 
relationship between foreign nationals and crime in the UK context.  
The next chapter will explore this further by providing a qualitative 
analysis of the immigration and crime arena. It will examine political and 
parliamentary debates, alongside the impact of immigration policy, to 
reveal how this has helped widen the construction of foreign national 
criminality. Political discourse, along with the media reporting of the 
issues, will be shown to impact public attitudes, and in turn the general 
construction of foreign national criminality. 
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Chapter 7 Parliamentary and political debates: Discourse 
analysis   
 
Since the 1950s, the topic of immigration has been highly politicised and 
has been one of the leading issues in almost every election campaign in 
the UK. The rhetoric of different political parties about immigration has 
fuelled public concern over the economic, social and legal impact of 
immigration. From the 1990s onwards, foreign nationals have often been 
blamed for increasing crime, and linked to different illegal activities in 
spite of very little evidence supporting their criminality. 
This chapter focuses on the construction of foreign criminality as a means 
of controlling foreign nationals, as well as rushing through legislation. It is 
useful to use discourse analysis to identify powerful discourses and the 
social, economic and political climate, which fostered its development, 
and track the historical development of the discourse over time. 
Analysing foreign criminality discourses would allow the research the 
opportunity of knowing what other ways of defending foreign criminality 
have been marginalised. 
 ‘Foreign predator’ and British victim: Analysing foreign criminality 
discourses  
Analysing parliamentary and political discourses has been used by 
scholars to develop our thoughts and identify constituents in terms of 
objects, statements, themes, arguments, traces of challenges and traces 
of ideas which changed directions (Yamamoto, 2013, Yamamoto, 2010, 
Noronha, 2015, Fairclough, 2000). Discourse analysis has been widely 
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used in studying the impact of legislation on foreign nationals, or how 
racism is implied through political and parliamentary debates, as well as 
the media (Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008, Van Dijk, 2000), Fairclough 
(2000), critically analysed political language produced by the British New 
Labour Party and Prime Minister Tony Blair. Fairclough runs his analysis 
in two different ways: qualitative analysis (called it critical discourse 
analysis) and quantitative data. Fairclough runs an analytical framework 
for explaining how discourse structured in projects for social and cultural 
change. Fairclough, analysed the style of politician’s language, 
discourses based on political representation, and genres constitute a 
certain way of using language like genres identify how language works as 
a means of control (Engelbert, 2012).  
Discourse analysts of foreign criminality discourses explained how 
political discourses have connected crimes with foreignness, emphasised 
the safeness of British communities without foreigners (Huysmans and 
Buonfino, 2008, Noronha, 2015). Yamamoto (2010), imaged the ‘foreign 
predator and Japanese prey’ dichotomization, which constitutes the core 
cognitive scheme of the official discourse of foreign criminality in Japan. 
Yamamoto (2010), qualitatively analysed Japanese police white papers 
and white papers on crime between 1986 and 2002, and found that social 
construction of foreign nationals criminality is developing and increasing 
due to the contribution of many barriers like policies, foreign criminality 
discourse and the media (Yamamoto, 2013). The author argued that 
foreign criminality discourses, which are increasingly prominent in 
contemporary Japan, is better understood as a political construction of 
foreign ‘others’ within, rather than as a response to an actual high crime 
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rate for foreign nationals. With the dichotomized picture of predator 
foreigners and British victim, the foreign criminality discourse frames 
immigration as a national security issue, proposing a more security-
oriented approach to immigration stronger policing of illegal migrants, 
stricter border control, and closer surveillance of foreign national 
residents as measures of crime prevention (Aliverti, 2012b, Spiro, 2009, 
Bosworth and Guild, 2008b). Foreign criminality discourse emphasized 
the dramatic increase of FNPs and highlighted the brutality of some 
crimes especially those that are dominated by foreign nationals like 
terrorism and immigration crimes are explained as the result of cultural 
and religion differences (Noronha, 2015, Aliverti, 2013a, Anderson, 
2013). Noronha (2015), Warner (2005), and Agozino (1997), analysed 
the media and political discourses of foreign criminality to represent facts, 
beliefs and events, identify the construction of foreign criminality, and 
interpret the outcome of focusing on the relationship between foreign 
nationals and crime. The scholars explored how the symbolic power is 
used to impose someone’s version of social reality as legitimate, and is 
distributed within society, also they show how the overrepresentation of 
foreign nationals in CJS data was used to claim its objectivity and support 
legitimising the relationship between immigration and crime (see also 
Chapter 4). 
While criminality is associated with foreignness, national security is 
represented as a traditional characteristic of Western communities 
(Rumbaut and Ewing, 2007, Every and Augoustinos, 2007). Claim-
makers urge the British government to reinforce enforcement against 
foreign nationals that goes well beyond British attitude. This perspective 
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portrays the goal of the immigration administration to be effective policing 
of foreign nationals (Banks, 2011, Bowling and Sheptychi, 2015). 
This chapter presents evidence that questions the basis of the foreign 
national-crime nexus in the UK by exploring the type of debates 
surrounding foreign nationals, the sorts of issues that have been linked to 
them, and the links to changes in immigration policy and public opinion. 
The analytical approach of analysing parliamentary debates and political 
discourses is intended to demonstrate/exemplify and explore the 
relationship between the text and the issue or the process of discussing 
the research problem (Jackson, 2007, Van Dijk, 2000). 
 Discussing foreign nationals in Westminster  
Looking at the parliamentary debates in Westminster on the Hansard 
website by the date reveals a consistent complaint in regards of the same 
issues that have been connected to foreign nationals historically. 
This section will follow the same structure that was used in Chapter 2, 
and in doing so explore how parliamentary debates represent foreign 
national criminality as a feature of demographic, health, economic and 
housing concerns.  
7.1.1 Populated pressures  
The immigrant population in the UK and its impact on the demographic 
changes has been discussed frequently in parliamentary debates. Many 
MPs from different political parties have welcomed the debates regarding 
the impact of foreign national overpopulation on different aspects of life in 
the UK (Wright, 2006). In the words of Nicholas Soames (Con MP) 
regarding the immigrant population:  
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‘…our country truly faces a turning point of historic proportions, which will 
profoundly affect the future of our children and subsequent generations. In 
fact, this is a crisis, of which members of the public are instinctively aware 
and about which many of them are rightly uneasy, but the Government are 
in almost total denial about it. I refer to the impact of mass immigration on 
our population, which will inevitably have the most serious consequences 
for our public services, our environment, our quality of life and even the 
future stability of our society. In some places, that is clearly already the 
case’(Hansard, 2010b, col 1WH) 
Such language suggests a ‘foreign invasion’, whereas the statistical data 
on the nationality of the UK population shows another story (Office for 
National Statistics, 2014). In spite of this, statistical data does not show 
the full picture due to the general meaning of ‘immigrant’ in British 
legislation (see section 1.2 Chapter 1); many foreign nationals are 
international students or economic migrants, working and paying taxes 
and ultimately contributing positively to the British economy (Science and 
Technology Committee, 2014).  
The Public Administration Select Committee (2013) has published a 
report criticising the ‘inaccuracy’ of ONS migration publication statistics, 
as they underestimate the true migrant population in the UK, something 
that will impact on the efficacy of immigration policy. However, debates 
are mostly intended to show the impact of immigration on the crime rate, 
and to try and make a connection between the increase of the immigrant 
population and UK crime rates (House of Commons Library research 
service, 2008). 
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Finally, as a response to political and public concerns regarding new 
waves of migration from Romania and Bulgaria (first arriving from 
January 1st 2014) David Cameron stated he wants to make sure people 
come to the UK "for the right reasons", not just to claim benefits. The 
government says it is particularly concerned about the pressure that 
immigrants will put on local services, housing, and the health service. To 
tackle this, the Prime Minister stated immigrants would need to prove 
they are "genuinely seeking employment" to claim jobless benefits. This 
would be a tougher test than the current one, and would include a 
requirement for jobseekers to speak English. Immigrants may also be 
excluded from council house waiting lists in England for at least two 
years, under plans for councils to introduce a residency test. David 
Cameron says he wants the UK to get better at charging foreign 
governments for NHS treatment provided to non-working overseas 
nationals. Government ministers have also examined the possibility of 
linking some benefits to contributions, which could exclude new arrivals 
from eligibility (BBC News, 2013a, BBC NEWS, 2013b, Riley-Smith, 
2013). 
7.1.2 Health Pressure  
Pressures that foreign nationals are putting on public services (especially 
the NHS) have been widely discussed in both Houses of Parliament. In 
the debates of ‘NHS Audit Requirements (Foreign Nationals) Bill’, which 
failed to pass, Henry Smith (Con) alleged that foreign nationals are 
putting too much pressure on the NHS and wants to ensure that the 
‘British health budget is not unfairly burdened’ (Hansard, 2012c, col 140). 
However, the highly respected Nuffield Trust showed in 2011 that 
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‘immigrants are far less likely to use hospital services than the general 
population’ (Hansard, 2013f, col 279). Ultimately, David Cameron has 
introduced heated debates in regards of ‘health tourism’, and the idea 
that tourists are taking benefits for free from the NHS (David Cameron's 
Office, 2013). This resulted in the Immigration Act legislation introducing 
NHS charges for all temporary non-EU citizens in the UK.  
Prior to Cameron’s mainstream ‘health tourism’ concerns, in a report of 
Health Select Committee, Committee Chairman David Hinchliffe said: 
‘The Committee does not underestimate the difficulties the Government 
faces in combating 'health tourism', and it's vital that the UK does not 
become a magnet for HIV positive individuals seeking to emigrate to this 
country to access our health care. However, we have seen no evidence 
that this is happening. The Government has no estimates of the numbers of 
people likely to be involved in health tourism, or of what they might be 
costing the NHS’ (Health select Committee, 2005) 
7.1.3 Economic pressure  
Following the banking crisis of 2008, parliamentary debates have focused 
on reducing welfare benefits as part of a general programme of austerity 
in public spending. This has had a direct impact on the immigration 
debate; for example, the House of Lords debates about the economic 
impact of immigrants in 2013 focused predominantly on foreign nationals' 
abuse of the welfare system, and a focus on illegal immigrants meant the 
Government introduced tougher measures to deter immigration crimes 
(Hansard, 2014d).  
In the meantime, an official government data report analysed the 
economic impact of immigration to the UK, finding that immigrants who 
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arrived after 1999 in Britain, and made up a third of the overall immigrant 
population in the UK in 2011, were 45 percent less likely to receive state 
benefits than native Britons. They were also 3 percent less likely to live in 
social housing. Recent immigrants from the European Economic Area 
(EEA) contributed on average 34 percent more taxes than they received 
as transfers, while those from outside of the EEA contributed 2 percent 
more (Dustmann and Frattini, 2013, see also Kennedy, 2011). 
Although welfare benefit has been central to the debate, employment and 
wages are central features (Dustmann and Preston, 2007 ) and have 
featured in parliamentary debates highlighting the relationship between 
immigration and crime. The shortage of employment and wages has 
meant some MPs have focused on the economic situation of Romanians 
and Bulgarians in particular (see for example, Hansard, 2006f, col 62W, 
Hansard, 2006b, col 14, Hansard, 2006c, col 20, Hansard, 2014c, Col 
567W, Hansard, 2013i).    
There are two implications of the above oft-repeated parliamentary 
debates. Firstly, it is possible that they raised anti-Romanian feelings or 
‘Romanian phobia’ among the public (Hansard, 2013h, Hansard, 2013g). 
Secondly, the influence of parliamentary debates about EU migrants’ 
economic impact and the 'open door' policy for working in the UK has 
affected their representation in the CJS statistics; as we have seen in the 
last chapter, the arrest and imprisonment rates of Polish, Romanian and 
Lithuanian nationals in particular has been elevated significantly.  
On the other hand, although the economic impact may not be the main 
factor in criminalising foreign nationals, it is certainly an important aspect 
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of this discussion. For example, part of the big storm about the deportation 
of the FNPs and foreign national offenders related to how it would save 
the taxpayers money and would create space in British prisons. This 
would mean the government would not need to build extra prisons and 
therefore could save money (see for example, 1st Delegated Legislation 
Committee of the House of Commons, 2007/2008, col 4, Home Affairs 
Committee, 2011a, No. 6, Hansard, 2010a, col 53WH-60WH).  
 It is mentioned that keeping FNPs in prison would unnecessarily cost 
taxpayers thousands of pounds, at a time when the UK economy is 
struggling (Home Affairs Committee, 2010, Public Accounts Committee, 
2014b). Furthermore, the representation of the delayed deportation of 
foreign nationals as wasting taxpayer's money helps solidify the foreign 
national-crime nexus, especially through focusing specifically on foreign 
national offenders and FNPs in media coverage. In other words, the 
‘unjustifiable’ delay in the deportation process, for which the UK Border 
Agency was culpable, increased the construction foreign criminality 
(Home Affairs Committee, 2012b). 
Tracing the different attitudes on topics raised by different politicians in 
relation to the main goals of some recent policy reveals the importance of 
economic factors, exacerbated by the global economic crisis. Politicians 
have tended to use in ways the economic pressure that have 
strengthened the relationship between foreign nationals and crime, and in 
reality criminalised some foreign nationals in order to facilitate their 
deportation or removal from the UK (Lee, 2007b).  
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7.1.4 Housing pressures  
As has been pointed in the section on asylum seekers (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.2.4), 21st century foreign nationals are also brought into 
debates surrounding housing pressures, especially with the ‘free 
movement’ policy for EU citizens supposedly placing pressure on social 
housing (Rutter and Latorre, 2009). There is a consistent heated debate 
in the Parliament in relation to the welfare benefits and social housing for 
eligible foreign nationals. The debates have become particularly heated 
since Romanians and Bulgarians have become entitled to live and work 
in the UK (Kennedy, 2014). David Cameron, in his speech in 2013 at the 
University Campus Suffolk, Ipswich, touched on the ‘common sense’ 
negative impact of foreign nationals on public services: 
‘We’ve made significant changes to our policies in the Home Office to get 
net migration down, but now what we need to do is to work across 
government so that our immigration policy is factored into our benefits 
system, our health system and our housing system…stopping our benefits 
system from being such a soft touch; by making entitlement to our key 
public services something migrants earn, not an automatic right; and by 
bringing the full force of government together to crack down on illegal 
working’ (Cameron, 2013). 
However, Wilson (2014) report to the House of Commons argued there is 
little evidence that EU and non-EEA foreigners are able to ‘jump the 
queue’ in the wait for social houses. Indeed, she states that there is no 
entitlement to social housing for anyone in England, even if s/he is a 
British citizen. The policy of foreigners being considered as ineligible is 
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therefore focused more on addressing public and political concerns than 
any real pressure from foreign nationals on social housing.  
 Stereotyping and linking foreign nationals to crime  
This section explores how the relationship between foreign nationals and 
crime has been represented in Parliament, by looking at the type of 
crimes that have been connected to foreign nationals and the language 
used to describe their criminality. Some instances reveal this more than 
others do, and these have been identified from the general themes of the 
parliamentary and political debates. The examples that will be discussed 
here are therefore immigration crimes, terrorism and national security 
post 9/11 and 7/7, and the management of foreign national offenders 
following on from the April 2006 scandal.  
7.2.1 Immigration crime  
As has been discussed in Chapter 3, the criminalisation of foreign 
nationals, and the connection of foreign nationals to different illegal 
activities, has increased significantly since the beginning of the 21st 
century. The expansion of ‘crimmigration’ legislation has influenced 
parliamentary debates, which started to connect illegal immigrants and 
illegal workers with almost every major issue facing the country. For 
example, economic issues keep the discussion of the relationship 
between immigration and illegal activities, especially immigration crime, 
at the forefront (see for example, Hansard, 2013c). 
The strong immigration rhetoric in Westminster has been criticised, as 
has the tough immigration policy that prioritises the criminalisation of 
foreign nationals, and connects them to different immigration crimes. A 
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speech by Lord McConnell, he pointed to this fact (Hansard, 2013d, col 
440): 
 ‘…there is a huge gap in the middle that is damaging the strategy working 
towards those aspirations ... the first is immigration. We will compete and 
succeed in the world only if we are open, flexible and welcoming. The 
Government’s rhetoric on immigration is damaging Britain’s international 
standing and our ability to be entrepreneurial and competitive... and I urge 
the Government to address that issue and look again at their rhetoric on 
immigration.’ 
Similarly, following the Queen’s speech in 2013, Lord Karan Bilimoria 
(Crossbench) criticised debates for reinforcing the immigration and crime 
relationship in discussing different issues faced by the UK. He appealed 
to Members to distinguish between examples of beneficial immigration 
such as students and those who are causing genuine harm to the country. 
He gave an example of the Head of Immigration from Australia (Hansard, 
2013e, col 173) who said: ‘every day in Australia they pray and thank God 
for the existence of the UK Border Agency’, as restrictions on immigration 
policy and the criminalisation of immigrants has affected the quantity of 
students who choose to study in the UK. 
The wide focus on controlling borders and restricting immigration 
movement, especially asylum seekers while debating new legislation in 
parliament is inappropriate. Such debates have ended up linking foreign 
nationals to different sorts of crimes, and identifying citizens of certain 
countries as requiring greater control and monitoring before they enter the 
UK, including those from the Middle East (Hansard, 2001g, col 627, 
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Hansard, 2001d) or South Asians (Hansard, 2001e, col 712, 715, 
Hansard, 2001f, col 173) 
The immigration-crime relationship has arisen in debates around border 
controls, including introducing differentiated borders to place more 
obstacles and barriers in front of those coming from countries classified 
as high-risk (regarding their asylum seekers, incidence of illegal entry, 
overstaying and terrorism), and alternatively facilitate entry for other 
desired categories of travellers (Hampshaire, 2009). In other words, 
certain nationalities and religions (particularly those who came from 
countries known to house terrorists) are placed under suspicion, and 
nationals of these countries require significant documentation to be 
granted a visa. In addition, on entering the UK, they are questioned, 
stopped and searched, and many are detained in the airports. Despite the 
government’s claim that immigration policy has progressed and any 
racism is in the past (Miles and Phizacklea, 1984), in practice it merely 
manifests in different ways. 
7.2.2 The national security context  
7.2.2.1  The phrases used in debates  
There is no doubt about the influential role of the language to construct 
the knowledge and the credit some social realities over than others 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1991), especially the political one, which aim to 
convince oneself and others of the legitimacy of the dangerous side of a 
particular sector in a society. The importance of the language comes from 
the meaning of society as Gorman, O’Byrne, and Patron (2006) explained 
that the society is a symbolic construct of composed of ideas and 
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meanings and language is all the time changing through human actors 
themselves and language will be the most important factors to affect the 
meaning of crime and offenders.  
All references to terrorism after September 2001 relate to Muslims and 
foreign nationals; Muslims have been encouraged to cooperate more with 
the local authorities to counter terrorism (Spalek and Lambert, 2008) 
indeed, the term ‘international terrorism’ automatically suggests the 
external origins of the terrorist threat (Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008). In 
addition, in most instances when the phrases 'national security', 
'terrorism', 'criminal justice', 'borders' are used, either 'immigration' or 
'asylum seekers' follow in the same line or paragraph (see for example, 
Hansard, 2013b, col 18, Hansard, 2013d, col 31, Hansard, 2001b, col 
198). Lord David Howell (Con), during the first response of the UK 
Legislature to 9/11, said: 
‘It seems also - this is more controversial - that young terrorists or young 
fundamentalists determined even to commit suicide in their mad cause are 
still coming too easily into this country. I am afraid that we shall yet again 
have to revisit the issue of the asylum entrants’ (Hansard, 2001c, col 16 
see in the same meaning also col 80) 
9/11 and the subsequent 7/7 London terrorist bombings resulted in a 
political and parliamentary discourse of alienation regarding Muslims, 
which distinguished between British Muslims and other British citizens. 
The language used avoided granting the status of British citizenship and 
identity to UK Muslims. The ‘foreignness’ of Muslims helped avoid using 
terms that emphasise the British nationality of those Muslims. The term 
‘British Muslims’ has been restricted. Other alternative terms have been 
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used instead, such as ‘Muslims in the UK’, ‘British AND Muslims’, ‘Muslim 
groups’, ‘Muslim communities in Britain’ and ‘Muslim population in my 
constituency/neighbourhood’ (see for example, Hansard, 2001 , col 610, 
620, 646, 657, Hansard, 2001e, col  712, 715, 716, 733, 714, 767, 
Hansard, 2005, col 902, 904). In addition, some political parties and MPs 
proceeded to talk about Muslims and their danger to British people 
without paying attention to the British identity of many Muslims in the UK 
(Hansard, 2001d, col 767). In a question by Baroness Kishwer Falkner 
(Lib Dem) to Baroness Amos (Secretary of State for International 
Development) following the 7/7 attack: 
‘when factual information is imparted by the Government in their search for 
the identities of the terrorists, it would be wise to make a clear distinction 
between those who may be Muslim but are foreign citizens and those who 
are Muslim and British citizens ... as the Minister will know, the Muslim 
Council of Britain is recording a large number – thousands – of low-level 
incidents, but incidents nonetheless, directed against the Muslim 
community in the UK’ (Hansard, 2005, col 907). 
7.2.2.2 Terrorists foreigners   
In spite of most, if not all, terrorist attacks in the UK being committed 
either by British citizens or members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
debates post 9/11 have primarily focused on foreign nationals, and 
border control has become a prominent part of parliamentary debate and 
political manifestos (Hansard, 2006e). The first statement of the British 
Prime Minister (PM) (Tony Blair) post 9/11 was a speech on 14 
September 2001 in the House of Commons speculating on the source of 
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the terrorism, ignoring the preceding British experience with terrorist 
attacks, which had not been committed by foreign nationals or Muslims: 
‘We do not yet know the exact origin of this evil. But, if, as appears likely, it 
is so-called Islamic fundamentalists, we know that they do not speak or act 
for the vast majority of law-abiding Muslims throughout the world’… Thirdly, 
whatever the nature of the immediate response to these terrible events in 
America, we need to rethink dramatically the scale and nature of the action 
that the world takes to combat terrorism’ (Hansard, 2001h, col 605-606). 
Blaming foreigners for different issues placed more emphasis on national 
borders and their role in preventing crime and securing Britain. This focus 
has become somewhat skewed, as monitoring borders has become a 
focal point for the majority of MPs who believe that securing borders will 
mean defeating crime and terrorism (see for example, Hansard, 2001ccol 
29, 50, Hansard, 2001d, col 933, 936). Appeals from MPs of different 
political parties have urged the government to take tougher measures, 
and blamed existing policies for not doing enough to tackle and monitor 
criminals (House of Commons, 2005, col 10). Hence, the enlargement 
and expansion of European borders were suggested frequently in 
Parliament as a solution for keeping terrorism and crime outside 
(Hansard, 2001d, col 619, 627, 644, 663, Hansard, 2001c, col 747, 748). 
Additionally, there were appeals to a coalition of the ‘civilised world’ to 
defeat terrorism (Hansard, 2001d, col 620).  
Debates around foreign nationals, especially in the House of Lords, (see 
for example, Hansard, 2001b, col 173), have considered foreign nationals 
(asylum seekers in particular) as a threat to national security and 
suggested closing the borders (Hansard, 2001b, col 133, 145, 147, 157). 
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There are other debates connecting foreign nationals to other different 
sorts of criminal offence, which suggest to the public (via the media) that 
there are strong links between immigration and crime. A speech by Oliver 
Letwin (Con MP) in the House of Commons linked asylum seekers to 
violent crimes, claiming many are bogus in reference to a newspaper 
article:  
 ‘Does the Home Secretary accept that requests for asylum can be misused 
by men of violence? What is his response to the statement made by the 
Saudi ambassador and reported in the Sunday papers that "many Arab 
governments have told the British Government repeatedly that a lot of 
people in Britain masquerading as political refugees are terrorists"?’ 
(Hansard, 2001a, col 3) 
All in all, the discussion of terrorism and national security have opened 
the door for debates that see foreign nationals as a source of crime, and 
their motivation for coming to the UK has been linked to the commission 
of illegal activity rather than seeking a safe place or looking for better life. 
Lord Marlesford’s comments on the Supply and Appropriation (Main 
Estimates) Bill 2013(Hansard, 2013a, col 1361) include this: 
‘Many people arriving in Britain, including some of those seeking asylum 
from persecution, bring with them their own political, religious and cultural 
agendas. My premise is that if a nation cannot defend its own border 
security, everything is at risk.’  
7.2.3 Foreign nationals and non-immigration criminal offences   
7.2.3.1 The 2006 scandal  
In April 2006, it was revealed that between 1999 and 2006, the Home 
Office released some 1,023 FNPs convicted of serious crimes, without 
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their being checked or considered for deportation (6th Report of the 
Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, 2006). Of these, 
more than 870 FNPs had been serving at least 12 months, and thirteen 
were serving more than 10 years. This event led to considerable and 
heated debate, especially when 445 of the 1,023 FNPs who had been 
convicted of a wide range of offences were given leave to remain. Their 
crimes were mostly under the categories of drug offences, forgery, 
robbery, deception and violence (Home Affairs Committee, 2012a). Their 
releases ultimately led to a row over deportations and whether or not the 
Home Office was in control. Charles Clarke resigned as Home Secretary 
and his successors, John Reid and then Jacqui Smith, pledged to ensure 
not to repeat these failings (Casciani, 2006).  
The 2006 scandal can be considered as the official starting point for 
parliamentary debates connecting foreign nationals to non-immigration 
criminal offences, outside of the impact of terrorism or immigration 
crimes. The storm was largely whipped up by the Conservatives, who 
used the failure of the Labour Government to bolster their own political 
campaign. In 2006, after the Queen’s Speech, which announced the 
Labour Government's future policies, David Cameron said: 
‘…Look at the mess today – there are paedophiles in bail hostels, 
dangerous criminals in open prisons and 1,000 criminals released from 
prison who should have been deported’ (Hansard, 2006a, col 18).  
Nevertheless, after all the criticism over the Labour Management of 
FNPs, the Coalition Government has not fared much better on the issue. 
The Home Secretary reported in September 2010 to the HAC that 28 
FNPs had been released from prison during that year before being 
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referred to the UKBA (UKVI). The latter is in contact with 25 of them and 
the other three were, according to the Home Office ‘currently being 
traced’ (Home Affairs Committee, 2011a). However, the HAC in their fifth 
report found that 454 offenders were released (without sufficient 
explanation of the reasons) into the community between 1st December 
2011 and 31st March 2012, despite being subject to deportation action 
(The Home Affairs Committee, 2012). The Coalition Government have 
repeated similar mistakes and share the same performance issues that 
the Labour Government has been blamed for (Public Accounts 
Committee, 2014a). 
7.2.3.2  The used language  
As Chapter 5 showed, analysing language is constructive, functional and 
constitutive of reality. This section will analyse the language that has 
been used in Parliament and the related political discourses in relation to 
how the criminality of foreign nationals is described, and how FNPs are 
represented in parliamentary debates. It will do this by looking at the 
words used and the meaning they convey.  
7.2.3.2.1 Directing blame  
Without accurate data, reliable resources, or references to trusted 
empirical research, some Members in both Houses have used blaming 
language to describe foreign nationals and their legal impact on the UK. 
Such terminology has been used to unite negative sentiments against 
foreign nationals, gain support from other politicians and coax the 
government into taking further, harsher measures of deporting or 
repatriating foreign nationals to their countries of origin.  
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In a speech by Philip Hollobone (Con MP) in the House of Commons:  
‘It is no exaggeration to say that Britain has become the "United Nations of 
crime". I understand that we are now paying for the board and lodging of 
criminals from some 160 countries, out of only 192 recognised countries; 
80% of the world's nations are represented in our jails, and there are some 
pretty nasty people’ (Hansard, 2010a, col 53WH). 
Hollobone was trying to gain support from other MPs for his Bill to 
repatriate ‘all’ of FNPs to avoid the considerable economic expenses and 
to free up considerable space in British prisons. Hollobone’s proposal 
urged the government to be more proactive, and in doing so used 
derogatory language to describe foreign nationals and their criminal 
behaviour in the UK. He described them as: 
‘Pretty nasty people…they have abused our trust…we want these nasty 
people back in their countries of origin’ (Hansard, 2010a, col 53WH-54WH). 
Heated debates resulted in more complaints in relation to FNPs and their 
impact on prison administration and rehabilitation programmes. In the 
comments of Mr Peter Bone (Con MP) (Hansard, 2010a, col 55WH): 
 ‘Wellingborough prison is in my constituency, and it is overcrowded all the 
time. Its prison officers, who do a wonderful job, tell me that they never 
have enough time to work with prisoners and get them educated, so that 
when they go back on the streets, they reoffend instead of being model 
citizens. That is partly due to the overcrowding, which is caused by there 
being so many foreign national prisoners.’ 
The above comment illustrates the tendency of some MPs to blame 
foreign nationals for almost every issue facing the UK, making foreign 
nationals scapegoats for the faults of government and its agencies. In 
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consequence, the sentiments and negative tones relating to FNPs have 
sometimes turned into nationalistic and humiliating anti-foreign discourse. 
Such discourse dehumanises foreign nationals and blames them for all 
difficulties and challenges for prisons, which is especially unfair given 
they might not speak English or understand British customs (see for 
example, Hansard, 2010, col 55WH). 
Furthermore, the criminality of some foreign nationals has been 
generalised, and FNPs have been represented as ‘dangerous foreigners’. 
At the Conservative conference in 2013, Theresa May described the 
implications of ‘dangerous foreigners’ on British society, and in doing so 
simultaneously stirred up negative public sentiments while criticising 
other political parties: 
‘It’s ridiculous that the British Government should have to go to such 
lengths to get rid of dangerous foreigners… Labour and the Lib Dems will 
have to explain why they value the rights of terrorists and criminals more 
than the rights of the rest of us’ (Conservative Party, 2013). 
The majority of foreign nationals who have clean criminal records and are 
law-abiding are stereotyped as being criminals as a result of a minority of 
foreign nationals having committed crime. In 2003, Britain’s most senior 
police officer, Sir Chris Fox, President of the Association of Chief Police 
Officers said:  
 ‘Mass migration has brought with it a whole new type of crime, from the 
Nigerian fraudster and the eastern European who deals in drugs and 
prostitution to the Jamaican concentration on drug dealing’ (Thompson, 
2003) 
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On the other hand, there is an exaggeration of using the offending data of 
foreign nationals by MPs. In an urgent question by Chris Bryant (Lab MP) 
to the Minister for Immigration (Damian Green) with regard to foreign 
national offenders who have committed crimes on release before being 
deported, Bryant used the following data to raise his case (Hansard, 
2011b, col 1061 & 1062): 
‘Will he [the Minister] confirm that according to the report by the 
Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency, John Vine, there 
were 3,775 foreign national offenders awaiting deportation in May this year, 
and that according to the secret internal Home Office report in his hands, 
that figure had leapt by September by nearly 500 to 4,238 – higher than the 
number that the Minister just gave us?...Will the Minister confirm that the 
number of foreign national offenders deported has actually fallen this year – 
fallen , not risen – by more than 700… Will he confirm that foreign criminals 
who left prison this year and have not yet been deported have been 
arrested and charged with violent crimes? If so, how many; and does that 
include murder, kidnapping and violence to the person?’ 
Damian Green’s reply was (Hansard, 2011b, col 1062):  
‘The problem for the hon. Gentleman is that he should think carefully before 
asking urgent questions about newspaper reports that he has not read very 
carefully. All the figures in the newspaper report that he is relying on start 
not in May 2010 but in March 2009, so they cover a large period when his 
Government were in power…. The report at the weekend mentioned three 
cases involving murder. I have checked the facts. One of those people was 
charged and acquitted, so was not a murderer at all. Of the other two, one 
was not only released from immigration detention under the previous 
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Government, but committed the murder for which he was convicted under 
the previous Government’. 
Outside of the blame game the two politicians were playing, the 
unreliable data, which was presented as ‘fact’ by the Labour MP not only 
depended on media figures, but also has been exaggerated. For 
example, the last part of the Labour MP’s question in regards of the 
violent crimes that has been committed by foreign nationals released 
before deportation clearly misrepresented the actual crimes that had 
been committed.  
Another example from the Conservative conference in 2013 is of Theresa 
May using pejorative language and confusing statistics to emphasise the 
relationship between foreigners and crime: 
‘In the meantime, we need to do all we can now to limit the damage… with 
almost 70,000 appeals heard every year. The winners are foreign criminals 
and immigration lawyers – while the losers are the victims of these crimes 
and the public’ (Conservative Party, 2013) 
Such language was meant to stereotype those who appeal and win their 
cases as criminals, as well as to suggest they would ‘harm’ British 
society. Firstly, the (70,000) appeals every year cannot describe FNPs or 
foreign national offenders; unless asylum seeker appears are included 
the population of those two together makes no more than 1.4 percent of 
the mentioned number. Secondly, stereotyping asylum seekers as being 
criminals without clear evidence is breaking all principles stipulated by the 
1951 Geneva Convention and the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).  
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There was a noticeable tendency of some MPs to exaggerate prison data 
when using it in order support their perspective or argument. For 
example, when Hollobone (Hansard, 2010a) mentioned that one third 
have been convicted of violence or sexual offences; the real figures show 
that combined foreign national imprisonment for such offences makes up 
25 percent, and only 15 percent of FNPs were imprisoned for violent 
crimes alone in 2010 (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1.3.6 for more details). 
The large volume of HAC discussion concentrating on managing FNPs 
has mostly used extreme language when the number of the foreign 
national offenders living in the community was discussed. In the HAC fifth 
report in 2012 (Home Affairs Committee, 2012b, No 27 Legal 
Challenges), they stated: 
‘We believe that the interpretation of Article 8 rights currently weighs too 
heavily on the side of offenders rather than the safety of the public. Such 
interpretation allows criminals facing deportation to live freely in our 
communities and to endlessly prevent their removal through spurious 
claims about their right to a private and family life under Article 8 of the 
ECHR. The Article 8 rights of offenders must be balanced against the rights 
of law-abiding citizens to live their lives in peace, free from the threat of 
crime. We strongly support the Government's work to prevent the abuse of 
Article 8 rights, and hope to see robust measures to shift the balance in 
favour of public safety and against foreign criminals.’  
The response of the UKBA (Home Affairs Committee, 2012b, government 
response on recommendation 2) to the concern of the HAC in their fifth 
report about foreign national ex-offenders who are living in the 
communities was:  
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‘The UK Border Agency already has a dedicated team based in Liverpool 
managing FNOs living in the community who by law can no longer be 
detained. Cases are prioritised both in terms of the risk the individual poses 
to the public and removability and the team work closely with local 
immigration teams and the police to remove offenders. We are continuing 
to work towards increasing the return of FNOs, closely managing contact 
with the offender and utilising specialist investigation skills to document 
individuals. We are also making greater use of prosecution powers against 
FNOs who do not co-operate with the deportation process or breach bail 
conditions and we are working more closely with other agencies, including 
the police, to overcome barriers to removal. We work in partnership with the 
Ministry of Justice who will also take action when licence conditions are 
breached.’  
The restricted language that has been used to describe foreign national 
ex-offenders and the Government's efforts to investigate and tackle the 
released foreign nationals mirrors the tendency of the Government to 
represent foreign nationals to the public as somehow more criminal than 
British citizens. Immigration policy in this case plays a direct and 
significant role in raising the perception of the relationship between 
immigration and crime, without a well-founded pretext explaining the 
focus on FNPs rather than general prisoners. With the absence of 
statistics and reports indicating the number of FNPs who have 
reoffended, or whether the released foreign nationals engage in further 
illegal activities, it is not possible to assume that foreign national ex-
offenders will introduce more danger to the British community than the 
British prisoners released after committing similar crimes. 
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7.2.3.2.2 The ‘indirect’ connection 
Van Dijk (2000, p 92), highlighted the ‘disclaimer’ language in political 
and parliamentary discourse regarding foreign nationals, which promotes 
a possible ‘contradiction’ between ‘positive self-presentation’ and 
‘negative other-presentation’: 
‘…all agree that immigration is a natural and essential part of an open 
economy… The real issue that must concern the House and all our fellow 
citizens is the scale of immigration. Heads must come out of the sand’ 
(Hansard, 2012a, col 418), AND ‘notes that immigrants are generally 
decent and hardworking people, but further believes that failure to openly 
address this issue damages race relations’ (Spink, 2009). 
7.2.3.3 Prioritising deportation of foreign national prisoners  
Following the 2006 scandal, parliamentary debates have prioritised the 
deportation of FNPs more than the deportation of any other foreign 
national categories like failed asylum seekers (Committee of Public 
Accounts 28th). The HAC and Committee of Public Accounts reports 
have undertaken regular and frequent scrutiny of the UK Border Agency, 
having identified the significant and urgent need for it to improve its 
performance. The subsequent parliamentary debates have concentrated 
on the deportation system and the failure of the UK Border Agency to 
process FNP post-sentence deportation cases. A substantial blame-
game between the different political parties has ensued (see for example 
the debates in Hansard, 2008; Committee of Public Accounts, 2009).  
In answer to a question from Charlie Elphicke (Con MP) by the Minister 
for Immigration, in relation to FNPs who have been detained in the Dover 
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removal centre for three years after having served their sentence, the 
Minister replied: 
‘… This Government – like the previous Government, to be fair – will keep 
people in detention after their prison sentence has finished only if they are 
thought to pose a danger to the wider community. I am sure he will 
appreciate that if such people cannot be deported immediately for the 
reasons that we have been discussing, but they pose a danger to the 
British public, the best place for them is in immigration detention’ (Hansard, 
2011b, col 1064).  
Anti-immigration discourses and appeals to expand the criminalisation of 
foreign nationals, as well as deporting them, have been the general 
theme and main concern among many MPs. For example, in presenting 
his private Bill to deport all foreign national criminals, Hollobone stated: 
(Hansard, 2013f, col 157): 
 ‘My constituents in Kettering are fed up with repeat offenders, but incensed 
when those people are foreign nationals. The best way to have fewer 
crimes committed by fewer people is to ensure that foreign nationals cannot 
reoffend because after their first offence they are sent home.’ 
It should be noted that there is no information or statistical data 
supporting the allegation that FNPs pose a greater danger to British 
society than their British counterparts. Lord Marlesford (Con), asked the 
Minister of State in about the process of transferring FNPs for deportation 
after finishing their sentence to be deported. The Minister’s reply was: 
‘In cases where it is not possible to remove a person on the date that they 
complete their sentence, consideration will be given to holding them in 
immigration detention. Where it is considered appropriate to detain, a 
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decision will then be made about where they should be detained in line with 
a protocol covering the management of foreign national detainees held in 
prison custody. In line with this protocol those individuals who pose a risk to 
national security, whose offences suggest involvement in serious criminality 
or who pose a known security or control risk will be detained in a prison 
rather than an immigration detention centre. In other cases where detention 
is deemed necessary, individuals will be transferred to an immigration 
detention centre as soon as possible. Those convicted of lesser criminal 
offences, who are not considered a risk to the general public, who have 
strong ties in the United Kingdom and are not considered at risk of 
absconding may be released on a restriction order’ (Hansard, 2006d, col 
WA203) 
In addition, the process to identify those released foreign national 
offenders, from either prison or the court, is blurred and the information 
limited. Even the Chief Executive of the UKBA seems unclear and 
unsure, as the HAC convey in their 2011 report (Home Affairs 
Committee, 2011b): 
‘When questioned about the 520 Foreign National Prisoners classified as 
'allowed to remain', Mr Whiteman (Chief Executive) was unclear about the 
rights these individuals had. Specifically he was asked whether these 
individuals, who would be eligible to remain in the country, could apply for 
settlement and citizenship despite being considered for deportation after 
committing a serious offence. Indeed, he appeared to confuse the 
terminology, taking it to mean those who had been released pending 
deportation…The Committee has long suggested that the terminology and 
figures used by the UK Border "Agency" can be, at best, described as 
confusing and at worst, misleading.’ 
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The over-criminalisation of foreign nationals and the debates around their 
deportation are certainly not improving the performance of the UKBA; the 
HAC in their fifth report found no further progress in tracking the 57 
former prisoners whose location is unknown, and only two former FNPs 
were deported between November 2011 and March 2012 (Home Affairs 
Committee, 2012). The Public Accounts Committee report (Public 
Accounts Committee, 2014a) did not record any improvement for the 
Home Office in deporting FNPs:  
‘The Agency holds foreign national offenders in a limited number of prisons, 
some of which only hold foreign national prisoners, to make it easier for the 
Home Office to interact with them. The Home Office told us that it does not 
have a target for removing foreign national offenders but tried to remove as 
many as possible at the earliest opportunity. It told us that it removed more 
than 4,500 foreign national offenders each year (mostly prisoners). The 
number of removals fell by 18% between 2009 and early 2012. We heard 
that this was due to a backlog of cases in the Home Office prior to 2010, an 
increase of 13% in the number of appeals lodged, and cases being 
generally complex, with offenders not wanting to be removed. Despite this 
fall, the number removed in recent years had been similar to the number 
convicted, meaning that the overall number of foreign national prisoners 
had remained fairly stable. The Home Office told us that it was now starting 
to reduce the stock of foreign national prisoners’  
At the same time, the main concern of politicians from different political 
parties is still how to increase and expedite the deportation of FNPs, 
especially since the CIA 1971 did not make this automatic and gave 
power to do so to the court or the Home Secretary. The Act made one 
distinction between the EEA and Non-EEA citizens: deportation action 
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against EEA nationals is taken under the Home Secretary’s powers to 
deport, even if a court has recommended deportation. Therefore, 
Parliament wanted to cover the gap under Section 32 of Borders Act 
2007; convicted ‘foreign criminals’ in the UK sentenced to at least 12 
months imprisonment are automatically considered to be detrimental to 
the public good, and the Secretary of State is obliged to make a 
deportation order (Gower, 2013).  
However, involuntary deportation has been restricted under Section 33; 
for instance, if the deportation breaches the foreign national ex-offender’s 
ECHR rights or his rights under EU law (2007). In the new Immigration 
Act 2014, the exceptions of not deporting foreign national ex-offenders 
are mostly removed, particularly the one related to family ties and being 
entitled to Human Rights legislation; this was introduced following the 
case law of Abu Qatada. His case cost the British Government 1.7 million 
pounds before voluntary agreement to deportation to Jordan (Hansard, 
2013a column 1363), and ultimately the Jordanian High Court discharged 
him from any terror plot (Corera, 2014).  
National security is one clear catalyst for connecting foreign nationals to 
different sorts of crimes. Considerable attention has been given to foreign 
national offenders, either by exaggerating their ‘danger’ to the British 
community after release, or through discourses around deporting them 
and reducing their right to appeal. A letter written by Theresa May (Home 
Secretary) to the ‘Rebel Judges’ (Walters and Owen, 2013) says:  
‘… Foreigners who have committed serious crimes in this country, or who 
have attempted to cheat the immigration system, should be deported from 
Britain. Parliament wants that to happen, the public wants that to happen, 
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and I want that to happen… the right to family life … can be restricted when 
that is required, for example, to protect public safety, or for the prevention 
of crime… in June last year I ensured that the House of Commons was 
able to debate my amendments to the immigration rules… any foreign 
national who was convicted of a serious crime should be deported, 
regardless of whether or not the criminal had a family in the UK. … This is 
not a dispute about respect for human rights... It is about how to balance 
rights against each other: in particular, the individual’s right to family life, 
the right of the individual to be free from violent crime, and the right of 
society to protect itself against foreign criminals…’ 
May’s letter is an illustration of her personal attitude, her ‘war on foreign 
nationals’, which is a part of the current immigration policy the Coalition 
Government is trying hard to implement. In doing so their intention is to 
recapture the votes of those individuals who may have head their heads 
turned by UKIP. The exaggerated reaction and huge efforts made by the 
Home Secretary to abolish Article 8 of the ECHR clearly shows the extent 
to which foreign nationals have been connected to crime in political 
discourse. The above statement also exemplifies the way foreigners are 
described as more dangerous and violent than their British national 
counterparts do, and that they pose a danger to British society because 
of their criminality.  
 The implications of parliamentary debates  
The large volume of parliamentary debates, the large work and reports by 
different Committees in both Houses, and the related political discourses 
have resulted in significant changes to immigration and crime policies, 
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and increased negative public attitudes towards foreign nationals and 
their relationship with crime.  
7.3.1 Changes in immigration policy and facilitating security legislation  
Since the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001, debates 
regarding different categories of foreign nationals started to concentrate 
on legal factors rather than the economic and social factors. Foreign 
nationals are associated with different illegal activities and many 
significant changes have been made to immigration policy, like the 
indefinite detention of those suspected to be terrorists (Hansard, 2001a, 
col 4). The implication of the emphasis on tougher measures and more 
restrictive immigration policies towards FNPs has resulted in many FNPs 
remaining imprisoned or detained long after their sentence has ended, 
well after British prisoners with the same sentence have been released.  
Furthermore, the government has seen FNPs as a burden and the most 
significant barrier in achieve its goals of protecting the public and 
reducing re-offending by rehabilitating prisoners. Parliamentary debates 
concerning the danger of foreign nationals have contributed significant 
changes in immigration policy (Hansard, 2010, col 59WH). 
The relationship between foreign nationals and crime has been used 
frequently to make presented policy proposals more acceptable, to allow 
the Government's Bills to be legislated faster and without significant 
opposition. For example, the enlargement of the EU has emphasised the 
relationship between immigration policy and criminalising foreign 
nationals, as many espouse that greater control of its borders will keep 
Britain safer from crime and terrorism (Hansard, 2001c, col 1176, 1180, 
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1194, 1205, 1236). On the same day these arguments were made, the 
European Communities (Amendment) Bill was read for the third time and 
passed (Hansard, 2001c, col 1274). Facilitating immigration and security 
acts was the most obvious implications of the heated parliamentary 
debates concerning the linkage between foreign nationals and different 
sorts of crime, especially terrorism. Despite the Government having 
passed the Terrorism Act 2000 (it came into force in 19th February 2001) 
less than a year later they rushed through additional emergency anti-
terrorism legislation. For example, the ATCSA 2001 was introduced to 
Parliament on 19th November 2001; it received Royal Assent and came 
into force on 14th December 2001 (Home Affairs Committee, 2001). The 
Act was passed very quickly; this rapid passing was criticised by the 
Select Home Affairs Committee (2001, NO 11): 
‘We question whether it is appropriate for this Bill to be passed through the 
House of Commons in exactly two weeks with only three days of debate on 
the floor of the House. A Bill of this length - 125 clauses and eight 
schedules covering 114 pages - with major implications for civil liberties 
should not be passed by the House in such a short period and with so little 
time for detailed examination in committee’ 
However, the sheer amount of immigration and terrorism legislation 
concerned some MPs who were looking to safeguard foreign nationals 
and protect their human rights. This meant they should not be penalised 
or detained without evidential proof of connection to any sort of crime or 
terrorism (Hansard, 2001i, 936-937). The acceleration of the immigration 
and security legislation without the presentation of sufficient evidence to 
legislate more acts has triggered resentment from some MPs, like Keith 
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Vaz (Labour MP) (Hansard, 2006e, col 44-45) who criticised the 
Government's rapid introduction of legislation: 
 ‘… the need for tough measures to deal with those who wish to undermine 
our country and cause death and destruction to our people is a serious 
issue, and I accept that the Government have a responsibility to legislate. 
However, there is also a responsibility to ensure that proper evidence is put 
before the House when the case is being made, and I hope that in the rush 
for legislation – I take the point that it is urgent and important – we pause 
and consider people's responsibilities and their civil liberties’ 
The legislative haste has been criticised by many MPs, particularly those 
belonging to the Liberal Democrat Party. The speech of Simon Hughes in 
2001 contains many questions to the Home Secretary, and suggests that 
the need for legislation to be passed quickly post-9/11 should not mean 
breaching the human rights of any individual, including asylum seekers 
(Hansard, 2001h, col 929).  
However, linking foreign nationals to different types of crimes and 
violence has been done widely in parliamentary debates in order to 
speed up the passing of certain legislation. This has included making 
immigration policy tougher for the ‘suitable enemy’, and decreasing the 
population of certain nationalities under ‘suitable labels’ such as foreigner 
criminality (Hansard, 2001, col 927-928). For example, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005, which was introduced in the House of Commons on 
11th February 2005, received Royal Assent on 11th March 2005, and 
came into force immediately. The Act intended to deal with the detention 
without trial of eight foreigners at HMPS Belmarsh under Part 4 of 
ATCSA 2001. The Act also provided the Home Secretary with the use of 
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‘control orders’ on foreign nationals who were suspected of involvement 
in terrorism, which in some cases meant they were arrested and/or 
detained without trial. Along with the possibility that deportation may 
interfere with their human rights, this raised discontent among the 
Judiciary who emphasised the right of everyone to a free trial (Horne and 
Berman, 2011).  
Finally, the political rhetoric in Parliament has focused on immigration 
control as the most important counter-terrorist approach. A speech by 
then Secretary of State for the Home Department (Charles Clarke) on 
July 20th 2005 suggested addressing more foreign nationals’ activities 
through the Counter Terrorism Bill 2005. For instance, the Minister 
suggested criminalising activities that foreign nationals might engage in, 
such as the intention to be involved in terrorist activities or to encourage, 
directly or indirectly, people to engage in terrorist acts. In addition, the 
drive to increase the power of exclusion for these people from the UK led 
to the stipulation that passenger information must be divulged in advance 
of travel (E-Borders) (Hansard, 2005c, col 1255; on the same topic see 
Hansard, 2005a, col 2552W).  
The tough headlines produced by the statements of different 
governments on immigration, and the long discourses on a small group of 
people considered as very dangerous should not detract attention from 
the human impacts of the immigration system, as Lord Bishop of Lichfield 
has reminded the House of Lords following the Queen's speech 
(Hansard, 2013d, col 37). The insight of Lord Bishop came when he 
mistakenly joined the immigration queue at Heathrow. After waiting for a 
long time to be seen, he became aware of the suffering of foreign 
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nationals. This led him to remind not only the house but also the public 
that harsher measures will always result in the harsher treatment of 
human beings. Consequently, appeals to restrict immigration policy 
because of far-right political discourse or to respond to the success of 
these parties, has resulted in many different MPs urging the government 
to control immigration policy, especially relating to asylum seekers. Calls 
to introduce tougher measures were partly based on the assumed 
relationship between foreign nationals and different sorts of crime 
(Hansard, 2001e, col 657; Hansard, 2001f, col 675, 681). 
The unstable security situation and public disorder that has been 
correlated with the communities of foreign and ethnic minorities presence 
has used for the advantage of those politicians who are stricter 
immigration control supporters to push the government legislation that put 
more barriers in front of foreign national to enter Britain legally (Pressly, 
2007). 
7.3.2 Changes in Criminal Justice workers practice and crime legislation  
There are two correlations between those who working in the CJS and 
politicians. On one hand, both as human beings and being closer to the 
‘action’, those who working in the CJS field are prone to being affected by 
political and parliamentary debates, which stereotype foreign nationals as 
a source of crime. On the other hand, politicians trust the opinion and the 
recommendation by the CJS chiefs’, because it is based on their 
experiences with foreign nationals and their evaluation of the role foreign 
nationals’ play in crime trends. In a speech by Chris Grayling, (Con MP, 
who became the Secretary of State for Justice in 2012) (Hansard, 2001f, 
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col 787), the MP connected foreign nationals and asylum seekers in 
particular to crime, basing his attitude on a senior police officer's opinion: 
 ‘Last week a senior police officer said to me that there are people in this 
country – they may come here as asylum seekers or refugees, or perhaps 
through conventional channels – who are a genuine threat to our society. If 
we need a more regulated society to ensure that such people cannot take 
action that undermines our society, so be it. We should expect anyone who 
seeks to live here to respect the security of our society, and in my view, if 
there are people who do not do that, we should not be afraid to withdraw 
from them the welcome that we first offered them’ 
The above statement contrasts with logic and academic findings that 
suggest the routes criminals and terrorists use to enter the country and 
commit crime is very different from illegal immigrants trying to avoid any 
contact with law enforcement institutions, and asylum seekers and 
refugees who are looking for safe place and new life. As Walter Menzies 
Campbell (Lib Dem MP) said: 
‘We will examine with particular care any proposals that have the potential 
to penalise genuine asylum seekers. The pathetic men and women who try 
to cross the channel in inflatable rubber dinghies seem to me to be 
improbable terrorists. As we now understand, terrorists are much more 
likely to arrive in London in the first-class cabins of scheduled flights’ 
(Hansard, 2001c, col 707) 
Moreover, the practical side of the immigration and the Criminal Justice 
legislation reflects how the CJS and immigration officers target foreign 
nationals, making them of high suspicion (Pantazis and Pemberton, 
2009). For example, discussion of the draft Co-operation in Public 
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Protection Arrangements (UKVI) Order 2011, which is designed to 
enhance co-operation between the criminal justice agencies in each area 
and the UKVI in managing sexual and violent offenders, has given a clear 
expression that foreign nationals are more prone to commit sexual or 
violent crimes. Those foreign national offenders who received a 
community sentence or released into the community on licence are more 
closely monitored by CJS agencies (2011, col 3): 
‘The criminal justice agencies have the task of protecting the public from 
further offending by offenders who receive a community sentence or are 
released into the community on licence. The UK Border Agency aims to 
protect the public by deporting foreign nationals who commit serious 
criminal offences—where legislation permits—and by actively monitoring 
and managing foreign national prisoners who are released into the 
community.’ 
The draft order has made it clear that the CJS should be cooperating with 
the UKVI in order to manage FNPs effectively. However, the nature of 
this cooperation is unclear, as the report mentioned the informal 
cooperation of sharing information and release plans but recognised the 
need for practical cooperation at a higher level (2011). The Under-
Secretary of State at the Ministry of Justice (Crispin Blunt) has based his 
proposal to the House of Commons on the Multi-Agency Public 
Protection Arrangements or MAPPA, where different agencies of the CJS 
like the police, probation, and prison services work together to manage 
offenders. However, using the ideas of MAPPA and recruiting all the CJS 
agencies to cooperate with the UKVI in order to monitor certain foreign 
nationals (those who have been released into the community after 
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finishing their sentences) at risk of committing violent and sexual 
offences, rather than monitoring offenders in general, is ‘nativism’. There 
is discrimination based on nationality when different policies and legal 
treatments are applied according to those nationalities.  
The Minister's proposal opposed Section 325(2) of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, which requires the responsible authority in each area – the 
police, probation, and prison services acting together – to make 
arrangements to assess and manage the risks posed by sexual and 
violent offenders. The Act did not distinguish the nationality of offenders, 
as the public should be protected from any offender regardless of their 
nationality. If the Minister is suggesting that foreign nationals are more 
criminal, or they are more dangerous than British nationals, then he 
needs to present data to support his belief.  
On the other hand, if there is a law to monitor those who present a risk to 
the community, it raises the issue of why the Minister wishes to create 
specific legislation for monitoring foreign nationals. Furthermore, this 
should not require the explicit involvement of the UKVI when there is 
already cooperation between CJS agencies and the UKVI. It does not 
change the process by which foreign nationals, or indeed anyone else, 
are able to exercise their rights and access to the law. With regard to how 
foreign nationals are managed by the CJS, it makes no difference (2011, 
col 3 & 5). 
While there is a focus on the criminality of FNPs and the necessity for 
them to be deported, the focus on British prisoners does not seem to be 
at the same level. It was left to the BBC to reveal the escape from an 
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open prison by the robber Michael Wheatley, given 13 life sentences in 
2002 for a string of raids on banks and building societies, (BBC NEWS, 
2014). Indeed, Miller (2005) has revealed in her article ‘Blurring the 
Boundaries between immigration and crime control after September 11th’ 
that discrimination in the CJS between Americans residents was based 
on their citizenship. In short, the ‘aliens’ are treated tougher than natives. 
7.3.3 Negative public sentiment 
Historically, some British politicians have had a big impact on public 
sentiment. For example, Enoch Powell’s anti-immigration rhetoric, 
especially in his ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech of 1968, was given great fanfare 
by sections of the media. Indeed, his anti-immigration views caused 
Powell to lose his shadow cabinet position as Shadow Defence Secretary 
(Hastilow, 2007). Powell and his anti-minority rhetoric both affected and 
shaped some Britons’ opinions toward immigration, especially in the time 
he was politically active. For example, Powell won the 'most respected 
person’ in a Gallup poll (a British public opinion survey in February 1969) 
(Dumbrell, 2001, p 35). Powell also shaped political opinion and, 
according to Pettigrew (1998), his views encouraged some members of 
the public to have a more negative attitude against immigrants, helping to 
increase the vote for the Conservative party. In turn, this helped mould 
the Conservative into becoming the mainstream anti-immigration party 
(Pettigrew, 1998). 
Returning to the present, anti-immigration parties are single-issue political 
movements focusing specifically on immigration, and aiming to convince 
others – be they politicians from other political parties or the general 
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public – to view immigration as inherently ‘bad’ for the UK. Whilst 
marginal, these parties grow in size, and are able to influence not only 
immigration policy, but also significantly inform the debate about 
immigrants (van Spanje, 2010, Van Der Brug et al., 2005). 
Frequent parliamentary debates discussing terrorism, immigration crimes, 
non-immigration criminal offences, the need to control borders, managing 
FNPs and Islamic extremism have fuelled negative public attitudes and 
Islam phobic sentiments (Spalek and Lambert, 2008, Home Affairs 
Committee, 2005). The 9/11 acts and the political and parliamentary 
debates that followed helped create more tension and stereotype ethnic 
minorities and foreigners as being associated with or supportive of 
terrorism and terrorists around the world (Hansard, 2001b, col 169). In 
the comments of Patsy Calton (Lib Dem MP), on the political language, 
which has been used, and the dangerous implications of using language 
that targets Muslims and asylum seekers in the UK: 
 ‘Politicians should be careful about their language and so should the 
media. I was much taken with the comments of the hon. Member for South-
West Devon (Mr. Streeter), who talked about the need for positive language 
when dealing with these issues. We need to be careful because it is not 
only what we say that matters. There is the potential for misunderstanding 
on the part of people with different cultures and faiths. The Muslim 
population in my constituency is concerned about the linkage of asylum 
seekers with race issues…Justice has specific meanings for people of the 
Muslim faith. Similarly, I hope that "crusade" has dropped out of the 
language’ (Hansard, 2001e, col 740-741, see also Hansard, 2001 , col 
610). 
- 271 - 
 
Given that political discourses and parliamentary debates have a direct 
and considerable effect on public opinion (Hansen, 2003, Boswell et al., 
2005), some politicians have ignored their responsibilities and 
deliberately continued espousing negative attitudes towards some ethnic 
minorities, or blaming foreign nationals for crime, as the MP John Battle 
(Lab) said, (Hansard, 2001e, col 642): 
 ‘Interestingly, some younger Muslims said to me, "If as a politician you are 
committed to word-based politics, encourage all politicians and 
commentators to be most careful in the words that they choose and use to 
describe the realities we face now." Why? Because some of our language 
can be not only careless, but costly, thereby causing damage and isolation 
and deepening existing conflicts’ 
The focus on borders as a response to every legal or economic issue in 
the UK suggests that foreign nationals are responsible for many issues 
relating to crime. This is because crimes are seen as 'imported': 
restricting newcomers and controlling the entry of some nationalities will 
therefore protect the UK. Consequently, parliamentary debates regarding 
border security and tackling immigration crime/terrorism have linked 
those crimes to foreign nationals and apportioned blame in their direction. 
These debates have helped to create a negative public perception of 
foreign national prisoners in E&W (see for example, Banks, 2011).  
The implications of far-right political debate have been evident throughout 
the media, which has reported physical and racial attacks on some British 
Muslims, Mosques and foreign nationals. The racial attacks on Muslims 
and Mosques in Scotland, Wales and Belfast were mostly given 
recognition post 9/11, there is evidence for racial and religious hatred 
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attitudes leading to physical attacks on foreign nationals, Muslims or 
those who look like them (Hansard, 2001e, col 730 & 733).  
However, some MPs have sensed the impact on race relations and 
attempted to calm down and remind the rest of the politicians and MPs 
that religion alone does not cause terrorism. For example, Khalid 
Mahmood's comments during heated parliamentary debates post 9/11 
tried to calm the rhetoric against Islam and Muslims, and demonstrate 
how Muslims communities in Britain were side-by-side with the rest of the 
world in feeling sympathy for the terrible attacks in the USA (Hansard, 
2001, col 612): 
‘Will the Prime Minister accept my unreserved condemnation of the 
atrocities carried out in the United States? Will he also accept that that 
terrible act of terrorism claimed the lives of many people of many faiths, 
including Muslims? In addition, will he assure the House that it would be 
quite wrong for British Muslims to be tarred with the same brush following 
that dreadful act of terrorism’ (see in the same context, Hansard, 2001e, col 
649, 657 & 661; Hansard, 2001e, col 640, 626, 683, 693, 715; Hansard, 
2001f, col 715). 
Finally, the tough economic situation and increase of support for far-right 
political parties like UKIP has led to increase in debates stereotyping and 
criminalising foreign nationals. Oft-repeated aspersions of the relationship 
between immigration and crime give the impression that the Government 
and politicians almost intend to encourage negative public sentiment 
against foreign nationals, along with stereotyping foreigners as criminals 
in order to exclude them from the country without censure.  
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Chapter 8 Guilty until proven innocent: Discussing the 
findings  
Historically, foreign nationals cast as the enemy; all foreign nationals from 
different nationalities and ethnicities have faced similar allegations both 
historically and more recently. Foreign nationals blamed of representing 
demographical, health, economic, and political threats to the UK as host 
society, their association with crime links these concerns together in the 
public consciousness, and this results from the influence of political 
discourses and the media.  
This chapter will consider the arguments and findings of the previous 
chapters and explain logically the broad and heated debates regarding 
foreign criminality and the overrepresentation of foreign nationals in the 
CJS statistical data. 
 A historical enemy  
This research has revealed that Britain has always attracted and received 
foreign nationals from different parts of the world. They have been 
seduced (like Jews), offered opportunities to invest and work (like Irish), 
asked for help rebuilding damage from world wars (like BAME) or offered 
a place of safety in which to start a new life (like asylum seekers). All of 
these have created pressures on culture, structure of human populations, 
economy and ultimately politics.  
This research showed that the large inflows of different ethnicities and 
religions who came to the UK have contributed to raise the cultural 
pressure. Throughout history, waves of Irish, Jewish, and Muslim 
immigrants have represented a threat to the Protestant and Anglo-Saxon 
- 274 - 
 
way of life (Rathod, 2014). Large influxes of different religions including 
Jews, Catholics (Irish) and Muslims has produced tension in the 
relationship between these newcomers and the police, something that has 
affected the representation of those foreign nationals in the CJS statistics 
(Swift, 2002, Smith, 2009).  
Political and public concerns about unwanted changes to cultural life and 
the predominant religion (Christian/ Protestant) in the UK has expanded 
the stereotyping of the ‘threat’ posed by these nationalities, and 
consequently the threat construction has started to manifest through the 
relationship between foreign nationals and crime. For example, The Poor 
Law Amendment Act 1834, the 1848 Public Health Act and the large body 
of reports investigating the lifestyle and the health problems of Irish, were 
a response to political and public concerns. These culminated in seeing 
the Irish as the main problem, resulted in stereotyping and linking them to 
crime (MacRalied, 1999, McManus, 1994). People from certain countries 
or religions have often been stereotyped as a potentially criminal. For 
example, the Irish experience throughout the 1970s has been mirrored by 
the experience of Muslims in the 21st century; the same types of policies, 
political and public attitudes that confronted the Irish have been repeated 
against Muslims. However, the global connectedness and hypermedia of 
our times has ensured that these concerns have been expressed in more 
exaggerated terms than ever (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009).  
Seeing foreign nationals as a cultural threat is an important factor to raise 
the xenophobia, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2004) investigated the 
European Social Survey in 2003 and demonstrated that racial issues like 
diversity, culture and belief, and the protection of national identity 
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(particularly from identities from outside EU) are the main fuel for negative 
sentiment, rather than economic factors. This is especially the case for 
those people with few educational qualifications. It was found that better 
educated people display less racist attitudes (O'Rourke and Sinnott, 
2006). However, raising the negative sentiment is not the only implication 
of describing foreign nationals as a threat to British culture but it 
influences the political and public constructions of foreign criminality by 
considering foreign nationals as a direct or indirect source to raise crime 
levels such as hate crimes, fraud, and drugs.  
Moreover, foreign nationals have been blamed of creating a demographic 
change and a concurrent demand on public services, with more resources 
needed to cover the welfare benefit of people working and living in the 
UK. In order to restore balance, immigration policy has taken a leading 
role in distinguishing between ‘valuable’ and ‘non-valuable’ foreigners. 
However, the criteria of determining the value of the foreigner is not clear, 
and might be subject to change over time depending on the political and 
economic situation (Lee, 2007b). Those classified as non-valuable 
foreigners have been targeted by immigration policy. However, the 
traditional role of the immigration policy of refusing the applications of 
these foreigners, or deporting them, has developed due to immigration 
law becoming more intertwined with criminal law (Hartry, 2012, Stumpf, 
2006). Since the Alien Act 1905, immigration legislation progressively 
began highlighting the relationship between foreign nationals and different 
illegal activities, putting more conditions into place for admission to the 
UK, reducing rights inside the UK and increasing the power of immigration 
and police officers to tackle foreign nationals (House of Commons, 2005, 
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col 2, Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009, p 769). For example, the Alien Act 
1905 responded to the political and public pressure of the time in regard 
to the high population of Jews, showing a clear connection between Jews 
and crime as a response to their population increase at the end of 19th 
century (Harper and Constantine, 2010, Panayi, 1999, Pellew, 1989). 
Another example is the recent ‘war on terror’ and the subsequent 
‘package of legislation’ that sees Muslims and foreign nationals as the 
source of the terrorism and immigration crimes (Mythen et al., 2009). In 
spite of the present history showed that terrorism is driven by a complex 
political agenda and done by home grown and citizens. 
In a very recent migration wave, caused by enlargement of the EU, (see 
Table 6.4B) and British immigration policy was overcome by EU policies, 
which necessitated a greater reliance on the ‘old method’ of using the 
CJS, and the criminalisation of these undesirable foreigner citizens was 
an obvious means to begin putting it into action. The high arrest and 
prison rate was established at the same time as political discourses and 
parliamentary debates started including concerns about the high number 
of newcomers from these countries. Between 2004 and 2014 there were 
tens of debates in the both Houses regarding the demographic and 
economic impact of Polish, Romanian, Bulgarian, and Lithuanian 
incomers in the shared context with discourses of high crime in the UK 
(Public Bill Committee, 2014, Hansard, 2014a, Hansard, 2014f). For 
example, in the Select Committee on Home Affairs Written Evidence 
regarding the demographic changes in Cambridgeshire and the pressure 
on the police and the high crimes levels is as follows: 
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 ‘Recent A8 migration into Cambridgeshire continues to impact heavily on 
police and other services with evidence indicating that the pace of migration 
continue … In 2002 there were on average three non UK nationals in 
custody per day. This went up to an average of 13 per day in 2006. The 
figure now stands at 10 non UK nationals in custody per day… These 
increases in custody figures are partly a reflection of the increasing number 
of migrants in the County… Immigration has also bought an "international" 
dimension to criminality within Cambridgeshire. A good illustration of this is 
the proliferation of cannabis farms’ (Cambridgeshire Constabulary, 2008) 
Without forgetting the role of the media, such statements as these helps 
to elevate EU phobia (Hansard, 2013g; Hansard, 2013f), which is no 
different from historical anti-Semitism, Irish hatred sentiments and 
Islamophobia; all are placed under the umbrella of xenophobia, and each 
reinforces the construction of foreign criminality.  
Furthermore, the historical perspective showed a correlation between 
public complaints linking foreigners to crime as a result of the prevailing 
economic situation, and significant changes in immigration policy. The 
economic success of foreign nationals in the UK has been seen as a 
result of being willing to do the ‘three Ds’ jobs (Dirty, Difficult, and 
Dangerous) (Anderson, 2013, p 90). However, in negative public 
sentiment foreign nationals have been described as unprincipled people 
who increase crime levels (and as such have a direct impact on crime) 
(Bevan, 1986 ). Alternatively, foreign nationals are presented as taking 
British jobs and decreasing their wages, which will encourage 
unemployed British to commit crime (meaning an indirect relationship 
with crime) (Ochsen, 2010, Hansard, 1919, col 2278).  
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The consequences of negative public sentiments are to reinforce political 
and parliamentary debates, along with media reports that call for tighten 
immigration policy due to the criminality of foreign nationals (Doyle, 2014, 
Al-Faris, 2010, Allen, 2010). This eccourages the government to 
legislatiate for the criminalisation of foreign nationals (Aliverti, 2013c, 
2014a), and introduce tougher measures for the admission and reception 
of new foreign nationals (Schuster and Solomos, 2004, Somerville, 2007, 
p 22, Riley-Smith, 2013). However, at the same time the expansion of 
‘crimmigration’ legislation and tougher immigration policies, in addition to 
negative political debates, are emphasising negative sentiments and 
stereotyping foreign nationals as criminals (Al-Faris, 2010).  
On the other hand, the pressure on public services and the consistent 
annual increase in foreign national population places political pressure. 
All mainstream political parties try to convince the public of their 
immigration credentials in their quest to either gain or retain power 
(Bobby and Frere-Smith, 2014). Therefore, different political parties have 
used immigration policy as a card to play in the general election to 
influence the public attitude (Galloway, 2014, Hansard, 2011c, col 1063). 
The important part for them is how to reduce the pressure on different 
services by reducing the number of foreign nationals and their rights in 
the UK.  
Historically ‘unwanted foreigners’ were cut immediately and denied from 
entering the country once Royal power had made a decision, as 
happened with the Jews in the 13th century (Harper and Constantine, 
2014, Wilson, 1970, Bevan, 1986 ). However, with the development of 
immigration policy principles and Human Rights institutions, the numbers 
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of foreign nationals now must be reduced legally and reasonably; 
targeting certain nationalities or ethnicity should be built on reasonable 
explanations. Hence, the construction of foreign criminality by 
exaggerating their impact on crime stands as a significant strategy for 
reducing the quantity of foreign nationals. For example, Alien Act 1905 
was the first declaration of the intention to reduce the numbers of foreign 
nationals (Jews in particular) through their relationship with crimes; this 
act was only the starting point for the crimmigration legislation and 
stereotyping of foreign nationals that was to come later.  
 Foreign criminality and social constructivism theory 
Using a theory enables researchers to make a discovery of 
approximations to the truth not a discovery of immutable laws (Howell, 
2013). Social constructivism theory was chosen to understand why 
foreign nationals have been connected to crimes, how the perception of 
foreign criminality started and by whom, and explain changes in foreign 
nationals’ representation in the CJS data. According to constructivists, 
Governance ideology, language, politics, culture, media, and religion, are 
the factors to construct the system of knowledge and create social reality. 
The cultural, social, demographical and economic threats of foreign 
nationals were acknowledged as a social reality that has a serious impact 
on British society. Consequently, politicians and the media acted like 
foreign criminality is a reality/fact by building a picture of a world where 
foreigners imaged as felonious, immoral, and British as prey. In this 
framework, foreign criminality is identified as a social problem due to the 
political discourses, racist language, the media, government policies 
(immigration policy), and the overrepresentation of foreign nationals in 
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CJS statistical data. Many of foreigners’ behaviours and attitudes were 
categorised and labelled with immorality and criminality, as foreign 
criminality emphasised (see Chapter 7). Discussing foreign nationals 
continuingly in crime context has ultimately contributed to highlight their 
relationship with crime as a social problem that needs an action from a 
‘strong leadership’ (Yamamoto, 2010).  
The findings of the quantitative data of this research concur with social 
constructivism theory. Governing foreign nationals through crime by using 
of crime and punishment to manage illegal immigrants and illustrating the 
criminality of foreign nationals by using the statistical data of arresting 
and offending have resulted in constructing the nationality as an identity 
of offenders within CJ in modern western countries (Chacon, 2013, Inda 
and Dowling, 2013). The CJS data by nationality has been used as 
undeniable evidence of reality to demonstrate the objectivity of claim 
makers evidence (Warner, 2005, Yamamoto, 2010), however on the 
other hand it is fundamentally crucial to demonstrate the objectivity of 
claim makers evidence.  This research argued that the limitation of 
recording and publishing the CJS data by nationality, in the police and 
court stages support the process of constructing the criminality of foreign 
nationals in the UK. At the time, there is a wide political and public 
perception that foreigners are connected to crimes, and they often 
choose the illegal way to live in the UK, is usually not supported with 
evidence to accept or deny the relationship between foreign nationals 
and crime.  The criminality of foreign nationals was constructed because 
of their overrepresentation in police and prison data due to the crisis of 
emerging criminal law with immigration laws and over using criminal law 
- 281 - 
 
to manage foreign national. The power of the police and the immigration 
officers has been increased to deal with the criminality of foreign 
nationals at borders points or in the street resulted from the chaos in 
immigration policy.  
The picture of foreign criminality has been used to distract the public and 
to avoid blame for failing policies. The construction of foreign criminality 
has mostly been used to justify security breaches, the failure to manage 
FNPs, or regression in the economic situation. The failure of keeping 
Britain safe and the expansion of the overall ‘threat’ has led in particular 
to enhance the policy of managing foreign nationals as foreign criminals 
to justify immigration controls. Political rhetoric, particularly after 9/11 and 
7/7 London bombings, referred to managing terrorists and foreigners 
frequently and widely, and in doing so provided support for anti-
immigration legislation, both from politicians and a fearful public (see 
Chapter 3). However, Andrew Parker (MI5 Chief) indicated that all 34 
terrorist incidents after 7/7 were committed by locals (home grown 
British), not by foreign nationals (Laville, 2013).  
On different occasions, parliamentary debates have demonstrated that 
foreign nationals are used as a scapegoat for Government and politician 
failings. Even though FNPs have been detained in prisons or in detention 
centres for years after their time has been served, they continue paying 
the price for Government faults and the chaotic joint working of the prison 
administration and UKVI. The relationship between foreigners and crime 
has been used frequently in parliamentary debates as a political ‘blame 
game’, despite the fact that all political parties restrict foreign nationals 
once in power through different methodologies in order to recapture votes 
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from right-wing UK parties like UKIP (Galloway, 2014). In addition, the 
over-criminalisation of foreign nationals, along with Government promises 
to tackle immigration crimes and deport more FNPs, has been used by 
different governments to reassure the public of the Government 
performance, and urge the public to re-elect them. 
There are two implications (as below) of constructing foreign criminality: 
Firstly, the blurred cooperation between UKVI and the CJS, which led to 
over policing foreign and ethnic communities, stereotyping, receiving 
longer sentences and over representing them in prison data. Secondly, 
legitimising the discrimination on the bases of nationality as a 
contemporary version of racism and punishing people of being foreign.  
8.1.1 The marriage between the UKVI and the CJS  
The cooperation between the UKVI and CJS, as an outcome of managing 
foreign nationals, which foreign criminality discourses and immigration 
policy have well imaged to draw public to the relatively small numbers of 
suspected and foreign national offenders, and in doing so try to dodge 
blame for the real issues connected to each system (Lee, 2007, 
Yamamoto, 2010). The UKVI and CJS act together to draw public to the 
relatively small numbers of offenders and ex-prisoners, and in doing so 
try to dodge blame for the real issues connected to each system and 
ultimately construct the criminality of foreign nationals.  
This research demonstrated that the police are sometimes pushed 
towards the method of suspicion by the unquestionably policy, regulation, 
and immigration and criminal legislation. In the context of policing 
foreigners, policing responsibilities have been expanded globally due to 
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the changes in immigration policies; police are required to enforce 
immigration laws, secure the nation, policing foreigners became an 
element of policing and security. Practices of police power have been 
affected by legislative changes and different policies that associated 
immigration with crime such as ‘tough on crime tough on the causes of 
crime’ and wars on drugs, trafficking, and terror. These policies 
implemented an increase in the stereotyping of foreign nationals and 
brought them into direct contact with the police who now share powers 
with immigration officers to be to check the legal status of people in the 
street (Aliverti, 2012a, Aliverti, 2013a, Weber, 2013). Police officers had 
the power to investigate the legal status of any person they suspected, 
which eventually aligns with the general increase of foreign nationals in 
the CJS since 1997 (Berman and Dar, 2013). Suspecting and criminalising 
foreign nationals by increasing the power of the police and the immigration 
officers to deal with the suspected foreign nationals in the borders points 
or in the street (Aliverti, 2013, p. 135) has created confusion in the 
representation of foreign nationals in CJS statistics. Under new counter 
terrorism measures, the E-borders method to protect the nation from the 
outside danger was introduced in 2005 (Wilson, 2006, Bowling and 
Weber, 2011, Bowling and Sheptychi, 2015). At the same time there were 
also calls for a dedicated police force along the lines of the British 
Transport Police or the Ministry of Defence Police along the sea ports to 
combat the different sorts of crime that are imported from abroad (House 
of Commons, 2005, col. 2). Similarly, in the context of policing foreigners 
in Australia Weber (2013) argued policing responsibilities have been 
expanded globally due to the changes in immigration policies; police are 
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required to enforce immigration laws, secure the nation, policing foreigners 
became an element of policing and security (Weber and Bowling, 2004, 
Bowling and Sheptychi, 2015). The similarity between arresting foreign 
nationals in London and NI confirm that police forces have a similar policy 
towards suspecting and arresting foreign nationals.  
There is no doubt that the stereotyping of foreign nationals and 
connecting them to different illegal activities like immigration crimes and 
terrorism has become well established. However, managing foreign 
national offenders and tackling illegal immigrants have gone too far in 
British immigration policy; tackling ‘illegal immigrants’ has been applied as 
a means to scrutinise those who stay legally in the UK (Al-Faris and 
Barton, 2014, Al-Faris, 2014). The overrepresentation of foreign nationals 
in CJS data mirrors the proposals that the CJS practise (especially the 
police) towards foreigners influenced and framed by the immigration 
policy, which targets ‘ideal suspects’, criminalising them in order to restrict 
their mobility through and to the country (Lee, 2007b). 
The perceived relationship between immigration and crime has been 
reinforced by immigration policies of different British governments through 
extending the boundaries of immigration crime, the use, and misuse of 
deportation and extending immigration and crime legislation (Weber and 
Bowling, 2004). For instance, as Chapter 3 showed, New Labour’s policy 
during their three consecutive general election victories had three 
significant features that encouraged the relationship between immigration 
and crime: Firstly, the expansion of immigration and crime legislation 
(Somerville, 2007). The expansion of using criminal law to ‘manage’ 
immigration (Aliverti, 2013a, p 60) resulted in a steady increase in the rate 
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of prosecutions and convictions for these offences (Aliverti, 2013c), and 
gave greater power to immigration officers to detain suspects for hours, 
refuse entry, stop and search passengers. In addition, police officers had 
the power to investigate the legal status of any person they suspected, 
which eventually aligns with the general increase of foreign nationals in 
the CJS since 1997 (Berman and Dar, 2013). Secondly, strengthening the 
British border to tackle criminals; British borders were expanded during 
the last Labour term in office in two ways: externally21 and internally22, the 
tightening and expansion of British borders was always associated with 
the fear of crime and especially the relationship with foreign nationals 
(Weber and Bowling, 2004, Hampshaire, 2009). Thirdly, controlling 
foreign nationals because of their association with crime; the terms risk 
and risk management have been used to describe an approach taken by 
government that does not ‘gamble’ with national security and the safety of 
citizens. 
In addition, following the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and April 2006 
scandal, new public protection sentences were introduced to improve the 
management of dangerous offenders. Those offenders judged to be 
dangerous, and who have committed serious sexual or violent offences, 
can be kept in prison until the Parole Board judges it is safe to release 
them (Indeterminate Sentence for Public Protection). The implications of 
such measures and legislation has targeted FNPs; foreigners committing 
violent and sexual offences are very likely to be detained in prison for as 
                                                 
21
 Like agreements with neighbouring countries and new requirements from the airline 
companies to check documents and visas for the passengers. 
22
 It is a new set of policies designed to focus control interventions on the inflow of specific 
foreign nationals 
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long as it takes to either decide their cases or facilitate their deportation. 
At the halfway point of the custodial sentence, the offender may be 
released if the Parole Board determines it is safe to do so, but release will 
not be automatic until the end of the sentence (Extended Sentence for 
Public Protection). Detaining FNPs after finishing their sentences, and the 
restrictive rules of not offering the foreign national offender parole or 
community service, is not part of the crime policy. Rather it is a co-option 
of the CJS by the immigration system as a tool to achieve its aims 
(Anderson, 2010, Anderson et al., 2011). Foreign nationals are detained 
and kept in prison not because they are serious criminals or pose a 
danger to society, as politicians, parliamentary debates and government 
policy suggest, but because they are foreigners (Anderson et al., 2011). 
The blurred lines between the HMPS and the Home Office (which 
culminated in the 2006 scandal) has established a habit of targeting, 
criminalising, and over-debating the criminality of foreign nationals and 
the need to deport them from the UK.  
The accepted relationship between immigration and crime is being used 
and exaggerated to justify the delay in the administrative process 
(Anderson, 2013, Noronha, 2015). Under this process, the preferred 
method to control by the Home Office is unacceptable and raises issues 
of stereotyping and the possibility of increased public dissatisfaction, not 
towards the legislature but the foreign nationals themselves. Whether 
detaining FNPs in prison or transferring them to IRCs, parliamentary 
debates showed there is no objective evidence or data to justify the 
government policy of detaining foreign nationals for such long periods, 
sometimes without court authorisation (Hansard, 2006d, col WA203). 
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Hence, it seems that the Home Office has the discretionary power to 
decide the danger and impact to the British society of those detained. The 
administrative process the Home Office follows is to keep the control on 
those who are foreign nationals to be easily deported, rather than 
releasing them in society where they might disappear. Furthermore, from 
a social point of view, being in prison, even on remand or detained, has a 
strong labelling effect, the same as for those convicted offenders who 
have not received a custodial sentence (Solivetti, 2011, p125). The mere 
idea of having been in prison means an individual faces many challenges 
when trying to reintegrate back into society.  
To conclude, foreign criminality discourses, immigration policy and the 
media influenced negatively the CJ practice towards foreign nationals. 
Foreign nationals were labelled, stereotyped, targeted and ultimately 
overrepresented in CJS due to the power of words and the ‘war on 
foreigners’ by the most powerful groups of the society towards powerless. 
The practical side of the immigration and crime legislation reflects how the 
CJS and immigration officers put foreign nationals on the spotlight, 
constructing them as ideal candidates for suspicion (Agozino, 1997, 
Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009, Wilson, 2015).  
8.1.2 Guilty of being foreign  
British government redefined the term of ‘foreigner’ and the desires to live 
and work in the UK, and increased the gap between foreign nationals and 
citizens by applying more responsibilities, zero tolerance policy, and 
decreasing the rights of those who are not citizens under the label of 
managing immigration and make them work for the benefit of Britain 
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(Hayles, 2006, Anderson et al., 2011). In this framework, foreign nationals 
expected to be financially independent, have a clear criminal records, and 
‘extremely’ collaborative with the immigration regulation, immigration 
policy and immigration measures, otherwise a server punishment will be 
applied. Courts and UKVI have presented the violation of immigration 
laws as a bridge to more serious crimes such as robbery, drug offenses 
and murder. In a case where radiologist was imprisoned as a result of 
lying about her country of birth, the judge who seen her case mentioned in 
his verdict: (Afed, 2009):  
‘For the last seven years the life you led in this country was nothing 
short of a complete lie. Offences of this kind are always regarded by 
this court as serious and they must have with them some deterrent to 
dissuade others’. 
In the eyes of courts and the Border Agency, that one aspect of person’s 
life (immigration status) means s/he is a serious criminal deserving no 
mercy. In this framework, the violation of immigration law is an indication 
of yet-to-be-committed serious offenses. Thus, the over policing on 
foreign national communities and severe punishment for immigration law 
violations is seen as a reasonable and justifiable reaction to emerging 
felons (Yamamoto, 2010). In contrast to the general legal principle, 
foreign nationals are guilty until proven innocent, the suspicion and the 
zero tolerance policy in the airports and inside the UK, all made 
foreignness in appearance is a clue to criminality. The implication of zero 
tolerance policy and the construction of foreign criminality led to increase 
foreign nationals’ representation in police and prison data; foreign 
nationals are more likely to be arrested and severely punished than 
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indigenous people.  It affects also the fluctuation and the change in the 
prison map, where the nationality of some foreign nationals has the 
highest prison representation due to the significant increase of their 
general population in the UK (see Chapter 6). 
As social constructivism theory suggest, those who have the power and 
authority have the enforcement and the administration of the law and 
policy that shapes the public life and determine who is against the law and 
who is defined as criminal and why. The powerful groups of the society 
influence the decision of who is and what is the punishment for breaking 
the law. Several agencies play a part in the system and control different 
aspects of the justice system (police officers, judges and magistrates, 
probation officers and parole board members); each authority (member) 
based its acts on different powers, procedural rules and operating 
philosophies, leading to predictable points of tension in the system. There 
is evidence of substantial differences in making decisions about different 
ethnicities and nationalities in police cautioning and in sentencing 
between different officials fulfilling the same functions (Waters, 1990, Bell 
et al., 2010, Papadopoulos, 2010).  
Foreign nationals have been often pictured as a negative risk importer; 
therefore, many precautions have been taken under the guise of 
‘defending’ the nation from the risks that foreign nationals are seen to 
bring, including terrorism, crime, social disorder, cultural issues, public 
health issues and strain on the economy (Hampshaire, 2009, Chacon, 
2013). The anti-immigration discourses by the politicians and the media, 
led to increase xenophobia and the negative public sentiments towards 
foreign nationals. Criminalising foreign nationals has started to create an 
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environment where foreign nationals can be subject to strict and draconian 
measures, with the ultimate outcome that they are deported from the UK. 
In spite of the secondary data revealing that foreign nationals engaged in 
lower level of crimes and are imprisoned mostly for drugs and less serious 
crimes compared to British nationals thus reflecting the result of targeting 
foreign nationals because they are aliens in this country especially, when 
the fear of being victimised is fundamentally disturbing (Box et al., 1988), 
especially when the potential criminal is a stranger who has been 
described as a ‘dangerous criminal’.  
The above conceptual frameworks resulted couples of findings: Firstly, 
the crisis of crimmigration is a reasonable and predictable reaction of 
construction the criminality of foreign nationals; the overrepresentation of 
foreign nationals in prison data have resulted partially from the 
crimmigration crisis and stereotyping foreigners as criminals.  
Secondly, in order to demonstrate a strong leadership by politicians 
foreign criminality discourses are emerged. Crimes by foreigners appear 
to be a perfect backdrop for a presentation of their strong leadership; 
foreigners play the villains; the British public plays innocent, helpless 
victims; and political leaders play the role of heroes who crack down on 
those bad people. A problem of crimes by foreigners gives political 
leaders an opportunity to demonstrate their leadership in dramatic ways 
when other problems are so deeply chronic and structural that there is no 
painless way to deal with them. By shedding a spotlight on crimes by 
foreigners, political and bureaucratic leaders maintain the image that they 
are acting on social problems, while distracting the public from larger 
problems that they have been failing to solve.  
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Thirdly, the construction of foreign criminality through the language, 
discourses, government policies, and media products established a new 
version of racism; focusing on non-white criminality has been replaced 
with foreign criminality. It is not about race superior anymore, the 
construction of foreign criminality enhanced a social perception of ‘us and 
them’ and different nationalities should be treated differently. Therefore, 
this new racism was a major driving force behind the discrimination of 
foreign nationals in the CJS. 
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CHAPTER 9 Conclusion  
 
 Introduction  
This research has looked at the historical development of immigration 
policy and immigration legislation, and its impact on constructing foreign 
criminality. The research has explained the historical context relating to 
foreign nationals and the consequent political and public blame placed on 
them of increasing crime either directly or indirectly. In order to examine 
these notions, secondary data comprising statistical offending data from 
the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, and immigration data from 
the Office for National Statistics have been used. In addition, political 
discourse and parliamentary debates from 2001 to 2014 have analysed 
for two purposes. The first of these has been to show the impact of 
foreign criminality discourses and the relationship between these debates 
and increasing criminalisation of foreign nationals, which includes 
growing negative perception in regard to foreign criminals. Second, this 
has highlighted the weak basis of this negative discourse, which has 
used the idea that foreign nationals are more likely to commit crimes than 
British nationals to facilitate changes in immigration policy and gain public 
votes.  
The above methodology has allowed the objectives of this research to be 
met. The research has inquired into the reasons for oft-repeated and 
heated debates concentrating on foreign criminality and the impact of 
foreign criminality discourses. The research has discovered the confusion 
in recording data that pertains to foreign nationals, and how the way 
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different categories of foreign nationals in prison are counted affects the 
total population of FNPs. This population is then used to make arguments 
about foreign national criminality in the political, media and public 
spheres. This concluding chapter offers a summary of the findings of this 
research, shows the contributions this study has made to academic 
knowledge, explains the limitation of the research, and recommends 
areas for future research.  
 An overview of the research problem and the limited literature  
The origins of the immigration movement in Britain have changed 
significantly in current immigration policy. Historically, immigrants from 
different parts of the world were welcomed to Britain and at times even 
seduced into coming to live and work here. However, when their 
population increased, or other issues of the time were connected to their 
presence in the country, political and public concerns began to emerge in 
relation to demographics, health, the economy and crime (Reid et al., 
2005, p758, Hagan and Palloni, 1999).  
The relationship between foreign nationals and crime has not gained the 
same academic interest as in the USA, not because the experience of 
foreign nationals in the UK is different from those in America, or that the 
issue is unimportant, but because of the limitation of the data. UK records 
are more focused on ethnicity than nationality, whereas USA records give 
more attention to the place of birth in offending and crime statistics 
(Butcher and Piehl, 1998, Butcher et al., 2008 , Cadwallader, 1992). In 
addition, ongoing political and parliamentary debates have focused on 
foreign nationals and their relationship with different criminal activities, 
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which has provided the basis for this research to investigate thoroughly 
this relationship.  
In order to understand the phenomenon of how criminalising foreign 
nationals is a socially constructed and how the identity of foreign 
nationals is connected to offenders. Social constructivism theory has 
been used. Social construction of foreign nationals’ criminality is 
developing and increasing due to the contribution of the stimuli and many 
restrictions as policies, political ideologies, and the media.  
This research found that immigration policy, foreign criminality 
discourses, and the media have established the construction of foreign 
criminality, by criminalising widely or calling to criminalise foreigners’ 
attitudes and behaviours. Thus, the relationship between foreign 
nationals and crime has been politicised to meet immigration policy aim 
of controlling ‘non-valuable’ foreign nationals as a result to the political 
pressure, which influenced by public concerns over immigration and the 
rhetoric of other political parties that criticise government in action on 
immigration policy. In other words, managing foreign nationals through 
crime is a political strategy, used by different political parties and 
politicians that are doing their best to ‘blame’ the opposite party for ‘past 
policy mistakes’. They all produce the same results, even if they 
superficially espouse different policy. History showed how Labour 
immigration policy is similar to the Conservative’s, and how the Liberal 
Democrats changed its position on immigrants on reaching office. There 
is a certain tendency from some MPs and politicians to connect foreign 
nationals to crimes, presenting them as criminals in order to control the 
phenomenon of immigration without significant opposition.  
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On the other hand, studying immigration policy to explain increasing 
foreign criminality has become a recent avenue of enquiry due to its rapid 
development and punitive direction. Immigration policy plays a significant 
part in the life of every foreign national, and those foreigners who have 
committed crimes will be affected as well as by penal policy. Immigration 
policy has an essential role to play in determining foreign nationals’ 
everyday life in this country regardless to their criminal behaviours. 
Therefore, this research has paid a lot of attention to immigration policy 
alongside immigration, security, and criminal justice legislation to explain 
trends in foreign national criminality and their changeable relationship 
with the CJS.  
By any means, British studies along with most American studies have not 
found a positive relationship between immigration and crime; on the 
contrary, some studies in the USA have found that the immigration 
movement has helped to reduce the crime level in some states (Stowell 
et al., 2009, Wadsworth, 2010). The limitation of previous studies and the 
importance of the topic, which is prominent in the media, national 
surveys, political discourse and the parliamentary debates, has motivated 
the researcher to engage examine the issues further, especially as they 
involve one of the most vulnerable sector in the society. Although 
prevented from speaking directly with such prisoners, this research gives 
them a voice of some kind.  
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 The contributions of the research   
9.3.1 In the literature review  
The parts of this research providing a review of the literature (Chapters 2, 
and 3), presented immigration policy and the foreign national relationship 
with non-immigration criminal offences from a historical perspective. To 
do this it made use of four case studies (Irish, Jews, BAME, and asylum 
seekers). Chapter 2 took note of the first establishment of foreign 
nationals being linked to non-immigration offences by analysing the 
development of immigration policy, political discourses, and the media to 
explain how the criminality of foreign nationals was constructed. Chapter 
2 looked also at Royal powers and the different trends in immigration 
policy that show evidence of both welcoming and excluding foreigners 
due to changes in the economic, social and political context. The chapter 
presented three case studies for the predominant foreign nationals during 
each time. In the first two case studies, which represented the 19th and 
the first half of the 20th century, the researcher found that the same 
issues are connected to every new foreign national group when their 
population increases and demonstrates economic success. The last part 
of the chapter, which covered the second half of the 20th century and 
included the third case study (BAME groups), showed the same blaming 
activity for the same kinds of issues, and as a consequence the 
relationship between these foreigners and crime has been highlighted. 
Chapter 2 introduced a body of knowledge to the historical background of 
constructing foreign criminality, supported by the experiences of 3 
different foreign national groups from different times in history. Each of 
these shared similar experiences and each were connected to general 
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criminal activities, something followed by political and public appeals, 
supported in the media, to reduce their population and restrict 
immigration policy accordingly.  
Chapter 3 (the second literature review chapter) took the reader through 
the most recent history of immigration, which focused on the two political 
parties who have played a significant role in changing immigration and 
penal policy, in relation to the level and type of foreign national 
criminality. The first half of the chapter focused on the immigration and 
penal policies for the Labour party, who stayed in the power for 13 years 
and played an essential role in increasing the connection between 
immigration and crime legislation. This section identified the most 
important themes that shaped the rule of the Labour party and how 
foreign nationals have been focused on due to tracking crime policies 
(like ‘tough on crime tough on the cases of crime’ rhetoric, the ‘war on 
drugs’ and ‘war on terror’) and the policies that resulted from them, 
leading to a considerable increase in the population of foreign nationals in 
prison.  
The implications of these policies were an increase in negative public 
attitudes and the media coverage, as well as an increase in stereotyping 
the suspicion of foreign nationals. The large amount of immigration and 
crime legislation made foreigners a scapegoat for many illegal activities in 
the UK. In addition, various events during this era (like 9/11, 7/7, and the 
2006 scandal) helped to shape Labour’s immigration policy. The 
implication of the terrorist attacks and the release of over 1000 FNPs 
without considering them for deportation have strengthened the 
relationship between the UKVI and the CJS; the cooperation between 
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these two institutions started to be more recognisable (Pantazis and 
Pemberton, 2009, 2011, Home Affairs Committee, 2001). Previous 
studies have concentrated on immigration crimes and terrorism to 
illustrate how foreign nationals were increasingly criminalised while the 
Labour party was in power. Section 1 of Chapter 3 highlighted other 
aspects of Labour policies that in practice targeted foreign nationals and 
developed the relationship between foreign nationals and crime in the 
minds of the public and CJS workers, as well as the institutions they 
worked in.  
The second part of the chapter looked at the policy of the Coalition 
Government. Unlike the previous government, the Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat Coalition has focused on the relationship between 
foreign nationals and non-immigration crimes, and in doing so has urged 
Parliament to facilitate deportation legislation and measures, fuelled the 
media, and increased public perception of a relationship between 
immigration and crime. The big campaign of the Coalition Government on 
deporting foreign prisoners and ex-offenders was intended to be part of a 
penal policy towards foreign nationals that minimised pressure on British 
prisons (and taxpayers), in addition to discarding foreign prisoners even if 
they have family ties in the UK (Immigration Act, 2014).  
Considering the different themes of immigration and penal policies 
between the Labour and Coalition Governments, Chapter 3 identified the 
similarities and differences between different them. This allowed an 
increased understanding of why the overrepresentation of foreign 
nationals fluctuated. Second, it allowed for the examination of 
immigration policy, and made it clear that in any investigation into foreign 
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national criminality, it is essential to examine closely political discourse; 
this research has accomplished this as will be discussed below. 
9.3.2 Contribution to the theory  
The relationship between foreign national and CJS in the UK has not 
been conceptualising with framework due to the limitation of recording 
and publishing their data by nationality rather than by ethnicity (Solivetti, 
2011) and the consequent limited literature review. This research has 
conceptualised the relationship between immigration and crime by 
employing social constructivism theory to achieve this research aim and 
objectives. Chapter 4 explained that the most powerful groups in the 
society have constructed the criminality of foreign nationals; these 
dominant groups have the power and the authority to define crime and 
identify who is criminal. Social constructivism theory explained the 
implication of actuarial orientation that the recent governments follow of 
governing some sector of the population through using statistical analysis 
of risk. This research demonstrated that immigration policy, CJS data, 
foreign criminality discourses and the media constitute a core element of 
constructing immigration more broadly in criminogenic terms and foreign 
nationals more specifically as the ‘enemy’ and a problematic population.  
This research developed the understanding of other functions of the CJS, 
which is to deliver indirectly immigration policy through controlling the 
quantity of those ‘unwanted’ foreign nationals. Employing Social 
constructivism theory allowed this research to enhance the theoretical 
framework of immigration and crime studies and investigate further the 
root of foreign criminality construction in the media and political 
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discourses and analysed in depth why foreign nationals are 
overrepresented in CJS data and over debated in parliament and the 
media.  
This research demonstrated that not only the overrepresentation of foreign 
nationals in police and prison data contributes to construct the criminality 
of foreign nationals but also the absence/ limitation of recording nationality 
in CJS statistical data contributes to further understanding the process of 
labelling foreign nationals as criminals and constructing the foreign 
criminality perception. This is revealed when some politicians (especially 
those involved with managing the CJS and UKVI) and media outlets have 
used arrest data to illustrate the relationship between foreign nationals and 
crime.  
9.3.3 Contribution to the methodology and data collection 
After the failing to receive permission from the NOMS/ MoJ to interview a 
sample of foreign nationals in British prisons, the researcher has looked 
for alternative methods to deliver the aims of this research. First, the 
researcher gathered all publishable secondary data that relating to 
foreign nationals and their relationship with the CJS. The research has 
used this data to facilitate a study of the relationship between foreign 
nationals and crime in the UK over an elongated period for the first time 
in this field of study in the UK.  
The researcher is aware of the limitations of these statistical data, as well 
as the critical position of criminologists in relation to data produce by CJS 
agencies. Nevertheless, it has been used in this research to meet certain 
aims. For example, it has been used to demonstrate the level of 
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knowledge in relation to foreign nationals and the police, courts, and 
prisons, and in doing so to question why there is hidden information on 
one hand, and foreign nationals are freely linked with crime on the other. 
In addition, these data illustrate the sorts of relationships between the 
CJS and foreigners, especially when there is a shortage research 
studying the problem that this research is investigating. Finally, the 
analysis of the secondary data provides a foundation for interested fellow 
researchers in this field to build on, and to develop their own 
interpretations and explanations for offenders in the statistical data by 
nationality.  
The numerical data provided an illustration of the level of criminality that 
foreign nationals demonstrate in E&W, and the type of crimes that have 
been committed by those foreigners. However, this secondary data alone 
is not sufficient in explaining why foreign nationals are targeted and 
discriminating against at different stages of the CJS. Therefore, 
parliamentary debates and the related political discourses have been 
used as another method through which to answer the research questions. 
The parliamentary debates, especially from the political party leaders, 
alongside those working in the Home Office and MoJ, have been used to 
support the arguments raised in related literature, along with the analysis 
of arrest and prison data. Parliamentary debates have been analysed 
alongside the literature to provide insight into how they have contributed 
to the relationship between foreign nationals, terrorism and crime 
becoming firmly embedded in the public consciousness (Aliverti, 2013a, 
Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008).  
- 302 - 
 
This research has therefore used this method to examine the likely 
influence of political discourse on the construction of foreign criminality, 
and in particular non-immigration criminal offences. Some of these 
parliamentary debates have helped give an interpretation of the confusing 
published statistical numbers of foreign nationals ex-offenders, and to 
understand the change in focus on criticising certain nationalities in the 
UK, and finally to explore the mind-set of the politicians and how foreign 
national criminality has been discussed in Parliament.  
9.3.4 Contribution to results 
The second halves of Chapters 6, 7 and 8 have presented an analysis 
into the situation of foreign nationals in the UK, and the blame that 
appears to be attributed to them. To the knowledge of the researcher, the 
research presents the first explanation in the criminological field using 
changes in immigration and crime policies, along with the prevailing 
political attitude towards foreign nationals, as the main variables.  
The second part of Chapter 6 has added unexplored contexts to 
criminological knowledge base, including: the relationship between 
foreign nationals and the police; discrimination in sentence length 
between foreign nationals and British; the level of criminality foreign 
nationals present; and the type of criminal offences that foreigners are 
imprisoned for in comparison to British nationals. The results of Chapter 6 
have been examined by looking at the sort of debates that arise when 
foreign nationals and crime are discussed in Westminster parliamentary 
debates. This research also makes a distinct contribution by exploring 
and affirming the general finding of previous studies, along with the 
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proposals of this research to examine the influence of immigration policy 
and parliamentary debates. The general themes of some of the language 
in Parliament have been used to show the level negativity in discourse 
relating to foreign nationals. The influence of immigration policy, foreign 
criminality discourse and the media have almost resulted in the 
normalisation of stereotyping, targeting, and managing the risk of foreign 
nationals in terms of their relationship with crime. The aim of risk 
management is to plot the characteristics of groups, develop predictors of 
the likelihood of disruptive activity, and to devise strategies for its 
minimisation.    
Most of themes of analysis included here have been chosen because 
they demonstrate how FNPs and foreign national ex-offenders are 
represented in political debate. Various events have led to heated 
debates, which in some cases have exaggerated the criminality of foreign 
nationals. The second part of Chapter 7 analysed the implications of such 
debates more closely. First, it found that many changes in immigration 
and crime policies have been facilitated under the label of foreign national 
criminality. Second, CJS workers have been affected by these negative 
debates, which have likely affected their attitude to foreign nationals, who 
are subject to stricter treatment at various stages of the CJS. Third, 
immigration policy and measures that stereotype foreigners as being 
potential criminals has created an atmosphere of suspicion, similar to 
BAME experiences within the CJS.  
The final contribution in this section is in the evaluation of the different 
areas of this research, which was presented in Chapter 8. The chapter 
has gathered the outcomes of the literature review, supported by four 
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cases studies, and demonstrated the vulnerability of foreigners 
throughout history and in times that are more recent. Chapter 8 showed 
how the ‘hidden agenda’ of politics has affected the prison population, the 
difficulty in gaining knowledge about FNPs inside prison, and concern in 
regard to the rights of FNPs. This has arisen in part due to the lack of 
transparency about their overall standing, especially in terms of finishing 
their sentence and preparations to deport them (Hardwick, 2012, Potter, 
2011).  
A further contribution in knowledge is presented by an explanation of how 
the CJS has been employed to achieve the aims of the immigration 
policy. This is evident as a part of the implications of merging immigration 
and penal policy by expanding ‘crimmigration’ legislation, which includes 
increasing cooperation between the UK Border Agency (now UK Border 
Force) and the CJS, alongside the battle to control and shape public 
attitudes towards immigration in general. Chapter 8 also made links 
between parliamentary debates and changes in the immigration policy, 
which also affected changes in CJS function, and the representation of 
foreign nationals’ statistical data on offending. In order to gain public 
votes and avoid blame for failing in certain areas of policy, blaming 
foreign nationals for different issues and linking them to different illegal 
activities has it appears become a popular choice for those in 
government. 
The final part of the discussion chapter explained the idea of punishing 
immigrants for being foreigners. The over criminalisation, policing and 
representation in the CJS statistical data has been used by politicians, 
immigration policy and the media to construct the criminality of foreign 
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nationals and identify those powerless people as risk importers and crime 
creators. British communities have been described as safe before 
foreigners came to this country and British nationals pictured as victims 
who are afraid of ‘foreign predators’. Chapter 8 sends a message to 
policy makers and those in power to treat foreign nationals neither as 
angels nor devils but as human beings. Blaming foreign nationals for the 
UK crime problem is an unfounded approach, as there is no empirical 
study proving a positive correlation between foreign nationals and crime 
in the UK, nor are there any particular statistics showing how many (if 
any) crimes have been committed by FNPs during their prison sentence 
(Justice Statistics Analytical Services, 2011). 
Some foreign nationals have committed serious crimes and imprisoned 
for them. The calls to deport such criminals are understandable. 
However, the consistent and extensive campaign to exaggerate the 
criminality of foreign nationals, and even the dangerousness of FNPs, is 
nativism. Therefore, the last finding of this research is to question the 
practice of placing suspicion on foreign nationals by associating them 
with crime. Furthermore, the parallel development of immigration and 
penal policy has, along with dominant anti-immigrant discourse in the 
political arena, served to develop an unfounded image of foreign 
nationals as more criminal than British nationals.   
 Limitation of the research  
There are some areas of limitation in this study, including the standard 
and depth of the obtainable secondary data, the lack of cooperation from 
the Ministry of Justice, the time constraints introduced by the data that 
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was used, and the implications of this research. This section will consider 
these limitations in turn. 
9.4.1 The limitation and chaos in recording nationality   
The absence of recording nationality in the police stage of the CJS, and 
the unorganised way of recording the nationality of foreign national 
defendants in the courts, have limited the outcomes of examining the 
relationship between foreign nationals and each of these components of 
the CJS. This has meant that it is hard to ascertain whether there is any 
unequal treatment of foreign nationals during these significant stages of 
the CJS. 
This absence of recording or publishing the data is limited the 
consequent research. The police-foreign national relationship is still 
under-researched, although this study has drawn some inferences from 
the arrest data in London and NI. Court procedures relating to foreign 
national defendants remain under-researched as well. Even so, this study 
has connected the reception and prison data, and used previous studies 
of BAME individuals to make sense of how court procedures and the 
level of sentence varies between different groups (Hood, 2003). This has 
enabled the researcher to make informed assumptions relating to the role 
of the courts in the sentences length of FNPs.  
9.4.2 The lack of cooperation from the Ministry of Justice  
The research methodology focused on analysing secondary data, 
alongside a qualitative analysis of political and parliamentary debates. 
This has taken place on the foundation of early chapters that have 
outlined the historical background of immigration and crime using case 
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studies. With greater cooperation from the Ministry of Justice, this 
research would be able to present a richer account of the experiences of 
FNPs themselves, including their economic and social circumstances and 
their experiences with the different stages of the CJS. This would, 
alongside the analyses presented above, have facilitated a more rounded 
and grounded study the immigration-crime nexus in respect to FNPs. 
9.4.3 Time span    
This research has presented a longitudinal study of secondary data to 
demonstrate changes in the representation of foreign nationals in 
offending data, alongside changes in ruling parties and their related 
immigration and penal policies. However, parliamentary debates between 
2001 and 2014 only present a snapshot of political developments and 
may have limited the understanding of non-immigration criminal offences 
and their relationship to foreign nationals. This is partly because debates 
between 2001 and 2006 were dominated by terrorism and immigration 
crimes committed by foreign nationals, and as such, there was less 
scope to investigate prevailing attitudes towards non-immigration and 
non-terrorist foreign national criminality.  
9.4.4 Generalising the outcomes of this research  
This research is classified in the criminological field. However, it has 
mainly focused on changes in dominant political discourse, and related 
changes in immigration and penal policies. The contribution of knowledge 
within the field of British criminology is clear, but applying the result of this 
research to other countries that have different immigration policies and 
political attitudes toward foreign national criminality should be considered. 
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It is likely that a similar picture would emerge in those countries that have 
recently felt the impact of a far-right political resurgence. 
9.4.5 The implication of this research  
This research recognises the challenges, barriers, and the sensitivity of 
the problem it has attempted to clarify. In consequence, it is not assuming 
to have presented a full picture of the relationship between foreign 
nationals and crime in E&W. Instead, the outcomes of this research 
provide researchers with an opportunity to engage more and investigate 
further the reality of foreign criminality, and the way that immigration 
policy and the political discourse affects this relationship. This is true both 
for the UK and other countries demonstrate a similar overrepresentation 
of foreign nationals in offending data.  
 Recommendation and future studies  
The following recommendations are made in relation to the findings of 
this research: 
1. There is substantial work to do to improve the recording of the nationality of 
those who come into contact with the CJS, especially in the first stages of the 
system (the police). Recording nationality, alongside ethnicity, should be 
required by law. This would provide equality and avoid potential discrimination 
through abuse of this power based on nationality.  
2. Important attention should be paid to the court recording system in terms of the 
nationality of defendants and the type of the crime (unrecorded crime) that those 
defendants have committed. 
 
3. Despite prison data being considered the most complete data that takes 
nationality in consideration, comparing to other statistics like arrest or court 
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proceeding database there are still many limitations, particularly as to how the 
nationality of prisoner is collected and recorded. This needs to be addressed. 
4. The government needs to consider publications that contain the nationality of 
the offender and its relationship with the CJS more seriously. They should 
clamp down on those who use ambiguity and limitations of the data to their 
political advantage. 
As a final point, this research is meant to provide a foundation for future 
research, contribute to the knowledge of criminological studies in the UK 
and open the door for further studies to look at the relationship between 
the nationality and the CJS. In this last respect, there are some areas of 
future study recommended for those interested in investigating the legal 
impact of foreign nationals in the UK, and examining the prejudice of the 
CJS against foreign nationals in the UK: 
1. Observational study of routine police patrol work to examine police behaviour 
towards foreign nationals, and if nationality is an important factor in stopping 
and searching those who have a ‘different’ appearance  
2. Observational study of magistrate and crown court procedures and examining 
foreign national cases in certain areas in the UK  
3. Observational study of the demeanour of immigration officers in international 
airports and the fair treatment of new arrivals  
4. Make a qualitative study (interviews) with FNPs in British prisons to look at the 
personal and cultural circumstances that lead foreigners to engage in illegal 
activities in a foreign country.  
5. Make a qualitative study in regards to the role of immigration and social policy in 
the relationship between asylum seekers and crime (especially property crime).  
6. Make an empirical study of recording data, especially in the police and the court 
sectors, due to the limitation of finding reliable crime and offender data in these 
fields. 
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7. Make an historical study of old parliamentary debates, especially when Hansard 
started its project to supply a full account of the parliamentary debates since 
1803.  
8. An empirical study examining the legal system in the UK and the most common 
crimes that foreign nationals are imprisoned for, like drugs, VATP, fraud and 
forgery (as immigration and non-immigration crimes). 
9. A particular study to examine the media role to highlight and exaggerate the 
criminality of foreign nationals as this research has acknowledged this role but it 
needs further studies to cover the significant role that the media is paying of 
reshaping the public perception and even in some cases the political 
perceptions.  
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Appendix (1) 
 
This Appendix will include:  
 
1.  The first refusal from NOMS to allow the researcher making interviews with 
FNPs in prisons in England  
 
2. The final refusal from the above institution after resubmitting an edited 
application   
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Appendix (2) Quantitative data (Tables) 
Table 1.1: Foreign born and foreign nationals’ population January-December 2004-2013 
 
Year 
 
Total UK 
population 
Foreign Born population(000) Foreign national population (000) 
UK E&W UK E&W 
   2004
23
 60000
24
 5233 4958 2946 2799 
2005 60400 5552 5268 3198 3045 
2006 60800 5997 5692 3594 3428 
2007 61300 6342 5992 3942 3721 
2008 56395 6683 6294 4169 3886 
2009 56590 6910 6488 4344 4024 
2010 56893 7139 6715 4460 4125 
2011 56977 7509 7063 4772 4419 
2012 57317 7679 7180 4852 4464 
2013 62605 7780 7307 4902 4538 
Source: ONS  
 
Table 2.1: Foreign nationals and criminal offences evidences 
Source  Type of evidence    Quote/ Result  
 
(E
v
a
n
s
-
G
o
rd
o
n
, 
1
9
0
3
) 
 
Sir Alfred Newton, Lord 
Mayor of London in 1899, 
and a Commissioner of the 
Central Criminal Court 
‘15 percent of the persons charged before him were ‘certainly foreigners’  
The Chairman of the ‘Apparently there were ‘organised colonies of foreign crime’ in London. He showed that the percentage of 
                                                 
23
 From 2004-2008 the data is taken from the APS and from 2008 the data is taken from the APS and LFS. The research found no difference between the two methods in 
determining the foreign born and foreign nationality migrants in the UK and England and Wales.  
24
 Total UK population from 2004-2008 is incomparable with the total population from 2008-2013, as the first is mid-year population and from different resource Source: 
National Records of Scotland and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA)/ ONS. 
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County of London Sessions 
(Mr W. R. McConnell, K.C.)  
the aliens tried in his court, north of the Thames, had risen from 7 percent in 1892 to 11 percent in 1900 
to 22 percent at the October Sessions, 1902, and to 25 percent at the first sessions held in 1903’  
Mr John Dickinson, 
magistrate of the Thames 
Police Court 
‘I had A.G.’s case before me a few days ago for picking a woman’s pocket. He had been only a short 
time in this country, and there were find on him some letters from persons in prison in France, in which 
they declared their intention of joining his as soon as they were released’.  
‘[I can notice a sort of invasion of professional criminals]…in the Winter of 1901 a gang of twelve 
Germans. Eight of them charged with burglary and four with receiving … it was proved that these men 
were skilled burglars who had simply came into this country’.  
Mr Justice Darling at the 
Old Bailey, in sentencing 
the last batch of the nine 
bank-note forgers of whom 
the suicide Barmarsh was 
the most notorious  
‘ I do not think there is another country in the world to which undesirable foreigners like you would be 
allowed to come in enormous numbers, and to exist, doing little or no work, but preying on the country 
which has given you refuge’  P 259  
The Recorder of the Old 
Bailey 1903. P 259 
‘This court is occupied for days each session in trying these disreputable foreigners, whom nevertheless, 
we receive with open arms’ P 259 
 
Mr Loveland-Loveland, 
K.C., in sentencing a 
foreigner at the Clerkenwell 
Session 1903. P 259-260 
‘The case fully illustrates how desirable and necessary it is to check the unwelcome invasion of alien 
criminals. At present, the dregs of foreign countries flow incessantly into hospitable England and within 
few days are engaged in committing all sorts of offences. The sooner Parliament frames laws to prohibit 
the landing of these undesirable the better’  
(Mr McConnell, K.C.) 1903, 
in sentencing two foreign 
Jews.  P 260 
‘This is another of those cases in which undesirable foreigners land here without a trade and without 
money, and with the express intention of living by plunder’  
 
Major E.G. Clayton, 
formerly Governor of Lewes 
and Wormwood Scrubbs 
Prisons and became later 
Secretary of the Prisons 
Commission.  P 260 
‘The number of aliens sent to prison during the period of five years ending March 31, 1903, was 13,114’  
1337 had been once previously convicted,  
525  had been twice previously convicted,  
285 had been previously convicted three times, 215 four times,  
162 five times,  
484 from six to ten times,  
203 from eleven to twenty times,  
123 above twenty times’ 
 
‘The number of foreign prisoners in the year ending March 31, 1899 was 2181; the figure had risen to 
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3449 in the year ending March 31, 1903 
 
‘The percentages of increase of crime during the same period were:  
 
Russians and Poles                         117percent 
Austrians                                          86percent 
Spaniards                                         85percent 
Norwegians and Danes                     78percent 
Germans                                          67percent 
French                                              58percent 
Italians                                             45percent 
Belgians                                           44percent 
Swiss                                               40percent 
Americans                                        25percent’    
 
‘year    sentenced           Aliens                     percent 
1899        730                     47                       6.5 
1900        777                     28                       3.6 
1901        785                     32                       4 
1902        978                     68                       7’ 
(H
a
n
s
a
rd
, 
1
9
1
9
, 
c
o
l 
2
7
7
8
) 
 
Sir Ernest Wild (Con MP) 
‘You cannot be in the criminal Courts without realising what an enormous amount of the work of our 
Courts is caused by the aliens and by their crimes. I ask the House to draw no distinction between the 
crimes for which they are directly and indirectly responsible. It is very difficult to get figures. However, 
figures were given in the Royal Commission of 1902, which were quoted in the Debate when the Aliens 
Bill was passed. Figures were given that between 1899 and 1903, there were 1,731 offences against the 
person, 3,189 against property, 62 of forgery and coining, and 8,132 of other offences, including 
indecency, disorderly houses, and matters of that kind, all committed by aliens. That is a total of 13,114 
offences committed by aliens in the period of this four or five-years’ 
(E
v
a
n
s
-
G
o
rd
o
n
, 
1
9
0
3
) 
Inspector Hyder, Mr Johns 
Dickinson a magistrate at 
the Thames Police Court.  
‘…the foreign prostitution increased…and has driven the others away’ P 264-265 
 
Royal Commission on Alien 
Immigration report 1902. P 
‘As regard prostitution, the evidence shows that in certain parts of London there are a large number of 
foreign prostitutes. In the police returns given for the C Division, where there are the greatest number of 
foreign women of this class: 
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262- 263 London  
Year           British prostitutes          Foreign nationals  
1892                   256                                  150 
1902                   350                                   347 
 
Whitechapel Division  
 
Year           British prostitutes          Foreign nationals  
1892                  331                                13 
1901                 220                                 52 
  
‘Prostitution by itself is no offence, unless it is accompanied by solicitation or disorderly conduct, and that 
the evidence is to the effect that the foreign prostitute is generally far more sober than the English’  
 
N.J. Highmore, Senior 
Assistant Solicitor of the 
Inland Revenue at 
Somerset House. P 266-
268 
‘In five years ending in 1897, six convictions for keeping illicit stills were obtained in the East End of 
London. But between January 1, 1898 and December 8 1902 there had been 51 convictions of this 
offence – all obtained against foreign Jews’  
 
‘ the number of foreigners convicted in the Metropolitan area during the five years from 1898 to 1902 
inclusive, was:  
 
Offence       Foreign nationals                    English  
Clubs                       26                                    17 
Restaurants             56                                      2 
Shebeens                 2                                      18                                 
(only drink supplied)  
These were entirely unlicensed places …kept mainly by Italian and Jews. Some of them are kept by 
French, German and Poles’   
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(Evans-Gordon, 1903, p 
277-285) 
1.There is a large number of newcomers in the UK especially from Russia and Poland (the majority were 
Jews) 
 
2. The residency and the entrance of those immigrants who are from Eastern Europe in particular should 
be conditioned.  
 
3.Further regulations are needed to prevent the UK from ‘undesirable aliens and those who might be a 
burden on the British society  
 
4. The worst impact of foreign nationals is their overcrowding and gathering in particular areas in London. 
New Aliens should be relocated 
  
5. Special attention should focus on the criminality of foreign nationals and the impact of their 
connections with different criminal offences 
T
h
e
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(Evans-Gordon, 1903, p 
277-285) 
1.Certain classes of foreign nationals should be controlled  
2.A department of immigration should be established and do the following missions:  
- Made and enforced orders and regulations  
- Appointed sufficient staff of officers to apply and protect the immigration regulations  
- Gave the immigration officers staff that are checking the newcomers at arrival the power to report those 
who thing that are ‘undesirables’ to the immigration department 
3. The immigration department should check and react to those reports before a Court of Summary 
Jurisdiction reviewing these cases  
- Any foreign nationals who has been imprisoned two years before his arrival or ‘is reasonably supposed 
to be’ a criminal, prostitute, or living on the proceeds of prostitution, ill, have no source to support his 
living cost may be ordered by a court of Summary Jurisdiction to be deported 
4. Medical examination at arrival  
5. Refusing or giving wrong information at the entry port is an offence  
6. The overcrowded areas with foreign nationals or certain foreign nationals should be prohibited from 
new resettlement  
7. the registration at arrival is necessary 
8. Upon conviction of any felony or misdemeanour upon indictment, the Judge may recommend to deport 
that foreigners and the latter might punish as rogue or vagabond if he refused to do so.  
Source: (Evans-Gordon, 1903, Hansard, 1919) 
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Table 2.2 European imprisonment  rate  
Ranking  Title  Prison population total 
1 Russian Federation 644 237 
2 Turkey 176 268 
3 United Kingdom: England & Wales 85 982 
4 Poland 71 806 
5 Ukraine 70 417 
6 France 66 864 
7 Germany 61 906 
8 Spain 61 835 
9 Italy 52 636 
10 Belarus 29 000 
11 Romania 28 319 
12 Azerbaijan 22 526 
13 Czech Republic 20 829 
14 Hungary 18 424 
15 Portugal 14 238 
16 Greece 11 798 
17 Belgium 11 769 
18 Netherlands 11 603 
19 Serbia 10 500 
20 Georgia 10 236 
21 Slovakia 10 007 
22 Bulgaria 9 028 
23 Austria 8 188 
24 Lithuania 7 810 
25 Moldova (Republic of) 7 643 
26 United Kingdom: Scotland 7 464 
27 Switzerland 6 923 
28 Albania 5 455 
29 Sweden 5 400 
30 Latvia 4 745 
31 Armenia 3 880 
32 Norway 3 710 
33 Ireland, Republic of 3 647 
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34 Denmark 3 481 
35 Croatia 3 424 
36 Finland 3 105 
37 Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic of) 3 034 
38 Estonia 2 807 
39 Kosovo/Kosova 1 816 
40 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Federation 1 722 
41 Slovenia 1 511 
42 United Kingdom: Northern Ireland 1 443 
43 Montenegro 1 083 
44 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Republika Srpska 940 
45 Cyprus (Republic of) 811 
46 Luxembourg 631 
47 Malta 582 
48 Jersey (United Kingdom) 154 
49 Iceland 147 
50 Guernsey (United Kingdom) 83 
51 Isle of Man (United Kingdom) 80 
52 Andorra 55 
53 Gibraltar (United Kingdom) 52 
54 Monaco 28 
55 Faeroe Islands (Denmark) 11 
Source: The World Prison Brief 
 
 
Table 2.3 Ethnic Minority groups in national and prison population 
Ethnicity 2001 general population % 2001 prison 
population % 
2011 general population % 2011 Prison 
population % 
Census Aged 10+ Census aged 15+ 
White 92 95 90 86 89 74 
Mixed 1 1 - 2 1 4 
Asians 4 3 3 8 6 7 
Black 2 1 12 3 3 13 
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Others 1 1 3
25
 1 2 1 
Source: Census, April 2001, ONS, Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales 2011, ONS. Table A1.20 Offender Management Caseload Statistics 2011, MoJ; Mid-
2009 population estimates, ONS.  
 
 
Table 3.1 The level of cash support for qualifying asylum seekers 
Qualifying person  The cash level of support  
Couple (married or in a civil partnership) £72.52 
Lone parent aged 18 or over £43.94 
Single person aged 18 or over excluding lone parent £36.94 
Person aged at least 16, but under 18 (except a member of a qualifying couple) £39.80 
Person aged under 16 £36.94 
Single person aged 25 or over (excluding lone parents) decision to grant support was made prior to 5 
October 2009  
£42.62 
0-12 months infant  Extra £5 a week 
Pregnant woman (for healthy food) Extra £3 a week 
1-3 years toddlers  Extra £3 a week 
Source: (UK Visas and Imiigration (UKVI), 2014).  
 
 
Table 3.2: Enforced and voluntary removal by ‘medium harm’ assessment category 
Year Total  Medium harm 
2008/09 34920  18614 
2009/10 37746  25524 
2010/11 41264  28205 
2011/12 36859  18063 
Source: Table rv.08: Enforced removals and voluntary departures by harm assessment category  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Other includes Mixed 
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Table 5.1: Freedom of Information requests by the researcher  
Title To Sent Receive Status 
Crime committed by foreign nationals (ref: 15168) Home Office (by 
WDTK)  
8 June 2010 27 July 2010 Partially successful 
Foreign nationals arrested in London 2008-2012 MPS (by WDTK) - 1 August 
2014 
Successful 
British nationals arrested in the UK MPS (by WDTK) 20 March 2014 25 March 
2014 
Information not held 
British nationals arrested in London MPS (by WDTK) 25 March 2014 22 May 2014 Successful 
ref. 2014030002094: Why British nationals arrested for 
immigration crime 
MPS (by WDTK) 1 August  2014 5 August  
2014 
Information not held 
Ref. No: 2014080000310 what is the country of origin, 
ethnicity, and the other nationality of arrested British 
nationals for immigration crimes. 
MPS (by WDTK) 16 August 2014 28 August 
2014 
Refused  
Foreign nationals arrested by nationality questions in 
regards to previous FOI request 
MPS (by University 
email) 
March 19/ 2014 June 11/ 
2014 
Successful 
Muslims foreign national prisoners population in the UK MoJ November 4/ 
2011 
December 5/ 
2011 
Partially successful 
Muslims prisoner population MoJ March 14/ 2012 May 10/ 
2012 
Successful 
Foreign national prisoners by type of custody and 
sentence length 
MoJ March 5/ 2014 May 10/ 
2012 
Partially successful 
British nationals arrested MPS March 20/ 2014 August 1/ 
2014 
Successful 
ref. 2014030002094: Why British nationals are arrested 
for immigration crime 
MPS August 1/ 2014 August 28/ 
2014 
Refused 
Unrecorded nationality prisoners and the UKVI 
procedures 
Home Office August 17/ 2014 September 4/ 
2014 
Partially successful 
Asylum seeker and illegal immigrant prisoner by the 
type of crime 
MoJ August 29/ 2014 - Do not hold a national 
dataset. The request 
exceed the permitted 
expenses  
British prisoners by sentence length in E& W MoJ August 16/ 2014 September 9/ Successful 
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2014 
The reoffending rate, broken down by nationality, of 
released foreign offenders before deportation 
MoJ September 7/ 
2014 
- Waiting for internal 
review  
Non recorded prisoners Public Enquiries 
[NOMS] 
February 11/ 
2014 
 Referred  
Non recorded prisoners Data Access and 
Compliance Unit (MoJ) 
 June 11/ 
2014 
Successful 
Processing non- recorded nationality prisoner cases 
(30721) 
FOI Team/ Home 
Office 
February 13/ 
2014 
- Did not reply  (only 
acknowledgment email 
sent ) 
Arrest of foreign nationals by nationality questions in 
regards of previous FOI request 
MPS March 19/ 2014 June 
11/2014 
Successful 
Source: ‘What Do They know’ (WDTK) website and the researcher’s University email  
 
 
Table 5.2: the limited (unpublished) data of foreign nationals- CJS relationship  
Category Type of data Available variables 
S
to
p
 a
n
d
 s
e
a
rc
h
 
Stop and search foreign nationals at the individual and aggregate level  Ethnicity, age and 
gender 
Number of persons and vehicles searched under Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 by police force area, Section 
60 of the Criminal Justice and Public order Act 1994, Section 44 (1&2) Terrorism Act 2000 
self-defined ethnicity 
Number of arrests resulted from searches under Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 by police force area and 
Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public order Act 1994, 2009/10 
self-defined ethnicity 
Searches of vehicles and occupants under Section 44(1) and searches of pedestrians under Section 44(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 
and resultant arrests, by police force area, by ethnic appearance, 2008/09 
Ethnicity, and police 
force area 
Section 44(1) & (2) Searches, terror arrests and other arrests by police force area self-defined ethnicity 
and 
A
rr
e
s
t 
Arrest foreign nationals data in aggregate level  Ethnicity 
Persons arrested for notifiable offences by type of offence 2001/02 to 2011/12 Gender and age 
Persons arrested for notifiable offences by police force area, 2009/10 to 2011/12  Gender, age and 
ethnicity 
Number and proportion of persons arrested for recorded crime (notifiable offences) by police force area 2008/09 and 2009/10  self-defined ethnicity 
Recorded committed crimes by Foreign nationals ( Khamael Al-Faris FOI 15168/ 2010) self-defined ethnicity 
c
o
u
rt
 
Annual sentenced offenders by nationality - 
Persons sentenced for indictable offences at magistrates' courts by outcome, offence group Ethnicity 
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Persons tried for indictable offences at the Crown Court by outcome, and police force area Ethnic appearance 
Number of persons cautioned for notifiable offences by police force area  Ethnicity , age 
R
e
c
e
p
ti
o
n
 i
n
to
 
p
ri
s
o
n
 
Convicted un sentenced reception into prison by offence group  Gender , age 
Reception into prison by nationality (Available by nationality  only between 2004-2010) Ethnicity and gender 
Reception into prison by type of custody, sentence length, and offence group   Gender, age 
First reception into prison by type of custody  gender 
Receptions of fine defaulters into prison establishments by offence group gender 
Convicted un-sentenced receptions into prison establishments by offence group gender 
Receptions of prisoners on indeterminate sentences by type of sentence gender 
P
ri
s
o
n
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Month end population in prison 2000- 2009 30 June  Gender 
Population in prison  establishments under sentence at 30th June 2007 and 2008 by sentence length and number of previous 
convictions and cautions 
Gender 
Population in prison establishments by type of custody and offence group (2008 available by nationality)  Gender, ethnicity 
Population in prison establishments by, custody type, length of sentence, Ethnicity, age and 
gender 
Population of indeterminate sentenced prisoners by type of prisoner/ or type of sentence Gender 
Immediate custodial sentenced population in prison establishments by sentence length and offence group  Gender and age 
Population in prison establishments under sentence by offence group  age and gender 
F
o
re
ig
n
 
n
a
ti
o
n
a
ls
 a
n
d
 
im
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 
c
ri
m
e
 
Type of crimes committed by the Asylum seekers (criminal offences and illegal working) - 
Population in prison establishments under immediate custodial sentence by number of previous convictions and cautions  Gender and  age 
S
u
p
e
rv
is
io
n
 p
re
-
re
le
a
s
e
 
Pre-release supervision orders commencements, England and Wales, 2008 to 2012 self-identified ethnicity 
Proportion of offenders who re-offend and average number of re-offences per re-offender by ethnic appearance, England and Wales, 
2007 to 2011 
self-identified ethnicity 
Percentage of persons starting court order supervision by the Probation Service, 2012 self-defined ethnic 
group 
Source, MoJ  
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Table 5.3: The collected and available data from different government institutions  
Category Type of data Source Time 
F
o
re
ig
n
 n
a
ti
o
n
a
ls
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Estimated population resident in the UK, by nationality/ foreign nationality APS/ LFS, ONS Jan-Dec. 2008-2012 
Estimated population resident in the UK, by country of birth/ foreign country of birth APS/ LFS, ONS Jan-Dec. 2008-2012 
Top five common nationalities  APS/ LFS, ONS Jan-Dec. 2008-2012 
LC2208EW - Passports held by country of birth ONS 2011 
Distribution of non-UK passports held in the usual resident population by English region 
and Wales; 2001 LFS and 2011 Census 
2001 LFS and, 2011 Census of 
England and Wales 
- 
Country of birth and passport held for all usual residents of England and Wales, 2011 2011 Census of England and 
Wales 
- 
The annual asylum seekers inflow the population of immigration detainee in England and 
wales 
ONS, MoJ, and  FOI request to 
MPS 
1993-2012 
Top ten asylum seekers population MoJ 1999-Q1 2013 
Subsidies for asylum seekers  UKVI - 
Estimated Resident Population of the UK by Most Common Non-British Nationality,
  
ONS 2004-2011 
Estimated Resident Population by Non-UK Country of Birth and Non-British Nationality for 
Scotland, Wales and NI.  
ONS (report) ‘Population by 
Country of Birth and Nationality 
Report, August 2012’ 
2004-2011 
Foreign nationals arrested (NI)  NISRS (FOI) 2006-2010 
Foreign nationals arrested (London) MPS (FOI) 2008-2012 
British Nationals arrested (London)  (FOI Reference No: 
2014030002094) Khamael Al-
Faris 47420 
2008-2013 
A
rr
e
s
t,
 s
e
n
te
n
c
e
d
, 
a
n
d
 
p
ri
s
o
n
 r
e
c
e
p
ti
o
n
 
Untried reception and immediate custodial sentenced receptions into prison 
establishment by nationality and ethnic groups  
MoJ 1993-2009 
The population of non-criminal and fine defaulter breaking by nationality MoJ 1999-2012 
Prison population by the type of prisoner breaking by nationality MoJ 1999-2012 
FNPs by type of custody and sentence length  FOI 88548 (Khamael Al-Faris) 
(Sentenced type unavailable prior 
2002) 
1997-2013 
Population in prison  by nationality and ethnicity MoJ 1993-2013 
 
Population in prison  by nationality and ethnicity, type of prisoner, offence group  and sex MoJ 2008 
P
ri
s
o
n
 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 Population in prison establishments by ethnic group, type of prisoner, sex and nationality
   
MoJ 1999 & 2006-2009 
Population in prison under sentence by ethnic group, nationality, offence and sex  1999-2000 & 2003- 2012 
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MoJ, FOI 70025 
Top ten largest nationalities of FNPs MoJ 1999-2013 
Population in prison under immediate custodial sentences by type of offence and 
nationality  
MoJ, FOI 70025. MoJ (JSAS FOI 
75790) 
1999-2012 
prison population by self-identified ethnicity and type of offence MoJ 2009-2012 
Number of committed violent and property crimes HO  
Recorded crimes and offenders for the Violence Against The Person (VITP), property 
crimes, and Theft and Handling by nationality 
 
MoJ and FOI 
1991-2011 
VATP, sexual, robbery, burglary, hand and theft, fraud and forgery, motoring offence and 
drugs offenders by nationality  and ethnicity  
 
MoJ 
2000-2011 
by ethnicity 2004-2011 
O
ff
e
n
c
e
 
g
ro
u
p
 b
y
 
n
a
ti
o
n
a
lit
y
 
 
Muslims prisoners population by nationality  FOI 75790 (Khamael Al-Faris) & 
FOI 73257 
2002-2011 
Muslims Foreign national prisoners population in the UK by establishment FOI 73257 Khamael Al Faris 2011 
Number of Muslim foreign national prisoners by offence type and sentence length FOI 73257 2011 
FNPs discharged from determinate sentences by offence group  JSAS (MoJ - FOI 73215) 2001-2011 
M
u
s
li
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
th
e
r 
d
a
ta
 
Offenders eligible for removal under the TERS scheme by nationality   MoJ (JSAS FOI 77617) 2012 
Enforced and voluntary removal by ‘medium harm’ assessment category UKVI/ HO 2009-2012 
Source: MoJ, Home Office, ONS, and FOI  
 
 
Table 6.1A Total annual foreign nationals arrested in NI from 2006-2010  
Data category  Year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total annual arrest  4883 6174 7281 7145 6611 
The annual growth % - 26 18 (49)
26
 -2 -7 (-9)
26
 
APS of foreign national population
27
 32000 51000 51000 63000 60000 
Representation % 15 12 14 11 11 
APS of foreign born population 77000 95000 100000 100000 99000 
Representation % 6 6 7 7 7 
Source: FOI (F-2011-00331), and APS 2004-2012 ONS.  
 
                                                 
26
 Numbers between brackets refer to the annual growth in the first two years (2006-2008) and last two years (2008-2010) of the table. 
27
 Estimated Resident Population by Non-UK Country of Birth and Non-British Nationality for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 2004-2012 (ONS) 
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Table 6.1B: Foreign nationals arrested in NI per crime from 2006-2010 
Crime Type Year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Murder 14 12 11 12 6 
Rape 32 44 36 38 58 
All sexual 42 38 67 71 81 
All violent 513 706 896 1024 1053 
Robbery 39 39 41 60 64 
Burglary 177 230 303 316 297 
Other total crimes 4066 5105 5927 5624 5052 
Source: FOI (F-2011-00331), and ONS: Table 6: Detailed Migration, Northern Ireland, 2000-2012. 
 
 
Table 6.2A: Foreign nationals arrested for specified areas in London, April 2008- December 2012 
Annual arrest  Year 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Grand total  37560 72434 81673  74786 68428  
Arrest annual growth % - 93 13 (117)
28
 -9 -9 (-16)
28
 
Foreign nationals population in London
29
  1577000 1625000 1663000 1777000 1763000 
Representation % 2 4 5 4 4 
Source: FOI, and APS/ ONS.  
 
 
Table 6.2B: foreign nationals arrested in London only per crime from April 2008-31
st
 December 2012 
 
Crime type 
Year 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Murder 47 175 88 82 74 
Rape 297 636 785 795 644 
                                                 
28
 Numbers between brackets refer to the annual growth in the first two years (2008-2010) and last two years (2010-2012) of the table. 
29
 Estimated population resident in the United Kingdom, by nationality January to December 2008- 2012. Source: APS/ LFS, ONS 
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All sexual 672 1592 1902 1503 1422 
All violent 7748 15390 17975 16269 15905 
Robbery 644 1627 1773 1883 1616 
Burglary 941 1805 2640 2446 2170 
Other offences 26794 50571 56764 51357 46867 
Source: FOI (Directorate Of Information Reporting Services, 2013) 
 
 
Table 6.3A: Total British arrested in London from April 2008- December 2013 
Annual arrest Year 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Grand total 196951 227689 215165 197659 172583 164860 
annual arrest growth % - 16 -6 -8 -13 -5 
British Londoners
30
 5044000 6061000 5136000 6030000 6122000 - 
Representation % 4 4 4 3 3 - 
Source: (Metropolitan Police Services, 2014), and ONS.  
 
Table 6.3B: British nationals arrested in London only per crime from April 2008-31
st
 December 2013 
Crime type Year 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Murder 
31
 1879 2501 2340 1892 1747 1849 
Rape
32
 1319 1690 1698 1615 1356 1321 
All sexual 1526 2071 1916 1899 1718 1703 
All violent
33
 15933 21462 21060 18935 18065 17534 
                                                 
30
 Estimated population resident in the UK, by nationality January to December, ONS. 
31
 Includes: Murder, murder attempt, murder conspiracy, and murder threat 
32
 Includes: Rape, rape attempted and rape conspiracy 
33
 Recorded under common assault and common assault racial  
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Robbery 
34
 7644 9364 10103 10137 7867 6310 
Burglary
35
 7789 10430 9304 10276 8632 7484 
Other offences
36
 6908 6603 8539 8105 7863 7652 
Grand total 196951 227689 215165 197659 172583 164860 
Source: (Metropolitan Police Services, 2014)   
                                                 
34
 Includes: robbery business (attempt, racial, and conspiracy), robbery personal (attempt, racial, and conspiracy 
35
 Includes: Burglary dwelling (attempt, conspiracy, and racial) and burglary non-dwelling (attempt and conspiracy) 
36
 Include: other, other non-notifiable, other notifiable    
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Table 6.4A1: Top ten nationalities arrested in London comparing to their general population in London
37
 April 2008- December 
2012  
Category  2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2011 % 2012 % 
Arrest rate (1) Poland 4086 11
38
 Poland 7232  10 Poland 8132  10 Poland 7980  11 Poland 7475  11 
General population 110000  4 110000  7 124000  7 145000  6 143000  5 
Arrest rate (2) Romania 2201  6 Romania 4958  7 Romania 6396  8 Romania 6787  9 Romania 7383  11 
General population 25000 9 37000  13 42000  15 48000 14 57000  13 
Arrest rate (3) Jamaica 1957 5 Lithuania 3768  5 Lithuania 4521  5 Lithuania 4373  6 Lithuania 4087  6 
General population 25000  8 38000  10 33000   14 56000  8 45000  9 
Arrest rate (4) Nigeria 1902 5 Nigeria 3608  5 India 4015  5 India 3460  5 India 3147  4 
General population 54000  4 52000  7 117000  3 117000  3 143000  2 
Arrest rate (5) Lithuania 1845  5 Jamaica 3334  5 Nigeria 3983  5 Nigeria 3309  4 Nigeria 2798  4 
General population 32000  6 24000  14 48000  8 53000  6 46000  6 
Arrest rate (6) India 1444  4 India 3138  4 Jamaica 3549  4 Jamaica 2997  4 Jamaica 2538  3 
General population 88000  2 93000  3 22000  16 28000  11 28000  9 
Arrest rate (7) Somalia 1232 3 Somalia 2368  3 Somalia 2667  3 Somalia 2403  3 Irish 2158  3 
General population 43000  3 32000  7 30000  9 26000  9 93000  2 
Arrest rate (8) Irish 1087 3 Irish 2244  3 Irish 2538  3 Irish 2232  3 Portugal 2085  3 
General population 102000  1 105000 2 106000  2 108000  2 52000  4 
Arrest rate (9) China 1066  3 Portugal 2054  3 Portugal 2220  3 Portugal 2147 3 Somalia 2018  3 
General population 24000  4 53000  4 41000  5 51000 4 25000 8 
Arrest rate (10) Portugal 1051  3 China 1924  3 Pakistan 2046  2 Pakistan 1970  3 Pakistan 1994  3 
General population 44000  2 21000  9 39000  5 40000 5 42000 5 
Total annual arrest  37560 - 72434 - 81673 - 74786 - 68428 - 
Source : FOI.  (Directorate Of Information Reporting Services, 2013), APS, ONS.   
 
 
Table 6.4A2: Top ten nationalities arrested in London according to their population in their population  
Year  1
st 
 2
nd
  3
rd 
 4
th 
 5
th 
 6
th 
 7
th 
 8
th 
 9
th 
 10
th
 
2008 Romania Jamaica Lithuania  China Poland Nigeria  Somalia  Portugal  India  Irish  
2009 Jamaica  Romania Lithuania China Poland Nigeria Somalia Portugal India  Irish  
2010 Jamaica  Romania Lithuania Somalia Nigeria Poland Pakistan Portugal India  Irish  
2011 Romania Jamaica Somalia Lithuania Nigeria Poland Pakistan Portugal India  Irish  
2012 Romania Jamaica Lithuania  Somalia Nigeria Poland Pakistan Portugal India  Irish  
Source : Adapted from table 6.4A1 
                                                 
37
 Population by nationality, London  January - December 2004, 2008- 2013. Greater London Authority, APS, ONS. 
38
 Percentage of the total foreign nationals arrested in London  
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Table 6.4B: Foreign nationals’ population from EU and the rest of the world in E&W and the UK 2004-2013 
Year EU Foreign nationals Foreign nationals from the rest of 
the world  27
39
  14
40
  8
41
  2
42
 
UK E&W UK E&W UK E&W UK E&W UK E&W 
2004 1094 - 951 - 125 - - - 1852 - 
2005 1198 - 945 - 233 - - - 2000 - 
2006 1403 - 981 - 404 - - - 2191 - 
2007 1588 - 971 - 567 - 33 - 2354 - 
2008 1736 1578
43
 975 895 677 603 64 - 2433 2308 
2009 1858 1689 1006 931 745 654 88 - 2486 2336 
2010 2003 1808 1038 950 829 728 119 - 2457 2317 
2011 2283 2070 1091 1021 1038 911 135 - 2489 2349 
2012 2343 2115 1092 994 1074 956 155 - 2509 2351 
2013 2507 2269 1168 1081 1148 1002 177 173 2394 2268 
Source: ONS  
( -)  = Not applicable  
 
 
Table 6.5A: Untried receptions into prison establishment by nationality 1993-2009
44
  
Year Total reception British reception % foreign reception % Unrecorded nationality 
1993 53565 49964 93 3286 6 N/A 
1994 57079 53005 93 3820 7 N/A 
1995 55287 51269 93 3731 7 N/A 
1996 58888 54778 93 3914 7 N/A 
1997 62066 57440 93 4163 7 N/A 
1998 64697 59494 92 4906 8 N/A 
1999 64572 59456 92 4772 7 0 
                                                 
39 Includes countries in the EU14, EU8, EU2, Malta, Cyprus, and Croatia from July 1/ 2013 
40 Includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Spain and Sweden. 
41 Includes the Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
42 Includes Romania and Bulgaria Joined EU in 2007  
43 From 2008 Includes 26 EU nationalities only (the EU14, EU A8, Malta and Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania). Table 2.1: Estimated population resident in the 
United Kingdom, by nationality. ONS  
44
 This is the only information the research could get from the Ministry of Justice publications.  
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2000 54892 49363 90 4994 9 0 
2001 53467 47184 88 5666 11 0 
2002 58708 51624 88 6326 11 0 
2003 58696 51333 87 6623 11 0 
2004 54556 46845 86 7176 13 535 
2005 55455 46575 84 8346 15 534 
2006 55809 46092 83 9215 17 502 
2007 55305 44056 80 10739 19 510 
2008 57417 45687 80 11176 19 554 
2009 55207 42655 77 11268 20 1284 
% 3 -15 -1
45
 243 8
45
 140 
Source: MoJ 
 
 
Table 6.5B: Untried prisoner population by nationality 1999-2012  
Year Total prison population Untried % Of total prisoners 
Foreign  British  Foreign  British  Foreign  British  
1999 5388 59074 760 7169 14 12 
2000 5587 59043 880 5928 16 10 
2001 6926 58732 905 5343 13 9 
2002 7719 62564 966 6282 13 10 
2003 8912 63614 1150 6004 13 9 
2004 8942 64379 1284 5627 14 9 
2005 9651 65670 1496 6058 16 9 
2006 10879 66160 1532 5919 14 9 
2007 11093 67767 1747 6016 16 9 
2008 11498 70751 1654 6424 14 9 
2009 11350 71231 1711 6552 15 9 
2009
46
 11467 70898 1704 6675 15 9 
2010 11135 71016 1739 6074 16 9 
2011 10779 73030 1757 6170 16 8 
2012 10861 73238 1555 5656 14 8 
% 102 24 105 -21 6
47
 -2
47
 
Source: MoJ 
 
                                                 
45
 These percentages refer to the annual growth of untried prisoners receptions for 16 years from 1993 to 2009. 
46
  The 2009 figures from both the old and new prison IT systems have been presented to aid comparison for the whole table parts. 
47
 These percentages refer to the annual growth of untried prisoners for 13 years from 1999 to 2012, excluding the new 2009 IT records. 
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Table 6.5C: Comparison between untried reception and untried prison population by nationality 1999-2009 
Year 
Total untried British 
reception 
Total untried British 
prisoners 
% 
Total untried foreign 
reception 
Total untried FNPs % 
1999 59456 7169 12 4772 760 16 
2000 49363 5928 12 4994 880 18 
2001 47184 5343 11 5666 905 16 
2002 51624 6282 12 6326 966 15 
2003 51333 6004 12 6623 1150 17 
2004 46845 5627 12 7176 1284 18 
2005 46575 6058 13 8346 1496 18 
2006 46092 5919 13 9215 1532 17 
2007 44056 6016 14 10739 1747 16 
2008 45687 6424 14 11176 1654 15 
2009 42655 6552 15 11268 1711 15 
% -28 -9 -1 136 125 8 
Source: Adapted from tables 6.5A & B 
 
 
Table 6.6: Convicted un-sentenced prisoners by nationality 1999-2012  
Year Total prison population Total convicted un-
sentenced 
Convicted un-sentenced % of their total prisoner 
Foreign  British Foreign  British Foreign British 
1999 5388 59074 
4651 
272 4379 
5 
7 
2000 5587 59043 4184 259 3925 5 7 
2001 6926 58732 4227 389 3838 6 7 
2002 7719 62564 5166 455 4711 6 8 
2003 8912 63614 5127 532 4595 6 7 
2004 8942 64379 4738 575 4163 6 6 
2005 9651 65670 4723 775 3948 8 6 
2006 10879 66160 4958 862 4096 8 6 
2007 11093 67767 4429 718 3711 6 5 
2008 11498 70751 4648 754 3894 7 6 
2009 11350 71231 4491 674 3817 6 5 
2009 new 11467 70898 4464 645 3819 6 5 
2010 11135 71016 4259 760 3499 7 5 
2011 10779 73030 4018 605 3413 6 5 
2012 10861 73238 3534 518 3016 5 4 
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% 102 24 -24 90 -31 5
48
 -3
48
 
Source: MoJ 
 
 
Table 6.7A: Immediate custodial sentenced receptions into the prison establishment by nationality from 1993-2009  
Year Total 
reception 
Total British 
sentenced reception 
% Total foreign sentenced  
reception 
% Unrecorded 
ethnicity 
Unrecorded 
nationality 
1993 50563 43628 86 2218 4 0 105 
1994 61188 52552 86 2746 4 1 123 
1995 69016 58498 85 3405 5 12 155 
1996 74306 70507 95 3671 5 17 128 
1997 80832 76321 94 4167 5 8 344 
1998 85908 80772 94 4895 6 3 241 
1999 90238 85126 94 4927 5 4 185 
2000 91195 85712 94 5237 6 5 246 
2001 90523 84217 93 6026 7 5 280 
2002 93615 86114 92 7018 7 3 483 
2003 92245 84251 91 7482 8 NA 512 
2004 93326 84579 91 8355 9 37 392 
2005 90414 80418 90 9612 11 6 384 
2006 88134 77975 88 9832 11 8 327 
2007 90261 79193 88 10737 12 8 331 
2008 98820 86354 87 12136 12 4 330 
2009 93621 79763 85 12408 13 3 1450 
% 85 83 4
49
 459 11
49
 - 1281 
Source: MoJ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 These percentages refer to the annual growth of convicted un-sentenced prisoners for 13 years from 1999 to 2012. 
49
 These percentages refer to the annual growth of ICSR into prison for 16 years from 1993-2009. 
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Table 6.7B: Sentenced prisoner population by nationality 1999-2012  
Year Prison population Sentenced 
50
 
Foreign British Foreign % British % 
1999 5388 59074 3864 72 47377 80 
2000 5587 59043 3919 70 49059 83 
2001 6926 58732 4576 66 49471 84 
2002 7719 62564 5617 73 51462 82 
2003 8912 63614 6281 70 52882 83 
2004 8942 64379 6256 70 54453 85 
2005 9651 65670 6509 67 55497 85 
2006 10879 66160 7284 67 55956 85 
2007 11093 67767 7488 68 57880 85 
2008 11498 70751 7682 67 60275 85 
2009 11350 71231 7502 66 60716 85 
2009
51
 11467 70898 7418 68 54575 79 
2010 11135 71016 7554 68 56439 79 
2011 10779 73030 7346 69 57914 81 
2012 10861 73238 7526 67 59200 80 
% 102 24 95 5
52
 25 2
52
 
Source: MoJ 
 
 
Table 6.7C: Immediate custodial sentenced receptions and prison population by nationality 1999-2009  
Year 
Total British sentenced 
receptions 
Total sentenced British % 
Total sentenced foreign 
receptions 
Total sentenced foreigners  % 
1999 85126 47377 56 4927 3864 78 
2000 85712 49059 57 5237 3919 75 
2001 84217 49471 59 6026 4576 76 
2002 86114 51462 60 7018 5617 80 
2003 84251 52882 63 7482 6281 84 
2004 84579 54453 64 8355 6256 75 
                                                 
50
   Sentenced - held in custody as a result of receiving a sentence in a criminal court; persons committed in default of payment of a fine are normally included in 
this group. Immediate custodial sentenced numbers do not include fine defaulters. OFFENDER MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS (2006). Offender  Management  
Caseload Statistics  2005 UK Home Office p, 76. This does include immediate custodial sentenced prisoners.   
51
  The 2009 figures from both the old and new prison IT systems have been presented to aid comparison. 
52
 These percentages refer to the annual growth of Immediate custodial sentenced prisoners into prison for 13 years from 1993 to 2012, excluding the 2009 new 
IT records. 
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2005 80418 55497 69 9612 6509 68 
2006 77975 55956 72 9832 7284 74 
2007 79193 57880 73 10737 7488 70 
2008 86354 60275 70 12136 7682 63 
2009 79763 60716 76 12408 7502 60 
% -6 28 - 152 94 - 
Source: Ministry of Justice  
 
Table 6.8A: Prison population by nationality, 1993-2013 
Year  Total  British Foreigner  Immigrants’ detainees Unrecorded   % Foreign prisoners  
1993 44246 40264 3982 NA NA 9 
1994 48879 44886 3993 NA NA 8 
1995 49073 46607 2466 NA 388 5 
1996 55256 50682 4574 519 315 8 
1997 61467 56611 4677 476 179 8 
1998 65727 60393 5133 477 201 8 
1999 64529 59074 5388 490 67 8 
2000 65194 59043 5587 524 565 9 
2001 66403 58732 6926 1081 745 10 
2002 71218 62553 7716 759 946 11 
2003 72286 62417 8912 1079 1141 12 
2004 74488 64379 8942 957 1168 12 
2005 76190 65670 9651 996 869 13 
2006 77982 66160 10879 1366 944 14 
2007 79734 67767 11093 1218 874 14 
2008 83194 70751 11498 1473 946 14 
2009 83454 71231 11350 1465 874 14 
2010 85002 71016 11135 963 2851 13 
2011 85374 73030 10779 633 1565 13 
2012 86048 73238 10861 730 1949 13 
2013 83842 72179 10786 832 877 13 
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% 89 79 171 60 126 5
53
 
Source: MoJ, and  (Ministry of Justice, 2014a).  
 
Table 6.8B: The population of non-criminal prisoners by nationality 1999-2012  
Year Total prison 
population 
British National Foreign National 
Detainees
54
 Fine defaulter Detainees Fine defaulter FNPs Foreign   
offenders 
%Foreign offenders 
of total prison pop. 
1999 64529 57 92 490 2 5388 4896 8 
2000 65194 51 80 525 4 5587 5058 8 
2001 66403 41 39 1054 2 6926 5870 9 
2002 71218 78 1 675 4 7716 7039 10 
2003 72286 107 1 944 6 8912 7962 11 
2004 74488 106 1 819 8 8942 8115 11 
2005 76190 108 1 857 13 9651 8781 12 
2006 77982 121 0 1188 12 10879 9679 12 
2007 79734 57 1 1135 5 11093 9953 12 
2008 83194 66 1 1390 17 11498 10091 12 
2009 83454 58 1 1439 24 11350 9887 12 
2010 85002 43 6 913 17 11135 9616 11 
2011 85374 30 8 881 20 10779 9849 12 
2012 86048 27 13 1094 15 10861 9960 12 
% 89 -53 -86 123 650 102 103 6
55
 
Source: MoJ  
 
Table 6.8C: Foreign national offender by time served and detention after in the prison    
Year  Becoming time served Time served detained 
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2011/2012 2012/13 2013/14 
Q1 (Apr - Jun) 1079 1242 1208 1467 1410 1271 
Q2 (Jul - Sept) 1149 1309 1206 1409 1466 1277 
Q3 (Oct - Dec) 1099 1211 1152 1396 1333 1319 
Q4 (Jan - Mar) 1234 1308 - 1403 1367 - 
Source: (UK Visas and Imiigration, 2014) 
                                                 
53
 This percentage refers to the annual growth of FNPs for 20 years from 1993 to 2013 
54
 Detainees for immigration crimes: not all British nationals (overseas) have the right to enter, live and work freely in the UK, like British overseas territories 
citizens from Hong Kong who are controlled under immigration regulation GOV.UK (2014). Types of British nationality London https://www.gov.uk/,  
55
 This percentage refers to the annual growth of foreign national offenders for 13 years from 1999 to 2012 
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Table 6.9: Prison population broken down by nationality and ethnic group 1993-2012 
 
Year 
White Mixed Asian Black Chinese 
56
 Not stated Unrecorded ethnicity  
Unrecorded nationality FN* BN** FN BN FN BN FN BN FN BN FN BN FN BN 
1993 1206 34944 NA NA 622 730 1137 3585 481 532 NA NA NA 4 1005 
1994 1281 39241 NA NA 593 747 1351 4237 550 526 NA NA 6 10 337 
1995
57
 1376 40565 NA NA 636 849 1414 4542 659 637 NA NA 4 14 388 
1996 1389 43416 NA NA 661 979 1436 5525 769 741 NA NA 4 21 315 
1997 1515 48526 NA NA 637 1223 1623 5946 899 890 NA NA 3 26 179 
1998 1710 51815 NA NA 643 1363 1721 6227 1059 976 NA NA NA 14 201 
1999 1734 50598 NA NA 633 1293 1886 6074 1133 1086 NA NA 2 23 67 
2000 1749 50473 NA NA 534 1288 2068 6091 1228 1165 NA NA 7 26 565 
2001 1946 49919 NA NA 598 1352 2868 6191 1508 1227 NA NA 6 43 745 
2002 2006 52449 NA NA 555 1519 3870 6933 1283 1519 NA NA 4 59 946 
2003 2088 51697 NA NA 695 1606 4362 7320 1578 1719 NA NA 4 74 1132 
2004 2422 48622 340 1477 1214 2549 3766 6093 475 191 38 173 3 74 1167 
2005 2789 53645 372 1746 1551 2929 4197 6750 655 168 62 177 5 36 869 
2006 3200 53494 401 1864 1854 3159 4582 6997 757 157 63 230 5 53 944 
2007 3150 54651 389 2016 1860 3332 4644 7190 971 162 53 215 11 45 874 
2008 3343 56370 403 2248 2009 3707 4539 7828 1120 203 60 220 8 27 946 
2009 3567 56497 367 2435 2065 3849 4086 7782 1211 189 43 114 2 8 874 
2009 
58
 3547 55462 374 2488 2106 3897 4162 7752 1229 181 40 114 4 42 1026 
2010 3705 55462 404 2488 1970 3897 3705 7647 987 181 24 83 340 1257 2851 
2011 3905 56894 377 2683 1969 4121 3302 7617 739 157 25 106 487 1452 1565 
2012 3921 56631 381 2723 1963 4228 3312 7756 750 183 28 108 534 1609 1949 
% 225 62 12 84 216 479 191 116 56 -190 -35 -38 8800 40125 94 
Source: Ministry of Justice   
*=Foreign nationals, **=British national 
 
 
 
                                                 
56
 From 1995-2003 the classification was Chinese and other  
57
 1995-2003 Asians was classifying as south Asians and it may differ from the later classification in 2004 
58
 New prison IT system changed in 2009 the both old and new data systems have been presented to aid comparison  
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Table 6.10: The top ten largest foreign nationalities in prison from 1999-2013  
Year 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 6
th
 7
th
 8
th
 9
th
 10
th
 
1999 Jamaica 
858 
Irish 727 Pakistan 
351 
India 231 Netherlands 
222 
Nigeria 211 Turkey 190 Colombia 
121 
Ghana 116 Germany 115 
2000 Jamaica 
1062 
Irish 671 Pakistan 
293 
Netherland 
209 
Turkey 196 India 190 Nigeria 184 Colombia 
118 
Somalia 116 Spain 116 
2001 Jamaica 
1699 
Irish 689 Pakistan 
372 
Turkey 225 Nigeria 221 India 209 Netherlands 
203 
Somalia 146 S. Africa 130 Spain 125 
2002 Jamaica 
2583 
Irish 663 Pakistan 
314 
Nigeria 
265 
Turkey 217 Netherlands 
204 
India 185 S. Africa 170 Somalia 156 Serbia & 
Montenegro 114 
2004
59
 
Jamaica 
2493 
Irish 658 Nigeria 
399 
Pakistan 
367 
Turkey 252 India 231 Netherlands 
220 
Somalia 220 Iraq 156 Bangladesh & 
China 144 
2005
60
 
Jamaica 
1486 
Nigeria 
859 
Irish 727 Pakistan 
416 
Turkey 292 Somalia 284 India 253 Iraq 240 Ghana 212 China 201 
2006 Jamaica 
1422 
Nigeria 
945 
Irish 719 Pakistan 
428 
Somalia 339 China 320 India 278 Iraq 276 Turkey 255 Poland 243 
2007 Jamaica 
1374 
Nigeria 
1028 
Irish 638 Vietnam 
437 
Pakistan 389 China 374 Somalia 344 Poland 320 India 285 Iraq 257 
2008
61
 
Jamaica 
1657 
Nigeria 
1902 
Irish 1087 Vietnam 
296 
China 1066 Poland 4086 Somalia 
1232 
Pakistan 
8366 
India 1444 Iraq 362 
2008  Jamaica 
1176 
Nigeria 
1002 
Irish 657 Vietnam 
494 
China 454 Poland 450 Somalia 445 Pakistan 393 India 343 Iraq 283 
2009 Jamaica 
3334 
Nigeria 
3608 
Irish 2244 Vietnam 
562 
Poland 7232 China 1924 Pakistan 
1668 
Somalia 
2368 
India 3138 Romania 4958 
2009 Jamaica 
1055 
Nigeria 
765 
Irish 627 Vietnam 
564 
Poland 523 China 479 Pakistan 457 Somalia 441 India 344 Romania 327 
2010 Jamaica 
3546 
Nigeria 
3983 
Irish 2538 Poland 
8132 
Vietnam 638 Pakistan 2047 Somalia 
2667 
Romania 
6396 
China 1831 Lithuania 4521 
2010  Jamaica 
942 
Nigeria 
727 
Irish 681 Poland 642 Vietnam 596 Pakistan 440 Somalia 433 Romania 
380 
China 364 Lithuania 361 
2011 Jamaica 
2997 
Irish 
2223 
Poland 
7980 
Nigeria 
3309 
Pakistan 
1970 
Romania 
6787 
Vietnam 529 Lithuania 
4373 
Somalia 
2403 
India 3460 
2011  Jamaica 
837 
Irish 736 Poland 722 Nigeria 
614 
Pakistan 498 Romania 473 Vietnam 472 Lithuania 
428 
Somalia 417 India 364 
2012 Jamaica 
2538 
Poland 
7475 
Irish 2158 Nigeria 
2798 
Romania 
7383 
Pakistan 1994 Lithuania 
4087 
India 3,147 Somalia 
2018 
Vietnam 452 
                                                 
59
 The prison population in 2004 as in January unlike other years in 30
th
 June 
60
 As 30 September unlike other years 30 June  
61
 Arrest data for the top 10 prison nationalities are bold typing from 2008-2012 
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2012 Jamaica 
900 
Poland 
750 
Irish 737 Nigeria 
594 
Romania 
541 
Pakistan 472 Lithuania 
462 
India 426 Somalia 410 Vietnam 396 
2013  Poland 829 Irish 769 Jamaica 
759 
Romania 
608 
Nigeria 534 Pakistan 517 India 509 Lithuania 
462 
Somalia 408 Vietnam 341 
Source: Ministry of Justice and FOI request to the Metropolitan police. 
 
 
 
Table 6.11: Top ten nationalities arrested in London comparing to their population in prison April 2008- December 2012  
Category  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Arrest rate (1) Poland 4086 Poland 7232 Poland 8132 Poland 7980 Poland 7475 
Prison population
62
 450 (6) 523 (5) 642 (4) 722 (3) 750 (2) 
Arrest rate (2) Romania 2201 Romania 4958 Romania 6396 Romania 6787 Romania 7383 
Prison population 193 (17) 327 (10) 380 (8) 473 (6) 541 (5) 
Arrest rate (3) Jamaica 1957 Lithuania 3768 Lithuania 4521 Lithuania 4373 Lithuania 4087 
Prison population 1,002 (2) 308 (11) 361 (10) 428 (8) 462 (7) 
Arrest rate (4) Nigeria 1902 Nigeria 3608 India 4015 India 3460 India 3147 
Prison population 237 (11) 765 (2) 329 (11) 364 (10) 426 (8) 
Arrest rate (5) Lithuania 1845 Jamaica 3334 Nigeria 3983 Nigeria 3309 Nigeria 2798 
Prison population 1,176 (1) 1,055 (1) 727 (2) 614 (4) 594 (4) 
Arrest rate (6) India 1444 India 3138 Jamaica 3549 Jamaica 2997 Jamaica 2538 
Prison population 343 (9) 344 (9) 942 (1) 837 (1) 900 (1) 
Arrest rate (7) Somalia 1232 Somalia 2368 Somalia 2667 Somalia 2403 Irish 2158 
Prison population 445 (7) 441 (8) 433 (7) 417 (9) 373 (3) 
Arrest rate (8) Irish 1087 Irish 2244 Irish 2538 Irish 2232 Portugal 2085 
Prison population 657 (3) 627 (3) 681 (3) 736 (2) 220 (11) 
Arrest rate (9) China 1066 Portugal 2054 Portugal 2220 Portugal 2147 Somalia 2018 
Prison population 454 (5) 202 (15) 209 (14) 225 (11) 410 (9) 
Arrest rate (10) Portugal 1051 China 1924 Pakistan 2046 Pakistan 1970 Pakistan 1994 
Prison population 199 (15) 479 (6) 440 (6) 473 (6) 472 (6) 
Source: (Directorate Of Information Reporting Services, 2013).  Ministry of Justice  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62
 Includes the prison population and the (rank of prisoners) from these nationalities in prison  
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Table 6.12A: FNPs under immediate custodial sentences by type of offence 1999-2012  
Year VATP Sexual Robbery Burglary Theft & handling Fraud & forgery
63
 Drugs Motoring Other Not recorded
64
 Total
65
 
1999 637 367 276 190 176 200 1604 NA 285 127 3862 
2000 678 421 289 211 207 141 1748 NA 190 33 3918 
2001 650 392 318 212 201 212 2146 NA 411 34 4576 
2002 756 365 405 221 201 250 2983 79 303 55 5618 
2003 856 391 434 236 224 330 3141 112 374 52 6150 
2004 1055 471 489 227 253 396 2756 137 426 45 6255 
2005 1134 576 508 244 258 611 2539 142 465 34 6511 
2006 1271 674 579 242 297 866 2605 175 550 24 7283 
2007 1366 787 623 250 274 914 2551 139 562 25 7491 
2008 1494 817 646 275 297 1085 2322 142 583 21 7682 
2009 1640 822 611 308 377 1077 2435 131 514 25 7940 
2009
66
 1643 926 593 256 325 977 2110 122 553 94 7599 
2010 1710 1115 641 292 419 606 2057 110 782 74 7806 
2011 1741 1034 703 286 500 447 1757 130 878 40 7516 
2012 1821 1063 731 372 534 434 1716 97 873 38 7679 
%
67
 186 190 165 96 203 117 7 23 206 -70 - 
%
68
 8 9 8 5 9 6 1 2 9 -9 - 
Source: Population in prison establishments under an immediate custodial sentence by ethnic group, nationality, offence group, and sex. MoJ. FOI70025. MoJ 
(JSAS FOI 75790)   
 
 
Table 6.12 B: British prisoners under immediate custodial sentences by type of offence from 1999-2012 
Year  VATP Sexual  Robbery  Burglary  Theft & handling  Fraud & forgery  Drugs Motoring  Other  Not recorded  Total  
1999 10,208 4,576 6,058 8,582 4,232 904 6,574 NA 5,109 1,132 47375 
2000 10,512 4,670 6,056 8,756 4,811 874 6,703 NA 5,856 831 49069 
                                                 
63
 Between November 2008 and March 2012, cases were categorised as either ‘Theft/Fraud’ or ‘Fraud’. Then from March 2012, the ‘Theft/Fraud’ category was 
separated as one category for ‘Theft’ and one category for ‘Fraud’.  (FOI request to NOMS. Ref: 82155) 
64
 Where the offence data are incomplete, the category ''offence not recorded'' is used instead. THE RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND STATISTICS 
DIRECTORATE (2006). Offender  Management  Caseload Statistics  2005 Home Office Statistical Bulletin. London NOMS, Home Office  
65
 The total represented the aggregated population of FNPs by the type of crime not the total of sentenced FNPs. See table 6.7B to notice the difference 
between the two totals.   
66
 According to the new system when the prison recording system has changed in 2010  
67
 This percentage represented the overall aggregate growth from 1999-2012  
68
 This percentage represented the annual growth for every individual year from1999-2012.  
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2001 10,966 4,661 6,483 8,290 4,377 805 6,882 NA 6,156 851 49471 
2002 11,408 4,928 7,079 8,915 4,519 775 7,041 NA 5,794 1,013 51472 
2003  11,766 5,062 7,668 8,665 4,259 733 7,511 2,222 3,671
69
 951 52508 
2005
70
 16,225 6159 7554 7824 3849.00 832 8,088 2,016 4,810 628 57985 
2006 14,911 5,609 7,812 7,535 3,819 806 8,019 1,739 5,023 383 55656 
2007 16,208 6,538 8,110 7,661 3,417 812 8,029 1,339 5,402 356 57872 
2008 17,299 6,783 8,075 7,647 3,528 910 8,636 1,231 5,834 232 60175 
2009 18,270 7,063 8,431 7,568 3,047 922 8,542 1,014 5,268 257 60382 
2010 18,140 8,146 8,062 6,391 3,239 909 8,786 769 5,114 436 59992 
2012 14537 8,098 6,075 5954 3,352 722 5,859 521 5,310 247 50675 
%
71
 42 77 0.2 -31 -21 -20 -11 -76 4 -78 - 
%
72
 3 5 0 -3 -2 -2 -1 -19 0 -13 - 
Source: Population in prison establishments under an immediate custodial sentence by ethnic group, nationality, offence group, and sex. Ministry of Justice. 
 
 
Table 6.12C1: The rank of the type of crimes committed by British prisoners comparing to their total from 1999-2012 
Year  Crimes rank % 
1
st
  2
nd
  3
rd
  4
th
  5
th
  6
th
  7
th
  8
th
  9
th
  10
th
  
1999 VATP 22 Burglary 15 Drugs 11 Robbery 13 Other 11 Sexual 10 Theft &H. 9 Fraud &F. 2 Not rec. 2 - 
2000 VATP 22 Burglary 18 Drugs 14 Robbery 12 Other 12 Sexual 10 Theft &H.10 Fraud &F. 2 Not rec. 2 - 
2001 VATP 22 Burglary 17 Drugs 14 Robbery 13 Other 12 Sexual 9 Theft &H. 9 Fraud &F. 2 Not rec. 2 - 
2002 VATP 22 Burglary 17 Drugs 14 Robbery 14 Other 11 Sexual 10 Theft &H. 9 Fraud &F. 2 Not rec. 2 - 
2003 VATP 22 Burglary 17 Robbery 15 Drugs 14 Sexual 10 Theft &H. 8 Other 7 Motoring 4 Not rec. 2 Fraud 1 
2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2005 VATP 28 Drugs 14 Burglary 13 Robbery 13 Sexual 11 Other 8 Theft &H 7 Motoring 3 Not rec. 1 Fraud 1 
2006 VATP 27 Drugs 14 Burglary 14 Robbery 14 Sexual 10 Other 9 Theft &H 7 Motoring 3 Not rec. 1 Fraud 1 
2007 VATP 28 Drugs 14 Robbery 14 Burglary 13 Sexual 11 Other 9 Theft &H 6 Motoring 2 Not rec. 1 Fraud 1 
2008 VATP 29 Drugs 14 Burglary 13 Robbery 13 Sexual 11 Other 10 Theft &H 6 Motoring 2 Fraud 2 not rec 0.3 
2009 VATP 30 Drugs 14 Robbery 14 Burglary 13 Sexual 12 Other 9 Theft &H 5 Motoring 2 Fraud 2 not rec 0.4 
2010 VATP 30 Drugs 15 Sexual 14 Robbery 13 Burglary 11 Other 9 Theft &H 5 Fraud 2 Motoring 1 Not rec 1 
2011 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2012 VATP 29 Sexual 16 Drugs 12 Robbery 12 Burglary 12 Other 10 Theft &H 7 Fraud 1 Motoring 1 not rec 0.4 
Source: adapted from the above table 6.12B   
Not rec = not recorded crime  
                                                 
69
 Other offences and non-recorded crimes in 2003 as 28 February unlike other years 30 June   
70
 2004 and 2011 data are not available  
71
 Percentage change from 1999-2012 
72
 Percentage change per year for 11 years 1999-2012 
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Table 6.12C2: The rank of the type of crimes committed by FNPs comparing to their total from 1999-2012 
Year Crimes rank % 
1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 6
th
 7
th
 8
th
 9
th
 10
th
 
1999 Drugs 42 VATP 16 Sexual 10 Robbery 7 Other 7 Burglary 5 Theft 5 Fraud 5 Not rec 3 - 
2000 Drugs 45 VATP 17 Sexual 11 Robbery 7 Burglary 5 Theft 5 Other 5  Fraud 4 Not rec 1 - 
2001 Drugs 47 VATP 14 Sexual 9 Robbery 9 Other 9 Burglary 5 Fraud 5 Theft 4 Not rec 1 - 
2002 Drugs 53 VATP 13 Robbery 7 Sexual 6 Other 5 Burglary 4 Fraud 4 Theft 4 Motoring 1 Not rec 1 
2003 Drugs 51 VATP 14 Robbery 7 Sexual 6 Other 6 Fraud 5 Burglary 4 Theft 4 Motoring 2 Not rec 1 
2004 Drugs 44 VATP 17 Robbery 8 Sexual 8 Other 7 Fraud 6 Burglary 4 Theft 4 Motoring 2 Not rec 1 
2005 Drugs 44 VATP 17 Sexual 9 Fraud 9 Robbery 8 Other 7 Burglary 4 Theft 4 Motoring 2 Not rec 1 
2006 Drugs 36 VATP 17 Fraud 12 Sexual 9 Other 8 Robbery 8 Theft 4  Burglary 4 Motoring 2 Not rec 0.3 
2007 Drugs 34 VATP 18 Fraud 12 Sexual 11 Other 8 Robbery 8 Theft 4  Burglary 4 Motoring 2 Not rec 0.3 
2008 Drugs 30 VATP 19 Fraud 14 Sexual 11 Other 8 Robbery 8 Theft 4  Burglary 4 Motoring 2 Not rec 0.2 
2009 Drugs 31 VATP 21 Fraud 14 Sexual 10 Robbery 10 Other 6 Theft 4  Burglary 4 Motoring 2 Not rec 0.2 
2010 Drugs 26 VATP 22 Sexual 14 Other 10 Fraud 8 Robbery 8 Theft 5  Burglary 4 Motoring 1 Not rec 1 
2011 Drugs 23 VATP 23 Sexual 14 Other 12 Robbery 9 Theft 7 Fraud 6 Burglary 4 Motoring 2 Not rec 1 
2012 VATP 24 Drugs 22 Sexual 14 Other 11 Robbery 10 Theft 7 Fraud 6 Burglary 5 Motoring 1 Not rec 0.4 
Source: adapted from the above table 6.12A 
 
 
Table 6.13A: FNP by the type of custody 2002-2014 England and Wales 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009(1
) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total FNP 
7716 8912 8942 9651 10879 11093 11498 11350 11467 11135 
1107
6 
1086
1 
1078
6 
1083
4 
Remand 1421 1682 1,859 2,271 2,394 2,465 2,408 2,385 2,349 2,499 2,469 2,073 2,051 2,253 
Untried 966 1150 1,284 1,496 1,532 1,747 1,654 1,711 1,704 1,739 1,821 1,555 1,616 1,763 
Convicted un-
sentenced 455 532 575 775 862 718 754 674 645 760 648 518 435 490 
Sentenced 5,621 6,287 6,264 6,523 7,296 7,493 7,699 7,527 7,619 7,723 7,580 7,694 6,874 6,836 
Fine defaulter 4 6 8 13 12 5 17 24 20 17 25 15 14 15 
Less than or equal to 6 
months 327 425 463 477 655 555 666 674 705 714 780 653 683 556 
Greater than 6 months 
to less than 12 months 101 138 150 227 347 380 483 316 317 318 313 310 252 277 
12 months to less than 1,507 1,606 1,478 1,669 1,928 2,092 2,221 2,188 2,137 2,203 2,063 2,336 1,842 1,919 
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4 years 
4 years or more 
(excluding 
indeterminate 
sentences) 3306 3716 3751 3689 3792 3677 3375 3273 3217 3160 2971 2982 2781 2826 
Indeterminate 
sentences 378 394 413 448 562 784 937 1052 1042 1159 1258 1245 1136 1085 
Recalls - - - - - - - - 181 152 170 153 166 158 
Non-criminal 
prisoners 675 944 819 857 1,188 1,135 1,390 1,439 1,499 913 1,027 1,094 1,861 1,745 
Source: Ministry of Justice (JSAS/FOI 88548) and Table A1.9 Prison population by type of custody and nationality status, 2002 to 2014,/ MoJ 
 
 
Table 6.13B: British national prisoners by the type of custody 2002-2014 England and Wales 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009(1) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total British 
prisoners 
62564 63614 64379 65670 66160 67767 70751 71231 70898 71016 73030 73238 72179 73999 
Remand 10993 10599 9790 10006 10015 9727 10318 10369 10494 9573 9583 8672 8539 9627 
Untried 6282 6004 5627 6058 5919 6016 6424 6552 6675 6074 6170 5656 5803 6601 
Convicted un-
sentenced 
4711 4595 4163 3948 4096 3711 3894 3817 3819 3499 
3413 3016 2736 3026 
Sentenced 51492 52921 54496 55560 56033 57942 60366 60804 60365 61401 63412 64525 63587 64333 
Fine defaulter 29 39 43 64 77 62 92 88 79 106 101 99 115 104 
Less than or equal to 6 
months 
5085 5515 5256 5508 5273 4586 5193 4413 4176 4206 
4516 4072 3842 3929 
Greater than 6 months 
to less than 12 months 
2247 2061 2150 1994 2172 2076 2367 2136 2071 2052 
1994 2063 1858 1778 
12 months to less than 
4 years 
20283 19687 19882 19908 19636 20689 21342 21538 18119 18001 
17974 18400 17381 17548 
4 years or more 
(excluding 
indeterminate 
sentences) 
19092 20607 21997 22665 22182 21855 20957 21181 19107 20262 
21081 22225 23446 24384 
Indeterminate 
sentences 
4756 5012 5168 5422 6692 8675 10417 11448 11102 11918 
12349 12440 12026 11495 
Recalls - - - - - - - - 5711 4856 5397 5226 4919 5095 
Non-criminal 
prisoners 
79 95 92 104 112 97 66 58 39 42 
35 41 53 39 
Source: Table A1.9 Prison population by type of custody and nationality status, 2002 to 2014/ MoJ
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